>> hello everyone and welcome.

i am a distinguished fellow here working on the middle east. when i scheduled this event, many weeks ago, i optimistically thought that we would be talking about the end of the war in gaza and what would follow. that israeli hostages would have been released and there would have been a massive humanitarian effort underway to deal with the catastrophe in gaza. unfortunately, the war is still going on. it is almost six months now. this is certainly the longest war that israel has far since its war for independence and the bloodiest.

it is obviously very difficult, even if we had a cease-fire, it would be difficult to talk about the day after, even if the fighting stops now, thousands more palestinians, especially children are likely to die of hunger and disease. jared kushner may envy their beachfront, but it will take eight years just to remove the rubble from the current conflict. let alone begin to rebuild. it is unclear will govern the territory and who will pay for reconstruction, and how society and politics will recover and evolve. it is a pessimistic note on which we begin, but it is important to take stock of where we are and try to see a little bit into the future. we have assembled hopefully four

speakers. the r rating what -- we are waiting for one who is reversed. i will pose a few questions to each of them and then we will take a few questions. those online can submit questions and we will get to as many of them as we can in the next hour and a half. we will try to keep this discussion as simple as possible. we know that there are a lot of emotions, but we want to be civil and constructive. she has had some technical difficulties, so i'm going to go to someone i have followed through many years and who is well known and respected in washington.

the professor for development at the university of maryland and director of the critical issues pulled. i would like you to give us a brief update on the situation on the ground, as we see it and talk about the shifting public opinions that we are seeing about the war, particularly the u.s. >> thank you for having me. i am pleased to join the panel. let me start with public opinion . it really goes to the heart of the matter in terms of what president biden has been facing at home and now, as he is waging a election campaign. i do not think he could have

expected where we are nearly six months into the war and where the american public is. i want to start by referencing may 2021. it was only a few months after biden had come to office. he came with an empty agenda that highlighted democracy and human rights and was backed by a lot of young people and different segments of the democratic party, in supporting him. he faces a major crisis in may 2021, when there was an attempt to force them out. israel bombarded gaza, resulting

in more than 2000 dead and that episode. what was really the bull during that crisis in comparison to what we now face, it is considerably smaller, but what was obvious at the time was that the president was clearly out of touch with american public opinion even then. you could see that at the time, he did not condemn what to many people called war crimes. he did not work hard to end the conflict quickly. mainstream members of congress in his own party were against. they basically pushed him to make more efforts to join the

conflict. i think what happened at the time, i did -- i wrote two articles about it. one for the brooklyn institution and one for the boston globe about how that conflict actually hurt him. i think these people are not prepared to listen. especially more importantly, a large percentage of democrats, including nearly half of democrats that disapproved of his handling of the war. that is the time when we find that nationally, the president's

numbers start to decline. immediately after the gaza war. there are many reasons why his numbers started declining. what is interesting is most of the drop in 2021 came from democrats. there was very good reason to think that it was probably correlated, even then. i think the problem, he has had a problem with the constituency even before the horrific attack on hamas on october 7 and then the bombardment of gaza by

israel. i think one of the things that they see since october is initially when you had civilian casualties. the first two weeks, it was mostly focused on the hamas attack and the israeli casualties. repeating a question we asked over the years about whether the public wanted to lean towards israel, the palestinians or either side. we saw an obvious spike. a spite of sympathy for israel, including among democrats.

it was the largest single spike we had observed in years. still, keep in mind that the spike happened across the board. that is except among young democrats when there was no support for israel after the hamas attack. we also keep in mind the majority of democrats and independents wanted the u.s. -- even as the minorities he wanted the u.s. to take israel's side increase and those who wanted to take the other side decreased in the first few weeks. we conducted another poll on this issue. what we found was much of the support that israel had gained had really disappeared and

declined considerably to weeks later. obviously, there has been a lot since then. showing a partisan divide on this issue, particularly as the war went on in horror in gaza became clear. >> if i can stop you for a minute, i wanted to draw your attention to a poll that came out today to get some perspective on this. there have been times when they have been angry over certain

wars or other incidents, but this is a new poll that showed many americans disapprove of israeli actions and only 36% approve. 75% disapprove. as somebody who has been doing this for so long, have you ever seen numbers like that? >> i have not. i have been studying this for decades. to some of them for the first time in the late 1980's. a remarkable trend has taken place over the years with more democrats walking away from supporting israel. still overwhelmingly, democrats are evenhanded.

largely from young people, especially young jet -- young democrats, but even the young evangelicals. we have not seen it before. i actually have not seen that pole this morning, but i want to say something that is really relevant. in our own discourse we have seen huge demonstrations from hundreds of thousands of people turning up. very often they are labeled as muslim and arab americans. that is not really what is happening. of course there are a key constituents and obviously we have seen that in more ways than one, but this is far more pervasive.

hispanic americans, women, the kind that we have seen over the years more motivated by social justice and human rights issues than strategic issues. that is one poll that i am not released yet that shows two thirds of americans want the u.s. to champion, to make human rights the goal of the policy. when you ask them what is the best way to advocate to push for human rates, relying on international organizations and being a model for the world. those are the top answers not just for democrats but also republicans.

we go to minnesota and there were 19% who voted in protest. yes, they are. that is 1.5% of the entire minnesota population. hundreds of thousands of people in the streets with dozens of organizations have nothing to do with them and still labeled. obviously, i think the administration and the president's campaign are getting a little bit of sense of it. something big has happened. >> let me stop you there for a

minute because i see we have been joined by the generalist. i want to go to you, and the events are dizzying. obviously, a much better place to tell us where we are in terms of the actual conflict on the ground. we see that the cease-fire had broken down. and what are the political dynamics? if you could briefly tell us where you are, we would be grateful. >> apologies, especially to the audience that i am late.

i thought it was a seven hour difference, but i did not account for daylight savings. i'm glad i made it in time. there is a lot to cover. i will give you a picture of where we are now. basically, israel, as we have heard, does not have a good strategy for what to do once it has eradicated or largely removed hamas. what we are seeing in the gaza strip is a holding pattern. from the israeli approach, they are committed to removing hamas as a military power and a governing power. they continue, but it will take a long time. when someone like me analyzes the situation, i do not see

those breakthroughs happening, but they insist it will take a long time and that it will take a regime change. my analysis is that it is not going very well for them, but regardless, israel has not had a strategy. the mass starvation and the suffering that we are seeing it as a result of this inability to find an alternative. even if israel agreed to the biden doctrine of having some kind of restructuring, there would still be the same issue. even if israel paid lip service to serve certain interests and de-escalate the situation, some people think that is primarily because he is interested in dragging it out, which he is. he is interested in an endless

war, but i think that strategic challenge that israel faces and gaza and the reason israel never went into gaza in the first place, it is because it does not have a good solution or answer. unfortunately, i do not see another way of it going other than prolonged occupation of gaza. it might have, depending on how bad the situation gets there. i do not think it is as bad, but if it gets that bad, there might be a situation. we must start administering the day-to-day life there. i think they are confused and frustrated. they feel like the leadership is not serving their interests, but

they also do not have good answers right now for what to do in gaza. everyone understands that israel has military power and they can pretty much do what they please. they have destroyed gaza and made it uninhabitable. now they are dealing with the consequence of that. as far as the cease-fire talks, they are stuck. i think israeli public sentiment is interested because the price would be too high to pay, which i think is plausible, but also not interested because any cease-fire would allow for time to refocus efforts on getting him out of office. most of the country wants him out of office. the mood in israel is stark.

in some ways, domestic crisis overshadows the crisis in gaza. there is much more attention to how israelis are supposed to regain their security and political leadership that they believe in. on the cease-fire talk, the situation has been quite consistent. they want to have freedom of operation. a full withdrawal of troops and a timeline for an ending to the ward. that is a real sticking point. that remains, as far as i can see, the main issue here. >> if you could say a word or two. are they benefiting from this? for the first time, does that help him or hurt him?

>> he thinks it helps him. he thinks he is projecting power. he probably understands that after 70 years of impunity, he does not believe there is a real price to pay. i do not think the u.s. will abandon israel in the north were elsewhere. he has that leeway. it has in pandering to a political base that has this illusion, but that standing up to the u.s. is a projection of power. he said the reason i am doing this is to send a message to hamas. that is how he is positioning himself. more isolated israel becomes, the more the far right says the whole world is against us. we need to fight harder, longer

and stronger. that is kind of the reaction. whether it will help him, i do not know. >> they covered israel alone, which is not exactly true. despite the various signs of irritation we have seen between the u.s. and israel, an expert on that topic is our next beaker who has taught me so much on this topic over the years. as president, she is an officer and previous director for peace now. feel free to react to what they have said. i want to get a sense of your reaction. especially on capitol hill.

was it a leak in that chuck schumer. a stunning speech. he has obviously gotten some flak for that. where do you see u.s. israel relations now in terms of your expertise in washington? >> thank you for the question and thank you to the previous speakers. i think a lot has been said about this. the question of where u.s. public opinion is seems to be pretty subtle. democratic public opinion has clearly moved beyond what the biden administration understood was happening. i think this has weirdly taken them by surprise.

political analysts viewing this without a preconceived idea of what public opinion has to be, we are not surprised. if you look at the protest, they are not just palestinians and palestinian americans. this is about rights and values of social justice. it has been coming for a long time. it is related to what a generation, multiple younger generations of americans see as a question of fundamental value and not having a valued exception for anything, including israel. that took a lot. i think it took them by surprise. it does not necessarily translate to any certain policy so far. it is important.

though she were speech is a good example. it is a powerful speech. i will note that this is not dissimilar to what the biden administration previously did when they had their order for sanctions. they know well that they are unpopular. the voters that they care about the most. most settlements are not a popular issue. having a policy and putting sanctions on settlers, maybe they thought letting off steam without taking on gaza. it is challenging whether bb is a good leader.

if you look at the actual policies, that speech was a little over a week ago. i do not want to say silver linings in the way that was framed, but it is a famine. every expert for security says there is famine or incipient famine. the congress borrowed aid for the only organization that has the capacity to deal with this. in parallel, that same bill gave unconditional military aid to israel. direct funding for which they can buy weapons and other things, including a chunk of it in israel.

actual cooperation agreements. >> that is part of that 10 year agreement. >> it is, but that does not mean that in the context of ongoing genocide being committed that congress could not put some reports on that, some limitations. the language suggesting concern. the fact that congress right now and democrats in congress are jumping in with both feet, joining in with republicans in what is a clear targeting of academia, of the liberal views that they hate in congress. they are framing it as a fight against anti-semitism. by making it about

anti-semitism, democrats are joining in. biden was quoted yesterday. you get a sense that they are trying to give some breathing room. i do not think from what i have seen that it is yet going to translate into any shift in policy. i do not think it makes a difference. we are seeing pictures now of children starving to death. there cannot be a famine. we are seeing them now. we do not see anything yet to suggest that leadership or congress is lead -- listening to their colleagues.

they are pushing hard for this and have been for months. they immediately framed that language that destroys bun security resolutions. they are binding. it does not mean that they are enforceable. you do not have to be a lawyer to understand the difference between binding and enforceable. they tried to destroy the entire idea of accountability and it is baffling. in parallel, the issued a finding that israel was not in any way violating u.s. law. you cannot give aid to a country that is blocking the movement of humanitarian aid. the u.s. decided, they have

easter answers from israel, so they are ok with it. i will say one more thing. the part that is most maddening about this, for anybody engaged in this, it feels like the biden administration learned all the wrong lessons. as opposed to the lesson being, if you try to stand up even a little bit, you will take the exact same cost and political capital as if you actually had a policy, defended it and did something meaningful to defend security. there is another way right now. biden administration shift policy. the price they would pay and outrage from israel, they are framing this as abandoning israel, even though we are doing everything the same. the republican party is dining

out on this. democrats or so-called democrats tweeted out they will never vote for biden now. i do not know if he was before, but he tweeted that. you are paying the same price as if you had shifted policies. it is too late to do six months -- undo six months of death. i do not think that will change, but for those looking and saying, i cannot vote for you, knowing that if i do, i am voting for four more years of support for absolute -- an actual shift in policy to say, if you vote for me, i am putting some backbone into a different approach could make a difference. so far it seems like they think that they can manage this with some cosmetic language while

they continue, full steam ahead, provisioning genocide, defending genocide, not allowing the communities to do anything to prevent further death. >> what i like about you and always have is that you do not waste time and you get straight to the point. in defense of chuck schumer, who i went to college with and i remember for wearing khaki pants and blue blazers in 1970 -- he already knew reggie was going. but he did say something that i thought was very important. i wanted to give him his due. he said in his speech, it was not just that they were in danger of becoming a pariah state. i had it and i lost it, but he basically said we must be better than our enemies, lest we become them. that was -- it may just be words

-- >> if you are a palestinian or someone who cares about palestinian lives listening to that, it is basically more shade. it is saying that the palestinians are horrible while you are literally engaged in a war that destroyed 75% of the houses and has the population facing famine. it aims at a narrow part of the democratic race. do this because it is good for israel is the framing. >> all right. i wanted to pull away a little bit from that focus. the senior advisor to the president.

someone whose judgment on the issues. while this is going on, we still have skirmishes across the border. we had a spate of attacks by militia groups. americans, the death of three americans. it seems to have subsided after a vigorous response. we still have the shipping in the red sea. what is your sense over whether this terrible war is going to become a regional war? well iran allow that to happen, get dragged into it were sucked into it? >> thank you very much for

organizing another fantastic discussion. it is good to be on a panel with laura. i think -- there are two pieces of good news and two pieces of bad news. the main actors do not want an expansion of the conflict. even without coordination or confliction. these actors have made it clear through direct and indirect channels of communication that they do not want this word to expand beyond gaza. now we have heard that there

have been to meetings. once in january and once in march. i think that is -- apparently. that is good news because i think it allows for both sides to figure out ways of bringing down the temperature. it helps to avoid misunderstanding or miscommunication, which often happens when you operate through intermediaries. the bad news is, if you look at where de-escalation has happened, it is where iran has more influence, more command and control over some of these actors that are not even necessarily funded by the iraqi government. and after the incident, iran was

able to pull the plug and bring them in even before the u.s. retaliated. we saw the u.s. retaliation a degree of consciousness to respond in a way that was much more assertive compared to previous retaliatory acts, but in a way that would not result in uncontrolled escalation. there are actors. they have a long track record of annoying advice. -- ignoring advice. we might wake up and find that they have done something that is not coordinated with iran and has resulted in the kind of casualties that would be

difficult to look the other way and would result in uncontrolled escalation. the last piece of bad news is that we are not out of the woods yet. yes, we have had six weeks of relative quiet, but imagine in the best case scenario, we get a cease-fire in gaza. probably a temporary one. with that result in israel turning its attention to the north? hezbollah has said if there is a cease-fire in gaza, we will stop our attack. israel has not said the same thing, in fact they have said the opposite. if hezbollah is not pushed away from the border, israel will continue its attacks to allow citizens displaced from the north to return to their homes.

that is an unworkable formula for hezbollah. whether that would change later on, we do not know, but even a cease-fire will not guarantee that the northern border will be quiet. they have said that they would stop if there was a cease-fire, but they have learned that they had a very powerful tool in their hands. human conflict has its own dynamic, so it is possible that we would see escalation there. in a scenario, there is and encourage -- an incursion. i can guarantee, sitting here without any doubt, you would see resumption of attacks. this cease-fire that we have right now on that front is not permanent. it is temporary. it is because the conflict in

gaza remains tragic, but if you look at the number of daily deaths on it has plateaued a bit. there is justification for them to say that it makes sense to allow the iraqi government to negotiate in terms of withdrawal of u.s. forces. the prime minister is coming to washington in a few weeks, so it makes sense to give the government time, but if there is a campaign that results in more atrocities, i think it will be very difficult to keep these groups at bay. again, there are plenty. >> i was meeting with a senior official who was extremely concerned about the prospect of an israeli war. depending on how that went, it could reignite the popular mobilization unit in iraq, which

stood down for now. i want to start bringing in questions. there are a bunch online. some of them are more comments and questions. in fairness, some of them are talking about how hamas cannot be trusted to distribute aid. i think we have to understand that there are very strong feelings about hamas. this is from one who writes that they are a fanatic group. do americans understand who israel is up against? despite we are seeing shifting public opinion, there are many americans who also see israel as justified and what it is doing

in response to the hamas attack. i want to make sure that we reflect those feelings as well. let's start with some questions the audience and i will go to the -- over here. say if it is addressed to a particular person. >> this is addressed. whenever there is an outrage against palestinians and it is criticized in congress, they always have to balance it by talking about how palestinian and payment and hatred etc. i wondered for a long time and you do pulling in israel. how did the younger demographics and israel become so right-wing?

we saw in our communal clashes, the outpouring of hate and violence on both sides. there was a study of textbooks back in 2008 or 2009, orthodoxy achievements. basically, it later absorbed report. there was not much difference. they dehumanized each other but gave their narratives and strong form. talking about before october 7, wanting to deprogram those i have worked with. how did we get here with so many young people in israel who now

comprise the both of the idea? like let's separate the question of incitement from the question of the positions of young people in israel. one very obvious reason is israel itself. the larger share of the jewish population in particular. we can actually see very large among israelis in general, but especially israeli jews, where they are broken down. you have the different groupings within the jewish community.

they have the hardest position about the nature of israel and their attitudes towards arabs. that is a big part of it. but it is also something more complicated. it goes beyond strategy. in part, this is something that goes beyond israeli and palestinian conflict. it is in every conflict. it is whether you have to start preparing for or if it is a constant conflict, and escalating conflict. it leads to demonization. demonization, i think it is

believed tied to help people read the prospects of peace and war. that is on both sides. if you look back to when people were somewhat hopeful, very few people among the jewish community -- very few palestinians supported acts against israelis. when the prospect was reduced, began a significantly different view of the public, it is all about how people read the conflict. barbara mentioned comments from the audience and how people see hamas. no matter what, there are laws that have to be obeyed, no matter how bad your enemy is.

that is why those laws were written. the fact that you have a powerful enemy does not justify breaking the law. it goes for everybody. the question about hamas and its influence, sure. a lot of people did not support it. a lot of people do not like what it stands for. history did not start with october 7. you already had despair among the palestinians and in the west bank. many of us were predicting violence no matter what. that does not mean -- when you have hopeful outcomes and there is no despair, people know that when hamas does something harmful, they say stop it, yours hurting our prospects for

getting out of this. if you are desperate and you see no layout and somebody does something awful, you may look the other way. that is what happens. i think the administration's initial idea that somehow palestinians and arabs would say, hamas is horrible, so let's blame them. israelis would say, this is what we got. i think it is naive. i think the policy was very naive about the opinion. i'm not surprised by any of this. we see it pardoning positions between them, but also supporting policies and no

cease-fire, going on, continuing the war. it is what we expect. it is tragedy. >> and wanted to go to you. you treated al a very upsetting incident. you are at the dentist with one of your kids and i think the dentist or the dental hygienist made some comments that you found very shocking. i do not know if you want to repeat the anecdote, but it gives a sense of where a lot of israeli sentiment is. >> the receptionist was talking about how israel had just captured the palestinian that they held responsible for planning the kidnapping of the three teenagers in the settlement in 2014 that then sparked the operation in the west bank and in gaza.

it is just an anecdote. it was offensive because they were kids around. and i just kind of said, i do not think torturing would lead to a better security situation. she said that it had. but it is not like we engaged in a substantial conversation. i think it is emblematic of the fact that israel has gone with a strong military might approach over and over and has not come out with a better result. you could argue that there has been some sustainability. if you look at how it happened, some would consider that a success. whether it is a long-term, sustainable solution, i do not

know. but that is the mindset. in the specific paradigm where you have escalation and possibly a war of attrition that could go on for a long time, that is what they understand. it has never been the go to for israel. it is going more right-wing. if you have a leader who comes in with a conviction and a strategy, that could change. i think israelis would go with a different vision, if it was properly disseminated. they have not had that for a long time and the international community has sent a clear message that they can build

settlements. it has had a real toll on how israelis understand. they do not understand that there are consequences for actions, like a child who thinks that they can get away with things. it is that simple. >> trying to understand how the body of politics moves. what she just mentioned, the impunity. that is part of it. most of the youth today have lived almost their entire lives under that government. and those governments have, each time they say, this is the most right wing their history. they have been more and more right-wing.

that is their entire lifetime, but i also want to make the point that it is not just the impunity. the entire peace process. i say this as someone who worked in the department for years. the entire process is based in part on explicit dehumanization and denial of palestinian rights. you do this because it is good for israel, not because palestinians have rights. you end occupation because it is better for israel security. from the perspective of anyone who has grown up in the peace process era, you have an entire structure approved by the u.s. and the politicians of your that says, we are doing this because if we do not, bad things will happen to us, and if we do it, better things will come. they have set for years, if we

do not do it, nothing bad will happen to us and we can still get all the great stuff they are promising without doing it. and there is no such thing as palestinian rights. it is fundamentally dehumanizing. you have generations of israelis who do not see the west bank. they do not see occupation unless the heirs -- they are soldiers. they believe they are defending jewish rights against terrorism. the politics of the current government -- it is very absolutist and it is natural because this has been the policy, even in the peace process era. the biggest argument used by the left was the demographic threat. if you do not make peace, they will have many more babies and then they will outnumber us.

it was never, it is wrong for us to systematically deny people rights. they are angry at israelis because the schoolbooks are inciting them. we have to reprogram palestinian kids in gaza. the fact that a 15-year-old in gaza right now is five wars old and envisioning a great visual of how many wars old they are -- i'm sure that is not what makes them hate and resent israelis, it is because their books told them to. that is the world we're are living in and that is the paradigm that they have authored and continued to endorse. the only benefit that can accrue. anyone watching on the ground can see that this will explode not because of anti-semitism or bloodlust but because this is untenable.

people here is really say, i would be fighting back. >> we have a lot of questions in the room. this is from a former u.s. official, a very distinguished gentleman. he wants to know if others have stepped up to fill the gap and whether the 12 month band has gone into effect. i think the u.s. stopped in january, suspended funding. >> yes. since the allegations by israel of a small number, i think it was 12 people out of 13,000 being directly involved. there has not been evidence produced, but a lot of people cut off aid and most of them have resumed aid, based on the fact that israel still has not given evidence of a pervasive --

even if it is true, it does not show that. but also because there is a famine. that is why u.s. policy, i wrote it was a moral obscenity that right now you are cutting off aid. the aid is now restarting from other countries. >> the u.s. is giving it to the u.n. world food programme, i believe. >> fundamentally being able to distribute it on the ground, anybody who has watched chef jose andres, world central kitchen, the hero right now. there is no way to distribute. israel is assassinating palestinian or police officials who are involved in disturbing underground based on the argument that they are hamas official, bearing in mind that the past 16 years, hamas has ruled. it is like a de-baathification

of iraq, we will kill anyone who had a civil service position. unrwa's capacity cannot be replaced on the ground. nobody else can do it they do. and the funding crunch continues. >> right there with the beard. [inaudible] >> do we see ignorance strategic footprint years from now, as you mentioned you said his fear of the popular mobilization forces being ignited in the region and also the houthis capabilities, there is a record of partnership in terms of both entities. and also in the information space, you see credibility being

established for these members of the iranian proxy groups. and on the domestic side, they have been their lowest turnout in elections as well. keeping out of these bits and parts in mind, how do you see iran's role going forward in terms of managing its proxy networks? >> that may add on another thing we had talked about earlier which is iran's nuclear program and whether you think the situation in gaza, if it expands, could actually finale effect inference decision on whether or not to create a nuclear weapon. >> this experience in the past six month has been a mixed bag firearm. on the one hand it has been able to demonstrate that this network which was created primarily to deter attacks on iran soiled actually has the capacity that iran was looking for to turn any

kind of bilateral confrontation with iran enter original one. the power to project through the mediterranean ocean and the red sea is impressive. a number of actors who can work more or less with higher coordination with one another, it is real power. however, it also in the process, iran has demonstrated how reluctant it is to use these groups for anything less than defense of its own land. so this is not a formula which you have all for one and one for all, they are willing to sacrifice a lesser member of this axis, like hamas, and iran is not willing to sacrifice hezbollah for defending hamas or the palestinians because hezbollah is a crown jewel for its defense policy and for

preserving iran itself. so it is a mixed picture. and in the process, i think there are other points of vulnerability that have come to surface. if you look at the kind of retaliation the u.s. has engaged in, for instance, killing very senior officials. what israel has done in syria in the past six months, we have at least 11 commanders that have been assassinated by israel in syria. this is such a break from the pattern of the past failures, because we used to have -- past few years, because we used to have lots of iranian assets in syria but there was this tradition of giving itself into personnel on the ground so they would know that an attack is coming to minimize casualties. but now attacks are aimed at killing iranians and irgc.

and you see that iran cannot retaliate in kind. even the rhetoric of revenge that we used to hear from iran when the u.s. killed general qassem soleimani and 2020, one of that is gone, because iranians understand the limit of their power and they. a huge price. the u.s. has also killed people. the network works on personal relations, so when the u.s. killed someone in iraq, this was a man who had been operating in that field for more than three decades that had lots of personal connections. of course you can say it's the price of doing business in at the end of the day, everybody is replaceable, but you lose a lot and losing personalities who have networks. the risk here, which is something i don't see anyone thinking about much in the u.s. or in israel, is that in a scenario which we moved in a

direction that this mixed picture changes and becomes actually quite negative for iran's original attacks, right, we might end up in a situation where iran might try to compensate the lots of security that is to get through its forward difference through another option. what is the other option available to it? its nuclear capability. it is closer than ever to nuclear weapons. so in a scenario where we have a confrontation between israel and hezbollah, which is going to be extremely costly and disastrous, no doubt about it, of course, israel will prevail at the end we might reach a new degree of deterrence. but in the process, hezbollah's capabilities will be diminished, no doubt about this, right, of this is the reason israel wants to engage in that confrontation, to weaken hezbollah.

if you are iran and the original deterrence has been weakened and also you're in a situation where you don't see any possibility of using your nuclear leverage at the negotiating table to get sanctions relief, than the most obvious option is to go for the alternate attack. so i am afraid that the more israel succeeds in weakening iran's original deference the more it feels in creating an even bigger problem for itself. iran is sitting behind a nuclear shield, it would be in the same situation russia is in today, everybody can help ukraine but nobody there is catching russia. >> that is such a depressing thought. i did want to read this one positive note, don't forget, -- was a right-wing leader, he was considered a terrorist in 1948, and he signed a peace agreement with egypt. don't lose hope. so there is, i suppose, allows the possibility of a shift.

i wanted to ask mairav, i know that one of the sticking points in negotiations over a cease-fire has been the release of palestinian prisoners. has anybody been able to see a list of who might be released by israel? i know there has been referenced to people who have blood on your hands, which would suggest perhaps baguti might be among them. >> i think at some point hamas announced he would be one of the prisoners they would want released. i am not privy to the list, i am not sure anybody except for those in the negotiations are. but i know that israel claims it has actually become more flexible and would release larger numbers of prisoners. and of some of those prisoners, it would be demanded that they be exiled, that they cannot remain either in gaza or the west bank. i really think the prisoner issue, even though the idea is

that hamas is always -- has always operated in a way of attack in order to release its prisoners --[inaudible] to have that be a priority. in this case i don't think it is a major issue. the most easily sellable issue, it is a point the far right can play up very much and opposing hostage deal, which they oppose anyway for all kinds of reasons. but i don't think that is -- >> so the main sticking point is hamas's demand that israel agreed to a permanent cease-fire and withdrawal from gaza. >> yes, and it has been consistent from the very beginning. there is also the issue of returning gazans who are displaced back up north into northern gaza which is what they are demanding and israel, for various reasons, is preventing. although in some ways, if israel

wants to operate in rafah and have some kind of legitimacy to do that, it has to move that population back up north. in some ways, israel is in the corner and not able to really do something that would work for anyone in either scenario. >> he has been very patient. if i can get the microphone to him. yeah. >> thank you. i really appreciate the ideas of the two beautiful scholars in black, which gives us hope that there is still some good to come from the united states. my question is, please don't mind my very frank question, one is that is there hamas is a terrorist.

but the state of iran killed way more people does the state of israel killed way more people that hamas did on october 7. secondly, i would like to ask, since most of the political and military muscle that israel uses to conduct its crimes against humanity is given by the u.s., would it be fair to call the usa state sponsor of terrorism? moderator: [laughter] i think your question actually contain answers within it. let me, let's give a little history here. as the person online noted, the former prime minister of israel had been a terrorist before the creation of the states.

we know that yasser arafat and the plo were considered a terrorist organization for many, many years. then in 1988, mr. daines had a meeting in algiers, which i actually attended as a journalist, where they recognized israel's right to exist. of course, they were late, they recognized the 1948 partition 40 years too late. so we have a horrible situation where their prospects for peace which have become frustrated, looking down there is individuals and organizations for actions that are terrorism, frankly. but as get us any closer to a solution because often, those same people are the only ones who have the popular support necessary to actually make peace. so arafat was able to agree to the oslo accords.

it didn't work out for a variety of reasons, among them, bibi netanyahu's terrible leadership, a number of failed peace summits, we had a second intifada that broke out and the israelis imprisoned yasser arafat's headquarters in ramallah. he eventually became very sick and died. instead of yasser arafat, we got mahmoud abbas, who is now considered to be, in for a long time has been considered to be incapable of really serving the interests of palestinians or negotiating any kind of permanent peace. so there has to come a point in time when you stop labeling people and start being pragmatic and dealing with those who have the ability to make decisions that can be supported by their populations. but the united states, you know very well, especially since september 11, 2001, we have made

an industry out of terrorism designations, sanctions, and it hasn't gotten us, it seems, any closer to a peaceful solution that we seek. so that is my editorial. please. >> thank you for a great program and a great panel. my question is, how effective is foreign policy in a presidential election? the average american goes to april, to think about foreign policy but it is gaza, or the iranian nuclear deal, when they vote for president? isn't this what other points bibi netanyahu is counting on, that it will not make a difference what happens? >> that a question for shibley, but i want to add one piece to it, and that is, even donald trump, representative republican -- the presumptive republican nominee, has said israel is damaging its reputation and it should finish the work, which i thought was an interesting comment, from trump. yea, what role does foreign

policy typically play? how do you see it in the past, and now? >> it has always played a role. the question is, what are the public priorities? one of? the things to understand is that even when the issue itself may not be a priority in the public mind, the assessment of leaders are tied to what they do on those issues example, one reason why young people are angry with biden, they are angry with him because his behavior since he came to office, as i said, even dating back to mid 2021 has gone against what they assumed about him, his own character. so it undermined his own character as president in their

eyes. and foreign policy in this particular case, particularly when it comes to the gaza war, it is kind of a prototype for what the u.s. stands for. and this issue of gaza is a prototype for a review of human rights, further kind of world we want to see. so yes, it does matter, and i think that one of the things that biden is banking on, and some of it is true, is that, as many of us who are angry with biden on this issue, when push comes to shove and you have biden versus trump, the people are going to say, i am not going to let trampoline. that people will put aside their anger even as angry as they are

on gaza and probably vote for biden. most people would some independents, some republicans. moderator: biden. [laughter] >> the question is whether there will be enough sentiment that says, cannot bring myself to vote for biden even if i don't like trump. they will either sit at home and not vote, not be mobilized, not good at recruit people to vote for biden, not contribute to the campaign, or vote for third-party candidate as a protest, not for anything else. so it could hurt biden significantly and we have already seen that in some of the reactions in places like michigan. it is not the central issue of the day, but it is an important issue of the day and because of the scale of the horror we are witnessing that goes to what we stand for the country, as a people, as a democracy, what

values do we cherish, all of that is wrapped into it and tied to our assessment of the character of the president of the united states. so it is going to matter. how much? we don't know. moderator: i have a very tough question that has been submitted by a guy named roy gutman, who is a former journalist, someone i have known for years. i believe one, a pulitzer for covering famine in africa back in the 1980's. he has a really tough question. do all members of the panel agree with lara that israel is committing an ongoing genocide? i wouldn't use that word, because i do not -- the effect may be genocidal, but i do not leave that the intent is genocidal. that is my own personal view.

i don't see it as equivalent to the houthis and the tutsis in rwanda or the nazis elimination of 6 million jews. >> the definition of genocidal law doesn't require it to meet that bar. the international part of justice in looking at this on the probable case for probable genocide based on -- a probable case, based on the intent. it doesn't have to rise to me trying to kill every member of a race in the world, that is not the bar for international law even though it is intuitively what a pathetic of. "it can't be genocide if it doesn't kill anybody." that is not what it means in international law. moderator: does everybody want to talk to that? >> i would just say that only

intent, actually, it is more debatable because of the rhetoric we have heard coming out of israel. but without getting too much in the weeds, i am not an expert on the legal definitions of genocide, obviously i am aware of what is happening in the hearings, but in some ways, it is important to name it what it is. i am not saying it is not, but at this point, it is distracting from what is happening on the ground, which is a disaster of epic proportions. this is not new, what israel has been doing to the palestinians for decades, it is just on a larger scope that it has a lot more legitimacy to do it because of october 7. the dispossession, the disenfranchisement, the dehumanization. just preventing them from living. . there's different levels of that. different peaks to that. some call it genocide, some don't. i don't think that is the issue here. it is an issue, but the real issue is, how do we go to a place where people can live with

unity and freedom? moderator: and eat. we have time, i think, for one or two more questions. this gentleman has been very patient. let's go to him. >> hi. i am a filipino, catholic american and have lived in town since 1952 that i have seen u.s. presidents come and go. lobbyists are still here there have been. their kids are. anyway, the question is this, basically, this is addressed to you all and your bosses, whoever is paying your salaries. [laughs] basically, when will the west, including america, and you could

throw in israel there, it being a socialist democracy, by the way, when will they ever learn that were crimes and genocide has consequences? i thought here in the 21st century, we would be getting away from the sentence of the 20th century. if you don't care to answer that, what would you advise the next president of the united states whether it be donald or joe biden, concerning the middle east? that was the same question that i posed to henry kissinger in 2015. moderator: what did he say? >> he also answered it, concerning putin, he said that the west, america needs to prepare for the redrawing of the map of the middle east, and he also said, the west needs to

prepare for a post-putin russia. and if that didn't send a single out to every single other country in the world, i don't know what did. so. moderator: does anybody want to offer any policy prescriptions for the next president the second-term biden or trump? >> if i may, i have an article in the current issue of foreign affairs, called the two-state mirage. the idea is not that we oppose the two-state, i have been a supporter of it before it was popular and her work hard formally and informally to make it happen. but rather, that my worry is that the talk of two states now or reviving diplomacy at a time

when you see the devastation and the horror, whatever you call it, it is an unacceptable humanitarian catastrophe that is human-maid. it is one that is not likely to lead to any prospect of peace, especially given the kind of psychology israel and the palestinian community now, but also what is required on the ground. and therefore, my fear is that it would distract from providing humanitarian aid, and looking for a humanitarian solution down the road therefore, our recommendation was not to use the premise of two states as a smokescreen, but rather stop being complicit.

one of the questions asked about the role of the u.s., part of the problem, whatever you call what is happening in gaza, whether you call it genocide, atrocities, and violation of international law, were crimes, it is in a horrific scale. let the lawyers hammer out what they will lubricate for legal reasons, but it is an acceptable -- hammer outwardly will label it for legal reasons, but it is unacceptable. it goes against international law as we understand it, i guess international humanitarian law. part of the problem is that we have been complicit in the united states of america, the government has been complicit in these events. when there are no consequences, when the u.s. does not follow through in defending those principles, you are essentially supporting them indirectly and

making them happen. therefore, our recommendation has been to start holding violators of international law and those who carry out war crimes to account. and the international court of justice, if it decides what is happening is genocide, then that has implications for the united states. who should be judging israel and the palestinians on the behavior, not on some prospect of an outcome that is not likely to materialize. even if you can't solve the problem on your own or with others, stop being part of the problem and start being part of the solution. by ensuring that there are consequences. moderator: final thoughts from

our other panelists? shibley, when you say consequences, do you mean going as far as stopping certain kinds of military aid? >> absolutely. when you are saying or observing the kind of violations of human rights, even american law, let alone international humanitarian law, and you don't condition military aid on behavior, what do you expect? there is no question that that is something that is essential to assert american influence and to influence events down the road in the middle east. moderator: let's see. one more question? go for it. then we will close.

>> even as the u.s. and israel negotiate with hamas for the cease fire and to ease hostages, there is rhetoric coming from both administrations that hamas can't be part of the negotiations for long-term peace . i guess my question is, given the fact that that sort of rhetoric that denies agency to palestinians to pick their own leadership has resulted in the growth and popularity of hamas, how realistic and pragmatic is it to think that hamas can be eliminated from the long-term negotiated settlement? moderator: i will pass that last hot potato to mairav. >> i think it's a good question, and we are seeing that -- the way to win with hamas is not the

way israel is doing, not to militarily pummel them, that is not going to be the answer. even if we forsake and agree that israels war is right, the question is how to get there. the u.s. has experience in this and others, it is not the way israel is doing it, it'll have to be a political, diplomatic solution. we call it the israel-gaza war, it's the israel-palestinian war. so what happened when they elected hamas in 2006. nobody in the world is going to support elections at this point. so you are stuck because the palestinians need political representation, they deserve a leadership to represent their interests. and they haven't had that. the world has not let them have that. i think clearly, the strategy has to change. if you want to beat hamas, you

need to think about how to integrate it on some level, into a future post-war scenario. that is just a practical way, regardless of their moral standing. moderator: alright. i want to thank my guests. these topics are not easy. and obviously, if we had brilliant solutions, we would be telling them right now, but i think it is important to look at the shifts not just in the region, but also here in the united states. i thank you for coming, i think those of you online, and i think mairav, shibley, ali and lara for their candid and forthright remarks. thank you all. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy, visit ncicap.org] [indistinct conversations]