thinking or panelist security artist and masa and the hu for joining us. joining us this morning. [applause] we will -- we will move directly into the next panel. if we could have the participants come up. if you need to grab a couple of coffee, we'll do so. but we'll make a transition here. >> i'm leaving you now. thanks, masa.

>> welcome, everyone. thanks for joining the second panel up to a public conference on u.s., rok.com. my name is elen kim. i'm senior fellow with the korean chair scsis. we discuss the previous effort for japan to work together and expand their tri lateral

corporation especially in the face of facing the secure challenges from north korea. we are looking at this escalating tensions between china and taiwan. and ways for japan to working together to maintain peace and today i'm joined by an excellent panelists. it's my great pleasure to introduce each of them first, my -- on my left, is dr. shu song min. he's the director for asian security networks. based in hawaii. his area of expertise covers korea, china. north korea's nuclear program. >> next, we have the director of

contemporary chinese studies. she specializes in chip:'s contemporary foreign policy and politics. last, but not least is is my colleague hart who is a fellow with the china project at csis. due to some personal emergency, my colleague cannot be participating. but in he remembers place, and if he decides to china us. thank you so much for joining us. cfi special institution initiated in the underappreciated of chinese. and at lied. his research poll city is

u.s.-china policy and taiwan secure issues. thank you for joining us today. let me just say that this is the first time for the career chair to have this to discuss the china relation as a stand alone public discussion poppeck. for the audience who may not have followed this close licks i would like to ask our panelist to give some initial marks on how each of their representative countries actually view the issues between taiwan and china and the possible conflict between them. >> let me start with maybe ryan, maybe. >> thanks, everyone, for having me thanks for the korea chair and thanks for helen for moderating. it makes sense that you aring a this success in the context of u.s., rfk ties.

i figure i would set the seen by talking broadly about the trajectory about the u.s.-taiwan and how he has been starting. >> if she ever hears you talk about -- you asked taiwan relations, we'll hear them use this kind of practice because one alcohol policy is based on the relations act. under six assurance. there's decades of policy that has remained consistent in our one china policy. officially, you know, u.s. policy on taiwan is that we acknowledge beijing's position. that's how -- but we don't make an actual position. we don't recognize that position. and we don't have an official position on tie want sovereignty. the u.s. policy is focused on pushing all sides to resolve

this issue peacefully and without cohersion. and u.s. policy is focused on -- they're focused. the mechanic niches. and that's largely in the context of, you know, growing chinese pressure. you know, i'm mid as we look at the balance of power and the chinese' effort to challenge taiwan. washington has continued to arm that rod with the sense of capabilities incluesing trying to take military action against taiwan. that's the core here of where we're at. an important point to make here is that u.s. policy towards taiwan is probably varied by policy we can make up that congress wanting her to maintain robust on official relation with tie watch. called people exchanges especially in the economic space too. there's a lot of support here in

washington for continued relations with taiwan and continued strengthening those. i think it's important to emphasize some of the most recent development that is have come up, during the biden administration. they have taken tact can efforts to increase can. from using threats and cohersion. so you've seen him make encrypt remarks. four times now. he would come to their defense. but his administration would say there's no official choice come in. >> so by and large the u.s. continues to have this strategy of strategic am big utility as to whether they would come to their defense. >> there would be tackle nickal and historic shifts, i think. you've seen a couple of others

from the biden administration to talk about taiwan with military aid which is a tactical shift in how we support taiwan but not necessarily, not changing official u.s. policy. but, you know, from beijing's perspective, beijing has continue anyly -- constantly that the u.s. attempted to hollow out the u.s. one china policy they will use statements including from xi jinping. making these statements that it used washington as provoking and they say using taiwan as a cart to contain china and suppress. that's beijing's perspective. there have been two major flash

patriots that have really created -- i think a deterioration in cost relaxation. the first one is the august 222 visit. and then speaker policy. much more strongly than they anticipated me. they held the largest military experiences in decade and significantly closer to taiwan, they took great moves. to send a signal of beijing's displeasure with that. diplomatically beijing also canceled or suspended key areas of dialogue and relations were only revived in the last couple of months after the biting chief

summit in san francisco so there was over one year where tensions were still really high between the u.s. and china because of the taiwan issue. the second flashpoint i would highlight is last april taiwan's president with speaker mccarthy, held military exercises, took less provocative steps, did not fire missiles over the planes but they took significant military action so these have been major flashpoints in the relationship in destabilizing issues for stability but about midway through last year we started to see the biden administration and beijing re-engaging where we had legible

important cabinet level meetings culminating in the november summit between biden and xi jinping where xi jinping agreed to restart military by military dialogue so we had some stabilization reemerge and that was crucial because it came just before the taiwan elections january 2024 where we saw the now vice president when -- win and so far beijing has not taken major military responses but i would flag that the year is early so well things are relatively stable now there is still concern in washington that after the inauguration in may in

taiwan or -- taiwan we might see beijing provoke a military response or take other action so while we are starting the year in a stable place there is a lot of opportunity for escalation and the u.s. presidential election as china becomes a key issue i think we will see taiwan come back to the four so i hope those are all helpful and i will wrap up but look forward to questions. >> ok, thank you so much for inviting me here and asking to talk about japan's position regarding china and taiwan. japan and the prc have signed joint communiqué in 1972 with

official position has always been japan recognize the government of the people's republic of china as the sole legal government of china so to japan both china and taiwan are very important and so japan and china have reaffirmed their strategic relationship last year during the aipac in san francisco and china is japan's largest trading partner and one of the largest investment destinations for japanese companies so economic relations between china and japan are very close. in the meantime, japan also has robust economic ties with taiwan

and people to people exchanges with taiwan and there is an enduring affinity between the people so japan's position regarding china in taiwan has not changed since the normalization of relations between japan and china in 1972. but of course it is also true that japan is now deepening cooperation and exchanges with taiwan because taiwan is an important partner with which we share fundamental values. so this change might have been driven by several factors but geographical proximity to taiwan and china's assertive behavior in the east china sea are the main reasons for the growth of japan's relations with taiwan.

that is simply because the maintenance of peace and stability across the taiwan strait is at the core of japan policy and the presidency said in 2013, the first year of his presidency, that the goal was a solution wait forever so this statement has actually been a source of alarming japan about the possibility of a war across the taiwan straight. so in order to prevent conflict across the taiwan straight, i think japan's policy is

threefold. first, invest in japan's capable -- defense capabilities. meanwhile, japan is fully aware that they cannot win a war alone. that is why a strong u.s.-japan alliances indispensable for japan. japan is also working hard to deepen defense cooperation with australia and iraq, including intelligence sharing, cooperation, energy security and also in terms of opinion, i would say the russian invasion of ukraine was a wake-up call to many pacific japanese and they have realized that war cannot

happen overnight so generally speaking i would to say support for a strong u.s.-japan alliance and domestic military buildup, that type of support is now on the rise. i will stop there. thank you. >> thank you for the opportunity. let me say a disclaimer first. the views i present are my personal views. i have an argument for the session which is that i think a major crisis in east asia will start from the korean peninsula, not taiwan straight. many have debated for the last

two years so what will north korea do if there is a contingency in the taiwan straight, i think that question should be reversed, what would china do if there is a contingency on the current the -- on the korean peninsula. i would compare the change in perspective for the korean peninsula and taiwan straight in the various conditions that will enable or hinder a surprise attack in each region. why did kim jong-un in and outs to abandon reunification? [indiscernible] china might be emboldened by china or russia and kim jong-il might want to intimidate korea more and [indiscernible] north korea has shown their creativity in coming up with

aggressive rhetoric to justify some russian kim junction did not have to abandon unification policy making fundable shift in national narrative and deny history inherited by his grandfather. it has more to do with the domestic politics with his concern about south korea's cultural influence growing in north korea, given that north korea passed a series of laws to prevent [indiscernible] the law to make sure young north koreans of public culture in 2022 passed a law to protect the cultural language so it is more

about domestic politics to eradicate south korean identity and it has reached the level where kim jong-un has to announce the abandonment of reunification policy and [indiscernible] it is more about domestic politics or power transition from kim jong-un -- kim jong il to kim jong-un so it may be a sign north korea might directly target south korea as they did in 2010. the situation across the taiwan straight, xi jinping preoccupied

with domestic issues and should be worried about ple given report of corruption of leadership so not the best time for china to take dilatory action against taiwan unless taiwan make radical moves toward independence and taipei is not likely to do so because taiwan has the same problem, domestic problems, high housing prices will be his priority [indiscernible] legislation is divided so it is not also ideal time for new administration to make radical move toward independence so taiwan straight seems relatively will maintain status quo.

let me disclose why korean peninsula -- taiwan enjoys the stopping power of the water for pla to invade taiwan, it has to cross and amphibious attack requires time or mobilization and pla preparation for amphibious invasion will cannot proceed without u.s. intelligence community and north and south korea share a land border and a record of naval conflicts in the west see so military conflict is easier to break out in the land on korea peninsula rather than taiwan straight and korean peninsula is

more likely to have conflict because of frequency of military exercise. both china and north korea tend to increase military provocation whenever south korea or taiwan conduct military exercise. taiwan implements one joint exercise at the national level per year. north korea has five times more opportunities to justify their aggression using south korea military exercise and conflict on the korean peninsula can escalate faster than taiwan straight because of offensive military doctrine so since 2012 south korea has developed the three axis system so three parts, first a preemptive strike

against north korea [indiscernible] and second is air missile defense system and third is korea massive punishment and retaliation plan such as infiltration of special ops. all of these strategies are recorded openly at the south korea flight paper. taiwan defense paper explains attacking the enemy at the most vulnerable place so they understand the geography of the taiwan straight and taiwan strategy does not include preemptive or retaliatory strike against pla military bases on may land or operation in beijing

but they does [indiscernible] to summarize all these element korean peninsula geography and south korea offensive doctrine suggest kim jong-un does not intend to start a major crisis but anything can escalate into a bigger crisis and then he might intend in the first place so more likely to happen on korean peninsula then escalate much faster than taiwan straight. i do not mean to underestimate china threat to taiwan however china's military challenges in the taiwan straight are uncertain but within critical range and chain reactions are

unpredictable so to conclude so what does all of this analyst apply, deterrence need to be strengthened as much as they are in the taiwan straight but the most important a difficult challenge is to make sure we fully understand south korea's counterattack and china has a role to play as chinese officials say china can influence and reverse activity but at least beijing can communicate south korea's response if they provoke and for the sake of their own interest china -- north korea better not make too much trouble so here we should consider combining

military exercise and diplomacy to engage with beijing in one voice if it is true beijing intends to avoid a major crisis and maintain status quo in the taiwan straight they should be more to do so on the korean peninsula. >> thank you. this is a very interesting. i have a couple of things to pick up and then would like to follow up with each of you but maybe you could explain a little bit about south korea's stance on the china taiwan issues. we heard from -- we heard about the u.s. and japan official policy on taiwan issue but i would like to hear your thoughts on south korea. obviously south korea has been very cautious about this issue but we recently we have been

seeing small changes. does it mean there is a policy shift on where south korea stands on the issue? what is driving the change? and then i would like to hear about the joint statement leaders of south korea, japan, and united states about the same 90 day adopted in the joint camp david summit, the language, they say reaffirm for peace and stability across the taiwan straight as an indication of prosperity and the international community. is that language sign of sort of three countries relying on this issue? if not, where [indiscernible] >> south korea government

position on taiwan straight issue has been moving from [indiscernible] -- it is moving closer to the u.s. position but there is still time so in 2021 during the summit between the president's for the first time they include the phrase south korea also emphasize that peace and stability of taiwan straight in the joint statement it was the first time. during the domestic briefing it was mentioned south korea policy has not changed at all, just emphasized the peace and stability everyone cares about achieving of course including china as well so he emphasized one china policy has not changed and another senior official said

china should be happy because south korean president did not pull out china in the statement. so in the summit in may 2022 include -- includes the phrase south korea cares about peace and stability about the peninsula. but last april before the summit the president framed taiwan issue as international with implication beyond northeast asia and that prompted beijing serious reaction and there was backpedaling and accumulation of

other south korean high officials, defense mr. and foreign minister remarked the same message we care about taiwan straight peace and stability so there was progression about [indiscernible] an element of ambiguity that south korea government never said what they want to do if there is a contingency in taiwan straight, south korea's vice defense minister said south korea does not have any conversation about contingency in taiwan straight with u.s. so there is political to talk about peace and stability from south korean perspective but no comment about contingency plan yet. >> i think i was gonna iterate the same point about the statement that the taiwan issue is not just domestic, it is of

international importance and that angered beijing because the refrain you hear from china's ministry of foreign affairs is constantly that this is a domestic issue for china and to deter others from intervening. that was a significant statement. i think overall the inclusion of taiwan in these statements is it is important. i think it reflects a broad alignment on the china threat perception and concerns among r.o.k., japan, u.s., broad concern about the growing assertiveness of beijing and the military buildup and provocation toward taiwan and it is a growing recognition on the three countries of the linkage of

security issues. you see more admissions at recognition of the fact that these issues are linked, that south korea and japan security is linked to taiwan. you see official statements coming out from korea officials that you know transit through the taiwan straight is critical for korean import so they see this as a big issue for them and so you see more willingness to be for leading but beyond the broad strategic shared threat perception i think there are differences in how the three countries, how much they are willing to be forward leaning. one recent example is japan both u.s. and japan put out official statements congratulating william lai on winning the election then making a comment

on that election which is something beijing fire back at immediately criticizing them and i think we have not seen that from the r.o.k. side so there is more desire to remain quiet around some of these issues and the last thing i will say is in terms of beijing's response has been to take r.o.k. and japan action on taiwan as being pawns for the united states, they task this as the united states using them as ships to put pressure on beijing to suppress beijing so that is the kind of line they have tried to tout here and i think we will likely see more of that thinking so at least publicly there is not this kind of you know recognition and beijing that you know the r.o.k. and japan are largely responding to their perceived threat perceptions from beijing you

know except again they are trying to cap this as just following what the u.s. wants them to do. >> i think japan is geographically close to the taiwan straight, korean and insula, and russia -- korean peninsula, and russia as well. so that means japan is faced with a very serious security environment. for japan, the peninsula, a crisis in the korean peninsula or the taiwan straight are equally important. that is why for japan it is important, the joint statement that exercise the importance of the taiwan straight crisis is

equally important for japan. of course china has harshly criticized japan and south korea after that joint statement. i think china has changed a little bit the approach to south korea and also to japan because china has softened to some degree they are stance toward japan and also to what south korea in order to drive a wedge between the united states and japan or between the u.s. and south korea or even south korea and japan. so china's reaction has shown

that china is criticizing japan and south korea and u.s. moves internationalization of the taiwan issue but so this has led china to change their policy toward japan and south korea. also i do think there are differences in dealing with taiwan straight among the three countries but even so, i think institutionalization of secured cooperation is vital to deal with either taiwan straight crisis or korean peninsula crisis so the point has been

mentioned in the first session that we need to promote the institutionalization of cooperation among the three countries and this kind of cooperation should expand beyond the security area. >> thank you. let's move on to a slightly different topic. taiwan had an election in january. i would like to hear thoughts on their countries reaction to the outcome and brian could you tell us about what the policy toward china and the u.s. will be and do you expect the policy to change and how -- and what do you think china will likely response to that? >> in terms of taiwan's election

in january, i would say japan's, japan is watching very closely china's move because in the run-up to the inauguration of the president -- president-elect in may, the 100 days before may is crucial that we need to watch china's move very carefully. for now, i think china is increasing pressure on taiwan. for example, china's aviation in administration said very brief statement that it has changed a flight plan close to that sensitive median line in the taiwan straight and this can have a very possible military

implications as well and also china has announced that beginning of tariff reduction on some of the products before taiwan's presidential election and that was two days after the presidential election is kind of -- shifted diplomatic ties to china. i would say china is ripping up the pressure on taiwan. in my view, the possibility of war across the taiwan straight is not that high at the moment.

i do not know if you are familiar with the movie all is quiet on the western front. this is a war across the taiwan straight and probably they would be no war across the taiwan straight in the immediate future but actually the tension across the taiwan straight is very high and china is trying to isolate taiwan and the international community and china is trying to put economic pressure on taiwan and has the intention to change the median line across the straight so these kinds of strategies are really difficult to deal because deterrence policy, which we talk a lot about, deterrence strategy doesn't work very effectively to

deal with the kind of strategy china is adopting. so maybe we need to pay more attention to the policies that china is putting a lot of effort into. >> the last year and the year before there was a growth of volume of population of south korean think tank and media about what should south korea do if there is contingency in taiwan so without much discussion there was a lot of discussion about their was likely to be tension in taiwan straight and by extension of that discussion on the eve of presidential election in taiwan

right after that with the victory of ppp the immediate response from south korean press editorial or op-ed was tpp simply means china will continue to threat and conduct military provocation around taiwan island so it is the same argument, south korea should be worried about that but as time goes by there is some more signs of status quo where biden said to the journalist questioned the u.s. will not support taiwan independence so that translates into u.s. preference to maintain status quo followed by analysis this is election year for u.s. so u.s. does not want to have another contingency taiwan straight and same thing with china as i explained china is

faced with so many economic problems and pla leadership problem so not the best time for china to also initiate any major crisis so there is more and more understanding that may be status quo may be maintained at least for this year with the caveat that as long as tpp as they are we should be worried about the worst case which is now being overshadowed by growing threat perception and controversy about north korea change in posture. >> yeah, on the taiwan election specifically, beijing made its views very clear before the election, they did not want to see the tpp likely going and i think they also knew the polling in taiwan was consistently clear throughout the lead up to

election day with showing lai with a small but significant lead so they had months to prepare for this eventuality that he would win so when he did we saw beijing put out statements that ultimately whoever wins an election in taiwan it doesn't change the fact of how they view k-1 -- taiwan. but i think there is a lot of key issues here and slides -- specific dynamics at play that have led to where we are now so it is significant i think from beijing's perception that he did not win the outright majority unlike president lie with a 56% majority so from their perspective that means lai is

coming into this in a different position politically more challenging position for the dpp and the dbp also lost its majority in the legislation so i think additional pressure on the administration once in power and i think a key part of this is lai made statements running up to the election that he would not provoked any major shifts in largely cast his bed for president -- his bid for president as a continuation of the previous administration which has been you know obviously beijing did not want to see the administration i do not want to see a dpp administration but he has been proactive about limiting the more pro-independent you know of the tehran electorate and i

think -- taiwan electorate and while i think he is more forward leaning on independent issues he still cast himself as being large really in continuance of the administrations of that is what i expect in the same is true on relations with the u.s. but it is clear he and his you know future vice president will continue investing in the u.s. relationship and continue trying to strengthen ties with washington but i do think a key issue here is waiting to see what beijing does after the inauguration in may. you know in speaking with chinese card -- counterparts, you know chinese scholars, there seem to be widespread belief and skeptism him being a continuation of the previous administration and i think andy and china expect you know have lower expectations for him in terms of they are more worried about him and so they are worried that he could push the envelope in new ways and so i

think we are likely gonna see beijing respond to the inauguration but it will be i think contingent, you know, chinese scholars have said they are waiting to see what he says but i do not think they will be giving him much benefit of the doubt i think beijing will want to make his you know bake a assertive response and show they will not you know not be patient with him and so i think that sets us up as i said earlier in my opening remarks i think it sets us up for a pretty tense 2024 especially as the u.s. presidential election heats up as well so i think yeah, not too optimistic about the stability in the straight relation going forward but hopefully i am wrong. >> my next question is we also have an election here and ambassador masa during that

presentation that there is concern about the u.s. possible weakening stance on taiwan issue so i would like to ask about what that would mean for south korea and japan if u.s. shows weakening stance on taiwan. >> i'll take first, yeah. the u.s. weakens commitment for the stability of taiwan may have a lot of impact on south korean perception to the u.s. for their contribution for the stability of east asia overall but can generate a lot of debate and controversy about south korea's desire for nuclear armament. so we all know 70% of south

korean people expressed the desire to have their own nuclear weapon in survey but not why they wanted and the assumption is because of the increased threat from north korea with advanced nuclear weapon capabilities or the u.s. perception lies dysfunctional politics or weakening commitment for defense for allies with the image of trump administration but actually it has more to do with the war in ukraine, politicians saying after seeing what happened in ukraine we believe in the u.s. alliance but this is a world of uncertainty and we would like to have our own measure of self-help and in a public survey done by korea

and institute of national reunification asked why you want nuclear weapon, 30% say uncertainty about the politics other than north korea or china even excluding china so giving the trend to u.s. policy in taiwan will be perceived as a factor of uncertainty of south korean perception about the world of politics and they will again generate another discussion or desire for nuclear armament on the south korean people. >> in terms of the upcoming u.s. election, i think we do have a lot of confidence. ambassador she has raised the

concern of a possible weakened u.s. commitment in the taiwan straight that may lead to a possible war or give the wrong signal to china. also there are concerns about the possible trump economic policy because he has already declared that if he becomes president he will impose a tariff on chinese goods i think of more than 60%. so either way, it could create an uncertain economic environment and it is likely to

be a major shock to markets. so there are many concerns. having said that, i am actually cautious but not that pessimistic about the future. because if you look at japan's relations under trump 1.0, japan has done very well in dealing with his demands about trade conflicts so i think no matter who was the next president of the united states, we need to

have a very smart strategy to deal with that and if we look at the past experience, it is not that bad. if we can have a very good strategy. second, in terms of korean peninsula issues, if trump becomes the next president, it will increase a lot of uncertainties but if we look at his first term, he tried to negotiate, just have a direct talk with north korea. it did not bear any fruit. but anyway, because of the

direct talk between the united states and north korea, and china has shifted their policy to strengthen its relations with north korea because they have those kinds of concerns to be excluded from negotiations in terms of north koreans nuclear program. so i would say we cannot predict the future, but what we can do is think about the possibilities and try to figure out a better way to deal with that. >> so we have 13 minutes so let me ask final question and open the floor for questions from the

audience. tensions escalating in the korean peninsula and also maybe in the future maybe things will change in the taiwan straight. [indiscernible] i am curious to see about you know, have you seen any signaling by north korea for support by china in the taiwan contingency in the latest if you can remember and brian for the same question, my view is that china north korea relations are it is very difficult to beat, they have active at economic relations but politically i do not know what is going on but with russia north korea moving closer so i was curious whether have you seen any signaling by

china of support for north korea in the contingency? >> i think it was 2022 october one of north korea's high officials in foreign ministry directly commented that north korea opposed any u.s. involvement, any economic power involvement in the domestic affairs of our countries so direct expression of support for china and when u.s. officials visited taiwan king john wrote a letter of solidarity to beijing so north korea has cap signaling we are ready to support china if something happens. i did not see much of such a

remark recently and then so north korea clearly expressed support for china's position on taiwan straight whereas i did not hear for decades i did not see much expression from beijing for north korea position on reunification whereas xi jinping made a speech in south korea and expressed he wished for unification of korean peninsula, he did not say i am ready to support south korea but he at least mentioned he wished peaceful unification for korea when he addressed to south korea congressman when he visited south korea national congress. kim jong-un should be worried

about the perspective of unification of peninsula put back to your question he should be busy with coming up with actions and war policies that match his unification declaration, he already dismantled -- international tourism so he may be busy with following up with his own remark better than -- more than worry about what happens in taiwan contingency. >> in terms of i think beijing's perspective on this, i think north korea is a double-edged sword for china in many respects. on one hand you see it is very clear you know chinese military strategist hotspot about the kind of strategic advantage that

comes from having you know issue leakages and linking other countries so you know we see advantages potentially in if there is a crisis in the taiwan straight they do see some potential advantages to you know a korean peninsula crisis as well as the u.s. and allies putting pressure on u.s. alliances. but i think you know on the other side they are concerned about the unpredictable nature of what that can bring and the risks for escalation and the inability to control the situation so i think that is particularly true with north korea where beijing is often wary of kim jong-un and some of his provocations, i think china is watching warily now as we see more north korea russia

alignment. i think again double-edged sword beijing could see potential upside in terms of distracting the u.s. on putting pressure on the u.s. alliances in the region and potentially helping russia and the war in ukraine but again it also we have seen i think beijing try to kind of manage the situation and avoid the situation where russia and north korea are making decisions that will distract china so i think you know we have seen the vice foreign minister go to south korea and read and issue statement i do think 2024 will be an important year for china dprk relations, specifically because it will be the 75th anniversary of the founding of their relations and we have seen you know during these recent meetings between chinese and north korean officials we have seen them make the statements that they look forward to

strengthening strategic cooperation this year and this is a year of bilateral friendship for them so i think there is some opportunities they are for beijing to strengthen those ties and leverage to their benefit but again i think beijing is worried this can cut both ways and spiral out of control is not managed. >> so i would like to take some questions from the floor. >> dave maxwell, thank you for your great remarks. if there is a crisis, if conjunction has violent provocation, what is he really trying to achieve? and if south korea responds decisively with violets, how would kim response to that? and a topic we have not touched

on is human rights. is there a potential for trilateral cooperation for human rights concerning china for forced repatriation of south koreans to north koreans, is there trilateral approach possible to chinese human rights? thank you. >> if we look back what happened in 2010 there was no particular aggression from south korea's military exercise was normal exercise and [indiscernible] was firing to ourselves, military regular exercise so that variable here why north korea suddenly take this attack on south korean life, the experts generally agree it should be something about domestic politics to support a power transition process to strengthen kim jong-un and the

next leader but still is only a guess but if it is true this guess is popular because it makes sense that from kim jong-un we respect him as a rational actor then again from this provocation could be for domestic politics from south korea u.s. perspective it was so dangerous he could quickly escalate out of control but kim jong-un regime still the gain from the risk provocation is that domestic variable that we cannot really understand from the outside. a lot of factor from the perspective is they want to itself -- they want to test how far south korea can go and how far the u.s. and china will intervene to stop and -- to stop escalation of tension so after [indiscernible]

memo to secretary robert gates so since the offensive doctrine the south korean defense minister meaning the south korean response to the end and that phrase was included in the joint statement between minister and secretary austin so the problem is if north korea conduct another type of provocation it is ok if they fire missiles to the air to the water but if they target south korea south korea will respond immediately and to the end so the question is then at what point by that help of intervention but again it is

gain understanding from the u.s. side and at this point we want to make sure conjunction understand what south korea trying to do here, do not test our resolve and for that matter we did china's engagement [indiscernible] >> i want to point out, norman song and his article full speed ahead and both panels said trump is going to be president. it does not have to be that way. if biden gives the lbj speech

and bows out and let's the democratic convention pick another candidate, first speaker said there was strategic ambiguity. i do not think this ambiguity, you are telling us don't believe our eyes that he has some problems with dementia and trump has a problem with being demented so it is a simple solution. it does not have to turn out the way you guys think it is. >> thank you. last question and then we will try to wrap it up quickly. >> hello. former deputy chief of staff intelligence insole and korea.

while serving in korea and japan we had a lot of crises behind the scenes people never heard about. we've been talking about different things that could go wrong. are there any things we can tried to do to help things go right in terms of confidence building measures we can try to implement? without going into ways that would put the site in the hands of china or north korea, thank you. >> i will radiate one thing that has come up -- i will reiterate one thing that has come up there trilateral measures to strengthen communication are key. i think it's -- i think there has been a lack of coordination, even at the track to dialogue where unofficial dialogues there

has been a lack of communication on contingency planning for dual crises in the taiwan straight or current -- were korean peninsula so i think there is still a lot of work that can be done on thinking through how to manage tensions and how to make sure they are not. to put pressure on beijing to not align their activities and i think some of these things like a joint trailer laurel military reports are important for ensuring we can you know operate together there's a lot of steps that we can continue to make, and the convergence of these three countries under the last two years has made for more growth but there is more work to get into the nitty-gritty of how we operationalize thinking and improve communication. >> thank you, times up, so we

have to conclude right now. so thank you all the panelists for joining us and thank you all for listening. thanks. >> coming up tonight on c-span, pharmaceutical executives appearing in front of congress to testify on the cost of prescription drugs. then major general pat writer giving pentagon reporters an update on defense secretary lloyd austin's health after another recent hospitalization. and deputy defense secretary erickson talk about covering

china and russia in latin america and more, coming up tonight on c-span. >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government. we are funded by these television companies and more, including buckeye broadband. ♪ >> buckeye broadba supports c-span as a public service, along with these other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. >> ceos from johnson & johnson, mark and esther myers quipped testify on the cost of prescription drugs in a hearing from the senate health education labor and pensions committee. this first portion is just