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part of last year's inflation reduction act. announcer: now, a discussion on the relations between the united states and south korea and military strategy in the indo pacific region. the conversation also highlights china's ambitions and threats from north korea and comes just before a trilateral meeting between president biden and the leaders of south korea and japan. as moral depravity. you are ending humanity's future. >> youtube livestream but also especially on c-span1 and c-span radio. we are happy to have you all in

attendance, whatever platform you are joining us from. the buzz these days is about tomorrow's trilateral meeting at camp david, a critical relationship between south korea and japan and the u.s., but today's program focuses on another triangular relationship between the u.s., south korea, and north korea. it features a discussion of a paper under a similar name by scott snyder, senior fellow for korea studies and director of the program on u.s.-korea policies and the council on foreign relations. if you're in the korea space, scott is a familiar face. for very good reason. he is a well-known expert and writes and speaks extensively on u.s.-korea relations as well as regional affairs in the endo pacific. i will not go through his entire bio. we have that link on our website

or his prolific bibliography, but i will mention more recent titles, including a co-edited volume that was published in january of this year. a good book, i highly recommend it. also, autonomy and alliance in an era of rival powers published in january of 2018, a book i have cited in my own writing. and the same year he co-authored a book titled domestic constraints on south korean foreign policy. before turning to scott, i want to contextualize today's program in relation to the larger project of which it is a part. scott's paper will be featured in volume two of kei's new flagship journal, which is running under the title of defining the indo pacific, a region of diverse visions. it consists of two sections.

the first present the u.s., japan, south korea, and chinese perspectives on the end of pacific concept and some of their respective strategies or outlooks. the second features more korea focused analysis, including a paper by rory metcalf and a paper by myself on debates surrounding the so-called strategic flexibility of u.s. forces stationed on the korean peninsula, in particular in relation to a contingency over taiwan. i will add, the first volume of korean policy came out earlier this year. hard copies are available in our foyer as well as online. we will put a link on our youtube chat. i have asked scott if he would present for 15 or 20 minutes on the key findings and takeaways from his paper. then i have questions i have

prepared that i will bob his way and open things to you, but here and online for some q&a, so thank you for joining us. scott: thank you for the invitation. it is great to be here at kei and i appreciate the editorship of this process and project and his conceptualization of it. as i look at the title of my paper on the wall there, it occurs to me that increasingly the endo pacific is a nice way of not naming the elephant in the room, china. because a lot of what my paper really focuses on is how the u.s.-south korea-north korea triangle has interacted with and grappled with china's influence

on the peninsula. and i am going to do a little bit of a spoiler alert and give you my takeaways first. for those of you who were going to read the paper, you can just close your ears, i guess. the first take away for me is the focus on china, the u.s. rivalry, and is dynamic on the u.s.-south korea-north korea dynamic, china may overshadow and distract from our traditional focus on north korea. it may make north korea subordinates to china as a main focus of policymakers. that is something that comes into relief in my paper as i review the history of u.s.-south korea-north korea interactions over the past 20 years.

on take away is that the china and north korea dynamic, which is related to this triangle and how it works remains complicated. the strengthening of china and north korea relations is a byproduct of the deepening china-u.s. rivalry that limits u.s. ability to influence north korea but north korea is more dependent on china. it is not always mean that china can control north korea. that has been a focus for a long time among china and north korea watchers and remains a subject of continuing debate. we are getting new data points in this current environment, but i would say that the range of use remains diverse in terms of whether china really is able to control north korea or north

korea really seeks autonomy from china more than anything else. i will come back to that later. a third take away as i look at the strategic triangle is that historically one of the main factors that has influenced the dynamic end of element of this particular triangle has been the nature and focus of leadership in south korea, and other words whether south korea is led by a conservative administration or progressive administration, so that is important to keep in mind because north korea has been more hostile toward conservative south korean leadership and more cooperative with progressive south korean leadership. that has been a primary dynamic with china being a secondary dynamic until recently. my last take away is that the u.s.-china rivalry is impinging

on this particular triangular relationship because the rivalry has energized competing strategic configurations between the u.s., japan, and south korea on the one hand, as we will see tomorrow, and between china and north korea and russia on the other. it is actually interesting to see how north korea has been activating the triangular relationship engaging with china and russia recently. so how do i approach this topic of looking at the u.s.-south korea-north korea strategic triangle? what i did was go back and look at the development in phases. i saw three main phases in terms of development of china's influence in relationship to the u.s.-south korea-north korea triangle over the past 30 years.

the first phase was in the 1990's, when the u.s. was engaging directly with north korea on the geneva framework and establishment of a country and peninsula organization. at that time, what was notable is china had a marginal role to play in denuclearization efforts and in the institutional configurations around a push for denuclearization at that time. south korea's role was primary, and the configuration of that organization, which was created in order to build light water nuclear reactors in north korea as part of the geneva agreed framework, the bilateral effort to address that phase of the north korea nuclear crisis,

china was not involved. the european union was on the board. china was nowhere to be seen, so i think what was really remarkable was the lack of china's involvement. we saw china began to be involved a little in the late 1990's. there was a grouping called the four party talks in the context of north korea's famine and efforts to recover from the famine that was established. that was the first multilateral engagement china had with the u.s. and the two koreas, but it also was pretty stillborn and then we have to wait until the second phase that i analyzed to see china take a more central role. that occurred in 2000s and the big facilitator of china playing a more central role related to

this particular strategic triangle was the united states and the bush administration because the bush administration looked to china to host the six party talks, the main diplomatic vehicle to address the north korea nuclear issue after the breakdown of the agreed framework and the failure of the organization in the early 2000's. china was brought in and had a set of interests related to being involved. but they were not exactly the same as u.s. interests. even though china was host, china's main objective as host of the six party talks -- denuclearization with the objective of the talks. china benefited from being the

convener come about what china was looking to get out of those talks was an assurance that things would remain stable. the six party talks was basically for china a crisis management mechanism to prevent conflicts between the u.s. and north korea from escalating. it was also a way in which china tried to use its role as a mediator between the u.s. and north korea but also as a way of trying to build leverage and influence with north korea to shape the outcome of the talks. so in the context of six party talks this ended up being an umbrella organization through which and under which various trilateral configurations interacted with each other. one of them was the u.s. -- u.s.-south korea-north korea triangle. during this period, during the bush administration, the dynamic

as related to north korea was also interesting because south korea could use the six party talks as a way to show some autonomy and pursue a level of cooperation with other parties and channels of dialogue at a time when the bush administration's main conceptual framework related to the use of the six party talks was to build the coalition of five against one to pressure north korea into denuclearization. and the administration was not always on the same page with the bush during this time. it showed up to less within the six party talks than in the context of an ongoing debate over which is more effective in

dealing with north korean sanctions or engagement. that was an active part of the u.s. -- u.s.-south korea-north korea dynamic. the chinese developed expectations about the prospect of strategic distancing between the u.s. and south korea during that time. they really were hoping to see the administration not only take more agency in the context of the six party talks but also to lay the groundwork for peeling off a little bit. for china, the main challenge was to try to find a way to gain enough influence on north korea to generate a positive outcome from the six party talks.

the reality was even though we had the six-party umbrella, the way the dynamic worked in the context of the discussions at that time was the u.s. and north korea remained the principles and it was the six party talks blessing a bilateral agreement between the u.s. and north korea that led to progress, so china was there to affirm but not necessarily exert decisive influence. then the third phase, the most interesting and relevant to the conversation today, very telling in terms of the way things played out, is from 2017 onward. let me mention one other thing in the second phase. the obama administration actively sought after the bush administration to cooperate with

china on north korea policy, in particular the 2013 summit. there was an agreement to do that, but that did not go far. the third phase is interesting because we see china's core motivations being fleshed out in the context of an atmosphere of confrontation between the u.s. and north korea and also this remarkable turn toward bilateral symmetry that occurred in 2017 and 2018. that time -- i would not say the relationship between the u.s. and china was that close, but china was most cooperative on

the passage of u.n. sanctions in response to north korean continued testing in the 2016-20 17 time period and was beginning to impose its own unilateral sanctions on north korea as a means by which to try to gain leverage on kim jong-un in 2017. yet all of that potential for putting pressure on north korea that came from the u.n. sanctions resolution as tensions ratcheted up in 2017, it dissipated as an unintended consequence of trump's turn toward summittry. this is interesting because the advent of china-north korea summitry reverted to a pattern we had seen previously,

basically any time the north korean leader engages with the outside, including with south korea, they go to china first. that is what happened as north korea ramped up and engaged with south korea and the united states. it enabled from the outside perspective, not knowing the internal dynamics, it seems to materialize from nowhere but of course they both had motives for wanting to get together in the context of engagement with south korea and the united states, and i think for kim jong-un the main motive prior to engaging with south korea and the u.s. was to demonstrate that north korea had strategic depth that could support the process. for china, i think it was about refocusing on north korea as a

buffer and trying to enhance china's strategic awareness of what was going on to make sure there were no strategic surprises. so what we saw was, after having not met for the first four years , meeting for the first time just days before the summit, after the summit, and before the singapore summit and basically they had five summits in a year. that reactivated china's engagement with north korea and focus as a strategic buffer. the reason why that timing is interesting is it is before we saw the full-fledged rise of u.s.-china rivalry. that was beginning but did not

really fully flower until after china had made the strategic decision to engage with north korea, so i think the decision to engage and roll back the clock to restore north korea as a strategic relationship occurred prior to the advent of an increased u.s.-china rivalry but the magnification of the rivalry generated strategic space for north korea to maneuver in the context of things like the breakdown of the security council ability to pass sanctions punishing north korea for long-range missile tests and things like that. but there is another effect that occurred, that north korea,

despite its desire to achieve strategic autonomy, in my view that is what north korea's main view was in terms of managing, to generate strategic autonomy of their own triangle with the u.s. and china respectively. instead of achieving that, what they ended up doing was to achieve greater dependency on china. so we are now in a situation in the context of the indo-pacific where north korea is both more dependent on china but also has greater room for maneuver. finally, the focus on the indo-pacific as a framing mechanism that has really kicked in in the biden administration initially with moon but fully flowering under yoon has been to

broaden the u.s.-south korea alliance in ways that raised interesting questions. historically, the alliance has been so focused on security and deterrence of north korea, but in the context of the indo-pacific it raises interesting questions about the relative focus of china as a focal point for coordination and a major generator of threat perceptions and concerns in the u.s. and south korea. it is broadening the alliance to include china accompanied by a broadening of the mechanisms by which the u.s. and south korea are engaging in cooperation but also comes with a risk. one is the risk that north korea will somehow get lost, despite north korea's periodic returns

to the headlines. it is not the way it was. the risk that north korea could get lost in our focus on china and also how do we balance that set of issues? in the context of the alliance conversation. so far, we have seen a broadening of aperture without necessarily losing the focus on north korea. but i do think as the process unfolds and with the advent of the emphasis of these two opposing strategic triangles, it really should soothe any potential aspects of what might happen in terms of u.s.-south korea-north korea. there is more in the paper i

would have loved to talk about, but i am under strict instructions to try to limit remarks to 20, 25 minutes and hope i have fulfilled that objective. i hope i have been clear in at least hitting the highlights of my review of how this triangle has developed in the context of both china's rising influence and the u.s. efforts to reframe its strategy in the indo-pacific. clint: thank you, scott. you have been -- done a fantastic job not only sticking to time but summing up the key points. just listening to you and taking notes, i have a handful of questions i want to get to. we want to gather our audience's thoughts as well. starting with looking back a little bit, you mentioned in the second phase that you explained

in the paper during the 2000s until 2017, when the third phase begins, that china's role evolved from being more active but still a somewhat distant influence on the peninsula. do you think that many underestimated china's role to be more active? did you see in your research -- what is your assessment on if there was a dividing line around 2009 when china more actively supported? scott: i would argue there's a tendency to overestimate china's role rather than underestimate china's role. part of this came with expectations for what china might do as a convene or of the six party talks. the idea of the five against one

framework that i think was implicit in the assumptions underlying the creation of that approach and china during that same period, i think they were struggling to try to figure out how to influence north korea. during that period. in part to leverage it for purposes of working on the six party talks but also to enhance their own level of confidence that north korea would be more integrated, at least with china. and possibly even more integrated into the region. the reason i focus on that is because in that lead to thousands phase -- late 2000's phase, we saw efforts by china to promote engagement with north korea bilaterally.

there was a whole host of cabinet ministers engaged during that period, really in an effort to generate institutional and exchange leakages between chinese organizations and north korean organizations. i think there was effort by the chinese to bring north koreans out and engage with them and communiques, the main emphasis on the chinese side was the first point was we need to enhance strategic communication, which basically meant strategic communication was lacking, meaning we feel like we could be blindsided by you north koreans. let us know what is going on. then also one of the problems with trying to describe this period, you mentioned 2009 but i

would argue another critical turning point following this effort to try to enhance stu schimmel ties with north korea was 2013, after kim jong-un had taken power but 2013 was the downfall of the major figure china had really invested in in terms of a lot of the interactions and relationships they had tried to build. and also at that time i did a fair amount of research looking at what the chinese were doing in terms of direct person-to-person relationships engaging with north korea. before kim jong-il passed away, there was a very heavy emphasis on engagement with north korean senior leadership at the chinese

in the sea, and that dissipated with even kim jong-un showed up at the chinese embassy in pyongyang before he became reader, but that dissipated and i think really we saw a weakening institutionally of china-north korea ties at the beginning of the kim jong-un period. it was not only at the head level but also at the lower levels as well. clint: we had some sort of tech difficulties. am i coming through? ok. do you want me to talk more? clint: i do. you mentioned this event in your

remarks. maybe i did not pick up on it when i read the paper, although it is probably there. was china's approach to north korea more a function of its relations to the u.s. or its own increasing assertiveness? maybe it is difficult to disentangle those things. the other piece that comes to mind is north korea's scott: i have been watching the china-korea relationship for a long time through regular writing. that has been my main focus for them. i would say that chinese policy towards north korea has been

stable in terms of their main objectives. as focused on north korea, i think they have remained operative for a long time. at this point i would say in that order. the other thing that i think is notable is that i think that china has always when they have been making policy toward north and south korea, they have seen it through the lens of the relationship with the united states. i think this is one of the big blind spots in terms of chinese policy. it has always been instrumental. it has always been in the context of the u.s.-china relationship. although the buffer strategy has worked well for china for a long time in the traditional context

of any kind of conflict, it has not worked well for china as it has for south korea. one of the real puzzlers for me in watching the china-south korea relationship for a long time is why the chinese government has been so ineffective in trying to craft a policy that would be appealing. the more you look at it, the more it is really puzzling. in some ways it feels like the chinese have had a tin ear as it relates to south korea. the best evidence of that was when xi jinping visited seoul national university. it was widely criticized.

now we are in an even more adverse environment because of the shift in public opinion toward china to an extraordinarily more negative orientation than was the case even back in 2015. and through 2018, 2019. clint: i will pose one more question that i have prepared. for the audience, particularly those online, if you have any questions, you can put them in the youtube chat box and we can turn to them when we turn to q&a. for those in the room, raise your hand and we can bring a mic to you. a third question, as you are alluding to aspects second ago, given the problem that japan has in china-south korea relations

and thinking about xi jinping's visit in 2014. how has china driving a wedge between u.s. allies impacted china-u.s.-south korea relations? scott: i think what has been interesting about the chinese approach is to relations between south korea and japan, respectively, broadly speaking is that china as a fellow party during post-world war ii when japan had something that it could connect with south korea at least emotionally to some

degree, a sense of grievance as it relates to the history of japanese aggression. we saw china really play that card right around that same period at a time when they were interested in establishing a productive relationship with china and actually on the japan side i think there is some concern about how actively they were interested in doing that. what we saw on the chinese side was precisely the impulse to exploit historical grievance. the one that really stands out in my mind from that period is that -- instead of a plaque

mother chinese gave the south koreans the whole museum. i distinctly remember chinese scholars trying to play the japan grievance card at meetings during that time and kind of feeling like the chinese were giving a bear hug to the south koreans and the south koreans were cringing. do not hug me to close. i think one of the problems and challenges and also, this is very contemporary. if you look at the chinese media response to kim jong-un's outreach back in -- back in u.n. 's outreach in march of this year, it is vitriolic. it is odd to see such a response

with a third-party development. it is clear that they were criticizing for strategic sleepwalking. there were some very strident chinese op-eds in the global times that came out in response to kim jong-un's decision to go to japan. they refer to it as strategic sleepwalking. they are befuddled by why and how he is approaching his relationships with japan and the u.s. in the way that they are. it is even playing out in the response in the chinese media over the course of the past few days.

we can definitely see that the trilateral does hit a chinese nerve. it feeds into this dynamic between opposing strategic late rals, at least for the purposes of this paper. clint: let's open things up to the audience. if you are in here, just raise your hand and we will bring a mic to you. i saw you. >> scott, you mentioned that north korea has been more hostile toward south korea. i am wondering how that works in practice. has north korean ever shown in interest to south korean

politics or to try to work the public opinion? scott: i don't see much success in terms of north korea's ability to reach into south korea to affect election outcomes. the way that that has worked historically, there was always something in the south korean election cycle that they refer to as the north wind. that was the perception that north korea might be trying to do that kind of outreach. but it usually ended up seeming like something the conservatives were trying to play up in order to generate support on national security grounds rather than anything that looks like an effective north korean political strategy to influence elections themselves. that does not mean that north korea does not have influence

operations inside south korea. in that context, i think that it is true that any of those operations are more likely to affect individuals that are on the far left and therefore a little bit closer to the progressive side than the conservative side in south korean politics. that has been there in one form or another. again, i would not say that it has been decisive to any kind of election outcome. it is really more of -- i think the efforts to influence actors within south korea have been more on the sub theme or the dog whistle category. it is hard to say it is an effective dog whistle. it is just present.

it is like the buzz that you can hear but not anything that is interfering with conversation. >> it makes me think of the postbellum civil war, waving the bloody shirt strategy. maybe more effective in an american context. i'm not sure. other questions? right here. wait a moment and mic will be brought your way. >> thank you, scott, for your remarkable expiration of the triangle relations. i talked with south korean friends and colleagues and i often get a reply that south korea has to prepare for north korea's attack on south korea rather than helping taiwan or the u.s. forces.

do you think north korean leaders or kim jong-un is planning to take advantage of china's possible invasion of taiwan or in other words does xi jinping expect north korea will attack south korea or any actions to divert u.s. forces? scott: of course that is way beyond the scope of my paper. but it is an active topic of discussion around town. of course, one aspect of that discussion is the fact that focusing on taiwan-related contingencies, that dialogue is much more advanced than the context of the u.s.-japan relationship. president un back in the fall of

last year told cnn that his focus was going to be on north korea. in that respect you could say that it is about holding down the fort on the peninsula while any kind of conflict may proceed. that may be relevant. it certainly is understandable from a south korean security point of view. the other aspect of your question is really related to what is a scenario that we actually need to prepare for. that is an interesting question because first of all we don't know if there will be conflict. they need to consider all the scenarios. one of the scenarios might be the one that you pointed to which is basically what i would

call the north korean opportunism scenario. tensions develop in the relationship. north korea sees an opportunity to advance on the peninsula and it engages in activity designed to achieve some kind of gain. there is another scenario that gets less attention and it is related to the debate that i flagged in my talk and that is what you might call the china-directed north korean conflict scenario and it was could we imagine that china would somehow induce north korea to take a first move that would distract or even refocus u.s. attention on the peninsula as part of the strategy for engaging in conflict in the streets.

i can say which one of those scenarios will be more likely in part because i am remaining a little ambivalent about the debate over his north korea a client -- is north korea a client of china or does it have autonomy. it probably waxes and wanes in the dynamic and it might not be a question we will be able to answer with sufficient clarity to be useful. i think what that means is that from a conflict planning point of view you have to consider both scenarios. i want to emphasize that what i think will be one of the main messages over the course of the next day or two, a unified message from the u.s., japan and south korea is focused primarily on prevention of that scenario from playing out and part of

that is a whole alliances, a trilateral approach to stating the undesirability of any taiwan conflict being decided through military force. it is of critical importance and of national interest that any efforts to deal with this be peaceful. clint: beyond the scope of your paper but masterfully answered in concise fashion. the paper i am writing will focus on some of the debates and discourse around this issue. i would echo what you said. there has been notably increased distress signaling.

this began under the previous progressive administration in which kim jong-un has been more outspoken in this regard, not only tying peace and stability in the taiwan strait to the region but also the international community and they have done this in a trilateral context. the last thing i would add is in south korea's own in the pacific strategy, they link peace and stability in the taiwan strait to security on the korean peninsula. often times historically korean leaders have talked about the piece being essential but the inversion of the linkages very notable. i don't know in my research of that ever happening. nevertheless i think the focus is overwhelmingly preventing this from happening. just to plug another organization, the atlantic council just produced a report

yesterday that talks about some of these scenarios and the risks of whether coordinated chinese north korean actions or uncoordinated and there are distinct risks to both, what that might look like and the ways to think about that. other questions? i might ask my colleague if there is anything online. >> there is a question online, given the rising influence of chinese and the alliance, how can south korea guarantee that the media that it remains a pivotal focus in the u.s.-korea dialogue? scott: read it just one more time for me. sorry. >> how can south korea guarantee that the immediate threat of north korea remains a pivotal focus in the dialogue. scott: in some ways i actually think that south koreans will

not have to work too hard at that because the north koreans are likely to be even more effective in ensuring that it does not drop too far as a priority. i think that the sensitivity that i was really trying to explore in my paper is related to the question of within the context of the alliance that has long historically been focused primarily on north korea as the main threat, is it possible to walk and chew gum at the same time? can we focus on china and north korea and if we start to do that, are there downsides we need to worry about? one of the downsides that i tried to point to point you in my initial remarks is the risk that as we focus on china policy that we somehow subordinate north korea as part of china policy and therefore treat china

as the only actor and ignore north korean agency. i think that would be a mistake. since we have the nuclear consultative group and since these statements are all focusing extensively on north korea and certainly from the south korean side, even participation in this trilateral is being justified by kim jong-un first and foremost as a tool with north korea. that is how they are presenting it. i don't necessarily think that broadening the aperture to include china has to mean that north korea disappears. i don't think that it will disappear and i am no more

confident than i was in the initial phase of my inquiry that we will be able to cooperate on china and continue to cooperate on north korea in an effective manner. yes, right here. >> hi. i am kathy. i want to shift the focus to north korea. how can kim jong-un go into things like the summit, how much will it be filled in his mind and what are the choices to make? one is more allies between china and russia and more supercharged about nukes. maybe it is to drive a wed between japan and south korea because we have seen progress, a little bit of progress these days. what does kim jong-un perceive about this and what is his

choice after the summit? scott: i don't think the north koreans will be pleased. i would expect to hear some vocal criticism over the course of the next few days. what is more interesting and a little bit complicated is that this trilateral summit is also coinciding with the beginning of the freedom shield exercise in north korea. north korea objects to the return of these exercises and building them up into more active exercises. there are actually two targets for north korean rhetoric. the more interesting question is will it also be accompanied by some kind of symbolic representation of protests. some kind of test and what type of test might north korea engage

in in this context. i don't want to make a prediction about exactly how much or what north korea is going to do. what i think that past records suggest that all the things that i have talked about are probably part of the repertoire in terms of north korean response. as you mentioned and as we have mentioned previously, the really new thing that is most interesting was the trilateral meeting in which kim jong-un hosted a chinese representative and the russian defense minister. the first evidence of post-pandemic person to person diplomacy that we have seen at that level, suggesting that north korea is taking on what it is -- what is happening in this trilateral. the other aspect that is

complicated, how do we do the relative rules of russia and china in the context of that trilateral. a really interesting new development is the revival of the russian-north korean military relationship and the possibility of various types of exchanges going on in the context of that relationship. at the same time historically the relationship has been so much more dominant as a primary source of influence. the north koreans have tried on previous occasions to jumpstart the relationship with russia as a way to counteract some of their over dependence on china. i think it is still too early to say whether they can really succeed. i am skeptical about their ability to succeed on that front. clint: given the time i think i

might try to gather two questions. one in the second row here. also andre back there and the first room here. -- the first row here. >> i was wondering is there a desire for reunification between north and south korea like ireland. would nationalism be a better tool for china? they don't really need a buffer. >> i think only in your last answer the word pandemic popped up and can you address how the two major events of this decade so far, the pandemic and russia's invasion of ukraine, may have shaped the worldview of north korea and perhaps this

trilateral altogether. i will pass the mic forward to this gentleman. >> hi. amongst the south korean intellectuals and historians i have talked to about chinese history, every 70 or 80 years china unifies and breaks up. it is a typical pattern of chinese history. they tried to unify china back in 1949. we can see symptoms that the chinese economy is so poor that they may collapse anytime and

many economists are talking about it. also the power of xi jinping is in trouble. seems very weak and getting worse. i wonder how western scholars are looking into such trends. clint: three hard questions in a short amount time. scott: at this moment i am not terribly -- i don't really see either the north korean or the south korean government showing much interest in reunification. in south korea it appears that the mystery of unification has been a target of reorganization. on the public opinion front, it seems like there is also a lot of caveats and caution as it relates to reunification. having said that, we are in an environment, an international

affairs environment of disruption. this leads me to the second question, covid and the russian invasion of ukraine are significant disruptions that in my view on covid, north korea has used pretty effectively domestically to distract from the failure to reset and also, i don't want to speculate about north korean lessons from the invasion of ukraine. so far it has been a moment of opportunity. we do spend some time being concerned about lessons that north korea might take in terms of the challenge to existing international borders, things like that. at this point i think that maybe

we can just say that it has also been an opportunity potentially for some kind of economic gain. i'm sorry, the cyclical view of history and the american views of china, i am better to defer to my china specialist colleague. you can read their opinion online. the issue of how china is developing has been a major shaping factor that is clearly affecting foreign policy in the region and that was actually the broad backdrop and is a starting point for the paper that i wrote . i think what i should say is if you want to explore this more,

you need to read the volumes that clint has assembled. clint: that was perfect. an hour is never sufficient to discuss such complex issues. thank you for joining us, scott. o would reiterate we will --kei will have a postop event on tomorrow's trilateral summit on monday afternoon starting at 2:00 p.m. we will have an event on australia-south korea relationship, featuring a paper it will be in the volume scott's paper will be in. that is august 30. thank you very much for joining us here on youtube and c-span as well. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2023]

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