you receive from minnesota? host: welcome to the senate to strategic and international studies, i am charles bell, a senior advisor here at csis and i'm pleased to welcome everyone here in this room. all of the hundreds of not thousands of you who are watching online. i am particularly excited to welcome our distinguished guests who have come for this important conversation on the military and the strategic implications of august. collaboration between australia, united kingdom, and the united states, this aims to boost the

defense capabilities and enhance technological integration and expand the industrial capacity of all three of our nation. first announced in september of 21 it is comprised of two distinct pillars. pillar one is the trilateral effort to support australia's acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. pillar two is focused on expanding advanced technology that arbery nations will use together including cyber to capabilities -- cyber capabilities, quantum, artificial intelligence, other undersea capabilities, and a range of other capabilities. as you can tell, it is an extraordinarily ambitious program and we are just

beginning to understand the scale of those ambitions. this means investments into our own and are allied systems. a linking of asian and european allies. an integration to a large degree of our industrial capabilities. the ambitions have grown of this undertaking commencement with the scale of the challenge we are all presented with. this was undertaken against the backdrop of a deteriorating security environment in the indo pacific region. specifically centering around the explosive growth of china's military capabilities and the increasingly aggressive use to which those military capabilities are put. those two trends have heightened security concerns in the region and motivated members to begin outlining to respond to the challenges presented. when you look at this remember

it has more than one objective, meant to transform the industrial shipbuilding capacity of all three nations: it is meant as a thin logical accelerator and reestablish what is called a strategic equilibrium in the indo pacific region and ultimately, it is meant to be a model for how the united states works with and empowers its closest allies. if our ambitions are the challenges that it faces. --r ambitions are matching the challenges it faces. the necessity of finding these skilled workers who are going to be building those submarines, the challenges of performing a regulatory system and the way that we control our most sensitive technology and the overriding imperative of providing torts and now and not in 10 years. to discuss this and the gigi on

a military significance i am honored to be here today with two of its forces, and viral milk guild day --admiral mike gilday and kurt campbell. i do not need to introduce them but i will just so we know who we are talking about. mike is a surface warfare officer and he is a graduate of the naval academy and his degree is from the national war college. he has aboard the uss chandler and has commanded the uss higgins and the destroyer squadron seven. and u.s. fleet cyber command. as an officer he is serving in joint positions as the director of the joint forces command as

chief of staff for the naval strike group for nato and he has served as director of point step in the 32nd cno on august 22. kurt campbell serves as the deputy assistant or indo pacific affairs on the national security council. he was chairman and chief executive officer of the asia growth. from 2009 through 2013, he served as the assistant secretary of state for east asia and the pacific affairs and was formerly ceo and the cofounder of the center for new american security. he has the author and editor of 10 different books and received his ba from uc san diego in international relations from oxford university. i am extra nearly humbled that you chose to have this conversation with us and i would like to invite a view up to the stage to have the conversation -- invite those of you up to the

stage to have the conversation. >> is my mike on? we both have served aboard the same ship. i was on the princeton as well. we will compare notes after this, thank you! >> that will be the entirety of our conversation today! i would like to start with a very basic but perhaps expensive question here for the admiral. from a military's perspective, what is this intended to accomplish? admiral mike gilday: in your eloquent remarks you mentioned the destabilizing environment in the indo pacific and a region that is of critical global prosperity. i think this is among a number

of initiatives that the united states is undertaking with its allies and partners in order to provide more stability and predictability and i think to stay with the stability piece is very important. there is also a deterrent aspect to this, against any maligned behavior i think is key. in terms of our navy working together with the u.k. at australia some would say it is a natural next step for us. we have been working together for 100 years and this would be an obvious evolution in terms of where we would go. not only in terms of interoperability but also this takes into a new level in terms of interchangeability. a particularly -- particularly with this which will be commented to a three nations with components made and that are common to u.s. submarines.

that is a great leveler for all of us in terms of interchangeability. i also would put some points on that you made in technical interoperability as well and technical exchange and i think interoperability is not the right word but the partnership that we gain in the industry is going to be key here in terms of knocking down barriers with the respect to the transfer of technology and information and i think that in areas like quantum and ai, unmanned, the possibilities are really limitless here. we would be so limiting if we did not take great advantage of the opportunities that will be presented in that regard. >> we start from the military objectives and increasing our interoperability and interchangeability as use sit as we here in australia do a lot

too. thinking about the strategic objectives, which note, this is not the only thing we are doing in the region and i'm curious from your vantage point at the white house how this sits within some of the other undertaking as we are building something that creates more strategic equilibrium? kurt campbell: thank you for holding this session today, i think it is important for that to be a greater understanding of what we are trying to accomplish. and i want to pay my respects to the admiral for the role he has played in everything. united states is undertaking both the sea and the indo pacific region more generally. i would say if you look at the range of efforts both in unilateral, bilateral,

multilateral, you see the evolution of the strategy that plays in the end of pacific squarely at the future endeavor. you have heard me say before that involves first of all trying to erect a bipartisan agreement about how we will conduct ourselves in the indo pacific, investing in the necessary capabilities in the united states more generally with the recognition that technology will be at the core of arenas of competition going forward. and then, a series of actions with respect to bilateral and multilateral engagements. i will run through some, largely about the quad, trilateral engagements we have undertaken in northeast asia, we have stopped to build on closer ties with japan, south korea, the

philippines, you will have seen it last week i think every substantial diplomatic initiative to open a much closer period of strategic orientation. partnerships between the united states and india. this is all about basically sending a signal of our determination to not only maintain peace and stability but also to stabilize, protect, and secure the operating system of the indo pacific which has basically propelled historic levels of growth with the people out of poverty, provided for a larger sense of well-being in the indo pacific and something worth very much preserving. it argued that some of those benefits have very much affected china as well.

we think we are doing is in the larger interest of the peace and stability that is largely prevailed in the pacific. i would say the other elements of this that are important are that we are increasingly blinking efforts in europe to our endeavors in the end pacific as the animal indicates. -- admiral indicates. we have strong partnerships between the u.s. and the world navy that has flourished over 70 years. we have never taken a step like this before, we decided largely because of the unique quality of the close partnership of our relationship with australia to take this step and to link not only great britain and the united states with australia but basically to link the theaters

in a more substantial way, a process that has in many respects been accelerated through the tragic conflict in the ukraine. i think what this is is a part of a larger determination of the united states to act in decisive, innovative ways to signal that we are going to play a powerful, important, and enduring role in the indo pacific now and into the future. i do also want to underscore that i do believe that each of the countries went into this with their eyes wide open. understanding the challenges and understanding that this is not just a week or two of celebration. they are all in it for the challenges ahead and this is not something that will be accomplished in a short period of time, this is a long term partnership. i think we are all up for.

>> we are lucky we can take the military and strategic perspectives at once. as we talked about the facility and injecting more stability into the region and we talk about china, it is not a secret to say that beijing has responded adversely across the board to the announcement of this program and yet it is not intended to promote china. -- provoke china. when president biden was reading this he said this has one overriding objective, enhanced stability in the indo pacific, make rapidly shifting global dynamics, and this may be more granular and ask how you may see us doing that? how does building up u.s. and i like capabilities enhance -- and allied abilities rates creates deterrents.

admiral mike gilday: not only americans, but also more broadly people around the globe. it is a phased approach that has been very transparent in terms of our beginnings to get more port visits with the australians and a phased approach to and begin deploying our submarines, perhaps up to four out of hms sterling. two through those submarines with the australians in a deliberate manner. and then, finally, get us to a point where australia's is ready and can then take us with the u.s.. summaries and eventually produce our own. we are working hand and globe with them in the u.k. in terms of creating the ecosystem that is so important to maintain a nuclear force. we had that when the united states since the 1950's and there is a culture there that

does not take any shortcuts. it is self assessing and self-correcting. that culture becomes very important and it is not something that just appears overnight. it has to be engraved in a group of sailors or passionate about what they do in the series and what they do. i think there are many layers of elements to this we have insured as dr. campbell said, 18 month consulted period, we have been wide open in terms of the challenges from an industrial standpoint from an vestment standpoint, in america we believe we can do anything but some days when i sit back and i think if we had started a nuclear submarine program from a cold start today, that is a big leap. again, i think we are getting to the point of your question, we have been transparent in terms of a deliberate approach. among the senior uniformed leaders we have been absolutely committed to our relationship

that is printed on trust. we have been committed to having candid, open, transparent, private, not attributional discussions about risk and being completely honest with each other in terms of how we see this progressing, areas where we need to accelerate, or we can, take a deliberate approach and slow down. maybe we have to race to the only ship that we could be expecting too much risk. -- accepting too much risk. kurt campbell: i think we fully recognize that nuclear propulsion provides the ability to deploy forks ordinarily long periods of time at greater distances. also provides the opportunity to operate in an increasingly

challenging environment. the survivability that nuclear powered submarines provides is unmatched and the ability to deploy ordinance conventional or otherwise over great distances has enormous game changing strategic significance. in a variety of predicted scenarios. it provides survivability, flexibility, much greater operational dexterity, and as the admiral indicates it is a partnership that will be developed over decades, frankly. this is a big deal and i would say one of the strategic benefits we are already reaping some of the rewards, we are operating and engaging and we always worked with australia as

the closest possible partnership. i think the admiral will be the first to say this is going to elevate that and we are seeing that already and we are engaging in a way that is unprecedented and we will only grow from here. >> i hope the two of you do not mind a frantic prerogative and pretend to be australian and be really blunt, -- if i take prerogative and pretend to be australian and be really blunt, let me help grow the capabilities and have a game changing capabilities for the australians. the national question is do we have the submarines? we are mandated by congress to be producing two virginia class submarines per year for a variety of reasons. 1.2. i would love to get your comments on what we see the initial announcements was the

sale of three submarines virginia class submarines, there are two more down the road, where do these submarines come from? should these be submarines we already have or are they future production? the industrial capabilities all three nations play into this because it is a numbers game. admiral mike gilday: it is too early to give an idea on where those summaries will come from or whether it is excess capacity or u.s. inventory, our goal and you can see the testimony to it is the significant investment that the u.s. congress is supporting in terms of the industrial base. $650 million last year and of the proposed 750 in the 24 budget and three point 4 billion i think over the five-year defense. it is significant across

different areas of workforce development. our secure infrastructure, strategic outsourcing to smaller companies to take some of the pressure off of our shipyards, supply chain developments, another would be areas like manufacturing we are trying to leverage some of the best new technological advances in manufacturing from around the world and apply it to the submarine program. they're trying to put industrial base in a position where they can increase their productivity. the priority is the columbia class submarine at one a year and then two ss. we are aspirational at this point in respect to reaching the goal of two in the year but all the indicators we have right now is that we are gaining momentum in terms of closing on that and i cannot give you a specific date would we expect to close on two. we are headed in the right direction right i think that puts us in a better place or the

intent would be to put us in a better place with whatever administration might finally make the decision. the congress will play a very serious kind of way in terms of laying out options. understanding the risk up front and then presenting a recommendation in terms of moving forward. we are working very closely, there is legislation that needs to pass for all of us to come together. i guess in short, we do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead and i think it goes right to the point that we made earlier that this foundational trust piece here is really important in terms of relationships. we are talking about a 30 year and never hear, -- we are talking about a 30 year endeavor here, we are talking about 30 years.

and so, while administrations will change and countries hopefully provides some sort of a shock absorber. who can count on that as being -- you can count on those as being foundational to execution. >> at least on my quick not so quick glance this is a fairly unprecedented move where we are not only undertaking investments into our industrial base or submarine industrial base year as is the u.k. and is australia, all three nations are taking investments into allies. as far as i can tell this is unprecedented in wartime and it is unprecedented in peacetime too. kurt campbell: we agree with what the admiral said. one of the points of this is

when the prime minister sunak and prime minister morrison and others met in san diego was to underscore some of the features of how we are going to proceed. we have an unprecedented commitment to australia in our industrial base, to basically focus on improving what i would argue is the jewel in the crown. what is our submarine capacity which frankly needs more resources and it needs more focus. it helps not only providing it but they are helping us understand the kinds of investments that the admirals indicate and i would say it is not just the ability to build, two submarines a year. they were describing. it is also getting a worrisome

large -- that does not make sense, a troublingly large number of submarines that are in repair and to get them back into the water out of the point more quickly. i think the truth is we do have a plan that will allow us to meet the requirements that are laid out in this. i would remember that when submarines are provided from the united states to australia, it is not like they are lost, they will be deployed by the closest possible allied force. in many cases you can make the argument that enhances deterrence which i would. frankly, it creates more capacity and that is the reason why i am grateful for the reason, the way that you asked these questions. the strategic significance of

this is that both australia and great britain have made a fundamental decision to align with us to change a cleat not just now, but as of the admiral indicates into the distant future. i would say that it was not very many years ago that if you had to make an argument which country is prepared to reorient more closely to other countries in the region like china, great britain and australia were two countries that in 10 years ago, flirted with different kinds of orientations and that is changed -- that has changed fundamentally. >> on enhancing deterrents. it is a delicate question and an important question, we have the crown jewels as you said, we are talking about the power of one and we are talking about whether or not you think there is a significant risk of taking these crown jewels and delivering our

most important capability to a sovereign foreign extraordinarily well trusted ally who is depending on circumstances may or may not be there when the balloon goes up. how do you think about that? i understand the enhancing part but how do we wrap our heads around this? admiral mike gilday: we put results in a position with respect to milton milt what we are ready to go and whether it can be a configuration of the political -- the government's. whether it is two or three we have to be ready to be able to flex and adjust. that is -- i'm not trying to be evasive, it is just that is what you, those are the directions we would get and it would execute accordingly. >> cannot have you underscored this because you set a second

ago that having australia has this capability, it has the potential to enhance deterrents. can you explain why you think that is true? admiral mike gilday: your first question is about what steps we are trying to take. i think the most important steps are to recognize that the current strategic environment is favored with the united states being able to operate, engage, with more and more partners. it creates a greater sense of balance at the strategic level and much more uncertainty with potential provocateurs. i think that these steps are very strategically sound. they are steady, i believe that they are bipartisan. there may be a group of people now that talk more about just

the united states acting alone. i think there is a proud tradition and a partisan tradition that recognizes that the united states is most effective when we operate and engage with other partners. you cannot predict every scenario in the future. i would scarcely -- i will not have any doubts about positing that the ability to operate much more effectively and create confidence that the united states is a stabilizing force and we want to be associated with them, that has to be overall beneficial to the peace and stability. i feel quite confident that strategic calculus favors these kinds of agreements. i think that this is major source of stability.

i do believe one of the things you have not raised is we need to do more to their are going to be nations that have questions. we will raise them in a diplomatic form at the iea and elsewhere. we need to commit australia for the work they have done in the pacific and the work they have done in southeast asia. we need to do more and we need the constant informational front foot. indicating that these are, this propulsion capability will be undertaken with all of the requirements that the groups appreciated, these will not be nuclear armed, these conditional forces. conventional capabilities and i think if we continue at it we will gain more and more understanding of what we are

undertaking. i will say i see that in my own deliberations. initially at the outset, because there were uncertainties and questions, people would say we need to know more. i am finding more and more interlocutors in singapore, india, japan, south korea, most of the countries of europe. fully understand the strategic circumstances and the calculus that went into this. i am increasingly confident that maybe not always openly and directly but certainly behind closed doors, many countries understand the rationale for what we have done and why we did it and frankly, are impressed that we did this. >> on opening up a wider front of more nations to choose that this might be in their security interests either expressly or

implicitly we have heard ever since the march 13 announcement, more nations, a pillar too curious, pillar two looks interesting and we have heard from south korea and from france, too. as we shift a little bit away from the conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines and underscore those points all of the time and we look at pillar two a little bit, what do we think are the prospects for expanding pillar two to cooperate with other nations in the statements? kurt campbell: if you are not tracking these as we are here, we have noted that there have been a call to broaden out this and pillar two but that is the full extent of the statement. i'm curious to get both of your takes on the ability to expand this outward beyond the nations? there is potential to do that in selected areas. instead of wholesale inviting

nations to pillar two i would look at certain areas where nations bring technology to bear to make a difference and we have trust in confidence that we can share that information back and forth. the preponderance of our r&d is being done by industry. we need to leverage that. that is the intent of pillar two. admiral mike gilday: leverage that and hit the accelerator so that i will speak for the united states, dod is sometimes very slow in terms of how we transition new technology to actually feel it. we are in some white using pillar two to accelerate so we can disruptive -- take this disruptive technology and use it. kurt campbell: and that was well

articulated. i do believe that there are going to be some areas where allies and partners have some either direct or niche areas where they can assist in a larger endeavor and that might be in hypersonic's, that could be in cybersecurity, it could be in antisubmarine warfare, there are a number of areas that we will explore as we go forward. i think the key will be that what do you bring to the table? are you able to do it in such a way that is going to be practical and operational? we are not just looking for the radicals. -- theoreticals. practical, real, efforts that will enhance defense capabilities. we are -- i will say, we are in

conversation with a variety of countries who are interested and it goes far beyond just those countries. we are grateful for that, the fact that countries are interested in it. it is a positive. we will explore those appropriately. i think all three countries have made clear that under the appropriate circumstances, we would be prepared to work collaboratively with other partners who bring capacity to the challenge. >> not a club to join but something for those nations who have the resources and capabilities to go after this. kurt campbell: you have to make the argument about what we bring to -- this is not just what you receive. it is what you bring. >> we have gotten a lot of questions in the presser and a

lot of questions online too about some of the challenges that we have. how we share technology and how we can collaborate and how we can get money into our systems and some others. beginning to dive down into the weeds of technology transfer, export control, reform, this is a question, emblematic of a lot of questions we will get. this is from the code-1 group, this marks a major enhancement of the defense operation. many commentators i guess he is including himself here note existing u.s. export controls like itar have proven complicated and inhibiting comparing the urgency of situations. it is a question but i think a lot of people agree, is that true, if so, what progress is being made on the front to break down some of those barriers given the urgency of our system

reimagining what it may look like? what are your two cents about what it would look like in terms of performing at this point? admiral mike gilday: i think leveraging -- this is a presidential initiative and leveraging assets begins with breaking down barriers and i think that you need to understand what those barriers are, new technology transfer and each individual case and i think we need to be raised, discussed, the risk needs to be clearly understood and then we look at how do we mitigate and break down those barriers. there are technologies that exist today like zero trust as an example and we can leverage that our technology transfers, frameworks, that perhaps, not perhaps, but would definitely mitigate or drive down risk and perhaps answer a lot of questions or mitigate apprehension that some might

have. we are in conversations with the congress right now about the legislative proposals that are required in order to move forward and some of those involve a very important thing that you mentioned. kurt campbell: i would begin with where he began which is this is mandated by the president. this is not a weather to, it is a how to. sometimes that simple crystallized fact helps quite a lot in complex bureaucratic situations. we are under clear instruction to move in that direction. i would make that point number one. number two, i also think we recognize that we are moving into an environment where we need to work more

effectively with allies and partners and that begins with working more effectively with our closest allies and partners and this is a classic, critical case study of taking the necessary steps to make sure you are working in a way with australia and great britain that we will not point to inhibitions as being things that have made this ambitious program moving slower than it should be. i think we are fully recognize that. that is his second point i would make and the third is that as the admiral indicated we are in the midst of substantial discussions both internally and inside of the government but with congress, about how to take those steps. yes, there is substantial debate

that is ongoing about whether this process will be fulfilled, i would simply say everything i have seen signals that the u.s. government and others are taking this just as seriously as possible. we are seeking to address exactly the point that you laid out for this. >> we are figuring out for the first time in 40 plus years how we will collaborate and safeguard and tighten those safeguards of controls between all three of us. i guess on that final question for me, i will make sure we hit the audience too, you talked about this a bit, will be into the world, nuclear stewardship in a way that we are sharing -- we have undertaken it with the mittens multiple -- britain's

multiple decades ago. you said that question is about if we wanted to do it, when we think about the lessons of nuclear stewardship, what are things we need to think about managing? that is an enormously large question. from the diplomatic and political, legal area, what are the challenges we have to get ahead of when we think about connecting and safeguarding this technology? admiral mike gilday: as we are talking about this between his navy, i pulled out and i reviewed admiral's comments in 1979 after the 3 mile island disaster. he talked about the core principles we have established in the navy nuclear propulsion community that we have never wavered from to this day. down to everybody who has served

on the nuclear power vessel, understands those tenants and it lays down that in the 1950's and he talked about he paid the difference between the civilian nuclear community and the navy and the fact that the navy is required to be more rigorous. staying true to them and holding each other accountable, in that type of environment it becomes very important and i think it can keep you out of trouble. i will not speak to the big policy issues but i will just say at the end of the day, as i said earlier, the bumper sticker is there are no shortcuts. we need to stay focused, navy is a trip and we will do it together safely. kurt campbell: i am like the admiral, one of the great things about the navy and his is that

leadership encourages using history as a guide. to help think through this period and the fact is that we are not starting from scratch. we have almost 80 years of experience. the australians have an enormous backlog legacy and foundational support from the united states around best practices. i think you can under night -- i do not think you can underestimate the importance of that. we look at the challenges, the focus primarily is to be expected has been on costs. and around other issues associated with the nuclear program but the real challenge is creating the highly skilled motivated, individuals who are going to be prepared to work

both in industry and on board ships. and submarines. i will tell you, i am pleased to say that process is already started substantially. the naval officers and those who are serving from australian forces in american schools are doing this ordinarily well. we are going to build on that and we will be done in great britain as well. i do think it is important to remember this is not starting from scratch. we have decided and i watched this and i watched the brotherhood and the partnership that the navy has brought to this. at the outset, some skepticism, some uncertainty, appropriately so. i have watched them make the internal commitment that they

will do what they can to help australia as great britain will to mount this enormous challenge. because we have done it and we know how to do it, we have high confidence that we can help them along this path. i bet it is enormously challenging, we have enormous capacity to experience this and that will come in handy, it will be irreplaceable and the best indicators of success. >> just one point. to those comments. kurt campbell: we graduate our first group of australian submariners from our nuclear power school in charleston in a week's time. we are proud of that. they are doing very well. >> all of them are above?

not just a couple of them? these are not -- these are guys who are excelling? we are going to double down on this. kurt campbell: the commitment is powerful and it is impressive, when you look at the challenges, will this be sustained politically? i have every indication that it will be sustained politically in the united states and australia. i believe for the reasons the admiral listed, the ballast in our boat will be the armed forces and it will be the navy and it will be our commitment of our defensive establishments to complete. i also believe that politically after extensive discussion between republicans and democrats here, both parties, others, the australians that we have the necessary understanding about what is involved here. look, i do believe that there

will be challenges ahead and at the same time i think people except those and we did not dawdle and not do anything with the 18 month period. we essentially explored and interrogated all of these problems together. we were extremely direct about what this was going to need, the numbers of people that are going to need to be trained. there is a tendency to say oh my gosh, are people aware of what is necessary? i do not think it is possible with an endeavor of this magnitude to be able to not identify everything. i have rarely seen a process more significant, more attuned to the challenges, as opposed to just thinking about the parade when we are celebrating the victory. i am quite confident that our three countries are capacity --

arthur countries are up to the challenge. >> one of the of the endeavor is here at csis, we hosted the head of the iaea saying this was undertaken in the most transparent fashion possible and has a clean bill of health from the iaea to this point. any other information that is out there is not tracking with where they are at. i understand that was the first goal? admiral mike gilday: you cannot have a country that is in better standing in this then australia has. i think we probably have to do a better job of propagating this storyline and we will.

>> that is enough from us here, so your hand go up, stand up and ask a sustained question. -- ask a question. >> all of these summaries and allies in the region has me thinking about the potential for incidents or unexpected events with china or other nations. for those of us in beijing last week, with secretary blinken, we were finding out that there was not a great through in getting a military to military channel going to work with china. i am wondering is it worth loosening sanctions on the chinese defense minister to get some kind of budgetary to military -- some kind of military to military channel going? thank you. admiral mike gilday: china's

inhibitions around military to military crisis prevention mechanisms and communication capabilities are long-standing. this is not a recent phenomenon. we do believe that it is important for the united states and china to take the necessary practical steps that would enable effective communication to deal with unintended circumstances or an accident or mishap. we will continue to articulate the rationale for why this is important, particularly as our forces increasingly rub off against one another, operate in closer proximity, we will simply say that if you do and it

has been reported in the wall street journal, china has undertaken some of these steps with other countries in southeast asia, they recognize the value of them. for a variety of reasons, we would say that they are mixed and beyond simply restrictions placed on senior officers. the chinese have been reluctant to score -- to undertake these efforts. we are going to continue to make the case both as secretary austin did at shangri-la and we will try to do in all of our undertakings that it is necessary, prudent, and indeed, expected that the united states and china take the necessary steps to have those lines of communication to deal with unexpected circumstances like a spy balloon that makes its way

across the united states. no one had anticipated. in fact, the necessary communications were lacking and that -- were lacking in that circumstance. we will make the arguments about why these are necessary and we believe that diplomacy you experienced last week is a good step. we will take those steps to improve dialogue and discussion with china as part of our larger strategy in the indo pacific. kurt campbell: from an operating standpoint, operating in international airspace we follow the internationally recognized rules. as you all have seen from videos that we have released when we

have been in close contact with whether it is the russians or the chinese we have been -- our many officers have been on ambiguous in terms of communicating directly to their counterparts, what our intentions are, how we are maneuvering, what we are going to do next. in accordance with the international law to avoid any kind of provocations. admiral mike gilday: it is really important to remain unemotional with a high degree of professionalism in terms of how we operate as you would expect we would. >> two questions here at once. >> thank you. i am from bloomberg news, a question for both of you, i guess they disparate technologies listed in pillar two i think a lot of people including me are still finding the whole pillar a little bit theoretical. if you could talk through what

some of those technologies will actually mean for the deterrents and what the last 72 hours mean for xi jinping. >> we will add 1 one top of that. >> i am from australia, from the austrian perspective we are strategically aligned with you, we are suffering from serious economic coercion from china in the meantime. why specifically i'm thinking of my former colleague who has been detained in china for two years, no progress in her case as of yet. what is the u.s. doing to support her case and australia dealing with chinese coercion and to the admiral, a similar question. australia is quite strategically vulnerable until the summaries come online.

what is happening to ensure that australia is not left vulnerable? >> those are four questions. pick your poison. kurt campbell: i have to venture into unfair ground but he will figure out the ones who are the right ones. i would say that when our senior diplomats engage with chinese interlocutors we do raise cases of generally citizens and others that are we believe being arbitrarily or inappropriately held in china. i'm not going to go into all of the details and i am also going to say we are cooperating with australia as well but i will begin with that, on the issue of economic coercion.

i think you will have seen some of the statements that came out of the g7, unprecedented, recognition, among allied democracies about the challenge that this poses and they need to take quite a steps. there is a deeper recognition that australia has experienced and frankly, handled with greater effectiveness than probably any country on the planet. those activities of economic punishment that have been perpetrated against australia, we have seen it in europe and various circumstances, the philippines, south korea, i think we recognize the challenge that this presents to both national economies but the global economy and i think we have undertaken a broader effort

not only as part of our direct diplomacy but working with other countries to gather capacity in which to address these issues directly with chinese interlocutors. it is a significant and serious continuing issue on the global stage. peter has good questions, your first question could you remind me real quick? look, i would say that the lion's share of we focused on to date has been to ensure that pillar one, the foundational understanding of capabilities and legal requirements and that foundation is essentially ready

for lift [indiscernible] >> yeah, look. so i would say that what we focus on today to -- to date has been to ensure with pillar one that the foundational understandings, capabilities, regal requirements and met that foundation is essentially ready for lift off. that has been our dominant focus. i would argue, appropriately we also believe that -- and we have begun efforts associated with pillar two. part of what we are doing is doing a kind of cataloging with various countries of areas where we've seen particular progress,

particular areas of technological capacity that we might seek to build upon. i think, i did identify some of the areas that i think have been candidate topics. those are by no means meant to be exclusive, we are exploring other opportunities as well. peter, what i would say simply is watch biz space. -- watch this space. we have negotiations associated with pillar two while we are also trying to ensure that the foundational steps are in good shape with respect to launching pillar two. now i've forgotten your other question. this is been -- sorry. so i think it would be fair to say that recent developments in russia have been unsettling.

to the chinese leadership. i think i'll just leave that. [laughter] >> in terms of pillar to, most of the things we are working with right now with u.k. and australia are classified, but i would say that examples that i can speak about involve ai and unmanned closely linked. the ai being the plug on top of the -- you know to the water bottle which would be the platform. and so we are doing work in the middle east. we are about to do more in south america. and we will join both of the australians and the brits for a big unmanned exercise that the australians are going to host in the full -- fall. with respect to deterrence, about in july we will commission

the uss camera in sydney. the ships to be commissioned for -- in a foreign country. one example of us stepping a little -- toward a little bit perhaps that has a return value. we do not do that very often. this will be the first time. i think that partnership is alive and well. we are trying to not self limit with what we are doing in the future. >> again, for those of you who do not obsessively cover every twist and turn on this, i would encourage you to look at the social media that the department of defense has put out around ai and unmanned systems and routes that have been taken in the u.k. over the last month. i would just like to say before we wrap, i would really like to underscore the unprecedented nature of the endeavor that we are on.

we are hinting our way, picking our way towards a new way of trusting our allies here. just drink them them in order to strengthen ourselves. that is something -- to strengthen them in order to strengthen ourselves. that is something we have not done in 70 years time. i would like to thank you both for making sure that we have the stability we need. if everyone could join me if you need -- >> because i will more thing on my way out? >> no, you may not. of course, go ahead. >> with the incredible leadership of the navy, a life of service and commitment has been given. the last couple of years have been some of the most challenging.

washington journal continues. host: a conversation on the future of artificial intelligence. our guest is neil chilson, served as chief t