we also take the opportunity to highlight a particular issue each year and this year we highlighted the issue of childcare. host: speaking of childcare, what are some of the findings? how would you describe the current state of childcare in the u.s.? guest: we have a broken childcare system in this country which is troubling because childcare is important for many reasons. it is important for children. there are 23 million children in this country under the age of five. about 12 million of them will exit our childcare system at some point during their childhood. we want others children to get off so that they are prepared for kindergarten when they start school. it is important for children that we have a strong childcare system.

it is also important for parents. parents need childcare in order to go to work and to care for their families about that more than 50% of people are working parents. they need the childcare support to enable them to go to work. childcare is important for our economy. want to make sure we have workers available to meet the talent needs of this country. we >> wyche leaving this for live coverage of a task force discussing u.s. taiwan relations and challenges posed by china. hosted by the council on foreign relations. live coverage here on c-span. >> i'm very pleased to present our latest report. u.s.-taiwan relations in a new era responding to a more assertive china. task force reports are meaningful. they represent the consensus of our members. a diverse bipartisan group of

experts. the fact that this group was able to reach accord on u.s. policy toward taiwan, a few additional or partially dissenting views which you find at the back of the report, reveal the enormous stakes the united states has in the taiwan straits and the desire for peace and stability in the region. this report is the culmination of nearly a year of work from our co-chairs, project director, task force members, and observers and staff here. my thanks go to our co-chairs for their leadership and wisdom throughout this project and for being here to present the report today. i also would like to recognize task force project director who held the pen of the group and drafted the findings and recommendations. i'm grateful to all our task force members and observers who convened several times over the past year to deliberate on these issues and provided important feedback during our proses is. some have joined us in person and some are virtual with us today. i'd also like to thank harry

harris who participated in our research drip tripp to taiwan and joining our co-chairs and director on stage to present the report today. i'd like to acknowledge my task force colleagues, shelly and connor anti-many departments and staff members at c.f.r. who make these reports possible. finally, i'd like to thank our president, richard haas, for his leadership and strong support of the task force program during his 20 years at the council. i hope you enjoy today's discussion. i your honor turn it over to our moderator, sarah. sarah: hi, everyone. can you hear me? i'm the editorial board of the "new york times." and thank you for being here today for the release of the consequential report on a consequential subject. i railroad sitting in this room during the iraq war and it seemed like every decision the u.s. government made about iraq was monumental for the middle east.

and today every decision that's made about taiwan feels like is monumental for the world. i don't think it's an understatement to say if the united states and china were to get into conflict over taiwan, there is no country in the world that would be unaffected. it's a big deal. before we get started, just some housekeeping. please, turn off your cell phones. please, please. i promise you you can live without your cell phone for an hour. silence it or turn it off. this is on the record. and i'm going to engage with the very distinguished group for 30 minutes, 25 minutes. then i'll open it up for questions from all of you. which i'm sure are going to be brilliant. if you haven't had a chance to really digest the report, i'm going to set the table with

three things that jumped out at me about t mooning the many conclusions of this report are, one, we are not making enough weapons to defend both ukraine and taiwan at the same time. two, even if we were, giving weapons to taiwan is not enough to defend it. the u.s. military would have to be directly involved. to defend it properly, is 245 fair to say -- is that fair to say? three, even that would not be enough. we need our allies to be part of defense. and we are not quite sure yet how far they would go to participate. that's all fair? that's sobering. that was sobering to me to learn. admiral mullin, can we start with you. i want to ask you to make the case for the vital importance of taiwan. make the case right now to the american people why should we

risk a war with china, with a nuclear armed rival, that is a factory of the world? admiral mullin: we had a debate over the course of the many months that we worked on this in terms of whether this is a vital national interest, vital interest, interest, etc. where we came down, you'll see it in the report, this is a vital interest to the united states. there are a number of reasons for that. probably the most significant is this -- this is an island that is in the center of the four to five top economies in the world. and if i can maybe put it in practical terms, if we go back to 2,000 dot-com, 2008, 2009 what happened when the economies tanked after that. or when we actually went into the recession for the pandemic, you think about the impact of that. this would make going to war with china for any reason, obviously this is a centerpiece,

i think would make all of those economic impacts seem small compared to what would happen globally. not just between the united states and china. principally for two reasons. one, because our economies are very heavily ranked. and secondly because of taiwan's impact on the semiconductor industry where they manufacture 60% to 70% of the semicontkrubgtors in the world and 90 -- semiconductors in the world and 90% of the most important semiconductors in the world as well. a war with china over anything, including taiwan, would devastate the global. it would also then put the two biggest global competitors at each other's throats for a long period of time. we need to do in the report, gets at this, we need to do everything that we can to make sure that doesn't happen.

part of the debate that we had is what to call this report. inside the staff. you see what the result is. if i could sum it up, i'm worried we are drifting into war. i don't like to drift into anything. i like to understand it. make sure that we have prepared as well as we k i think you'll see in the -- as well as we can. i think you'll see in the report we talk about deterrence which is failing over many years. we can have debates about that per se, but clearly china is much more aggressive, much more coercive on the military side, diplomatic side, on the economic side, and political side. and it needs to be, my view is or our view, it needs to be rebalanced because tensions are so high, we are at an all time low for the relationship. rebalancing that means we are going to have to take aggressive steps which at a time of high tensions could be read the wrong way. it is a very, very fragile time

in terms of resolving it peacefully. sarah: just to follow up on that. you spent much your career thinking about the middle east. is that fair to say? how -- what assumings did you bring to this project? how did your thinking change over time? admiral mullen: part of the reason, we talked about this a little bit off camera. in the four years i was chairman from 2007 to 2011 i didn't spend a minute on taiwan. i was focused in the middle east, wars in iraq and afghanistan, and we had a significant terror issue we were going after. i think that's not a broad brush-u brush across the entire -- a broad brush across the entire military complex. because they were running paycome during -- pay come -- paycome during his time. my perspective i didn't have the in-depth knowledge. secondly, we don't allow senior

officers on the ground in taiwan, never have. so the level of knowledge that i had with respect to this a lot of knowledge about the theater, a lot of specific knowledge about taiwan that i didn't have at my fingertips. certainly this task force has allowed me to dive deep on these issues in many, many aways. not least of which is to understand it's an extraordinarily complex issue. there is a history part of this report that i would commend to everybody because it has evolved over time. and it's not something that just recently occurred. there is a lot there that also applies to what's going on right now. sarah: admiral harris, i want to bring you n what can you tell u. what can you tell us about china's preparations for a possible conflict? what can you tell us about taiwan's capacity to defend itself? admiral harris: important questions. i think that over time being the

last decade or soerbgs certainly this century -- or so, certainly this cone century, we have seen the p.r.c. become far more aggressive in their discourse about taiwan. they have assured us -- we talk a little bit about strategic clarity and ambiguity and all that. it has been clear about their intent with regard to taiwan. they will take taiwan, restore it to their view of taiwan's place in the chinese territory, they will do it either peacefully or, if necessary, militarily. you can't get clearer than that. and they are building a military to confront the united states, our military, and those of our

friends and allies and partners. they are building a military that can confront us on the high seas, airspace, and above the seas, aerospace. some people they are already there. i'm not one of them. i believe today in 2023 we exceed the p.r.c.'s military capability in all domains. but it's tell porbl -- temporal. we had to continue to innovate and resource our military, your military, in order to maintain that edge to dissuade, to deter the p.r.c. from doing what they say they'll do if peaceful reunification doesn't work. with regard to taiwan's military itself, i visited there twice this year. i came away impressed by their

understanding and their determination of the nature of the problem. for sure russia on ukraine has galvanized the taiwanese. they understand the magnitude of the problem. for all of us if we allow an autocratic big country to have its way with smaller democratic countries, i.e. -- e.g., for example, ukraine or taiwan, then the global world order as we know it is finished. might will make right unless free nations like the united states and our friends, allies, and partners stand up to what's happening in europe and what could happen in east asia. sarah: to follow up on that. you are the ambassador of south korea. you were the head of the indo-pacific command. why don't we know more about what our allies would be willing

to do? especially given that one of the rationales in the report to protect taiwan is that it would make it easier to protect japan and south korea. admiral harris: our allies are coming to the relationship of the danger that's resident in the p.r.c. we see that in japan from abe. we see it through the administration, peter dutton, the minister of defense, he famously said, quote, of course we would go to war to protect taiwan, if the united states did. we are seeing a change and a view of our allies with regard to taiwan and what could happen. but to be fair to them, we are ambiguous on whether we would defend taiwan or not. i say we, that's the united

states. except for one notable exception. the president of the united states has said four times they are willing to defend taiwan. i think we should take him at his word and plan accordingly. sarah: i should say i have a friend who is an american businessman in shanghai who is married to a woman from taiwan. i asked him, should we defend taiwan? he said only if japan and south korea are with us. it was interesting to read in your report that they are a bit ambiguous as well. director gordon, how much do we know about what will deter china and president xi, and what will trigger him? the report talks about building up getting a footing to deter a war. so much could signal that we are ready to go to war and bring about that which we are trying

to prevent. you spent your career in intelligence. you spent 25 years at the c.i.a. what do we know about this important question of what will trigger war versus what will deter a war? >> i think the first thing we know is that the equation is in his head. right. it is his interest and his moment when he decides what needs to happen. so, we need to hold that as true. we are, however, seeing a number of things that are different than they were a minute ago. exceedingly fragile and can't happen, feels like -- here's what i would say. number one, his at the same time. and not only his at the same time of -- that reunification,

it is a national interest but not something he can pass down as somebody else. and there are people who make the argument is it because he's in a much tougher economic position so we need something legacy? or whether he just believes it from a naturalistic perspective. that is certainly from his words much more aggressive statement. number two, is coercive actions toward taiwan. if you remember russia and ukraine. why did russia turn off the power in ukraine? it was not in 2014 to turn off the pouer in ukraine. it was to say we own you. if you look at china's actions in taiwan, of being more provocative whether from a cyber sper spebgtive -- sper spebgtive or mill -- perspective or military action, they are saying their intention to reduce the

will. certainly their military power greater. what's happened in the south china sea and globally, if you take those together you will infer that if he hasn't made the decision he's certainly building the capabilities so that is a decision that could be made that is less far away for him than it was five years ago. sarah: you are convinced deterrence is possible with enough -- ms. gordon: i believe you have to work to defer, but the deterrence we have been practicing that has held is looking like it's not having the same influence on his equation. if you look at the study and how we break down deterrent and diplomatic and security and economic it is really aimed at two things. being clear about our interests. and that our interests will not be affected by china's coercion

of us to be smaller. two, increasing taiwan's resilience. and three, doing what we can to make sure that taiwan legitimately has its ain't to participate in the global economy. so i think you'll see that the deterrent actions are less passive. but they are still aimed answer the same historic -- against the same historic perspective of one china. sarah: i want to bring in david over there. let's just say chinese officials would say that in 1979 the united states acknowledged there is only one china and that taiwan is a part of it. did we, in fact, do that? >> you use add very important word there which is acknowledge. in 1972 the shanghai communique and 1979 normalization communique that's all we did. we acknowledged the chinese

position there is one china and taiwan is a part of china. we did not recognize, affirm, or endorse that view. while the united states doesn't support taiwan independence, nor do we endorse the p.r.c.'s perspective that taiwan is a renegade province that has to be returned to the p.r.c. at some point in the future, i think it's fair to say that the u.s. position is that taiwan's status is undetermined. we don't take a position on what the ultimate status of taiwan is. instead we stress and the report endorse this is policy that process is important. that any resolution of cross strait issues must be arrived at peacefully and with the consent of the people of taiwan. again echo what admiral mullen said, i think it's important for people to go back to the history section of this report and consult other sources to see how we got here and what the

elements are of the u.s. policy towards taiwan and our one-china policy. it wasn't created to be intelligible. it is multiple slice of -- sleight of hand rolled into one. it's important to grapple with that and see what we pledged to do and not do, and what we left ambiguous and preserved our freedom of action and maneuver. it's interesting to see what secretary blinken has said something that's been u.s. policy for decades. that the united states does not support taiwan independence. to jump on that and say that's a departure, that's a concession to beijing where he sold out taiwan in his meetings in beijing, which wasn't the case. if we took the time to look at nuances here, then i think we are in a better position to do what we have been talking about during -- sarah: did tkpwraoe to a-- agree

to disagree in 1979? or did we paper over, did we lie? because you can see in the history which you all spell out so clearly that there were promises made to -- that we wouldn't arm taiwan forever. that eventually reagan didn't set an end date, but he did say that armed shipments would taper off. we would cut off official relations with taiwan. tphepb who has been to taipei, our institute in taipei, it looks and speaks and smells like an embassy. how much of this is papered over and how much of this is what chinese officials would say is a

fake-one china policy? >> on the specifics of what you say, the 82 communique did talk about reduction in arms sales. but president reagan made clear at the same time that the overriding imperative of u.s. policy was to maintain a military balance in the taiwan strait. if it wasn't able to do both of those things at the same time, reduce arms sales to taiwan while maintaining a balance, then the latter would take precedence. i think that's what we have seen. the military threat posed to taiwan continues to grow. that is what china has pursued. and therefore we need to take steps to ensure taiwan can defend itself as u.s. law, the taiwan relations act makes clear. so in terms of our one-china policy as well, you mentioned a.i.t. the chinese want to frame everything we are doing here as having a fake one-china policy. the reality is we don't sign treaties between our

governments. there are certain things that have remained consistent since 1979. we have a director to a.i.t. but not a senate-confirmed bam bass door. taiwan's ambassador in washington does not present his or her credentials to the united states. there are important differences we should keep in mind whenever the united states is criticized for abandoning its wayne-china policy. to -- one-china policy. to your broader point whether we agree to disagree, clearly if you look at the history of the normalization process, taiwan was the biggest issue between the united states and the p.r.c. it was something that i think we finessed successfully. we recognize we would never come to agreement on that. and we successfully finessed it now for over four decades. i think where we might fall into a trap is in viewing taiwan as a problem that we can solve. that's the very american way of

looking at things. but our objective as we lay out in the report is that we should continue to seek to finesse this and push it down so that eventually there can be a peaceful resolution that the taiwanese people are comfortable with and endorse. i think to get back to the points that were made earlier, the biggest thing for us, i think, is to increase our deterrence and convince china that this is not something that they can do or that they want to pursue. sarah: we are talking about kicking the can down the road further. as far as can i tell the c.c.p. has always been crystal clear about its desire to get taiwan back. they would see it as getting taiwan back. and that would be a resolution, the end of the civil war in

president xi's mind, i guess. they are always going to care more about taiwan than the average american. i guess that would be fair to say. there are some of you up on the stage who think we should also be crystal clear. you didn't say it in this report, but there are some of you on this stage who have advocated for strategic clarity. is there somebody who wants to advocate for more clarity right now? susan: i'll start it. i think actually one of the most important parts of this report is actually this study task force's astergs that taiwan is a vital u.s. interest, and more, we articulated why. and the why is a really important one.

yes, it has security. yes it has alliances. it also has world order. it also has democracy. and it also has economic considerations. not just the proximate cause of the chips, but also what it would mean for this vibrant economy to cease to perform. so it's an articulation of those vital interests that i think is really important. and more by putting it out there, the belief that this is something that has to be a discussion with the american people. because today i don't think there is clarity within the united states over the position that taiwan has in terms of our national interest. and it will be consequential everything that we do to address that. and that ought to involve a conversation with the american people. i think that is one of the areas

where we are most clear and believe the clarity has to happen. then there are a number of other areas that we want to be clear with taiwan. taiwan about how they become more resilient. china. and secretary blinken's visit is an important part that have to have the ability to converse. i think there are elements of where we want to be clear. we are very clear on eshooing meaning -- eschewing meaningless acts but purposeful the interests are addressed. that's where we look at this report that's where we should see some of the real strengths of the study taoefplt >> we disagreed for some time. before harry talked about that, one thing that is really clear is the -- we talk about it a

little bit in the report in terms of khaes change -- what's changed in terms of context, is the one country, two systems piece. and that -- which used to be accepted until a couple years ago when hong kong went away. that was, particularly the visit i had to taiwan a year ago march, that just jumped off the page from all those that we engaged. admiral mullen: that changed the calculus about possibilities. that was sort of what -- that's what hong kong was going to be. there is a thought maybe we could get there with taiwan. not so much anymore given what china did to clarify its future by virtue of what happened in hong kong. >> let me back it up a little bit and tell you why i think taiwan is important. they are democratic. they are an innovation nation.

and they are a global force for good. there are 24 million taiwanese that want to live their lives just like you and i do. they don't want to live in a communist system, governed by a country that's committing genocide against their own people, and are -- and brutalized hong kong to bring them under chinese rule. ambassador harris: they should have something to say about that, in my opinion. forever, forever hasn't happened yet in my book. we need to continue to follow the law. we are a nation of laws. and our law with regard to taiwan is governed by the taiwan relations act. it obligates us to do certain things, including provide material -- materiel for taiwan's defense for their defensive needs. until such time as there is a peaceful resolution across the

strait the conflict between taiwan and the mainland. now the issue is strategic clarity. i was pleased with how the report handled the issue of strategic clarity and that's a testimony that david here who wrote it and the members of the task force and the c.f.r. team. because if you read the report closely, the report doesn't actually take a stand on strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity. richard haas did in his introduction to the report but he didn't put his finger on the scale. he left the task force work through this issue. so i was pleased with how the issue of clarity versus ambiguity was finessed in the report. now for sure, i've come out publicly, i am a proponent of strategic clarity and i'll tell you briefly why. there's three constituents i think we need to be clear about

with regard to what we would do if china invades taiwan. the first constituency is the taiwanese people. so they can then make the decision to either arm up or capitulate and join china. the chinese need to -- is the second constituency. they need to be fully cognizant of what the united states will do if they invade taiwan. china is a country governed for the longest time, not currently, but through its history by a one-china -- by a one-child policy without a social safety net for their older citizens. those older citizens are going to be orphaned if they go to war against the united states. so they need to be fully cognizant, in my opinion. but the most important

constituency is the american people. because it's your sons and daughters who are going to fight and die for taiwan if we go to war against china over taiwan. now, in the cold war, i'm a product of the cold war. i miss it in some respects. but as a product of the cold war, we got it as a nation when we were faced with a threat and the possibility of war with the soviet union. and we accepted that our military might have to fight either -- g.i.-u.k. gap. greenland, iceland gap. we understood that and we supported it passively if not actively. but we don't have that same level of understanding for taiwan because of our policy of strategic ambiguity. so i think we owe it to the

american people to be clear about what our intent is with regard to taiwan. that's why i'm an advocate of strategic clarity. that said, i did not dissent. i did not provide an additional view, quote-unquote, in the report, because i endorsed the report and embraced it fully for its stance on the overall issue of taiwan and how the issue of clarity versus ambiguity was finessed in the report. farah: so i have so many more questions for you all. but i want to open it up to our virtual audience first for a question from the virtual audience and then i think we're going to have a microphone for you all. i'm sure many great questions from the audience. who can give us a virtual question? >> we'll take our next question from david unger.

david: yes. david. international institute of strategic studies. this question is for susan who says the u.s. need to avoid symbolic provocative acts. would you characterize speaker pelosi going to taiwan last year as provocative? susan: i think that recommendation was our visit to taiwan and talking to almost every faction of the taiwan leadership. and asking the question of clarity versus ambiguity. and i think they were very resolute in terms of be clear with us. we are less concerned with what you say with the small exception of if you aren't doing something meaningful in terms of an outcome.

whether it is deterrent action or a strengthening action. and so i think that comes from them. i think it was certainly symbolic act. not being the person that decided what to do, i will -- i will probably defer on calling out whether it was meaningless or not. it certainly had an effect in taiwan, and it certainly is one of those things that can be used from a propaganda perspective by china to say what our intention really is. and so being careful about that is really what we're advocating. farah: has there been communication since then or military-to-military? if i'm remembering correctly. all right. a question in the back. james: hi. i'm james from the stevens center. i want to ask, especially david,

if you can list some of the actions that the united states could take that would pretty definitively exacerbate the security situation? what are the, quote-unquote, red lines that china holds to that the united states and china de facto outlined together in the joint commune kays that the united states cannot do without knowingly kind of breaching the accord, if you will? david: yeah. i mean, i -- what i would say, clearly the united states abrogated the defense treaty with the republic of china in 1979 when it normalized relations with the prk and so -- p.r.c. and so the general guideline with the u.s. government, everything that looks like a reconstitution of a mutual defense treaty would be seen as inconsistent with the u.s. one china policy and could trigger a conflict. and so you have to think about what that means in practice.

i think that one of the red lines that we've seen -- and this isn't explicitly stated in the report, but i think it was an assumption we went in with. things like a heavy u.s. military presence in taiwan is something that we need to avoid. and so when we talk about inviting taiwan to multilateral exercises or doing enhanced training with taiwan's military, you know, we advocate doing that in the united states and away from the island of taiwan. i think that's important. but i think what's implicit in your question, this isn't really laid out in the communiques. there isn't a list of things we can do and can't do. a lot of it is based on assumptions of how we think the chinese will respond to certain actions and, you know, private statementings that they've made over the years. you know, there are a couple of red lines in the anti-cessation

law. but china is kind of paying so it gives itself maneuverability and flexibility to say, ok, you triggered it and now we must act. so we are dealing with a lot of different of shades of gray here. in the report we do advocate doing more to train taiwan's military. we call for if not be ambitious du what we did with ukraine to have ukraine turn it around and we do call for increasing senior officer visits to taiwan as admirals mellen and harris noted. senior military officers in the united states do not go to taiwan. so you're talking about a real, i think, disadvantage that we come to it with. so i don't think that we have a good answer of saying these are the five things we can do or can't do. and there were certainly

disagreements within our group on just where the lines stands and to what extent you can push the line or china's attempting to push it in the other direction. but i would say if you read the report we do conclude we do need to be fairly forward-leaning in order to stop the erosion of deterrence that we see occurring in the taiwan strait. farah: one right here. and then i'll take a virtual question after this. >> sorry. i think you might have pointed to someone else. farah: i was pointing at the second row. sorry. thank you. very responsible. >> wow. thanks. the first time that anyone has given up a question. admiral mullen: i wouldn't have done it if i knew it was you.

>> thank you. tell us more about your discussions what farrah said in the beginning -- farah said in the beginning, the more need for weapons faster. and one of the three key constituency, what the american people want? because for the last five years we talked about the alarm bells over china and the political debate over what to think about china and therefore what to do about it. we're hearing quite a big difference of things to do. so one is, arm to the teeth like mike gallagher is saying in his committee. but outside the arming and the pentagon and the intelligence community, the rest of the united states is also kind of being warned about china. what do you think the gaps are or how are the warnings being received? what do you want to see more from areas like wall street, hollywood, disney, the nba, you know, across american society? what else can help the cause of preventing war other than arming to the teeth? admiral mullen: i knew there was a reason you shouldn't have gotten that mic.

>> you are never getting rid of me. admiral mullen: i'll take a crack at the answer here. part of what we really try to emphasize in the report, this just isn't about military capability. in fact, i would argue that that's certainly a critical piece but it is not depositive overall and we should take as many actions as we can across the entirety of the diplomacy, intelligence, military, economic capabilities that we have and that our allies have in this particular -- on this particular challenge. and i think the u.s. has great leverage on the economic side. sort of this combination of where we are in our economy. we're very intertwined with china. i don't see any way we're going to, quote-unquote, decouple from them, per se. focus on the right technologies to make sure they don't get used against us. but we have great leverage there, particularly as china's economy is struggling and will for some time in the future.

which is a way to -- i don't want to say finesse but help address these very difficult issues. i think that's true diplomatically. china's very aggressive globally. any time taiwan has given any consideration in conferences, organizations. we need to change that calculus, quite frankly. in addition, when you think impbuilding up -- building them up militarily, we haven't focused on taiwan for decades. i go to my focus of before. you can say that but you can't cartoon it to say it will happen overnight. it will take them a long time to help them build up capability. david brought this up. we've had an extraordinary impact on ukraine based on the training. we can do that. our allies can do that. and all of that is to focus on increasing or decreasing the likelihood that conflict would

break out. because the tensions are so high. the tensions are going to go up. there's no question about that. which gets back or gets me to president xi and biden have to figure out a way to stay in touch, to make sure they guide their people and their staffs to make the case, certainly here in the united states, about how taiwan -- how important taiwan is. and that leaders sort of control the narrative to make sure this doesn't break out into the war that would literally devastate the world. farah: let me just gently, foolishly -- like i feel like the witness in front of congress. i just have to say something more. susan: i don't think we can understatement the impact the war on ukraine had on the taiwan people and on xi's calculus. and taiwan isn't ukraine. and so thinking about that

combination is part and parcel of what mike said. what are you going to do? not just arm to the teeth with the same model but create the kind of will and resilience for taiwan to be able to exert its part of this balance more effectively. so i think had ukraine not happened, we might be having a different conversation. but since it did, you have to look at that and say, what is the analogue to that strengthening that we affected over many years that we might be able to affect? admiral mullen: and if i could add to that. because ukraine happened. we have seen gaps in our capability as a result of that. and there are real people dying. that will happen in taiwan. americans, taiwanese, and others that would participate. and we need to be ready for that. we need to make sure we have the

stockpiles. a real critical player in all this is the hill. and if this just gets wound up into politics as we know it right now, that will greatly limit what we're able to do to get red and to deter. so the hill has a huge place to play here. particularly -- and i'm fond of this because i used to do this for a living. particularly the appropriators need to provide the money to be able to do this. that -- without that, we don't have much of building up our own capabilities, much less theirs. susan: i have to say i was recently in tie pay and i saw the -- taipai and i saw the boxing gloves from the mayor of kooef. they have a -- kiev. it is not ukraine.

it's an island. i ask them, how many days would you -- would you last without being able to be resupplied with gas? farah: with it? eight mays days. there's no poland. it's a much different situation. and that -- that's real. let's take one more virtual question. >> we'll take our next question from daniel. daniel: good afternoon. i'm a recent c.f.r. international third fellow in japan where i focus on the geopolitics in the pacific region. in thinking about what was just said about -- eight days of l.n.g., whatever the u.s. does, whether it -- strategy or a less aggressive strategy to avoid conflict or not, it can't do it

alone. [inaudible] farah: daniel, you're going in and out. can you make sure you're speaking directly into your microphone so we can hear you? daniel: sorry. we're under a thunderstorm. farah: an act of god here. daniel: i am saying whatever we do, we are not going to be able to do it alone. we need our partners and our allies, whether it's directly in the region with japan and australia and south korea or economic issues, we're going to need europe. so did the task force consider at all the need for what would be multilateral action, the need for japan, europe, and others to work with or support u.s. action in deciding what u.s. strategies should be?

if not, maybe you take the opportunity now to think about, you know, how -- how should our need to rely on others influence what our strategy should be towards the taiwan issue? david: yeah. we note in the report that our network of allies and partners is our number one asymmetric advantage vis-a-vis china. and as it regards to the europeans, i think we're realistic that, number one, they likely will not support militarily or even have necessarily the capacity to do so. but what we can do is have very serious conversations with our european allies about sanctions and put together sanctions that we think would bolster deterrence and potentially even preview those to the chinese to convince xi jinping that economic costs would be enormous and not something he wants to

bear. and as it regards asia, we took note of i think really positive steps just this year, whether it's, you know, new pledges from japan about u.s.-japanese operation -- exercises in japan's southwest islands. whether it's reforms to our force posture in japan. obviously, we took note of aucus and the new u.s.-philippines relationships. niece countries are making are -- these countries are making their own soefrn decision -- sovereign decision about the threat and what the region would look like after chinese annexation of taiwan. and so, yes, we call on to do more to strengthen our coordination and cooperation with our allies about japan. and i think there is a growing appetite on their part. i don't think this is something we're forcing them to do. i think there is an openness now in tokyo, manila, as well as

elsewhere in the region to really think and talk about uncomfortable questions that they had wanted to avoid for decades. so this is absolutely part of the strategy and something that we focused a lot on in the report. farah: ok. let's do the front row here. >> thank you. from harvard-kennedy school. so we know taiwan has a presidential election coming up in january. so out of the three candidates, two are actually from the opposition. actually likely to advocate for a different approach than the current ruling party which is they would be more open to having a dialogue from beijing and maybe dial down. and building up taiwan's defense. so in the case that when taiwan's ruling party is going

to have a different attitude, whether it's towards china or even with the u.s., what does washington, d.c., do? >> i think the united states does not oppose cross-strait dialogue. it's something we consistently advocate for and the problem for the last seven years or so has been that beijing refuses to talk to taiwan's democratically elected leader. >> naubl naubl [inaudible] admiral mullen: going there, which i did a year ago in march, it ended with the elected politicians. the politics hits there pretty fast. at the same time, the taiwanese people are going to make their selection and to me at this

point, i mean, it's a very complex situation and choice but that's -- that is for the taiwanese people to decide and we will move forward accordingly, you know, based on what their leadership wants to do over time. i think it's a little early to say we would do this or we won't do that, something else at this particular point in time. nor, should we under any circumstance, advocate for an outcome that would proceed that election. we need to know it's going to be. -- going on. we need to essentially be ready to address the issues associated with that, you know, after the election. susan: in the report it talks about the vital importance is that it helps us defend our treaty allies.

should the taiwanese in the future -- i didn't get any indication that people of taiwan wanted anything to do with chinese communist rule. farah: but should they in the future at some point decide to move closer to china and to ratchet down their defense, how does that -- we need to defend? mr. harris: it comports with our law. that's what the taiwan act says. we advocate for peaceful reunification across the strait. if that's what the taiwanese want to do, we support that. by our law. farah: so we'll find another way to defend our treaty allies? susan: it sounds simplistic. then, you figure out whether that choice made how we address

our interests in the region? admiral mullen: and the other thing is we've been through this with several different administrations in taiwan from both sides of the aisle over time so it's not completely new ground even though it would be new players and we clearly have a different leader now in china. farah: actually, i feel like i should give this gentleman -- we gave up his question. >> i appreciate it. thank you. my name is patrick. i'm a fellow from the indo nearbyan flagship initiative. so while we're still on the topic of i would say partners and allies. we've been focusing on japan, australia, also, europe. but how important is it in this day and age to focus on our partnerships in southeast asia? i know we have the philippines at our allies. i find other nations very important. they're close in proximity. how important is it for us to, i would say, strengthen our

partnerships, maybe make new treaty allies there in order to defend taiwan if that question were to come up later? i think it's very important. i would like to see what your thoughts are on this. mr. harris: so i'll start in response to your excellent question. to our partners in southeast asia are critical to the united states. and i believe the reverse is true as well. we're critical to our partners in southeast asia. the only exception to the partner rule -- word would be the philippines. we are a treaty ally of the philippines. but we are a close security partner and economic partner with most of the rest of the nations in asea. it is on us, the united states, for not -- for taking five years to put an ambassador in singapore, to put an ambassador

in asea. i came to diplomacy late in life but i am a firm believer that diplomats and diplomacy matter. so it's on us when we don't get an ambassador into asean, singapore. it takes two years to get someone like me into singapore. it took a year to get an ambassador to australia, a treaty ally, after she was nominated. that's on us. and part of that is on our broken political system in washington. i called it in november of 20221 legislative malpractice but -- 2021 legislative malpractice but you cannot blame the senate if the white house doesn't nominate people in time. so it's on both parties and it's on us as americans to put

diplomats in diplomatic postings overseas. so our nations -- our allies, friends, and partners look at that. not only them but our adversaries and competitors look at that. and they try their best to fill the vacuum that's left when you have an important country like singapore, for example, that doesn't have an ambassador. thankfully, singapore, asean, and the other countries in southeast asia and in asia have ambassadors now. but they shouldn't have to wait two, three, four, five years for that to happen. farah: man. we have two clocks in this room. three clocks. and they all say different times. how much time do i have left? three minutes. let's take one question, quick question from the front and then i want to close it out.

>> hi. just a quick question. my view from having worked on it years ago is that if push came to shove and it looked like the p.r.c. was going to take over, the real question in everybody's mind, what are we going to do? are we going to respond? and are we got to -- not going to respond? do you have any final words what we can do to make it more clear that we are committed to responding and, of course, we need to build up the taiwanese as much as possible. but isn't that really the ultimate determinant here of whether we can keep this policy in place? admiral mullen: i listened to our current president on four different occasions. while it's always been pulled back by the staff afterwards, it's pretty clear to me. that's how i read it. harry: i'm with admiral mullen

on that. the president has been asked whether we would defend taiwan and he said yes. it's been people that has pulled back by unelected or unconfirmed by the senate but yes, we would defend taiwan. as the report gets into it, at the end of the day, whoever the next president is, president biden has set a standard -- set a place, if you will, on the question of whether the united states will defend taiwan or not. so as the report emphasizes, we believe you can't walk that back to zero. you can walk it back to where president biden is around there and then go from that point. but he has set a new starting point of the question of whether the united states will defend taiwan. >> [inaudible] harry: i don't know. if they speak english or get it translated, president biden said four times, the commander in chief said four times we will

defend taiwan. admiral mullen: this is the second task force that i participated on. i did one on korea, north korea a few years ago. and it's one of many, many tasks forces. and i just want to single out ayny who ran this. -- anya who ran this. your leadership is extraordinary. also to david sacks. one of the things that c.f.r. clearly has is people that can write and david is one of them who is also deep on the issues. to david, connor, shelly and others on the team, you know, it really -- it's really made it easy. this is a complex issue, as i said, and i do hope an awful lot of people will read and then tell others to read this. lastly, because i have the mic, i want to say thanks to richard haas. this is his last task force. i think he leaves at the end of the month.

to say thanks for his leadership over 20-plus years of his life, significant portion of his life, focusing on the key issues and his contributions have been enormous. we wish him the best in whatever next chapter is. farah: with that i think we're going to adjourn on time. i just want to say this report is worth reading every page. because it's such a complex issue. on the one hand, you have the question of protecting a vibrant democracy, upholding the world order. on the other hand, this very serious issue of possible world conflict and all of us have been in this room for iraq and afghanistan which were wars in a didn't go as many predicted.

and so it's sobering to read the report and to look at it in that context and wrestle with this idea of a world order that we have been at the center of for so long that president xi has said our time is coming. and so in my mind, i really wonder how much -- how much of this is about protecting ourselves and our influence in the world versus our allies and the safety of a democracy in asia. so that's what i want to leave people with that. the report gives a lot to think about and hopefully we will be together in this room again. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2023] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

>> the house will be back today at 2:00 p.m. eastern for more member speeches. later, lawmars are expected to consider a bill authorizing

funding touild or renovate seven veterans' medical buildings and a bill providing entrepreneurship training to terans. still to come this week, a bill to expand healtinsurance options for small business and a veto override vote on president biden's student lo forgiveness plan. as always, live coverage of the house here on c-span. >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government. we're funded by these television companies and more, including comcast. >> do you think this is just a community center? no. it's way more than that. comcast is partnering with a thousand community centers to create wi-fi enabled lifts so students from low-income milies can be ready for anything. >> comcast supports c-span as a public service along with these other television providers giving you a front-row seat to democracy.