after holding my wife's hand and getting this picture in the news, go backstage immediately to talk to elon musk. there would be a lot of interest in that, because there is a lot of interest in elon musk. but i think just doing twitter alone was too clever by half and it is a missed opportunity. host: this is teresa, a republican from florida. caller: good morning. it is a pleasure to speak to both of you. it is on my bucket list. i love "the national review." i grew up with it on my parent'' coffee table. it kind of turned my right side a little bit further right. anyhow. it is a real pleasure. it is an interesting race.

i have to say i am an optimist and i am hoping for the best for the country. i think -- >> we have three outstanding analysts in the field, so i hope you will give them your full attention. we just heard the national security advisor describe how we hope to move ahead in reducing nuclear risk, and i hope we provided some optimistic -- some optimism to all of us that the u.s. does not intend to engage in a three-way arms race. what i will ask each of our panelists specifically if they have additional optimism on that point. the topic of this panel is preventing a three-way arms race. for many years, of course, the focus of nuclear arms control

has been on bilateral competition between the united states and the soviet union, later russia. with apparent chinese intentions to build up its own nuclear arsenal, are we in a position to avoid that kind of arms race, both in the short term, the medium-term, and the longer-term? to discuss this with us today, we have three great experts. lynn rustin come up with the nuclear threat initiative. john will stone -- wolfstone with global zero and the center for a new american security. and someone from the program at princeton university. you can find their full biographies in your program guide. what i would like to do is get

us started by asking each of them a question, letting them respond as they wish for a few minutes, and possibly a second round of questions, and then we will look for good questions from the audience. feel free to jot down your questions as we go, and when we get there, i will ask you to raise some hands and i will pick people who look like they are ready to have the most perplexing questions. let's start with john. again, the primary question for each of you is how do you take what mr. sullivan said this morning. is it increase in any way your confidence that we will be able to avoid a nuclear arms race? that will be far more expensive and in my opinion much more

dangerous than the arms race we engaged in in the 1960's and 1970's. it's the approach we just heard outlined -- the appropriate one at this stage. >> thank you, tom, and let me say thanks to the arms control association. i always get sentimental when i come here because i came to the annual meeting in 1990, and they announced they were going to have the first ever position on nonproliferation. i went up to spurgeon keeney and told him i wanted to apply. he said, are you cheap? i said yes, and so i got the job. it was the best i have ever had. i'm thrilled to be able to come here. i'm still cheap. but i appreciate the chance to come give something back. let me start by saying i am very

sympathetic to the position that jake and the others behind the scenes were in, trying to write a speech for the arms control association, in what is an extraordinarily difficult period for the united states and the world. they are putting fire after fire out. they have done a remarkable job in holding the lines together in a unified way, something that has not been done in over a generation in response to eight generational threat, due to the invasion of ukraine by russia. i will call him this week and tell him that when i wrote speeches for senior leadership, they were much better received for the arms-control community than when he wrote them. i appreciate what he is trying to do. i appreciate the president, where his heart is and where his interests are, but i think there are two critical issues missing

from my point of view on china. they are clearly trying to get people to calm down. you heard the president's remark about confidence. we heard this town hyperventilate over a balloon. we should not take invasions of american airspace lightly, but we are the strongest, richest country in the world. i think we have to act in a way that shows we are confident, that matches our capability. i think that is nuclear as well. i read a recent report about how we need to accept that china is a near competitor on nuclear weapons. we have 4000 nuclear weapons in our arsenal. china maybe has 400. we are still at a 10 to one advantage. are they building up? it looks that way. do we know why? not really. we have to keep things in context. the other thing i thought was

important and unfortunately missing from advisor sullivan's speech is, it is fine and well to talk about risk reduction and management of these dangers. his job has responsibilities. it is a difficult job. but we still have to have a vision for what it is we are trying to do. what are we seeking in the long run when we tell china and russia we want to engage them on arms control and risk reduction? to what end? the united states, i still think, does much better, both with our allies and with the rest of the countries in the world, who are not rushing to help ukraine. we are still leading the alliance, but we still have trouble with the global south, who basically don't want to get involved. we still have to have a vision. the fact that he did not talk about a world without nuclear weapons, did not talk about nuclear reductions -- we still

have too many, more than we need for our security. talking about our commitments to nuclear disarmament has been a long-standing policy dating back to 1970. i think there is a missing element, and i understand why. in washington, he is fighting against people who want to match russia and china 141. i recognize it is difficult. but i still think we have to be strong with our vision, even if it is going to take a lot of work and a long time to get there. we should not give up on that. i would have been a bit more optimistic if they had broadened a little bit more. tom: thank you. let me first note that lynn rusten was one of the inspirations for including this panel. you all of course read "arms control today" cover to cover every month, and her cover story

in march on the future, which helps to frame the thinking on this topic. lynn, the same general question, whether you are more optimistic on the chances of avoiding this three-way race, and also, how do you think, or do you think, that russia can be brought back into a bilateral dialogue? are there on ramps? clearly, the u.s. is not going to meet moscow's conditions, cease support for ukraine before discussions can begin. but are there other gestures, steps, or in the terminology, on ramps, that the u.s. may be able to take? lynn: thanks, tom, for having me here today.

i cannot see because of the lights, but my co-author is here. what we heard today -- it is useful to have that speech because there has not been a competency statement of the u.s. policy and positions on arms-control and nuclear policy since the nuclear posture review came out, and developments continue to proceed. so i think it was useful for them to lay out there thinking. -- their thinking. i heard a work plan for the end of the first biden term. it really did not have a long-term vision. it did not even -- it kind of had a lot of question marks for what happens after 2026, although there is a willingness to engage in a dialogue with russia, if russia will do so. i think the administration

positions are probably more fully developed in terms of what it would do in a negotiation with russia than they are with china. i thought it was significant that jake said there would be no preconditions for talks with russia on nuclear arms control, because that has not been clear to me in the past at all. i think there is a debate in the administration. i don't know if this means that is settled or not, in terms of everything from whether you negotiate with prudent -- i understand my people would feel that way, or whether russia needed to come back into full compliance with new start. it seems like they are saying now that the door is open to a discussion about not only totally returning to compliance with new start, but more realistically talking about what comes after new start. i think -- so that partly answers your question.

they have just lowered the barrier to entry to a dialogue with russia. i don't think russia is ready, based on prudent's behavior, to have -- on putin's behavior, to have that dialogue now. as we stated in our article, it will be in russia's interest to continue to keep united states constrained in terms of its strategic nuclear forces, and i think that is going to be just as true at the end of the war, if not more so, then it is now. there is a reason that russia did not announce it is seceding from new start, although it is playing with fire by participating in other elements of the treaty. i think there is just a strategic logic that will get us there, and i cannot tell you whether it is going to be during biden's first term, after that, what we will find ourselves back

at the table with russia. it will be a much harder negotiation because it won't be limited just to the systems that are currently controlled under new start. that is where the challenge will come in. the u.s. will want to consider all nuclear warheads, including nonstrategic, nondeployed. russia will continue to be interested in capturing top-level strikes, concerns about missile defense. and there is kind of the new technologies and challenges that they mentioned today that are not as conducive to including in any kind of formal arms-control, but still will be part of a mix of things that will need to be discussed. my guess is that some of this will have to be discussed in parallel in different channels. the question is, how do we actually get to that point? i do think the time will come --

i do not know if it is when the fighting, the hot war, stops in ukraine, but i do think it will come, because it is in the mutual interest of both countries. tom: thank you, lynn. tong, i would like to ask you about 11 questions. i constantly recommend your writing to audiences and individuals who are interested in how beijing views u.s. moves. i would be -- [no audio]

i would be happy to ask you about optimism or pessimism after this speech, if you would like to say a few words about -- i have seven more questions, but i will let you pick which you would like to talk about. lynn: thank you -- tong: thank you so much. it is such a privilege to be here. i am encouraged that mr. biden expressed commitment and interest to engaging with china on arms-control. but i have to wonder if the u.s. policy media as a whole has an understanding of chinese thinking that is driving the chinese buildup.

i think we have to look at china's nuclear policy change, which is taking place currently, with efforts to diversify the forces, the growing culture change such as a potential shift to attack posters, a growing interest in developing capabilities to manage nuclear escalation, the opacity in china, the consistent opacity or even increasing opacity, about the logic, the rationale behind chinese measures, and the goal of the current campaigns of organization. we have to understand this change of nuclear policy against the context of china as a country that is changing. china as a country has changed dramatically in recent years.

i don't think the u.s. policy community has put enough effort into the broader context and how that affects china's nuclear policy. i do think we have to understand that both fear and division -- and vision are driving china' is nuclear buildup, and the two things are closely interconnected. the current chinese leadership appears to have convinced itself that the u.s. has adopted a much more aggressive strategic approach and intention toward china. and they don't think this can be resolved through reasoning and persuasion. they think only by building up and demonstrating much greater strategic capability, that will change the american

understanding of the balance of power, and make the united states treat china more equally and respectfully. the ambition to increasingly challenge american predominance, to erode american influence in the asia-pacific, but also in other parts of the world -- that ambition is driven by the perceived necessity to challenge the u.s. at the capability level, because there is no way to change american thinking through reasoning. that contributes to the power mindset. so the fear and the ambition are two sides of the same coin. but i don't think the u.s. community understands accurately about the fear part that is actually more important. in this regard, the u.s. question about whether you need

a bigger arsenal to deter china and russia simultaneously, i think take the assumption that you have to include the chinese nuclear weapons as additional pain points in your nuclear targeting strategies, but you didn't really explain why. that discussion is fueling the chinese belief that the u.s. is thinking about a nuclear preemptive strike on china. that the u.s. is driven by the intent to maintain nuclear hegemonies him. -- hegemonism. you need to explain to china why china should not also pursue that capability, right? china is not so ambitious --

whatever capability or policy the u.s. thinks is necessary for american security, china wants to know why china should not do the same. i think that is the internal thinking the u.s. needs to do. there is lack of understanding about china's internal dynamics, the leadership, the general public. they work in increasingly closed environments that generate a very strong internal feedback loop, where the more assertive interests of the top leadership encourage the policy elite and general public to amplify the same policy. it then appears the top leadership has a mandate to pursue more assertive security policies. it is under that dynamic we see the military coming up with

slogans like we need victory with strategic nuclear weapons. that is very new. what is driving that? it is perhaps more about the pressure on the military to appear basically loyal to the leadership. it does not necessarily mean the rocket program will start soon. the new slogans. but we should not assume that chinese nuclear policies are inherently cohesive, or coherent , because it is responding to a top-level pressure. the u.s. has long-term strategic thinking on nuclear weapons. more recent evidence shows that china is taking a step-by-step approach, building nuclear

weapons, then reevaluating the environment, than making another decision, which means the u.s. actually has opportunities to shape the next chinese movement. i hope we can look more deeply into the chinese internal dynamics. i still think there are opportunities to build a more productive nuclear relationship. tom: that is fascinating. more than once, one of your sentences made me think of a mirror image in washington about motivations and rationale. and that ought to lead to the possibility of a productive conversation, even if it starts at a much lower base than what we have built up with moscow over the years. jon, let me go back to you. our very good audience gave mr. sullivan a tough question about

politics, and that is the legislation to require the u.s. to pull out of new start. at least in my opinion, it sets conditions that would make any future arms-control agreement impossible. how would -- i'm interested in how you assess whether that will go somewhere in the congress, and if it does, perhaps as a piece of the national defense authorization act, how that affects the potential to move forward with either russia or china. jon: i got yelled at once by vice president biden for my political opinion. he said you may be really smart, but you do not know that much about politics.

now that i am liberated, i can -- whether it is a democratic president or a republican president, there is generally very little desire to see congress legislate foreign policy and treaty moves. i don't think it has any prospect of going anywhere. it is one of those things -- i know lynn will nod her head. we would immediately start to draft a statement of administration policy. will he veto a bill if it includes limits on presidential authority over military policy as commander-in-chief? i also don't think that senator cotton has as much residence in the congress as he might have had a few years ago. i think his behavior in response to the black lives matter protests, his interest in calling out the 101st airborne to quell peaceful debate, has strained his credibility.

he does represent what has been a long-standing traditional view among the extreme conservatives of being opposed to any form of arms-control in the united states, and any sort of mutual constraint limiting american policy. could easily see a bill like this come from jesse helms as well as senator cotton. i think it does represent what president biden and others, and we, should be worried about, which is the sense that if arms-control breaks down, some of that is a good thing, that the united states should poor more money into its nuclear and defense industry, even though we are approaching a trillion dollars, because there is still the sense that that is how we won the cold war. we outspent the soviet union and crushed them under the wheels of our military might. in fact, it was a deliberate decision by sensible people, recognizing the danger that nuclear weapons pose, to get out

of that cycle. they understood that nuclear weapons were unusable. i think the big message in the bill, and the sentiment expressed by those who say we should build up and match china or russia, is a sense somehow that this is a test of our manhood, that we have to show them that we are not going to be second to anyone. presidents generally understand that these weapons are unusable. the idea that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought is a reasonable sentiment to most people outside of the nuclear field, because they recognize the nuclear weapons are different. i think we will continue to battle political thinking that all we need are a few more nukes here and there, and the russians and chinese will know that we mean business. i think we would be better off listening to the sort of sentiment that tong just expressed. we need to understand what our adversaries are thinking, and

why they are acting the way they are acting, it instead of thinking if we were in their shoes, how would we behave, and what would be the things they would want to focus on. i think lynn has put her finger on exactly the right issue. if we are going to get serious about arms-control and engagement, which requires us to actually talk, to talk it out, we are going to need to get smarter -- i hope the terminology is ok -- asymmetrical arms-control. are we prepared to limit certain things in exchange for russia or china agreeing to limit other types of things? we have not done that in a long time in the united states. we are not very good at it. the congress is not very deep in its understanding of why these things matter. we have a lot of work to do to try to improve a dialogue, whether the president should be constrained, whether it is right or wrong.

tom: thank you. let me go back to tong. cannot avoid the fact that russia is at the moment an adversary. i would hope that washington is not lost in the mindset of treating china as an adversary. it is certainly a rival, perhaps a potential adversary. but i see more hope for a reasonable dialogue with china today then with russia. with that in mind, mr. sullivan's remarks about working within the p5, as well as working bilaterally with china, makes sense to me. as i mentioned, i think it would be very hard to get to the level of arms-control connection and

vocabulary we have with moscow, to get there quickly with beijing. but perhaps smaller measures on risk reduction, on crisis communication, on notifications back and forth, rules of the road in space -- which of these have the potential to begin a u.s.-china conversation on any level? and how can the u.s. best package these in order to draw beijing's interest? tong: i really appreciate the biden administration's efforts to find whatever way possible to engage china on nuclear weapons and arms-control issues. a multilateral approach has a greater chance of success. but i think perhaps more important is the u.s. needs to take a broader approach.

china, like russia, sees the problem of strategic security issues, nuclear weapons -- as technical problems. going forward, a much broader problem is the political problem of the bilateral relationship. like russia, china is basically holding dialogues on arms-control hostage to change in other words, the approach focuses a little bit too much on technical level solutions only. high technical level, there are two extreme ends. on one hand, you have proponents of uncontrolled measures who advocate in different types of

bottles, bilateral both, different engagements of uncontrolled notification matters, with rate reductions, quite communications, and we see in china a lack of interest to reengage, on most measures of which reduction. i think we need to understand that maybe in that pursuing measure alone, because of senior-level well, chinese officials at the operational level would need to take another effort in a personal level risk to propose those proposals, but they are still hard to get a blessing for the leadership. so much is determined by the influencing and thinking of the senior chinese leadership. although, on the other end of

the spectrum, there is focusing on building countermeasures, strengthening and determining, etc.. i think part of what determines makes the war less likely to happen is a risk that some of the measures can fit into the chinese fear. further, reinforcing the paranoia to maintain the military. that is strengthening the chinese interest in its own military including capabilities and that judgment help. i tend to think that we probably need technical level measures as part of a broader hope of society approach. in engaging china. it requires a much broader strategy and just that would

help address the underlying challenge in the relationship. that is the serious information asymmetry and the subsequent or consequently serious production gap at a societal level between the two sides. that is the fundamental source of perception and intrigue in nuclear investment and we need to engage with the uncontrolled nuclear path and the chinese counterpart as part of the hope of society. here, and the nuclear era, there are many things that can weakened -- we can are part in thinking of the interest on the most dangerous species of taiwan, and the two sides

genuinely disagreeing about who wants to initiate a conflict. they generally disagree about who wants to escalate a potential conflict to the nuclear level. that changes things to start talking about producing dangers, and lastly, i think, the key source of risk is the increasing cloak door seip of decision-making in china. they are given a longer -- two pursue more assertive capabilities, whereas the traditional on controllers and project security, they are going to take a more marginalized -- it is a lack of eternal accountability and checks and balances is a key problem, and i think the u.s. community can

mitigate that issue and you have congressional magnets in's and ngos and communities, a civil society. you can launch a broader engagement average, and use that to encourage chinese nuclear debate. that is a lack of internal debate. it is contributing to not necessarily a coherent chinese nuclear policy. and i think that is one way that you can make an effort. >> fascinating. thank you. i will give you an open-ended question, and after that, after we find the walk on the floor, we have our question ready. you've written in the article that i've mentioned in arms control today that the u.s. has to reconnect the efforts to

constrain the nuclear arsenals of competitors, and this will require elements of continuity and a new approach. could you share with this audience what you mean by a new approach? >> sure. as long as it relates to your question about congressional sentiment, i think we have to be open to other forms of agreement behind legally binding treaty's, although there is still a desirable thing in many cases, and certainly, i would like to see that continue the 50 year tradition of the agreement continue. and probably, ultimately, we will get there with them, but there is also a space with political commitments and

executive agreements, and some of the new technologies and challenges that are more prone to the rules of the road. that is not each other's interests to probe into command and control systems, and maybe have an agreement on that which can't be verified, but it could be important to raise understanding about why it is important to exercise strength, and i think there are other areas of restraint that can be very important and one would be how we respond to the concerns about buildup. i heard dave sullivan say that we will live within new limits as long as your 2026, and the future, if we can get into a

negotiation with russia about the future agreement, the numerical limits, we can live with that will be at affected by china's force. john reminded us that right now we have nearly 4000 and russia has over 4000 nuclear warheads. china has 400. there are is a pembroke element to this which is that china's 10 or 15 away from having current worst-case projected amount of forces, so it's not at all clear that we will ever need more than what we have now to deter china and russia, and it seems to me a priority really needs to be keeping russia constrained as we start to have a dialogue and as has been pointed out, our actions will have some influence

on how they develop their forces and the rest of the season in the world. >> coming around, i think there are different forms of agreement. there is a different technology we are talking about that are not conducive to counting and verifying and visually expecting, so we have to be open to new ways to address the regrets we have and how to mitigate them. >> thank you. let me ask you, if you have jotted down a question on a pad, could you hold it up a little bit so our team can collect them and funnel them to me. i see at least three or four, so i hope we will get them up rapidly.

thank you for that. there is indisputably a need for new mechanisms for negotiation and agreement both with the people's republic and with the russian federation. >> i will buy you time to read the question because what tom pointed out, and i read your stuff regularly, but it helps to see you in person, this mismatch of approach is not unusual. the united states wants to build some understanding and make some momentum through technical talks to build a way out. it sounds like what we are looking for is a broader landscape, and if that is easier, it really gets to the point was being made, that is compartmentalization or non-compartmentalization grid we will need, i will assume, everyone thinks it's better to

talk or not to talk. the to find some way to change the language because it sounds like it is not about part innovation so much as contextualization. if, the united states can agree we are better off in a non-relationship, we can have some top cover that will make things possible, but it is harder to get to a nonadversarial relationship and was we're talking. it seems like that is where the conundrum is for me. i don't know if it's the same for you. >> and for one of those first questions, we agree that we have to talk as governments. there is a great need for both americans and chinese to -- i don't mean to say educate congress but to help congress to tone down a rhetoric. here is something that is easy for a target.

first question i have is what does the administration do to reduce china's fear of an increasingly hostile and threatening united states? >> that is for all of you. >> i can start. i think, clearly like russia, china things we need a physical level that somehow will settle or define the overall financial relationship. however, i don't think china knows how to do it. if china is is equally, it is not more the solution or prospect of dialogue and

persuasion to change the nature of the financial relationship, and therefore, this can contribute to even greater powers and mindsets, thinking the buildup is not only the solution to change the u.s., but also the perception. perhaps the u.s. can bear a greater responsibility to come up with initiative. what i think is lacking here in this is research into the broader strategy of addressing the information asymmetry and the perception gap. the facts -- all aspects of the relationship include the nuclear relationship, and how the

nuclear community can work as part of that broader conversation. they can start considering in order to show that it is willing to listen to china and be engaged with china in a way that is acceptable. here, it appears that china is unwilling to discuss most of the issues related to nuclear weapons except very small number of chinese favored topics. perhaps, it is time to do something to avoid increasing the internally hardened position

around building up deterrence of ways that we can show a greater willingness to favor a topic. course, it will now fly here without too much obstacle, but there may be ways to readjust the topic and consider the financial first use agreement that wouldn't involve american allies or security commitments to other u.s. allies. that would help china clarify one of the most widely concerned with full in china's policy, which is whether it applies to china's own territory, clean taiwan. it would make china less likely to threaten nuclear use directly

or indirectly in the future conventional war. over taiwan if china can agree to an explicit financial agreement. i think making a gesture of being willing to engage in any issue like that without having to change american policy that would have some hope with starting a nuclear discussion. >> on to give lynn an opportunity. >> each of us are different in how we engage, and that needs to be different, and whereas i think in the case of russia, compartmentalization is what has worked for many years, and

should and will again talk about they managed weapons and risk, even though there are lots of other tensions and problems in this relationship. it is clear that for the stable future, that is exactly the opposite, and i worry a lot about the environment we have now, which is -- this administration has leaned heavily into the pacing military competitor, all of this strategy documents that are focused on china, and we seem to be trying to decouple economically from china which is so different from russia. china's economy is going to be a significant part of the world economy and i don't think that is possible to reduce dependency because there will be

interdependencies and that will be a positive thing. with the reduction of conflict, so, i think it is clear that this is the broader relationship that has to have more elements of cooperation as well as competition. that broader parameter has to be kind of set before we can get into the kind of new or dialogue that we hope to have, so i don't know when that happens, but maybe it doesn't happen until after the next presidential cycle, if at all. but it seems to be the entire mood of the country is focused on the adversarial process and insufficiently on the opportunities and necessities for cooperation. and, china's rise in the ageist

pacific which is unavoidable. >> on track to be brief here, it might give them room, but i'm not arguing we should do this easily, but one of the things we've never done is say to china, we are in a mutually deterred relationship. virtually assured deterrence work spread you have 400 nuclear weapon second detroit nuclear cities and hold u.s. allies at risk. that is something we know you have, you know we have, with an even greater capability. let's figure out how to manage that deterrent relationship. you would run into a number of challenges immediately. how do you work with allies. are they comfortable if we say we are me -- mutually to turn a big nuclear level. are we had a conventional level to make sure that we are doing to the edge and to -- advantageous, and it's not easy by any means, but one thing we do here and have for many years,

we have said they are simple things. this tends to be, if you say it, we will pocket and the allies will get nervous and we will get nothing for it. one advantage of president biden is that he is willing to say yes. i've heard that for 40 years pray i get it. we are going to do this anyways. there is some value in working through that. quite frankly, i don't think that is enough to get the chinese prepared to engage in a conversation. we have tried direct and p5. we tried broader. we try the u.n.. it's increasingly frustrating, but our job is to keep trying. >> we are simply acknowledging what many people concert to be a reality. we have acknowledge that these are russian. let me change the subject. there is an argument by others that a trilateral arms race is

unlikely because historically since the cold war, the u.s. and russia and china have all made a nuclear decision driven internally by political and technical developments and not so much in response to each other's arsenals and strategies. does that make sense to you? >> first of all, that seems completely untrue and the soviet relationship. that is particularly sensible to the argument. he is saying since the cold war, i don't desperate >> does anyone --? >> i don't agree and alter ui. even if you think this is driven

by internal factors, they have wanted to be seen as nuclear peers of the united states. they wanted to maintain what we call near relative parity. the united states has been unwilling to be second or is wanted to be second to none and are already seeing the pressure where the united states will have to determine which we can do at a much lower level, but in order to reassure or to do damage limitations, we will need to increasingly factor in china as well as russia. russia and china keep building as they are going, we will need to build up red russia will need to build up. china will then feel they are vulnerable so they will need to build up and that cycle refers to the body problem. without having read the book. it talks about the instability and the inability to predict how

these celestial bodies operate in a gravitational route. we are all in a gravitational well with each other, and increasingly, we are going to affect each other's trajectories, and it will be unpredictable. either way, let's sprinkle 10,000 nuclear weapons. that is not a good situation. >> let me go to what the ukraine has revealed. it is shown the weakness of russia's conventional versus. arguably, it has increases russia's dependence on nuclear weapons, particularly nonstrategic nuclear weapons. does this make it harder for moscow to agree to the kind of changes that would address u.s. concerns and the goals that were laid out. with this layout and return with

a similar question about ukraine which is do we know that china has actively discourage president putin with tactical weapons ukraine, and how strongly has he said that to thinly connect these questions, but we will turn to any of you to give an answer. >> you have a view on the second one? >> there is so much little in terms of information and my personal speculation for what is worse with a russian counterpart, and i just don't see chinese senior leadership

feeling comfortable putting direct blood pressure on putin in a coercive way to do that, that's because china and the first place doesn't share the concern that russia is serious about nuclear use. china is largely and genuinely making the most of small capabilities to deter an aggressive nato effort to weaken russia in this country. so russia wants to make use of a new either course of leverage, and to some extent, that is understandable, but that doesn't mean russia has a nuclear response in initiating nuclear war. >> ok. >> so, nobody knows how the war is going to and, no one knows

how it will feel cutting the losses or we will continue to double down. it is a broad consensus in the community that the best way to show vladimir putin that the nuclear weapons aren't that useful is for them to use in the -- losing the ukraine. we have to show that lack males not only not successful, but china, north korea, elsewhere. there is a fairly broad support. there are different levels of concern about putin's willingness to actually be nuclear or not. with a decimated conventional military, this will be harder to negotiate a deal on substituting nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear weapons without the united states thinking through being in a better situation in the arms-control world. are there things we are prepared to not do with a palm strike or a forward to play capability of

russia agrees to reducing its stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. the -- i would understand that if we were in the government, we would be supporting every ideal ally, showing our commitment, investing, deploying, doing what we need to do to make sure to determine this denial is credible. but once the war is over, thinking through what europe looks like and how we pull back, the idea that we need to have that defense posture, which is given towards the pre-february russian military which turns out to be a shadow of what we thought anyway and is now lost 20,000 pieces of equipment, however many hundreds of thousands, it is just nonsensical. we need to do that calculation a new, but were not their area. in the capability of the u.s. government and our community to do that is also atrophied over many decades. >> thank you. let's give a final word to lynn

on this topic or anything else you'd like to say. >> sure. first of all, the risk of nuclear use in this conflict is not negligible. i don't know how high it is, but it is still present, and we could be concerned about that, but i think we already know the great damage done by the nuclear coercion and the non-nuclear weapon states. even with some degree of impunity, putin has nuclear weapons, and at the same time, there is a strategic deterrent and there is a reason why kuhn hasn't attacked nato supply lines, just as the united states and nato has been cautious, and how they are appropriately cautious in how they have been

supporting the ukraine to avoid escalation with russia, but you know, we just have to hope that maintains. i don't know. i think how the war and matters because at the end of the day, we are seen nuclear weapons are a factor of coercive tools, but do they have any -- they don't have military utility. i think if god for bid he used a nuclear weapon, there might be an immediate tactical win, but the strategic consequences would be immeasurable. i think the verdict is out, and we will see after the cuban missile crisis, as we were reminded, it will lead to a very fruitful. of arms-control and constraints with a reduction of nuclear risk, and may be, at the end of the war, there will be some

opportunities for a new security architecture. >> from your lips to god's ears. i'm sorry we couldn't get to all of the questions. i will have this back to darrell who will explain to us how to eat lunch. join me for thinking our panelist today. >> thank you very much. thank you to the panelists for a fabulous discussion. a very good job, especially in real-time. minutes just after jake sullivan's address. now, we are going to take a break for about 15 minutes, stretch her legs, use the facilities, have more coffee, and please be back in your seat by 11:45 a.m. when the