beginning in afghanistan, the general advised president biden against his disastrous foreign policy decision. i now recognize myself for an opening statement. on april 14th, 2021, president biden announced the united states would unilaterally withdraw its military forces from afghanistan. for months before that announcement, the intelligence community and his senior

military advisers, including both gentlemen testifying here today issued dire warnings about the withdrawal's consequences. after the announcement, i, along with other republican and democrat members of congress urged the president to prepare for the withdrawal and its inevitable fallouts. unfortunately, the warnings were ignored. as the withdrawal date in there., the situation in afghanistan deteriorated as the taliban gained significant ground across the country. yet, the binding administration's failure to plan for their withdrawal threatened the safety and security of u.s. personnel in the country. as a result, in july of 2020 one, 23 state department employees in kabul said, a cable channel, secretary blinken, warning of their grave concerns for afghanistan 's stability and for their own

safety. yet, nothing was done. instead, our investigation uncovered the white house refused to listen to warnings about the situation on the ground, and disturbingly, we have uncovered the state department leadership prohibited its employees from even uttering the word neo -- shorthand for emergency evacuation -- until as late of august of 2021. too little, too late. eventually, this committee learned the state department did not even request an emergency evacuation until after kabul was surrounded by the taliban. as a result, the airport was not secured until august 17th, 2 days after kabul fell . as the saying goes, if you fail to plan, you plan to fail.

and fail, they did. the next two weeks created international outrage and humiliation for the united states. people all over the world watched as babies were flung over barbed wire fences by mothers without help, desperate afghans fell to their deaths from airplanes, and hordes of people surrounded the airport as they tried to flee for their lives. the damage to our reputation and credibility -- the united states' credibility -- around the world, that damage will last for generations. our service members were forced to watch as american citizens and afghan hours were beaten and murdered outside the gates of the airport. these brave americans were told to standby as terrorists brutalized innocent civilians. then, on the morning of august

26th, we watched in horror as reports of a terrorist attack at abby gate flooded the news. 13 u.s. service members were murdered, with dozens more injured. 170 afghans were killed with countless injured as well. some of the abby gate goldstar family members are here today, and we honor you. we honor your sacrifice. here, today, to the families today and the american people, i say, i will not rest until i get to the bottom of this tragedy. you deserve answers, the american people deserve answers , and i intend to deliver. with the last u.s. military plane left, on august 30th, 2021,

more than 1000 american citizens remain trapped in afghanistan. as were tens of thousands of afghan allies who risked their lives serving beside our troops and diplomats. among many -- if not most of those allies olympus are still trapped, constantly in fear for their lives. i want to thank both of our witnesses for being here today. despite current view, the officials actively trying to limit your testimony, you have agreed to appear here voluntarily, and i'm grateful to you, sirs, for your service to our country and your service to this investigation. i also want to thank the abbey gate all-star families for joining us here today. while the president has never publicly stated the names of your children, i will, here, today.

their names are darren hoover, johanne rosario, nicole g, hunter lopez, dagan page, roberto sanchez, david espinoza, jerrod schmitz, brian mccallum, dylan roland, kareem nakui, maxim novak and ryan dos. those are the names of the fallen. they will not be forgotten. with that, the chair now recognizes -- >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me start by thanking former chairman of the chief of staff, general mark a milli and united

states central command, general f. mackenzie jr., for testifying before the committee today and sharing -- as you did before -- the house armed services committee in 2021 -- keep military and policy insight on the united states' withdrawal from afghanistan. i also want to thank you both for the years of sacrifice and service to our great country and recognize the hundreds of thousands of american servicemembers, diplomats, and department professionals that work to support the united states' efforts in afghanistan over the course of our presence in the country. i also want to recognize the 2461 american military personnel

who gave their life in afghanistan for our country. of course, that includes -- who my heart bleeds for -- the 13 brave americans who were killed in an isis terrorist attack while facilitating the evacuation of 124,000 people over the course of 17 days in august of 2021. as i previously said, president biden's efforts to end the 20- year war in afghanistan have rang out true at home as it was the right ones. while that decision was in our country's best interest, another number of contributing factors complicated the withdrawal, namely president donnie fleeing afghanistan august 15, 2021, and the resulting collapse of the

afghan government. as we heard in our hearing last month, from former special representative to afghanistan, reconciliation, kilizad, former president donald trump, empowered the taliban at the expense of the afghan government with the doha deal. the trump administration's commitment to facilitating the relief of taliban prisoners in afghanistan and the afghan government that were in their custody, and initiated significant, unilateral, u.s. troop drawdown placed the taliban in the strongest positions since the united states first arrived in afghanistan 20 years earlier, continued troop draw-downs, despite the taliban not fully

complying with the terms of the doha agreement, undercut the united states' leverage with the taliban. during the transition between the trump and biden administration, it also became clear that the trump administration lacked a comprehensive plan for withdrawing from afghanistan despite the may 1st deadline fast approaching. upon taking office, president biden conducted a thorough interagency review and determined he had two options, the president could either continue the withdrawal started by his predecessor or break the agreement and return us to an active war with the taliban, a decision that would necessitate a significant surge of troops for an undefined time. taliban made clear that backing out of the doha agreement would result in resumption of hostilities that would place our service numbers, once more, in their crosshairs. let me be clear. this is not my opinion on the timeline. in fact, this is the

picture painted by the afghanistan after-action report, conducted by the state department, which dod has cooperated throughout its own internal reviews of the withdrawal. these are the facts outlined by this committee's own investigation, which is been comprised of over -- well -- one hundred hours of transcribed testimony, most of the public hearing, and 11,000 cases of documents produced by the same department. i also, again, like to reinforce the importance of broadening the scope of afghanistan, proper oversight of afghanistan, which requires an honest look back, not just at a few months, but at the entire 20 years of more over 4 administrations generals early and mackenzie, i am looking forward to your continued commitment to truth and

transparency today, helping us gain a better understanding so we may learn from our successes and mistakes, and i want to commend all who contributed to the successful evacuation and airlift of 124,000 people from afghanistan. we understand, over the course of our interviews and investigations, that this was an all hands on deck undertaking, and all i am thankful such an airlift was successful given the dynamics in chaotic situations on the ground, we must also scrutinize the lessons learned, including the traffic coming. i look forward to hearing how the defense department, similar to the state, afghanistan, aar, have taken efforts to assess and learn from our withdrawal so that we do not repeat those mistakes in the future. let me close just by saying, i would like more so to make special mention of our previously bipartisan commitment to ensuring special immigrant visas for the afghan allies who

work with u.s. service members and formats throughout our mission in afghanistan. thus far, republican leadership in the house is using to release the srt's to the administration's requested right now i know mcconnell and the majority number is on this committee agree that congress must act on filling our promises to them, and i hope to have your support in working with democrats on getting that done. with that, i yield. >> the member yields. only add to that comment, we are working -- very bipartisan manner -- to increase the number of sivs. i think it is vitally important, we talk about afghan partners left behind, to provide the visas necessary for them to get out of there, and i'm pleased to announce -- i don't want to announce the number yet, but we will negotiated and have an agreement. so, with that, i am pleased to have with us here, today, the

former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, general mark milley and former commander of u.s. central command, general kenneth f mackenzie jr.. both generals played a pivotal role throughout the afghanistan withdrawal, but also a pivotal role throughout our nation's history in many conflicts. i commend you for your service to our nation. your full statements will be made a part of the record. i will ask each of you, keep your remarks to five minutes. finally, as a reminder, today's hearing is subject to the veracity protections of section 1001, the united states code that makes it a crime to knowingly make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements to the committee in the context of this investigation. with that, i now recognize general mark milley for his opening statement. >> thank you, chairman:ranking

member meeks, members of the committee, thank you for what you're doing. i'm grateful for the opportunity to be here with general mackenzie. my purpose here today is help you form a holistic assessment of our efforts in afghanistan. most important, i am personally here today, voluntarily, to help the families of the fallen, 13 fallen at abbey gate, and the thousands fallen -- tens of thousands fallen and countless other members that suffered the invisible woman to florida. help them get answers. i'm humbled to be here today with three goldstar families from abbey gate. i know the other families couldn't make it, but i intend to contact them in the coming weeks. they know -- my family is for them -- they know that there are no words by me, general or any public petition or anyone i can ever bring back there fallen. but all of us can, and all of us must honor their sacrifice

to protect our country to be forever grateful that they answered the call for the colors . each of them paid the ultimate sacrifice, freedom likes on before them in order to keep our nation safe, and we owe them answers, and i'm committed to assist in the effort to get them answers, but we should also not be under any illusion. we're not going to get all the answers here today. the process will take a considerable length of time. we must also recognize that much of the record, in fact, is classified and beyond the scope of this opening. so, for over two decades, between 2001 and 2021, about 800,000 of us in the united states military served in afghanistan, and thousands of others from many agencies. of those, 2460, shoulders, sailors, airmen and marines, gave their lives. almost 30,000 more were wounded in action,

and countless others suffered those invisible wounds. that includes the 13 from navigate. we must always honor all of their sacrifice, each of them, over two decades of fighting the taliban, bringing osama bin laden to justice and ultimately protecting america. we lost over 200 u.s. international troops and many more wounded in action. units that were under my direct command, shoveled for multiple years of combat, both iraq and afghanistan. every commander who has ever served in combat knows that we personally issued the orders that gave the task, purpose, place, the time, the soldiers' deaths or wounds, and we also know it was the enemy that killed or wounded them. combats an unforgiving environment and those of us who served in the fidelity of ground combat lived with the dark reality everyday and every night.

we'll live with that for the rest of the days of our lives. there's no military leader, lost troops in combat who doesn't know that feeling. this is personal to me. i will do everything in my power to ensure that these families and all of our veterans and family know the truth and have the answers. at the peak of her military commitment in 2011, the united states had just over -- or just under a lip is more hundred thousand troops and about 20,000 unique contractors. the senior, the united states instantly brought out troops, close spaces and retrograde agreement. nothing we discussed today happened overnight. it was a process overall that spanned decades. the outcome in afghanistan was a competitive effect of many decisions over many years of war, and like any complex phenomenon, there is no single back to determine the outcome, but multiple factors in domination. the fall of 2020, as i previously testified publicly, my analysis, my personal analysis, was that an

accelerated withdrawal would likely lead to the collapse of the afghan security forces and government. resulting in a large-scale civil war reminiscent of the 1990s with a complete taliban takeover. november 2020, dod received orders from the white house to reduce troop levels, 2500, january 15th, '21. when the current administration took office, january '21, roughly 2500 u.s. troops on the and contractors. 0 nato troops beginning in february of '21, the national security council conducted a 10-week interagency review of the doha agreement with various options presented and debated. previous public testimony, i noted, at that time, my analysis, based on my assessment and the recommendations of the commanders to include general mackenzie, the consensus of the joint chiefs of staff, was that we needed to maintain a minimum force of 2500 troops on the ground, mostly special forces,

with allied troops and contractors in order to sustain the afghan national security forces and its government until the department divisions of the doha agreement were met. for the support my view at the time, it was only a matter of when, not if, the afghan government would collapse and the taliban would take control. again, i previously publicly testified, and i consistently supported and negotiated an end to the war, but only if there was a reduction and permanent cease-fire with afghan-to- afghan negotiations leading to an agreement between the afghan government and the taliban, and it was my view that, absent those conditions, i was not in favor of unilateral withdrawal for the u.s. forces because of my assessment and the associated costs and risks. a fundamental tension facing the president -- in fact, two presidents -- when no one could satisfactorily explain when or even if those conditions would ever be met, and if we stayed

indefinitely and an open war would likely begin with the taliban again with an increased risk of additional catastrophes. 14 a, '21, president biden made the formal announcement of his decision to honor the doha agreement with a military withdrawal while maintaining the continued diplomatic presence. the department of defense understood that our mission was to conduct a retrograde and remaining u.s. military forces and equipment, while leaving a small contingent to defend the american embassy all diplomatic outcomes were negotiated. on 14 august, the noncombatant evacuation operation decision was made by the department of state in the u.s. military alerted muscles, mobilize and rapidly deployed faster than any military in the world could ever do. it is my assessment that that decision came too late. the deploying forces quickly took operational control of the airports with a significant element, the 82nd airborne

division marine, national guard, special forces, along with our cia partners, selected nato forces. additionally, we set up multiple bases in the process of evacuation of the countries throughout the middle east. in short, the united states military performed one of the most incredible evacuations under pressure in recorded history and an equally difficult dynamic and dangerous environment. that performance is due to the individual bravery, competence, compassion, of every private and general who had any role in this deal. at the end of 20 years, we, the military, helped build an army, state, and we cannot for donation. the enemy-occupied kabul, overthrow the government occurred, and the military supported for two decades faded away. that is a strategic failure. but the military also provided help, for 20 years, that the afghan people we provided unprecedented opportunity to millions, and in the final days, we gave 130,000 people their lives and freedom at very high cost. most important, we protected

the united states from terrorist attacks from afghanistan, which was our original mission, and the mission remains today. many lessons are to be learned from many years of war, 20, and the 10 years brought on from forces and the lengthy evacuation. mr. president, i would like to submit this record. >> an objection, so ordered. >> for the mecca people, i think the most important lesson to learn is that your troops -- the united states military -- the private and general, did all that bravery and duty could ever do. your military defended you successfully for 20 years, and continues to do that, and for that, every american should be eternally grateful. all the veterans of afghanistan, hold your head high . i know there are several in the room today. know that you do your duty. each of you did what your country asked of you under extreme circumstances. many of you, like congressman matt, linda, is limited and did

it selflessly with professionalism, courage, compassion, and great sacrifice. finally, to the goldstar families, here with us today, and those that couldn't make it, there's nothing i can say or do that's going to fill the gaping hole in your heart, but as i have told you before, i am committed, and i will honor that commitment. i will get you the answers to get you to the truth, and i will personally all of a sudden, everyone else will as well -- honor your sacrifice and the sacrifice of others. thank you, mr. chairman. i look forward to your question. >> thank you, general milli. i now recognize general mackenzie for his opening statement. >> microphone? you got it. i would like to ask of this be submitted to the order. >> none objection. >> chairman mccall, foreign affairs committee, here to

voluntarily testify today but the military component of our withdrawal from afghanistan. before i begin, i like to recognize the goldstar families that are here today. i hope that what we discussed today will reduce their pain. i, like general milli, and humble enough to be in the presence today. as you are aware, september of 2020 one, i provided over 10 hours of open and closed testimony on the subject for the two congressional committees charged with oversight of military operations for the house armed services committee and the senate armed services committee. much of my testimony will be of necessity and mirror that earlier transcribed testimony. as a theater commander, i will confine my opening remarks of those matters that were under my direct operational control, specifically, the withdrawal of u.s. military forces and the subsequent noncombatant evacuation operation, two distinct and separate operations . we had detailed constantly updated plans for the region. executed both of the plants, all but separated in time, and thanks to the valor and

dedication of thousands of men and women in harm's way, we completed both missions, but not without loss of life. we honor the 13 brave americans who died at at the gate, joining the over 2400 other servicemembers who lost their lives in the 20-year campaign. their sacrifice stands with those of our coalition partners and, of course, the afghans who fought beside us for so many years. i briefed president trump on a plan to briefly depart afghanistan on 3 june, 2020. this plan envisioned the complete withdrawal of all our forces and our diplomats with citizens. it also contemplated the possible withdrawal of afghans who served with us. the plan had a number of options, but it was the framework for everything that followed. ultimately, president donald trump selected a branch of the plan that maintained 2500 u.s. military personnel in afghanistan by inauguration day, january 2021. we had branches of that plan to complete a withdrawal by may of 2021 had we been so ordered.

on 11 april, 2021, i received orders from president biden due to circuit her defense to execute a full military withdrawal by 11 september, 2021. that date was subsequently modified to the end of august. this decision did not include the withdrawal of our embassy, our citizens, and at risk afghans. it's important to understand that we had a complete plan to execute that task as well but were not ordered to do so. the president's decision was to maintain an embassy to not require our citizens to leave and, of course, do not expedite the extraction of at risk afghans. this was not a military decision. we substantially accomplished the military withdrawal by 12 july, 2021, my relieved general scott miller as the commander of u.s. forces in afghanistan. my orders then were to retain a military platform of 650 personnel solely designed to provide security for the u.s. embassy at the international

airport. during this period, and with minimal to no support from us, the afghan security forces, more importantly, the government of afghanistan, crumbled in the face of afghan pressure. orders to commence the noncombatant operation of evacuation without embassy, innocent afghans, received on 14 august. these dates are important because i believe that the events of then in late august 2021 were the direct result of delaying the initiation of the n.e.o. for several months. in fact, until we were with the taliban overrunning the country and extremists, as you are aware, your decision with n.e.o. rests with the department of the state, not the department of defense. despite this, we have begun positioning forces in the region as early as 9 july, but we could do nothing to commence the operation of evacuation until the n.e.o. was clear. our operations at the

international airport from 14 august 2 our ultimate departure on 31, artist, both rogue and tragedy. this was a combat operation of the most difficult sort, carried out in contact with the enemy. eventually put 5834 u.s. troops help is on the 2001 coalition and other forces -- 8 u.s. maneuver battalions up is on the ground at the international airport. i would like to talk more about abbey gate, a tragic event that has occurred over our 20-your engagement in afghanistan. it remains my opinion that there was culpability in this attack, it lies in policy decisions that create the environment august 2021 in kabul. culpability and responsibility do not lie with troops on the ground, but they performed magnificent. it does not lie with the platoon, company or flag officers who oversaw operations on the ground at kabul. the simple fact is this, on the battlefield, even with good plans, tremendous execution by brief people on the ground, the enemy sometimes has success. to ignore this fact is to ignore the fundamental reality

of the battlefield. if there's fault, it lies in policy decision that placed the joint force in this situation and exposed the force over time to the possibility of these kinds of attacks. we do not rely on the taliban for our security. we used them as one tool among many to beef up our defensive posture. we avoided a number of potential abbey gate attacks, and i'm proud of the commanders and troops who defended them. this is a small comfort to those who lost loved ones, and i realize this. nonetheless, what's remarkable about kabul is not the tragedy of abbey gate, but that many other attacks did not happen. i let my statement with this observation, i was the overall commander, and i and i alone, i bear full military responsibility for what happened at abbey gate. thank you, chairman, i am ready for questions. >> thank you, general mackenzie. i will not recommend questions. we have sergeant tyler vargas andrews here today. i want to thank you, sir, for

your service and your courage for testified before this committee almost a year ago to the day. he was a sniper at abbey gate and testified to us that he had the suicide bomber in his sights that was identified to be on the lookout. he sent sniper photos and other related documents to the commanding officer for permission to engage the suicide bomber. yet, that warning was ignored. he never heard back i and the chairman of the armed services committee, after that testimony, sent a letter to the department of defense, requesting that these documents and sniper photos be delivered to the congress, produced to the congress, by this document, this letter request. to date, that has been ignored. the department of defense has refused. we have also requested the

testimonies of general chris donahue and admiral peter beasley who were the commanding officers on the ground during the abbey gate disaster . the both of you, general millie, do you think that these documents should be turned over to the united states' congress? do you think that both general donahue and admiral beasley should testify before congress? >> sure. i am truly do believe transparency office on the board of directors for this operation for the american government -- i believe you are entitled to those with advanced classification. absently. whatever documents are out there should be turned over to the appropriate committee's jurisdiction and oversight. whenever witnesses are needed to establish truth and transparency within the classification, obviously. that's why i am here. >> thank you.

sherman, i agree with general millie. i associate myself with those remarks. >> also, on accountability, i have asked the state department officials who are responsible for the catastrophic emergency evacuation -- not surprisingly -- as they point the fingers at the department of defense. i want to set the record straight. the dod health conducted the emergency evacuation, but it is the state department that is responsible, under law, for developing the plan and leaving the evacuation. is that your understanding? >> yes. the state department and the federal agency is for planning and execution, oversight and execution of the occupied operation. and department of defense is in support of -- and other departments -- are in support of the state. that is correct. >> general mackenzie? >> i agree with that. >> the state department is responsible -- under law, again, for requesting the emergency evacuations of the

crew? >> that is correct. i think that action is done at the advanced level up as i would have to check the law, but i think the ambassador can make the decision to execute a n.e.o., but typically it will be him or the secretary of state. >> did the state department specifically, embassy kabul, have an evacuation plan for afghanistan? >> gorbachev, every embassy has an evacuation plan for afghanistan, and embassy kabul had a plan. what we call an s-77 list, a list of u.s. citizens and families in the country, and we struggled to gain access to that plan or work with them over much of july until we finally got a decision to execute the n.e.o., which as i mentioned, occurred on the 14th of august. we worked with the embassy before that , but we didn't have authority to move out and do the things you have to do to make a n.e.o. happen until the 14th of july -- correction, 14th of august. as i noted, we were with

extremists at that. . >> and august 14th, just days before the fall of kabul and the evacuation of the embassy, august 14th is when they finally put forward this plan? >> that is we got the authority to execute the plan. >> that's when you got authority, and you heard the white house and state department put pen to paper for a developer to get americans and our afghan allies out of afghanistan. correct? >> yes, i did. in fact, i was concerned by the middle of july. i was concerned about the different pace of department of defense planning as compared to department of state planning. i took an opportunity, then, to make representations to the secretary about my concern over that. the fact that we were moving pretty fast on this, they were not moving fast, and i was concerned that we were going to arrive at different locations, just based on it, and i went to the secretary, and we spent some time talking about that, actually followed up with a written idea on some things

that we could do, sent a letter with recommendations to the secretary of defense. >> and is that your recollection? general millie? >> absolutely. you know, without breaching things by executive privilege, et cetera, my incentive at the time and frank mckenzie's submitted assessments -- the general consensus from the military up to and including the secretary of defense was that the embassy should be coming out -- roughly speaking, does the same time it should be coming out, and then after the decisions were made to keep a diplomatic presence there, as the situation deteriorated, the breach of capital, et cetera, we were clearly passing for early called to execute a n.e.o. >> and they did, eventually, develop a plan? go ahead. >> they had a plan. like i

said, it's a requirement to have the plan, but it's wanting to have the plan. it's a second thing to do the actual coronation of a plan. we talked about the specifics of execution. so, having a plan is one thing. preparing the plan, correlating the plan with the people that are going to actually carry you out, the department of defense, that's another set of tasks, completely. >> that was too little, too late. >> my judgment, it was far too little, far too late. >> was that your assessment, general millie? >> it was. i would broaden it a little bit by saying, it was a consistent assessment by me and other members of the military up to and including the secretary. at the withdrawal of the military forces, and the contractors in the nato forces that went with it, ultimately, as i said in mild mean statement, a general collapse of the nsf and the government. and as i mentioned, the tension was one with those conditions that needed to be made. it was also our assessment, at the time, that keeping an embassy open in a war zone of his which afghanistan was -- and to do that without the presence of the u.s. military and the contracts of nato, et

cetera, that that embassy would be untenable. >> and that was your advice to the state department and the white house? >> as you know, because of the requirements of executive blitz, et cetera, i can tell you what my assessments were at the time, and those are my thoughts at the time. >> do you believe there is a failure to plan timely, which greeted the chaos at the airport? >> i think the execute for the n.e.o. came too late. as general mackenzie mentioned, sufficiently locked in at that. and 20 afghan governance was prepared to depart and departed the next day with 15. the thousands of afghan civilians gathering at the airport, and the afghan security forces were collapsing with venture capitals, and although there were still some in and around kabul, the general situation at that point, 750 u.s. soldiers in and around the embassy. the troops were required, along with others, to detect, and

they melted away. you have a situation with u.s. embassies and a 50 troops when the n.e.o. was called , and we leaned forward i think it is the ninth or 11th timeframe when we are had forces on alert, except with the ms, we learned marshall was deployed, with the mission-ready brigade, and the saudi underneath general mackenzie my ski patrol, rapidly deployed along the special forces to take control of the airport. they took two to three days, and that's where the videos come from, but eventually took control of the airport. >> general mackenzie? >> that reflect the opinion i had a time. >> i believe the accountability ensures mistakes of the past or not repeated, but from what i said, the president and this administration refused to acknowledge their failures --

there's an inscription that the national archives down the street reads, what is past is prolonged, and i watched this investigation to make sure the mistakes made in afghanistan never, ever happen again. with that, i recognize -- >> thank you, mr. chairman. can we start by saying, thank you. you all volunteer. you are here voluntarily. is that correct? >> that is correct, sir. >> although, you did receive a threat that one four. that is also correct? >> received a threat of being subpoenaed to come today. >> chairman mccall mentioned that he wanted us to appear, and that there are compulsory measures, which i took to be sure -- but look, that wasn't necessary from the beginning. >> i know. you can -- i want to get to the point -- it was something in regards to, you know, a subpoena to come. correct?

>> i was not subpoenaed. >> i said, the threat of a subpoena. something compulsory. >> answer like this. i testified several times, as well as general mackenzie and open and classified hearings on afghanistan. prior to retirement, chair mccall asked me, would you be willing to discuss with the committee. i said, absolutely, yes.no threat of subpoena or compulsory, nothing. i said, yes. i saw chair mccall again after he retired and he reminded me of the conversation. i said, actually. january or february of this year, we worked out some of the details. i said, i wanted to go back and review records, et cetera, then it was originally supposed to be a closed, classified hearing, because i still think i'm going to do one of those after this. i thought that was important to be a classified hearing, because a lot of information is still classified, and then there was a discussion for public hearing.

>> you know, so, just speak in on that. you have testified before. you have testified before the service committee. is that correct? >> testified before the house and armed services committees in both classified and open hearings, and then i have testified about nsf and several other testimonies. >> same with you, general mackenzie? >> correct, sir. >> and is your testimony this has anything changed from when you were in uniform and testifying to when you testified today? has there anything that you -- you know -- didn't testify to the for that you are testifying to now? is there any change of you or thought of what to race today from what you testified to previously? >> in general, for me, everything that i testified before is still true and accurate today.

in open testimony, that would be correct. i have learned more from advocate because of the investigations. that wasn't available from our previous testimony. but i have since read those investigations and been briefed on them, but they weren't available at first >> you testified today, and it is still basically consisting? >> yes. totally consistent. >> in general mackenzie, same for me. >> there's not really anything, you, learned today, because you testified to it before. right? >> i will leave that to y'all to determine. >> i'm just asking, from your testimony, you know, what has been made public, what has been public. >> sure. >> basically, this is not something -- >> ranking members, i mentioned in my opening statement, much of what i said today will mirror the 10 hours. that's my point. >> this is not anything ground breaking or anything, you know, that is being discovered newly.

this is something that has been out in the public from the time that you testified, back in 2022. right? nothing groundbreaking here. the fact of the matter is -- let me ask this question -- and i think, maybe it was you, general millie, said, the framework for what took place during the 20 years -- because i think that we should be looking at -- we really want to figure out what went wrong, what we need to fix, we need to look at the entire 20 years of being in afghanistan, not just the last few months. would you say that is correct? >> yes. and i said that before as well. on the written remarks submitted for the record, i have elaborated on what i think are, say, top 10 lessons, but there's many more. you are not going to learn all the lessons in short sessions, but i think there's a huge amount of lessons to be learned over the course of 20 years. you know, should we have gone after bin laden in 2021 in that winter when we had him, more or

less, from an intel standpoint? we thought we had him located. should we, could we have? yes? should we have? yes. in hindsight, that would change the trajectory of the whole board, and there's a whole series along the way, specific to this hearing, to help these families. i think the focus is more recent relative to the withdrawal itself, with the abbey gate and the n.e.o.. you are correct. a holistic view? absolutely. but that will take a considerable amount of time. >> but you said, the doha agreement under the trump administration had some connection to the conditions on the ground when joe biden became president and leading on up into the crisis at abbey gate? there was a connection. correct? >> yeah. i think the end game, if you will, the final, you know, monster, i think the framework of that is set by the doha agreement.

actually. >> again, we will find out the findings of what you should do. we should be talking about what happened in the trump administration, as well as what took place during the biden administration, because they are not connected, they are separate. we are serious about trying to figure out what took place and why to waste. we should be looking at both, what took place under the bush administration, the obama administration, the trump administration, and -- is that not correct? >> sure. as you point out, former presidents, this happen as a secretary of defense, secretary of state, happen as a church in and of the chief of staff and commanders in afghan. yes, this absolutely is a lesson to be learned from all of us, and the end game -- using the doha agreement if you wanted to say that was a strong point, sure, there's a lot to be said about that as well, and there's a continuing -- as i

mentioned in my opening statement -- there's no phenomenon in the world that >> my. is that if we are taking a serious look at this, you can just take a peek at one little segment of it and say, this is the reason everything happened without looking at what she did it, because you would have to look at it in its entirety. isn't that correct? if it's really about trying to figure out how we're going to make sure the mistakes that have been made and the things that we got right, you can only do that in a serious investigation if you take all of it and you look at all of it and you examine all of it, not just piecemeal in that. wouldn't you agree with that? >> of course i said that in my opening statement in the previous testimony, that a holistic look at the whole war, in order to really determine how it goes, et cetera -- and anything as complex as war is not the result of a single cause. in fact, there's multiple factors, multiple decisions. yes, in general, i agree. i'm here for the families to try to get them answers and try to get answers on immediate issues that are in -- >> so, i know one thing, the

amount of time that he had and where it got cut off there. so, let me ask this. with the conclusion of the doha deal, the taliban did not attack forces inside of afghanistan. is that correct? >> well, yes. we feel attack. they committed to not doing that. there were some attacks, but they committed to not conducting lethal attacks, and by my memory, i don't think those lethal attacks were on u.s. forces. >> let me ask you this. we are running out of time. >> chairman, if i may. so, with united states committed to the doha deal, that was to withdraw "-- withdraw from afghanistan all military forces of the united states, its allies, coalition partners, including all non- diplomatic civilian personnel,

private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting service personnel? that is correct? that is the doha deal to the trump administration? that is correct? >> as i recall, i think there was seven conditions of the united states signed up to, and eight conditions that the taliban signed up to. i think you rattled off most of the key once. it was a very explicit thing that said, you had to go with 13,000, more or less, 13,000 u.s. troops window he was assigned, then you had to go to 8600 -- >> let me get through this. i want to make sure. therefore, the withdrawal was well underway in january 2021, after president trump withdrew u.s. forces, not withstanding concerns about the taliban's behavior. is that correct? >> the withdrawal was absolutely underway. the withdrawal down to forces was underway. that's correct >> so, i don't have time, but i would like to because i would like to do a complete investigation.

that is what i think that our committee is -- has the responsibility -- so we can really be transparent the american people on everything that took place in the 20 years in afghanistan, not just one case, but everything. if we are serious and not playing politics for position. >> general's time has expired. i will say, the afghanistan commission is a commission of his looking at the last 20 of yours for the purpose of this mitigation -- to examine the evacuation. i will hold the members accountable in five minutes. under the rules, the disciplines that we can get to every member on this committee who deserves to be heard. we thank you for showing up with that, i recognize mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for calling in and supporting the hearing. thank you to the two generals for distinguished service to our country. thank you, very much for that. you know, general millie, you mentioned how u.s. suggested the minimum 2500 trips do remain. but who rejected your advice, was at the president?

did you ever get a written or oral feedback as to why they rejected the advice? >> again, i can say, the president said this or that. that is beyond the scope of the law, actually, executive privilege, but it's obvious that the president made the decision, the president made an announcement on the 14th, and our recommendation was, as i mentioned, and are thought at the time, as i mentioned. every president has the right to make those decisions. looking at things from a wider angle than a military angle, and our military assessment was keep 2500. with them, not just 2500, it 2500, plus the nato, plus the contractors. the contractors are key here. that, we thought our assessment was that would keep the afghan government and the military stable until such time as a diplomatic outcome could occur in accordance with the conditions set in the doha agreement. >> that had made the difference?

>> we will never know, i guess, because it didn't happen. so, i do think, though, and i believe that the afghan government and afghan security forces were not have collapsed in august of '21. had you maintained those postures, that was high-end special force capable of defending themselves and conducting operations they had been for a while. and i think my assessment, probably moderate to significant risk of u.s. forces , but is that worth that risk? again, doha agreement had conditions, but here was the problem. for two presidents, nobody that i recall -- nobody -- zero -- could coherently argue how it would end or how those conditions would be the poetic additions obtained. not a military problem, but how are the department conditions going to be obtained. >> i asked you, secretary of state blinken, september of 2020 one about the infamous

phone call with coney , and reuters did get a copy of that phone call, the transcript, and apparently, an actual verbatim and they listened to it. in it, he said, there's a need -- whether it's true or not -- this is our president of the united states seeing this. whether it's true or not, there is a need to project a different picture about the taliban end could abilities. general mckenzie, you talked about how there was no plan to get u.s. citizens out, and then there seemed to be the bewilderment of the party and administration why americans want flocking to leave and everybody waited doing it anyway. i'm just wondering what you thought of that phone call. i asked secretary blinken, he says, i don't talk about something that has been leaked. is it true? did he say that? line like that when you give a false impression to the whole group of americans and everything that got out, that's very, very serious. secondly, because i will run out of time, how many americans were left behind? again, i

thank you that you did everything you could to make this policy work, but you were given a policy that was egregiously flawed, but how many americans are left behind? how many of egregiously flawed. how many americans were left behind? how many allies? and what happened to them, where they beat and, killed, tortured mark back and the weapons left behind, there are reports some has found its way to hamas, i don't know if that is true. i know you did everything you could to destroy them on the way out but many were intact. >> i cannot speak to the phone call. the number of americans, this was an issue, the number of americans, as mckenzie said, every ambassador keeps a report that is supposed to track the americans, where they are, in the country, that was always a difficult number for us in the

department of defense to get a hold of. true at the tactical level and operational level as well. i don't know the exact number of americans that you because the starting number was never clear same is true from at risk afghanistan's, commandos, other afghans that served with us. those numbers varied so widely that they were quite inaccurate. i would just say, i am not sure , even today, about the accuracy of those numbers. >> are they in jail, dead, some of them are correct >> i think some were killed, afghans, i don't know about americans. they were tracked down, who worked with us, some of them killed and pretty certain some in brutal ways. some could escape through various means. others laid low

and kept her head down. >> the chair recognizes mr. sherman. >> thank you. i wish we were having a hearing with these excellent witnesses on what is on people's minds, what is going on in gaza where we could discussed the difficulties of urban warfare and how experts at west point said that israel has done as good a job as any other military in minimizing civilian casualties given the incredible difficulties in urban warfare. instead, we have a highly politicized hearing trying to blame biden. this hearing begin with biden's strategic failure. the witnesses should have not

testified, we have not repurposed the hearing it is continuously politicized. a highly partisan hearing should not be held if you are in the party that made most of the mistakes. let's put this in context, we had a real dispute as to whether we should leave 2500 or so american servicemen there for this decade and the following decade the dissent table argued for that, but donald trump promised the american people every single american soldier would be out. from that point, we had no bargaining position. that is why the chief negotiator said that it was well known by 2018 that we are hell bent to get every person

out what did we agree to in doha, an agreement that says, it is okay for the taliban to treat 12-year-old girls like sex slaves, nothing prohibits that, or prevents killing people because they are part of the lgbt community or prevents them from killing someone because they convert from islam to christianity, all they have to do is talk to the afghan government, they talked, and they assumed total power. we can do nothing about it because we promised the american people that absolutely every soldier would be out and donald trump promised to have them back by christmas of 2020. the trump administration lost 59 of our servicemen, 152 contractors, accomplishing nothing. we surrendered in 2020, we

could have surrendered in 2017. but perhaps the most extreme partisanship has advised with so many members of this committee having attacked president biden's plan did not bring back the $8 million of equipment we left behind. this equipment was in the hands of afghanistan people who had plenty of use for it, they can keep it for their own defense, selling to the taliban, they did not choose to bring it back to us and return it. i will ask general milley , was there way for us to go all around afghanistan and demands the return of our equipment? i realize, at the time, we hope the afghan armed forces would use that to resist the taliban,

if we realized they would cave immediately, could we have taken that equipment away from the afghanistan people with no casualties? >> of course not. we would have incurred substantial cavities if we had done was so many on the other side of the aisle have suggested and that somehow get back our equipment. >> how does our withdrawal from afghanistan compared to our withdrawal from -- actually, another question, joe biden came in in january of 2021, was there a comprehensive plan, at that time, to both withdraw absolutely every one of our servicemen, that was the promise donald trump made to the american people, while withdrawing in an organized way with no american casualties? >> two points, if i could go back to the equipment.

as i recall, i think it is laid out in the special ig's report, $80 billion worth of military aid, everything from food, building derricks and uniforms, including equipment. over 20 years. i think it is $7.2 billion of military equipment, u.s. manufactured military equipment that is with the afghan security forces, afghanistan on equipment. every piece of american equipment the american military on the -- the american military owned came with scott miller or he destroyed it. >> this attack on biden -- >> he has his time expired. >> unanimous consent to submit two reports from the george w. bush institute on february of

2024, the human cost and corruption. >> so ordered. >> we appreciate your service. we have to learn from what happened, the appeasement in afghanistan. the biden decision to appease is the worst foreign-policy national security decision i believe in the history of the united states. it led directly to the encouragement of dictators who are ruling by gun to invade the democracies on rule of law. we saw that on february of 2022 when putin invaded ukraine, and when the iranian regime invaded israel. we see that today, as the world's largest military buildup is being conducted by the chinese communist party to threaten taiwan. global war on terrorism continues and, with open

borders, american families have never been a greater risk of attack. i appreciate the military families who are here today. as a 31 year veteran of the 280 and three brigade, i visited four times with our personnel, serving in afghanistan, i saw them served with the afghan brothers just as you did. because of encouragement by my wife, my oldest son, he received a c.a.b., my second son a doctor, my third at the southern border, and also served in egypt. my youngest son served under your command a year in afghanistan. to me, the biden decision that led to the 13 deaths of the persons, the servicemembers, on excusable. -- on excusable.

i am very concerned you were blamed on august 26, 2021, mr. biden, he specifically said that the 13 murdered at the withdrawal of forces was a decision as determined by the military and he said he had letters that indicated you had said that there should be an immediate appeasement. i sent a letter that day to the present asking for copies of the letters and every couple of months i will send another request but it has not been provided. there are no letters. it is the responsibility of the president of the united states, his decision, that resulted in what happened, putting american families at risk. with that, the doha agreement , each of you, was there a violation -- it was conditions based, were there violations by

the taliban on the agreement? >> yes, the taliban violated every condition of the agreement except lethal attacks on u.s. forces, from the time they sign the agreement until the end. yes, they were in violation, they did not renounce al qaeda, they did not -- there is a series of conditions in the doha agreement they did not do. >> that is correct, every condition except the one about attacking american coalition forces. they stepped up attacks upon afghan forces during this time because we agreed to withdraw substantive air combat support during this time and they took advantage of that opportunity. >> i appreciate that donald trump has indicated there was conditions based and those conditions were violated and that would have led to his view of maintaining the ballroom

base. what is your position? >> linked to my recommendation, that we should have held at 2500 u.s. forces, if you assume that would allow the afghans to stay in the fight, you can maintain a viable base at bagram. >> bagram would be protecting american families. we still have a president making bad decisions. we had seven weeks ago, three young americans who were killed army reservist from georgia this was a decision of joe biden , who did not follow through on trying to stop these attacks on our troops. we have lost three servicemembers, over 40 injured the president needs to take this seriously we are in a conflict existential of our country. >> the chair recognizes mr. --

>> mr. crow. >> my condolences to the goes-r family for making the ultimate sacrifice, that we can never repay but we are trying the best to get answers for you. i want to extend my condolences to the over 2400 other goldstar families who were not able to join us today is families made the ultimate sacrifice in the 20 years of this work. my criticisms of the withdrawal and the missteps are well documented. there were issues that have to be addressed and i have been clear about that. i have tried to get answers, with my colleagues. i want to provide important context, ending wars in never easy and never clean. retrograde operations are some of the hardest and most

dangerous things that we ask our military to do. i wanted to provide some of that context. chairman milley , you said in your opening that the doha agreement that donald trump entered into with the taliban required the complete withdrawal of u.s. forces, that was the agreement the trump administration entered into. you said, had we not complied, they would be open war with the taliban. they kept their agreement not to attack u.s. forces, which allowed us to withdraw and reduce our footprint, had we not withdrawn, not stop the war, would we be in open war with the taliban? >> the probability is greater than not that they would have reinitiated combat operations on may 1st or may 2nd. the current administration, to

get that extended until september, to buy some time. little question in my mind, had the united states -- had either president -- if we did not withdraw, we would have been back at work with the taliban. >> general mckenzie ? >> i generally agree with what general milley said when we kept -- we thought this need to have an aggressive negotiation program with the taliban. one that was perhaps with a few more sticks and not all carrots. you needed to change the approach to negotiation if you decided to stay. we will never know. it is very possible that we could have been fighting the taliban. it is counterfactual. >> thank you. on the issue -- i was one of those voices that joined you and called for an earlier neo,

i thought that would have been better and led to a smoother evacuation. but not a perfectly clean one. the issue of who we evacuate, you talked about getting counts on u.s. citizens, but the united states never requires its citizens to register with the state department and in no instance do we fully know what americans are on the ground in any situation. correct? >> i think that is 100% correct. you see that in sudan, ukraine, other places, very difficult, it is a voluntary thing, people are encouraged to register with the embassy but i don't know of a compulsory requirement. >> when we evacuate american citizens, many were dual citizens. general mckenzie? >> correct. >> many had not american

citizen family members. >> correct. >> many did not want to evacuate until they knew there was a crisis because they didn't want to leave the family. >> correct. >> even if we started a neo earlier, that does not mean there would not have been a rush as the afghan security forces collapsed because people realized they need to get out. that probably would not have changed, even if we started it earlier? >> hard to know, but possible. >> our partners from our friends , our afghan allies who are still there. we have an obligation to get them out. there is a bill called the afghan allies protection act, a bipartisan bill, i want to take mr. barrett, a cosponsor, i

want to encourage my colleagues who are not cosponsors to sign on because we can still do right and save lives by passing this bill and providing a pathway for our friends to get out. >> the chair recognizes mr. perry from pennsylvania. >> we honor the goldstar families and the servicemembers here today. general milley , general mckenzie, were the rules of engagement , at the time of the incident, sufficient to servicemembers to protect themselves? >> it is my judgment they work. we had the standard roe with supplements to afghanistan. three main components, the right of self-defense, a u.s. service member anywhere in the world has the right to defend himself or herself against a threat, it does not have to be in action you are defending

against, it can be intent interpreted. we were operating under that threat. at the same time, we extended collective self-defense to our partners and allies. you can take action to defend the brits, you afghan partners. the third component was, we used direct action authority which allowed you to strike people not in direct contact with you, particularly in relationship to kabul if they post a self- defense threat . we exercised self-defense with legal effect three times during the defense of kabul . >> sticking with the abbey gate incident, you said there was no specific attack or intelligence, no specific intelligence existed and there was nobody on the bolo that fit that description? >> that is true. >> were you aware, after the

abbey gate attack, war you were servicemembers at the gate had requested the ability to service the targets? were you aware of that? >> i was not. >> understandable a combatant commander may not be aware of what servicemembers on the line are aware of. after that, that circumstance, were you concerned about the intelligence you were getting regarding the action you were about to take on the would be attackers, and that network? >> sure. so, on or about the 26, we were tracking four broad, very active threats. looking at the threat of a vehicle borne ied, person borne ied, indirect fire, rockets, mortars, and insider attack somebody gives insight and blows himself up in the

terminal. >> but you have nothing fitting the description of what your servicemembers on the gate, on the line, had maxima descriptions -- >> when the service member on the line is looking at the attacker, based on the description, he has the rules of engagement, but the rules of engagement at that point require him to check with his commander, go up the line, he does not get approval -- that is exceptionally concerning. i understand the fog of war and understand the circumstance, but a man has been blown up because he could not get the answer that he needed. on thursday, august 26th, the abbey gate attack happens and three days later the drone strike occurs. you said we had up to six reapers following the scars for eight hours -- following the car to eight hours with 60

pieces of intelligence that proved these were the people that had just attacked the abbey gate. >> no, sir. not correct. >> that is what i have from open-source reporting. maybe that is not correct. regardless of that, on the 29th, a drone strike kills 10, seven children, five days later, the pentagon admits there was a mistake. five days later. general milley, when did you know about the drone strike? on the civilian taking water to his family. >> when did i know it? >> five days before the pentagon said it was a mistake, when did you know it? >> day four or five. i did not know right away. >> who did you tell? >> it came up through me to the secretary of defense. >> from you to the sec def?

>> general mckenzie would have called me and said we have an incident -- >> does anybody else in the biden administration know it is a failure? not having a clue. who did you tell? >> i told the secretary of defense. we go through the details of the strike in a principals meeting. if you are saying, did i tell the president of the united states, or whomever, other than the secretary of defense, that there was a mistake, i think, doing this from memory, i think general mckenzie would have called me and i would have informed the secretary of defense or he would have called the secretary of defense, the chain of command, i may have been in there at the time i don't recall the individual i mentioned it to. for several days, it was my

impression that the procedures were executed directly and we struck a target we thought was an enemy. there was a mistake made. >> huge. and we lied for the american people. >> we were not lying, we were not intentionally trying to deceive. that is not what i was doing. >> it is a pretty big mistake. >> unanimous consent to representative meeks to participate in the hearing. without objection? the chair recognizes mr. snyder? >> i can send mike's -- i can send -- paraphrasing some of

the things i ever today, no single factor determine the outcome, something you have said, 20 years of decisions, actions, successes and failures contributed to what ultimately happened. you said there was a series of lessons along the way. if i can't do something, general milley , talking with ranking member meeks, the start of the end was the doha agreement ? >> a historian could look at it that way, you get started in 2011 to begin the drawdown by the obama administration. eight tenure process and the in game, i would say was doha agreement because it was a continuum , unbroken cause-and- effect on that moment. >> i think -- what were your

thoughts at the time of the signing of the doha agreement in 2020 ? >> well, the military was not consulted on the doha agreement , nor did i expect to be it was a state permit operation done under the secretary of state. i was not consulted. it was an 18 month process and begin both -- before i was chairman. that process goes on. we knew there was a negotiation going on. the specifics of which we did not know the terms of the negotiation. i found out about that from secretary esper after the fact. then, a week or two later, we were given the classified annex to the doha agreement. we did not participate in the development of the terms nor the negotiation. >> went the decision was made

to draw down to 2500 troops by an aggravation day, did you see that as something sustainable to the ultimate goal or did that put u.s. forces at unnecessary risk? >> 2500 u.s. troops, these are high in special forces, 2500 u.s. troops with the contractors , with nato, was a force necessary to buy time to ensure conditions would be met and result in a satisfactory negotiation settlement. with the government of afghanistan and the taliban. >> at any time between the doha agreement and january of 2021 when we were at 2500, even april , was the government involved in negotiations? was there evidence of progress being made in negotiations between the taliban and the government that would give confidence that we could achieve the conditions that were laid out in the doha

agreement ? >> i don't actually know that. i think that is a question for the state department because they have better visibility. i am almost positive that there were no substantive negotiations between the government of afghanistan, and the taliban. there may have been back channel stuff and stuff i am not aware of, but not aware of substantive negotiations. the doha agreement , one of the requirements, one condition, one of the conditions is, a reduction in violence for a specified time, 90 days, and that was supposed to lead to a permanent countrywide cease- fire and that would lead to a negotiated settlement between the government of afghanistan and the taliban. obviously, the taliban did not adhere to those conditions, they blew through those, but that was a part of the doha agreement. i think that is what we were

trying to make happen. >> the goal was to have that negotiated agreement with the taliban, the taliban realized the government was weak and they could achieve their goals by other means at one point, both of you, would you market the tipping point where the outcome was all but certain? probably long before august of 2021 i imagine. >> i would say two points, one, the doha agreement, because it was negotiated between the government of the united states and the state department designated terrorist organization, taliban, a bilateral agreement, that pulled the rug out a row wise from the afghan security forces and the government itself. they knew there was a date certain. that had a significant effect. historians will have to figure

out exactly what that effect is. the observable tipping point of the collapse of the afghan military, that clearly is in july. as you look at when provincial capitals started to form, the first one falls, august 6th, and in the next 10 days, the rest of them fall, all the way to the capture of kabul. the end of july, at the beginning of august, it becomes evident the afghan security forces are crumbling and that is where the neo things comes up. >> the chair recognizes ms. wagner. >> i want to thank the witnesses for our time and our service to our country. and recognition to our goldstar families who have joined us and those who didn't one of the 13 lost was from my community in missouri.

i want to remind our viewers and our colleagues here today that the title of this hearing, of this particular hearing, an assessment of the biden administration's withdrawal from afghanistan by american's generals. even 2.5 years after the biden administration's botched withdrawal after countless hearings, roundtables, and briefings, the incompetence that led to the abandonment of afghanistan astounds me. the administration ignored the advice of allies, experts, and military leaders, blowing past warning sign after warning sign as it allowed afghanistan to collapse. the total betrayal of our u.s. military servicemen and women, of our allies, of afghanistan,

and the subsequent chaotic, shameful withdrawal has seriously damaged our credibility as an ally and a leader. because of the actions of the biden administration, american communities are less safe and the world is much more dangerous and unstable. we are paying the price, now, with conflicts in every corner of the globe. yes, general milley, those responsible must provide answers , as you have said over and over. they also must be held to account. general milley , general mckenzie, i asked the following questions not just as a member of congress but also as a mother of an army ranger who served under your command in combat in afghanistan.

let me ask both of you, general milley and mckenzie, did you engage with our nato allies and other allies about the withdrawal plan before president biden announced his decision to go to zero in april of 2021? >> absolutely did that was fundamental. the nato slogan at the time was in together come out together, so we coordinated multiple times with nato allies. >> did they recommend not going to zero prior to or after president biden's april 2021 withdrawal announcement? >> yes, they did. it was my belief, had we stayed at 2500, we would have had 5000 -- >> yours and everyone else's. did our allies with troops in afghanistan inform you that they would withdraw if the u.s. went to zero?

>> yes. they said we will be aligned with you, in together, out together >> yes, because of the unique capabilities we provide, they could not have stayed. >> with the withdrawal of u.s. forces by mid july, more than a month before the august deadline, why was the drawdown executed so quickly? and did you believe the process was moving too fast? >> it was by design, from the beginning, we wanted to get out as quickly as we could because we thought speed prostate and would give us a cushion in case of unanticipated problems. >> what orders were driving the speed? >> concerns about the taliban attacking us and isis carrying out attacks, with room at the back end in case we had

trouble, and weather problems, aircraft problems, case that did not happen. >> it is not clear -- now clear that our allies were not ready for how quickly the u.s. withdrawal occurred. did you ever consider that the pace of the drawdown slow to enjoy the afghan military was able to successfully transition, if so, why was such action not taken? >> the doublets i don't believe the 30 days would not have had a material impact -- >> one more question, have the taliban been carrying out a campaign of retribution, reprisal, and revenge killings against the afghan allies that we left behind at max >> i believe, yes. >> yes, systematically. >> systematically. i yield back. >> the chair recognizes mr. phillips.

>> thank you for your sacrifices , to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle who have served in uniform, thank you for yours. to all of you in this room who may have served, i am grateful. particularly to the goldstar families in the room. if you may just raise your hands, those representing loved ones. i am one of you. thank you for holding that up. i am one of you and i know how you feel. i have been looking for answers my whole life after losing my father in vietnam. you can imagine the questions i had to this very day. with the help of the office of chairman milley, i went back to vietnam for the first time in my life in march of last year , i went to the very dirt where my father took his last breath. i can tell you it is where i took my first. when i came home, i recognized two things, first, one of the answers is this piece of plastic, a voting card we use

in the house chamber, where we make decisions which can make life and take life, true in the white house and our generals, with our armed services, and the weight of that is something that changed me forever. but i also recognized is our report about the hospitality of the beat mimi's -- the vietnamese were when i was there, how gracious, how hospitable, how kind and caring, and how meaningful they saw my return. my question to you, both generals, what do we need to start doing today in afghanistan to ensure that families here and families of the 2400 others that lost their lives can one day return to afghanistan and have the same blessing that i had to visit the dirt where my father was killed? >> i will be candid, congressman, i don't think there is anything immediate, it

will take years and years. in my view, i believe the taliban is still a terrorist organization. i believe they conduct incredible and horrific retribution inside the country and i would not recommend to any family member at this time to return. there is probably diplomatic initiatives that could be done in the years ahead. >> that is my question and my return was 54 years. what do we need to do now to plant the seeds so that people can return? >> i have served several tours in afghanistan and lost a lot of people. i have a problem reconciling with the taliban. my father had a problem reconciling with the japanese. wars are horrible things, i will probably go to the grave with it. i don't know how many years it will take but it will take a long time.

>> general mckenzie ? anything we need to do now? >> frankly, our principal concern in afghanistan right now should be the fact that al qaeda and isis can gather strength in ungoverned spaces with goals to attack our homeland. >> on that account, more difficult than it was before, what should we be doing now? >> we need to resource in a central command so they have the opportunity to do surveillance in afghanistan. i am out of the picture now. we need to keep an eye on it. that is very important. in the long-term, it is decades away before there will be any going back to denison, with the horrific treatment of women and children, human rights issues, they seem to embrace that. the taliban is a terrorist organization. they don't have a desire to attack us in our homeland but

they do harbor entities and organizations that do have a desire to do that and right now it is hard for me to get beyond that relentless focus. >> i understand. the u.s. has a history of making wars, sometimes successfully and sometimes not, we have a tradition of making peace, sometimes successfully, sometimes not, success, we made a lot of our former enemies our dear friends and allies are the things we should be thinking about right now as it relates to making former enemies our friends? >> in the case of afghanistan, hard to find common ground. difficult for me -- probably not the right person to ask. maybe as someone from the department of state, or usaad. i focus on the security issues and those are profound. >> thank you, to the goldstar families, my mission is to make

sure some that you can go back because there is nothing more meaningful and powerful. god bless you all. >> the chair recognizes a veteran of afghanistan who made a deer sacrifice to the nation and to afghanistan, mr. mast. >> thank you, generals, for putting on a uniform in defense of this country. many of us that put on the uniform what the next generation to wake up every day and say this country is still worth it, america is worth the fight and one of the most important reasons we have these hearings and we do these oversights, so everybody can wake up and say, this is a place that is worth it. i want to ask questions about targeting. i have watched your interviews from in uniform to leaving uniform, as you can imagine, of great personal interest to me and the goldstar families throughout the war. we left on august 30th, 2021, we lost 13 servicemembers on

the 26th of 2021. moving behind those dates, can you recall when the last time it was that america targeted somebody specifically for the purpose of termination on the 25th, 24th, 23rd? whether it be isis-k, taliban? >> we targeted isis-k ball maker -- >> prior to the 26? we made a mistake -- >> that was the 29th. >> prior to the 26th? >> it had been a lengthy time, but many weeks since we struck a target that you would develop and strike as a personality target. our strikes were during the time after the doha agreement . we were more

indirect self-defense of afghan forces which became increasingly difficult to deliver as our aircraft were repositioned out of aircraft -- afghanistan. the afghan struck, not only -- deep targets, but we have limited visibility on those targets and i don't believe they were effective in those strikes. >> general mckenzie, in one of your interviews, with fox , you said this, there were a wide variety of targets the u.s. military told the taliban to look at. i want to get specifically to that when did that envelope change for america and what did it look like? which targets were we choosing to give to the taliban to target and which targets were keeping for ourselves? what met the threshold of saying, the u.s. will hit this but we will give this to the taliban? >> i prefer to talk about this in a closed session that we passed the taliban information

on targets that were in close proximity to places we thought isis-k were preparing to strike, 18 of those targets that we passed and they took action on some of them but i cannot say if they did on all of them. they did not strike them with the drone, they drove out and may or may not have taken action. we did that i believe 18 times during this time. i mean after august 15th until they left the country. >> you said it was several weeks before -- since we targeted somebody prior to abbey gate? >> specifically, i was answering about the taliban, the relationship with the taliban was a direct, highly transactional relationship based on our withdrawal between august 15th and august 30th.

>> here is the reason that timeline, looking at that is important to me, i have looked at your comments, your interviews, speaking on a different subject, you are speaking about iran, the failure of the biden administration is taking iran off the target list, not that we should drop bombs tomorrow, but they should be on the list so that there is deterrence, so they know they cannot act and not have a response by the united states of america. to take a run off the target list was to give them aid and comfort, those with the exact words. it is my opinion that, if we are ceasing to target al qaeda, , or the taliban, those days leading up to august 26th, just as you look at the lack of

targeting iran is giving the enemy aid and comfort, i would look at giving that enemy, i would look at those lack of actions as giving that enemy aid and comfort. my time has expired. >> the chair recognizes mr. conway. >> welcome to our witnesses. general milley , as an american , i want to thank you for your service and how you conduct yourself in that service. american owes you a debt. you come from my hometown of boston, the father was in world war ii, the fourth marine division in the pacific. your mother was a nurse who served in the u.s. naval reserve during that same war? >> she worked in a hospital out of seattle >> and an uncle in the korean

war? >> two uncles in world war ii, one in the philippine and one landed in normandy. >> fair to say, your family answer the call to serve his country, including bearing arms to protect this country and deter its enemies. >> two uncles in world war i. >> you are in somalia, panama, haiti, and brigade commander to iraq and afghanistan. proud of that service? >> yes >> a colonel who served under you in baghdad but counted one incident where you ran across a -trapped bridge at night and ordered to prevent u.s. tanks from blowing up and the saving lives. is that accurate?

>> it is correct. >> general milley, on a truth social post, donald trump said, talking about you, this guy turned out to be a woke train wreck, who, think news reporting is correct, was dealing with china to give them a heads up on the thinking of the president of united states, this is an act so egregious that , at times gone by, the punishment would have been death. a member of the other side of the aisle on this committee called you a traitor and said, in a better society, quislings, referring to the leader of norway and world war ii collaborating with the nazis -- i won't use his words, general

milley would be hung. general milley , what is your reaction to those statements about you, especially giving you and your family's long and distinguished service to the united states of america as we are discussing patriotism and protecting troops? how do you respond to the kind of slander i just read attributed to prominent political figures? if you could move the mic closer. >> i don't agree with the comments but this is a free country. i am here for the families of abbey gate and those that served in afghanistan. as much as i don't agree with those comments, they have a

right to say them and i would like to stay focused on these families, with respect. >> that is very in keeping with the honorable tradition you have set in your career and your own good name. as a member of this body, i want to let you know i find those comments inconsistent with the honor trying to bestow on those who have lost loved ones. you deserve that honor and respect, too. those comments are dangerous and on the fitting -- and i renounce them and i have a very different view of your service. thank you for serving the american people. >> the chair recognizes mr. barr. >> on july 2nd of 2021 the

united states left bagram airbase in the dead of night without notifying the new commander who discovered the u.s. departure more than two hours after the military had left. general milley , was your assessment, at the time, bagram airbase was the most tragic airbase in afghanistan and across the region? >> i think it was a strategically important airbase , however, at that point, the troops had been drawn down to a degree it was not defendable by u.s. forces and no question of closing it. as far as the specific information with the afghan commander, i read that in the media, cannot comment on whether he knew or did not know. >> was bagram a key component of u.s. air components to and stop taliban advances? >> it had been for 20 years. >> was it the only u.s. airbase

in a country with a physical border with china? >> we have several really asleep, but at that point, that was the only one remaining. >> who, general milley, gave the order to abandon the bagram? >> well, the president makes the decision and announces it on april 14th, the decision simply wasn't withdraw u.s. forces and keep a diplomatic presence. the embassy will remain in print nine if you have to do a neo, use the trevor knight international airport. >> could one have taken place had been conducted out of kabul ? >> sure. but, you don't have the forces to defend. it is a non-question, you don't have the forces to defend bagram , if we were defending it, it would have required

5000, with the afghans with you, you could have defended it with 1800 or 2000. once you make the decision to go -- remove u.s. forces you don't have the option of keeping bagram. >> who did give the order? who specifically gave the order to abandon bagram ? i assume it was delivered to general miller. >> i cannot keep bagram and defend with 750 guys. not feasible that is his recommendation. brought up to the chain of command >> was there dissent within the military was the order given against military advice? >> to close bagram? no. the previous decision is a strategic decision to withdraw u.s. forces. >> you said dod and state were

operating at different speeds, if they were on the same page, do you think bagram could have remained a viable option ? >> the key point determine made is this, when you go below 2.5 k for u.s. forces, you cannot hold bagram. at 2.5, i was not enthusiastic about holding bagram. >> neither one of you recommended going below 2500 back >> my position was to stay at 2.5 k. >> after the decision is made -- >> i understand. when the president makes a decision, we execute. >> the point i am trying to make, the refusal to abide by the recommendations that both of you made, that would have preserved the option to maintain bagram and execute the neo from bagram. would bagram would have been a

preferable strategic exit? >> there are problems with bagram. it is far away from kabul, you prefer to have bagram at 2.5k. it would have helped a neo. >> it was the fact that the resources were not there, troop levels were not there to carry out a successful n.e.o. general mckenzie, did you make a request to seize bagram again ? >> we had a plan to do a variety of things. >> my time is expired. your advice to the political leadership was the correct advice. primarily because we lost a key strategic asset in the counterterrorism fight. now, in retrospect, looking at the fact that we have

competition with china and don't have an airbase, huge strategic blunder in my judgment . >> the chair recognizes miss dean. thank you general milley and mckenzie for your extraordinary careers of service to this country and the sacrifice both you and your families have made for the service of our country. i also recognize the very faithful service members of all of our military, some of whom are here today. but over the 20 years of the conflict in afghanistan, the more than 2400 who gave their lives for this country, for

this democracy, for the rights we prize here. i recognize the goldstar families in the room, i care desperately to get the answers that you need and i appreciate that both of you have talked about it being a comprehensive look you deserve, not about a single day or a single month, you deserve the answers to what went right with this war and what went wrong. to the veterans and families, i see sergeant andrews and her family, thank you for being here yet again. i wanted to start with the testimony before the house armed services committee in september of 2021 to where the secretary of defense lloyd austin said, the timing of evacuations, as for when we started evacuations, we offer input to the state department decision mindful of their concerns that moving too soon may actually cause the very collapse of the afghan

government we all wanted to avoid. i wanted to ask both of you, what role did the sudden, just almost instantaneous collapse of the afghan government play in the events following the continuing evacuation and withdrawal? can you speak to the other collapse that seems to have surprised most people? >> operationally, the collapse meant that -- we depended on afghan support to hold the perimeter, that was the most significant and immediate operational effect of the collapse of the afghan government and the collapse of the afghan military. we thought of it as a possibility and we put in almost 6000 u.s. forces to replace those people who melt away we could have held headquarters with a smaller

number of u.s. forces had the afghans remained. when the government collapsed, that when awake which had an immediate impact on everything else that followed. >> general milley ? >> with respect to what he said, that was a concern of the state department. there was a general consensus that, complete withdrawal of u.s. military forces would have a collapse of the government but the issue is timing. most assessment said that it would be 12, 24 months the military had a tighter assessment and we estimated that the earliest time of complete collapse could be in the fall, maybe around thanksgiving. nothing indicated august. we were advocating the withdrawal of the american citizens and embassy personnel prior to the events of august. >> what role did the afghan president leaving town? >> that was the straw that broke the camels back.

comparisons, i suppose, but zelenskyy stays, and his military stays in kyiv, and they are fighting tooth and nail. in this particular case, the entire cabinet, less one, one went up into the pantry of the valley and the rest of them gotten o airplanes and took off out of the country. nd took off it was very quick. >> as to the draw down, maybe it's more appropriate to general milley. under the doha agreement, the draw down of 8,600 troops by june of 2020 was required. but my understanding is subsequent withdrawals were at president trump's discretion. 4,500 by november of 2020, 2,500 by january of 2021 as a new administration is about to take place. >> and it did not see ideal.

on what basis did president trump order the troop withdraw? >> to back up, it was after the signing of the agreement. and that was executed as the secretary of defense. and esper submitted a recommendation and i concurred with it to hold at 4,500 until all the conditions were being met. secretary asper was removed from office on the 9th of november. one was a withdraw from somalia by the 15th of december. then withdrawal forces by the 15th of january. miller and i and others went over to the white house to confirm that order because we had not been consulted on that.

so we did and that order was subsequently rescinded. on the 17th of december or november, another order was received signed by robert o'brian, the national security adviser to the president, which directed that point to come down to 2,500, which was always given as the min force requirement by the military to two consecutive presidents. >> yet momentarily, the former president placed an order to withdraw everybody? >> it was a withdraw down to zero as you may recall they mentioned that there was some discussion of everybody is home by christmas, that kind of thing. but the actual formal orders is what i just discussed. >> again, i thank you for your service and i thank all the military families. >> chair now recognizes ms kim. >> thank you, chairman for holding today's hearing. i want to thank general milley and mckenzie for coming before

our committee with your testimonies. i do also want to welcome the gold star families and veterans. thank you for your service. following the chaotic withdraw from afghanistan, president biden stated he owes no apologies for how the withdraw was conducted. i disagree. to this date, we are still unclear on how many americans were left behind afghanistan. not to mention that they would help our service members with translation services and intelligence gatherings, which could have been prevented if it was not carried out in a way that was dismissive of the top dod leadership. president biden also promised in an abc news interview just a few days after the taliban take over of kabul that if there are

american citizens left, we're going to stay until they get them all out. and so did you consider this promise and order from the president? >> no. the abc interview, i wouldn't consider that an order. we receive orders from the white house in formal ways. it has been like this for decades. typically they are signed by the national security adviser to the president and that is transmitted to the secretary of defense, the chain of command. then the joint staff and the chairman will take those orders, the military orders to transmit to the combatant members. so i wouldn't consider an abc interview or any other means of a communication as an order. >> general mckenzie? >> i think milley described it exactly correct. >> was there any contingency

planning with the state department to ensure no citizens would be left behind? >> after we departed on the end of august. >> asking prior to the withdrawal. was there contingency planning? >> we always plan for capacities. we worked with 150,000. that's how many people we thought this would go back to june of 2020. that was the number that we thought would have to come out. and it is to make sure you've got the airplanes to move them. but it's up for the department of state to say who is coming out, how you're going to sort them and get them there. and that is when i would talk about the two velocities of the department, but we are depend on the state actually to make those decisions that will turn our ability into actual movements of human beings. >> so we talked about during

that abc news interview about when did you realize that president biden's promise would be broken? >> help me with that? >> when did you realize that the promise of getting every one of the american citizens left in taliban will be -- we would get them out? >> by mid july of 2021, i was concerned given events in afghanistan about the state's planning and their ability. and i always thought that you will never retain perfection there, but you want to get that number as small as possible, and you wanted to get as close to zero as you can. >> and were you told by the same administration just days later to leave americans behind if it meant getting out by

august 31? >> no. i was never told that. but i would share with you my advice in late august was we needed to get out by the 31st. if we did not leave by the 31st it was clear to me from our intelligence reporting and a number of other sources that we would have been fighting the taliban. so i thought you want to get out by the 31st and then resort to diplomatic means to bring your citizens that don't get out. otherwise you're going to have to pour thousands more forces into afghanistan just to stay there and permanently impair your opportunity to get citizens out. not to mention the tens of thousands of at-risk afghans that you would like to get out that will be much higher risk. >> and let me ask you my last question. that you testified you and general mckenzie recommended against keeping u.s. forces in afghanistan past august 31. why would you recommend this? even with hundreds of americans

and allies left behind? >> for the very same reason he just outlined. you're at a very small number and you would have to increase that in order to stay there and fighting what would be the taliban. as far as the american citizens, it wasn't clear then or clear to me what those numbers were. and that was never clarified. and are they down in kandahar? we can't, unless you put tens of thousands of travels there, we cannot be looking for this person or that person and by the end of august, especially after the 26th, it is not feasible. and it's to extend well into september and october and you could look together and so those weren't feasible or

acceptable courses of action at the time. although i understand the human desire, but did not know numbers, where they were. so it is not a realistic option. >> thank you very much. time has expired. >> thank you, generals for your service to the country. and echoing comments of my colleagues, i want to extend my condolences to the gold star families that were here and here earlier, paying the ultimate sacrifice for our country. i also want to recognize the sacrifice of our colleague, brian maas for his service in afghanistan. a lot of people on this committee do a lot of great things in service to their country. i want to thank corey mills, just getting people out of haiti, and i hope we can soon get a briefing on the situation that's going on there.

and this is a very important topic today on what happened and why did it not go according to what the experts in the pentagon believed? i think we need to know what gaps existed, the lessons learned. and how do we prevent something like this from happening in the future. we had soldiers die over the 20 years of war, and we had soldiers die on the withdrawal. and we would like to say it is an and/or kind of deal. either trump was responsible or biden was responsible, right? i actually think in afghanistan, it is an and/and quite frankly. there were mistakes made in the withdrawal. i think the american people

think there were mistakes made. and i think it is okay to admit that. i mean what is the opposite of that? everything went according to plan? general milley, do you think mistakes were made in either the planning phases, things we thought were going to happen or things on the ground that unfolded? do you think mistakes were made in that whole thought process? >> and that is the point of the direction reviews to identify those mistakes and to implement them in the future. and i think the fundamental mistake, the fundamental flaw was the timing of the state department call where it is too slow and too late, which caused a series of events to result in the very last couple of days. there is a lot of other

mistakes that are made along the way. i tried to cover them. and that is jermaine to this particular hearing and that was key and fundamental. >> and reading the sun cable, which i won't discuss here, but do you think some of the intelligence that you would all use and that they would use? >> and for the intelligence, we pulled off in the summer of '20. and then you draw from 86 to 45. you're pulling them off. and what that then means is we don't have a fingertip touch for what is going on in their security forces, that we blinded ourselves when you pull them off. so we would rely on technological means in order to be able to see what is happening, but they cannot read

a person's heart or see what is going on. so we lost our ability to that granularity to make better predictions than what has turned out, and that is true, etc., so it was a major gab and awe ability to see what was going on in that ground and that is going to happen. >> and there is no doubt that mistakes were made by multiple administrations over 20 years, that i'm sure we could point to when that action is completed. do you think it's a mistake to invite the taliban, which you call a terrorist organization, to camp david? >> i won't comment on that. that's a political act, and i'll stay out of that. but on mistakes, i think one of the key ones to be candid with you is the development at

large, which will begin in the early 2000s. the number of the security forces were too small. and decisions were made to field them. half of those were police, and they were completely not designed well. you're looking at 175,000 army and they fielded about 170,000 for the regime forces was always balanced, more in favor of the taliban. and they would have that sanctuary and these are decisions, that kind of thing, but they would have the consequences. at the end of the day that they were going on and they did not build them until late. that there is a whole series of

these that will go back in time that will end up in a collapse in the summer of '21. >> and the gentleman's time has expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman and generals. i'm going to share a couple of quick stories. one of those is related to the gold star families that are here. i had a constituent who did not lose his life, but was severely injured in the blast. i don't use his real name. i call him jose. he was about 175 pounds after recovering from his injuries. this young man though so dedicated to his country, he reuped. but for the marines, they didn't take him back. but he's now a navy coreman.

and still continues to try to serve his country. what i'm frustrated about is what seems like the behavior of the state department and dod frankly to a lot of us seems that some individuals chose to save face for the administration rather on bringing some shame to a foreign policy that was a disaster. and this could have saved both americans and afghan lives. general milley, you talk about the number of citizens and how it is possible to know who was there. i find myself screaming at the television when i was watching secretary blinken and others within the state department briefing, saying their estimate was about 200 u.s. citizens. most of whom chose to stay in

afghanistan. that is total b.s. i'd like to say the actual words, but i'm restraining myself. my office alone had nearly 200 open cases, 200 cases, not 200 people, 200 cases in my district alone. as i talked to my colleagues, they were having similar numbers. so this fantasy that we did not know where they were or what they were doing is a complete falacy. and they should have been talking to us, but they were not. and the other story i have about that is one of their citizens. he was an interpreter with the army. he was able to escape afghanistan. he's a u.s. citizen. his wife not as fortunate.

her first two attempts, she was beaten almost to death by the taliban. now the u.s. embassy had her passport and all the information. guess what they did? they destroyed it all on the retro grade. so she had to print a letter? guess what that proved? where she was going. and so after the second beating, she left. we were getting literally phone calls into the office and literally talking to her in the middle of the night. the third time she went is when the explosion happened. fortunately for her she was not one of the 170 afghans that were killed. and fortunately for my constituent, jose. he wasn't one of the 13

americans who was killed. we welcomed her home to the united states this past weekend, finally. if that is not an indication of a broken policy and broken system, then i don't know what is. i know she's dealing with the physical and psychological scars that this government has put on her. very quickly, general mckenzie. what information about american citizens did the u.s. pass to the taliban? >> very limited information and you really need to talk to state because they were the agency that did it to get through through. but you would need to go to the department of state. >> and are you aware that they

were beating up american citizens? >> i'm aware of those claims. >> and are you aware that they killed allies? >> yes, i am. >> mr. chairman, we had the sniper who had the bomber in his sights here in front of our committee before. and that was run up the chain of command, and he was denied the ability to take that sniper out. that is a break down. i believe that the security control of kabul contributed to this violence. i know my time is up. i've got a few other questions that i'm going to put in writing through the chairman. but at the end of the day, this is a shameful situation all the way around. i appreciate your willingness to work with these families and meet and talk with them now, but we must have accountability, we must. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> the chair yields. the >> thank you and gold star

families here as a gold star family member, my uncle being killed in action. thank you for being here. condolences to your loss. and eternal gratitude for the great great sacrifice and courage. when i was first elected, i visited our troops right away in iraq. and i asked them, you know in conversation, what his opinion was of the war at that stage and he would look at me and tell me one of the most important lessons learned, that i'm here to serve, and well those are yours. those are political decisions. i think what we have this morning in effect is a little bit of the replay of the conversation that we are

asking. generally, i thank for your service. to comment on political decisions that will thrust on them. and much of what we have should be turned around. we should be out there or maybe they should be out here asking the questions. and nevertheless, it is where we are. i just want to comment on one title of this hearing. and that is the fact that the last section of that is the taliban takeover. it's like a sequence that is there. and that one decision would lead to the takeover. many of the decisions we would have here would result in them not taking over? is that correct? >> and as i mentioned this is a series of strategic decisions that will set those conditions and they are made over the

course of 20 years and they impact the specific withdraw that came to multiple decisions. >> i couldn't agree more. there is a lynch pin to today's testimony that helped underscore something too as we are looking at things. that's when general mckenzie was talking about the fact that keeping 2,500 more troops at bagram could have been helpful. assuming, assuming the afghans stay in the fight. and one of those key decisions, frankly, that got us to where we were at the end of this was the decision that surrounded the dohar agreement in that sense. can you comment on that? >> it is the fact that the doha agreement was made by the taliban and the united states.

and you'd get a better answer out of pompeo. but the intent there was for that to occur, that u.s. taliban negotiation, in order to set the framework for an afghan to afghan negotiation. and that never happened. there was suppose to be a reduction in violence. >> and former ambassador and they were contradictory and those signals were amplified by rapid force and taken altogether and they will undermind their confidence. now i mean that was a critical point as well. but we could point to so many critical points in this whole process. and this is a look back, where we are learning lessons. and you know, four different

administrations, two republicans, two democrats, two decades and these are decisions that will culminate in the final occurrences that have occurred. that's the way where this should be viewed. we can dissect them and learn more in details, but we will learn this that we are working for any family member would want, so that no other american family has to go through what they went through and it is important to look back. i can't sit here on march 19 knowing what's going on in ukraine now. knowing that we have an article v responsibility, and putin has put in his sights, nato countries, the next target after he gets through with

ukraine. so i just ask everyone here on this side, you know, the political side. when we have a supplemental ready to give support, we must act on it now. because failure to do that will jeopardize in the future of the lives of other brave american, men and women, who are there under a treaty to defend our world and defend democracy and europe that my uncle died for. and i implore everyone here to put that bill on the floor for a vote. the future is important and saving the lives of courageous young american men and women is important and i yield back. >> and i agree with that assessment. the chair recognizes you. >> thank you. general milley and general

mckenzie. in april of 2021, announcing the decision to draw troops down to zero. what was your threat advisement that time? >> so my opinion then and my opinion now was if we went down to zero, you will see a collapse of the government and the military and it would be difficult for them to sustain themselves. >> did you advice as announced? if so, what concerns did you have and to whom did you raise them? >> so ultimately i participated in meetings at the highest level and it was heard. i don't want to go into specific discussion, but i had the opportunity to express at length and i did so. >> and in september of 2021, you testified before the house armed services committee that going below 2,500 was the other sort of nail in the coffin.

did you hold this belief in april of 2021? and did you provide the assessment to the president or anyone else in the administration? >> so my assessments are provided to the secretary of defense. and i've had that opportunity to be in higher level meetings. but my assessments will go up and they carry them over. >> and did the military leaders raise any concerns to you about the withdrawal? if so, what were their concerns? >> well sure. so general miller, his position mirrored mine and the concerns that i have articulated to you are those completely shared by scott miller. many in my positions were because of the commander on the ground. >> and what was your assessment of the strength and movements of the al ban at the time?

>> from after doha, the taliban benefited from the fact we were distracting them much more frequently particularly after we began the draw downs that were a part of the agreement. so they became larger, bolder, more aggressive. now the key point is they also drew back 100% to 99% of their attacks against us. most of their attacks are the low level commanders. on the other hand, attacks against the afghan forces, increasing the velocity and did not come down at all, hitting them very hard at this point in time. it is my judgment that the taliban grew better and bolder during this period of time. >> do you believe the state department was on the same page as the u.s. military in april of 2021? >> i'm just trying to think about that for a minute. and i think that the intent of the department of the state was to maintain a diplomatic

platform in afghanistan. even after we withdrew our military forces. i did not believe that was a feasible action in that, i didn't think that the government of afghanistan was around for the partners, once we removed the military capability. and it was the opinion. and that opinion lasted until august when we actually began to withdrawal our embassy. >> and in the lead up to the non-combatant evacuation? >> i felt they were moving a slower pace. i felt for a variety of reasons that i took them to the defense and officers that we could use to what we might not do for those across the region if we

had to pull people out from the embassy themselves and that concerned me and the requirement for closer collaboration with the embassy and our state department partners as the situation on the ground began to get worse and began to accelerate. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> gentleman yields. chair recognizes mr. davidson. >> thank you, chairman. i thank you for your presence here today and hopefully it will provide us guidance in how to take as many lessons learned as we can from this horrible and largely presentable disaster in afghanistan. and they have presided over the evacuation of 11 embassies. that is a record. and general, you highlighted that the state department makes the decision on when we need

that operation. so there is a civil military interaction there that the state department will make the call and it is their decision. but where does that become the military's? >> and ultimately the ambassador in country is the ultimate representative of the government of the united states for the execution. and that is policy and that is actually what we follow. now we support them, so it is our responsibility to get the aircraft together and to do all the fun things that happen. but the decision on when we come out to some degree is a department of state responsibility. >> and so a long time ago when i served in the regimen, we trained non-combatant operations and never had the experience of executing one of those. and it seemed inconceivably that the state department would ever make the decision that let's get the military out,

then count on some path afterwards for some of the civilians to get out. how did that decision resolve that we were going to get the military out? knowing that there were citizens remaining? >> that particular decision was the fatal flaw that created what happened in august. and of course as we began to withdrawal, >> and even in august, when the decision was unwinding, picking a date certain on the ground, no matter what, we're getting out on august 31. you knew you would leave american citizens behind. was it still the state department that said no, we're going to get them out some other way? >> absolutely. >> this is their decision and a

foreign affairs decision in congress. and that is a part of the goal of the hearing, and what they had for this war on terror is rules of engagement. can you explain in working on the rules of engagement? >> sure, i had no input on my rules of engagement that would come from the chairman and they existed solely within the department of defense. so there is never a pressure on the rules of engagement to give them on afghanistan or anywhere else as a result of the department. >> and that wasn't the state department then? >> it was not. >> how did they break down? so between the time of the rules of engagement that apparently you all felt no need to change. must be working well. how did it break down that sergeant ty e leer vargas andrews couldn't get a commander to make a decision? i mean frankly it seems like

they should have been trusted in that decision and to the company commander. he couldn't get somebody to make that decision. what was broken? >> and that is a tactical question in that low level. i don't know the exact detail to that. but the first rule of engagement is if you see or you feel a threat and if it is intent, you always have that right to defend yourself. >> the big problem is you held them accountable for a lot where they put a different one in, but they did not go to jail and they just left afghanistan. that is not how they were treated. did you feel empowered to make those decisions? >> sir, i can only say in the defense that we would employee the rules of engagement three times under conditions exactly as we're discussing. >> a lot of that sounds like you're blaming the guys on the

ground for not making the decision. i personally wasn't there, but i do think that will cross over and we will get our divisions here in congress. when i would look at the civilian side and the public policy side, the side that frankly a lot of people here in this body are suppose to make. they don't generally get around to doing that. but they also set a mission where they will set missions. and for a long time, we would have something along the lines of as much as it takes and we would have a previous witness who would come in and overseeing operations in afghanistan. is that an acceptable mission statement for anyone wearing a uniform? >> of course not. and you should understand the

purpose of what you're doing and understand the in state, which is starting about 2012 became a negotiated settlement in the power sharing agreement. >> and my application to that to say when we decide that, we should expect a better mission statement to serve everyone down on the ground by providing defined success, and that will apply across the board whether you are talking afghanistan, ukraine, anywhere else. i wish i had longer to talk to you all. i look forward to reading your additional submissions and i'll be happy to collaborate in any way. >> if i could, chairman. and you know this well from being a ranger and many others in the room as well. our mission is the u.s. military and the mission

statement was to prevent an attack on the united states of america from the territory of afghanistan. that mission was accomplished for 20 consecutive years. you accomplished your mission. every soldier, taylor, marine, accomplished your mission. this country was defended for two decades. >> chair recognizes our vietnam veteran, mr. barrett. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i appreciate you holding this session. and you know, i want to add my condolences to the gold star families. as the chairman mentioned, i did my time in vietnam. and i appreciate the sacrifices that those soldiers and families made during that war. so i appreciate general milley and mckenzie for both of you being here and willing to talk to us to see if we could find some answers to help these

families. so i really do appreciate that. you know, i guess i want to go to the point of also mentioning that one of the 13 service members that were killed during that evacuation came from my district. and that was corporal sanchez. i express my condolences to that family as well and i attended the funeral and it is always an unfortunate one when we lose the family members. and i want to change my focus a little bit to the fact that we left about $7 billion worth of military equipment and weapons that was intended for the afghan military, however, it was clear that prior to shutting down the bagram air base that the administration

knew that the afghan army was destabilized and demoralized, and just a matter of time until their needs would fall, leaving these weapons in the hands of the taliban. last year they started to pop up, which has left a war chest in that military group, the foreign terrorist organizations. so general milley, did the biden administration have any advanced knowledge and equipment was left behind would not be use the by the afghan military and would be seized by the taliban. when was this decision made to notify them about these new weapons? >> those weapons as you mentioned were a part of the

foreign military sales or assistance over 20 years. so that is $7 billion over 20 years. how much of that, those weapons were throughout the whole country, i mean they were spread out all over the place. so there was no specific indicator that i can recall. and we knew that they had those weapons and these are vehicles, its. but nothing that was specific to say this unit or that unit will hand off their weapons or any kind of stuff. and an important point here is that the united states military did not leave that equipment. it was given to the security force. the car you fought in. when we gave equipment, the

americans didn't give that. it's the army that is doing that. so i want to make sure, you know, that it is not a u.s. decision on that equipment because that is afghan owned equipment at that point in time. it's completely unpractical for us to go out and try to police that equipment in the summer of '21. it wasn't feasible. and that kind of wasn't their task and purpose. the afghan military collapsed, and the ig estimates $17.2 billion worth of u.s. manufacturer factory equipment ended up in their hands. this is some reporting out there that indicates some of the equipment has been sold on black markets, etc. i have zero doubt that's in the hands of people who have

objectives towards the united states. >> all right, thank you. and my time has expired, so i yield back. >> the gentleman yields. chair recognizes mr. waltz. >> thank you, mr. chair. i've got to tell you. mr. chairman, the more i listen to this hearing and the more infuriated i get. and i know the gold star families sitting here have to feel the same way. i know every veteran watching today has to feel the same way because it's not about us. it's about them. i think what upsets the most, general milley or mckenzie, are some of the statements from the president during this evacuation including an interview that the president gave on national television during the withdrawal on august 18, saying the generals, they never advised me to leave

2,500. and the only arobas in the world sandwiched between china, russia, iran, and a platform to stay after the counterterrorism. is that an accurate statement that the generals never advised him to leave a stay behind force to keep a lid on half the terrorist organizations? >> i will tell you what my thoughts were at the time. my assessments at the time. >> you testified today, you both testified repeatedly that you advised the national command authority, we should leave the stay behind course, including the base? >> plus nato, that's correct. >> and did trump leave that stay behind force despite the state of desire to get everybody out because the taliban did not meet the conditions? >> when the administration changed hands, there were 2,500 soldiers. >> and did you then, you stated today that you did not advise biden to pull everybody out? you advised them to stay?

>> that is correct. >> that is an inaccurate statement. let's go back to july of 2021. president biden, there is a likelihood, the likelihood that there will be the taliban overrunning everything, owning the whole country as highly unlikely. does that comport to your knowledge at that time and the fact that just a few weeks later, you said they would be around 60 days? >> and my assessment of the time is if we went to zero, there was a high likelihood of the collapse of afghanistan and with the taliban taking over would collapse. but i personally thought it would be in the fall, somewhere around thanksgiving. >> and we are talking within months. >> within months. >> and there is going to be no circumstances where you see people being lifted off the roof of an embassy of the

united states. it is not at all comparable with saigon. this picture proves that not to be the case. fair enough. joe biden, july 8, 2021. next, when americans should understand that we'll try to get it all done. and if you are an american and there are american citizens left, we're going to stay to get them all out. was that your understanding to stay behind? or were you planning to get out by august 31? >> planned to get out by august 31. >> and perhaps the most egregious. we believe about 100 to 200 americans remain in afghanistan with some attention to leave. you both testified today that it was impossible to know the number. in fact, is that accurate? it was very difficult to know the number. >> very difficult, and i don't think the numbers were accurate. >> and yet they revised that

number to nearly a thousand americans left behind. look, in july of 2021, bagram is closing. we are withdrawalling our four- star commander, general milley. ghani is visiting president biden, practically begging us to at least leave our contractors and some little bit of air support. general mckenzie, you testified you were so concerned in july of 2021 that you put up recommendations including lily pads to get our allies out, putting pieces in place to process our sivs faster. putting measures in place to get our american citizens out to get our allies out, and take care of protecting all americans. you were so concerned in july that you put those recommendations forward and that is what you testified today? >> that's correct. >> and the diplomats on the

ground. saying if you continue down this road, disaster will ensue. this is a formal channel going to the secretary of state himself. was that shared with you as the commander? >> i have never seen it. >> i have not seen it at time, and i didn't see it at time, i would like to see that. >> and do you know where the secretary of state was on august 13? the day before kabul fell? do you know where the secretary of state was? that they were not planning fast enough. according to the washington post, he was in the hamptons on vacation. secretary blinken, i can't imagine how that makes our gold star families feel. here is the bottom line and thank you for your indulgence.

i'll close with this. the state department to use a military term had its head up its rear. it wasn't planning. it, in fact thought, we could just have an embassy and the good taliban terrorists will take care of the bad taliban terrorists. that is essentially what happened. because of that, we didn't get our people out. we didn't get our citizens out. we didn't have the force posture. we didn't have the basing. we failed, and their loved ones are dead because of it. i apologize to you, to my gold star families. your government failed you. there is a difference, gentlemen, and i know you know this in taking responsibility and accountability. a lot of people have taken responsibility. no one has been held accountable, and they deserve

better. and if there is anything you would like to say. >> your time has expired. and they have the right to respond. >> i would like to take you up on that offer. i have met the other families, and i have committed to them, and i will do so to all of you that i will work with them to get the answers to make sure transparency is established. and that is with a a soldier does. i'm not going to turn my back on these families or any other gold star families. there are other ones in this room right now. jane horn is in here, i've been working with her for years. >> they deserve accountability, mr. chairman, and thank you, general milley. >> i agree 100%. chair recognizes mr. kane. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i want to thank our

witnesses for their service to our country and recognize the gold star families who are joining us today. general milley, general mckenzie, you mentioned today with infrequency about the impact and lack of coordination regarding the withdrawal of u.s. troops and its impacts on u.s. contractors, advisers, and logistics. what impact did that have on the afghan military? >> so the pulling out of contractors and advisers had a profound affect on the afghan ability. and when we came off to use a term of art and to see them back in the summer of '20, that was a major blow. when we made the decision to go from 2,500 to zero, you're bringing out all your people that will make sure the systems

work. and so before we went below 2,500. you would damp it on the round of bagram and there would be a contractor there and you would tag it. once you pull out those capabilities, you would drop them off and you have no idea at all, where they could be going directly to the taliban. you just don't see it. and perhaps is what it meant to aviation. the one sort of advantage that they would have. we wanted to keep our contractors in there for as long as we could. they had to come out. we came up desperately to help them. we would look at long distance, and maintenance, which has been tried by the airlines in the united states, and with success and the population. so we knew we were swimming upstream with us. i cannot, it is difficult for

me to overestimate the negative, synergistic affect drawing down these capabilities that they would have on the military. >> and that is obvious for people to estimate in advance and it is obviously what happened on the ground. >> this is foreseeable. this is not a surprise. >> did they ever come up with a plan to properly make up for the capabilities? >> we would try over the horizon, you know, security cooperation in one of the countries, but it doesn't work. you will have to be there with your partners. and that degree to which it is not your partners that you're not doing that and what you are helping them do is manage systems, and ensuring that it is not overwhelming when you pull that off and you will lose the ability to help them as well. so that was, i think a

significant factor in the collapse in 2021. >> was there any long-term planning on how they would continue their support in the military at all? >> we did. but again, you know, so you work under the conditions that you're given to operate, which is there will be nobody on the ground. ideally in a perfect world, there would be forces guarding the embassy that might be able to do limited form of security cooperation. but nothing at the add ministerial levels. and so really, very hard to see a way forward. >> and was president biden ever informed that the u.s. military hadn't yet figured out how to provide logistics and maintenance on board? >> that is a question i can't answer. i don't know the answer to that. >> general? >> yeah, i think that there were plans that were presented and they were not optimal as frank just pointed out. he was awaiting the

contractors, coming down. and the potential impacts and the remote maintenance, etc. but they recognize that nothing is going to replace the contractors on the ground. you're looking at if my numbers are correct that i want to say there were about 20,000 or so over the summer of 20 and that will come down to about 10 maybe and into 21 and you will start into eight or nine and there is still a significant capability there in the first or second week of july and that is when they are not going to say unless they will protect them. these are u.s. persons, right? and contractors from europe and they are local. so those pieces, it is a significant factor to the collapse in my view. >> and given the amount of time

that they have passed, are there any actions that you wish you would have taken that may have prevented this catastrophe? >> i think for me, the biggest thing is to synchronize the withdrawal of the u.s. military with the state department. and i'm an adviser, that sort of thing. and it is -- i mean we said it over and over and over again. there is probably other things, i guess, that could have been done. that's my biggest regret is i go back through all these meetings, etc. on that whole issue of the state department coming out with the military in july really is what we're looking at. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas. >> i yield back my time. >> i apologize.

mr. mccormick from georgia. >> thank you, mr. chair. congratulations to both generals for your retirement. hopefully you're enjoying that somewhat and congratulations to sergeant tyler vargas andrews for his retirement, and hopefully you're enjoying it as well. listening to your testimonies today, when you and i were together last time, we went back and talked about some of the things that happened to create the collapse. i thought it was interesting that general mckenzie talked about knowing about this collapse early on when you could see how it was working rapidly against us. and the interesting thing that you talked about, that you stated a second ago to make sure that forces were not being trained to harm americans, and i would agree. when i was there in 2016, there

were very few casualties, with a lot of violence, but they were not training bad guys. and 20,700 plus casualties, plus the years away that we all spent away from our families. we lost it during the withdrawal. now how many billions of dollars left for them during that withdrawal? how many billions? $7.2 billion left behind for the enemies to use. how many training bases are over there now? training enemy combatants against the united states? how many bases approximately? >> that i don't know. that would be an intelligence question. >> the beyond classified brief is about 27. $7.2 billion worth of military gear. and 27 bases to combat enemy bases. that is what urks me as my

friends who are no longer able to come home who lost lives, limbs, time away from their families. the money we spent. the time we invested just to give back to an enemy where we are not filling out the mission that we set out to do, and we did fail miserably in my opinion, especially that one day. and sergeant vargas andrews distinctly said in his testimony that he testified before about the kabul airport bombing. and they lined up exactly with the descriptions given by the intel that is the bomber. after being denied initial permission to engage the suspect, he elevated the issue to his battalion commander, brad wyden. according to vargas andrews, when asked if they had permission to kill the suspect, the lieutenant said i don't know.

decisions that would save lives and limbs and they get promoted for it. not only in our mission but i withdrawal, even a mission statement for that day, can we speak to that, if we don't have accountability, why are we here ? if we did learn our lessons from what we did wrong, why are we here? if we are not answering to the people who lost lives and limbs, why are we here? >> i can speak to the rules of engagement piece. the standard rules of engagement you are familiar with, the former colonel, et cetera, positive i.d., intent, you pull the trigger.

you don't have to ask permission of anyone. every soldier, sermon, ager, marine, has the right to self- defense. if you perceive, if it is your understanding, in that moment in time, whether afghanistan or anywhere else, except the continental united states, if you understand those conditions, you are in power, by law, to use lethal force if necessary. having said that, i don't know the specifics -- >> here is the funny thing, sir , neither did the lieutenant colonel. i will finish my piece -- >> i know the rules of engagement. i don't know the specific incident. >> i am telling you what the testimony was. in our litigious society where marines and soldiers have been in trouble for making the wrong decision, they expect a clear example -- answer from their superior officer >> when congressman walz was

there, they engage the enemy with lisa force without asking permission. i don't know the specifics of that case but i know the rules of engagement are clear and they are trained. i would have to personally interact with sergeant vargas, which i have not done, or colonel whitehead, or the company commanders to find out what broke down. if sergeant vargas had a positive i.d. on a note in the target with hostile intent, the rules of engagement allowed it. >> mr. self is recognized. >> thank you for being here and your testimony. general mckenzie , before i go there, i was going to ask the

question on the roe. we have had several conversations and i did not know who had the ultimate authority. if he had taken the shot, an roe, in my 25 years deployments on four continents, is crucial. if he had taken the shot in today's military, one wonders what would have happened to our young sergeant? general mckenzie , my question to you, on august 26th, -- that is five

days later, you thought would be fighting the taliban from a common purpose, on the 26, to full-scale combat on the 31st. what was your intent between those five days? >> let me briefly talk about the roe question between august 16th and 23 teams took lethal shots for this roe and nothing happened to the individuals who talk -- took the shot. three people with lethal effect. we had an agreement with the taliban we would be gone by the 31st of august, we negotiated that at a high level. that was not a military decision on a policy decision by the president, we would be out of afghanistan. clear, by voluminous intelligence reports, if we remained the on the 31st, not only would we be fighting isis-

k but also the taliban. very clear intelligence reporting. when i took to the taliban in doha, it was clear they wanted us to leave. we wanted to leave. our orders were to get out. we did have a common purpose which was leaving afghanistan. yes, we shared a common purpose i don't trust the taliban, i don't like the taliban, it is a highly transactional agreement but it was designed to let us get out. i will tell you, we did not outsource our security to the taliban but i am confident that we would have more abbey gate attacks had we not negotiated these limited agreements with the taliban for the security they provided. >> i was going to ask your assessment of the taliban. most people refer to it as

doha, but the formal name of what we refer to doha, the agreement for bringing pleas to the -- peace to afghanistan -- known as the taliban, and the united states. that is the formal name of the agreement. i have a copy. i have been following your testimony closely . i use that term naove with the ambassador, when he testified it before this committee several weeks ago. the entire agreement i think was naove. i think it was poorly negotiated, and i think the two of you with general miller and others, were put in a horrible position by that agreement. i have heard the words from the other side of the aisle, highly partisan hearing, i will tell you, i agree with several of my

colleagues that said we are still paying the price for that go to zero decision. we are paying the price around the world. we now see the red sea in its current condition, gaza, hezbollah standing ready. i think, i think what we engaged in, general milley , not so much defending our nation, i believe the mission of the united states military is to break things when our national interest requires it. 20 years there, we should have said, we are leaving, if you do it again, we will break things in the interest of the united states again. i am glad one of you mentioned the sanctuary because that was our fatal mistake in vietnam. the sanctuary across the border in cambodia and laos, it proved

a fatal error in afghanistan and iraq. there was a cross- border sanctuary. last question, qatar is playing a part in afghanistan, getting people out of afghanistan, and in gaza, was qatar a part of your decision before this? >> it was principally where we went to negotiate with the taliban. they did not have a significant effect on that. as we left, they began to flow people back into afghanistan. qatar walks a thinly the fine line between competing interests and they were active at the end of the afghanistan engagement. >> the chair recognizes mr. hill. >> thank you for voluntarily coming before the committee and we are grateful for your 86

years of combined service in uniform of the country that you love. to our goals our families, we are here for you and to conduct oversight in your name to get to the bottom this disastrous outcome after two decades in afghanistan. for me, it is a source of great disappointment because our nation is less safe, the way we exited, because of the signal it sends to our adversaries around the world. it was a mistake by the president to exit in his method, also as it relates to our ability to support our allies in the region. general mckenzie , i was struck with your opening comments, this is following what congressman sherman questioned about playing the game between the trump administration and the biden

administration. you said that you briefed president trump in june of 2020 and there had been -- i took it to be a dod and state comprehensive exit, military and state department exit. our strategic afghanistan partners exit, and american citizens exit. is that true? >> three june, 2020 to president trump accommodated the number of people in the embassy. it accommodated the number of citizens in afghanistan and projected number of afghan at risk people, not a plant that was coordinated with the department estate but it did reflect the capacity to bring those elements out. >> that got me considering, that was from dod's perspective, what it would take to accomplish those four goals.

subsequent, between june of 2020 and the inauguration of president biden, did state and dod work to fine-tune a joint approach with results? >> nothing substantive was done. we continue to refine our plan going forward to account for the reduced numbers. >> general milley testify to that if you miss go, about coming down to the christmas and then the january number on the military side. that implies, upon being sworn into office, joe biden and his advisors took the decision to get out completely. when was the first time you were told that the president had made the decision that we are going to exit completely from a planning point of view, not the date but from a

planning point of view? >> he announced it on the 14th. if memory serves, i think i was informed on the 11th. just prior. >> upon that announcements, did the department of defense and state begin a coordinated effort to a cops the goals of the june brief to president trump? was there no effort to get both departments, state with the preeminent role in exiting the nation, and dod? >> it was a coordinated effort led by the national security council. we did a rehearsal, concept drill on may 8th. tons of coordination being done. the fundamental principle was -- or the decision was to leave the embassy.

that is leaving in embassy in a war zone while simultaneously withdrawing your military forces. we strongly thought that the embassy should come out and it was not tenable to keep in embassy in a war zone. we thought they should bring it out. >> the subject of equipment, equipment owned by the afghan national forces. at any time during the planning , from the early donald trump planning in june of 2020 until 2021, was there a contingency plan -- as you saw the situation could deteriorate, to disable the fixturing, rotary wing, or larger artillery pieces that belong to the afghan government? >> i will let general mckenzie to speak to the specifics but we disabled as much equipment as we could before departing.

>> i am talking about the equipment -- by the afghan government? >> some of it. >> the afghans were using that equipment. we allowed them to use it and did not disable it. the airfield where there was afghan equipment, after we establish the perimeter, we did distort all that equipment and it can never be used. >> i just want to announce the white house and congressional leaders have agreed to grant 12,000 special immigrant visas for afghan nationals who assisted the united states. it will be in the state department foreign operations funding bill. that was supported by me and the ranking member as well. >> thank you something we both support. >> can't say we left the barn but we will not give them a

visa. mr. mills? thank you for your service getting haitian americans out of haiti. >> it is an honor to help americans out of haiti as we got the 255 out of israel and the americans out of afghanistan. there is a pattern of abandonment existing throughout this administration i will call attention to immediately. i want to take the -- thank the goldstar families. we want to stop charges against you, a grieving father who lost both of his sons, who understandably would be upset when there has been no accountability, the same individuals are getting promoted, they are serving, allowed to serve after making critical errors that cost lives

but people who refuse, because of religious and medical exemptions, are being purged out of our military think of the irony of this. i want to thank both of you for your service. i will ask rhetorical questions which are needed in an effort to face the context of my for the questions. mr. milley, can you tell me what your description of your job was as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff? >> codified in law the senior military advisor to the president. secretary of defense and national security council. and to congress by extension. his or her job, to be the senior military advisor of the group of people called the joint chiefs of staff, we are the chiefs of the individual services and we represent the joint chiefs and their advice to the president and secretary of defense. if there is dissenting advice, you give that as well. >> you are an advisor.

general mckenzie, your role as commander of centcom is ground force operation command, correct ? >> i am chain of command. >> whatever happens, the buck stops with you. i understand the advisory role, general milley has made it clear the direction he advised which was different than what the administration has done. you testified the same. i have an issue with what was said, you look at the secretary of defense who make comments that said there were no credible intelligence provided that could have led to the understanding of what a suicide bomber was going to do. however, you read the intelligence reports day today and a classified setting that would speak to the difference of that. even to the extent and the clarity of saying, moving it to this location. planning is commenced. planning is finished. execution is imminent. these are the day-to-

day logs we saw which proved there was credible intelligence that could have been rendered. not to mention the fact there was a state department who i put responsibility on, and have requested multiple times for blinken to step down. cables that warned what would occur. my only real severe issue i have had as of late, general mckenzie , you made multiple comments in the media and otherwise to the extent that a brave hero in my opinion who sacrificed his limbs for this country, sergeant tyler vargas andrews, to pull you, what he is not recalling is correctly. and you said that, you claimed there was no bolo that would meet description.

where were you on august 26? >> tampa, florida. >> i can tell you where the sergeant was, at the gate. i would trust on the ground information far more than someone sitting 11,000 miles away. who is watching from isr and potentially brief. his testimony was cooperated with marines and the events that he has made clear actually did take place. we are fortunate enough that the man who endured the most on the ground, and ground truth matters, is sitting right there. would you like to tell him that he is not recalling the entrance on august 26 correctly? that he and his fellow marines are not actually the ones who said there was a bolo? that he is incorrect in his assessment putting in question

his integrity, do you want to face him and tell him that? >> no, the battlefield is a complex place. there were a lot of threats that date. i honor his service and regret he was injured. >> have you spoken to him? >> i have not. >> you have not ordered him you had not questioned him even after our committee a year ago. >> he -- >> i am still talking general? he reserves -- deserves that respect and to question his integrity and what took place on august 26 that he observed, and sacrifices limbs for, you are unwilling to face him and telling him the same thing you told msnbc, that his recollection is incorrect and there was no such thing, that is shameful. i yield back. >> my understanding is that two generals have met with the families, they are willing to meet with sergeant tyler vargas

andrews. and you deserve that, sir. >> to follow up. general mckenzie, when did you retire ? >> april 1st, 2022. >> general milley ? >> i came out of my duty position on 30th of september and officially retired 1 november. >> at any point between the disastrous withdrawal in afghanistan to today, have either of you spoken with sergeant vargas andrews? >> i want o -- to but have not. >> he testified before this committee. did you watch? >> i did. >> i did not. >> did you get a report? >> i did.

>> did you ever feel the need to reach out or ask for a meeting based on his testimony back >> that would be inappropriate, i was in uniform as the chairman, there is an active investigation that was going on. he was a part of that and it would be inappropriate to meet with potential witnesses during an active investigation. >> the centcom investigation has been reopened. that is an active investigation. >> based on the active investigation, will you meet with him today? >> that centcom investigation has been closed. >> you will both look to meet with them? >> yes, we are in different statuses, no longer in active duty, he was commander and i was a chairman, and you don't want that influence on an active investigation. now we are not in uniform. >> with respect to the decision

by president biden to announce september 11th as the deadline for full u.s. military withdrawal, was there any tactical or military reason for that date? >> not that i'm aware of. >> not that i know. >> purely political and from the standpoint of, a symbolic date from your understanding? >> i will be candid, i thought it was inappropriate at that moment in time. it was rapidly changed until the end of august. >> you were never involved in the decision? >> no. >> general mckenzie, you said that you and you alone are responsible for the military operations . that occurred during the withdrawal. did you set the date for the withdrawal?

>> i did not. >> did you make the decision to bring our troop level to zero? >> i did not. >> president biden is the commander-in-chief, did he make those decisions? >> he did. >> do you think he bears no responsibility for the aftermath , that you are the only one who bears responsibility to the military operation? >> i was responsible for military operations and the commander-in-chief is responsible for the department of state, all the other operations, but i -- >> you report to the commander- in-chief? >> i do. >> is he responsible for the decision to set the date and set the troop level to zero back >> yes >> he bears responsibility? >> that is correct. >> general milley, you told the senate and house armed services committees , in september of

2021, that one provision of the doha agreement, the taliban adhere to was the most important one , do not attack us or coalition forces. you said that the taliban did not attack u.s. and coalition forces didn't the taliban carry out at least some attacks against u.s. and coalition bases in 2021 including indirect fire attacks? >> there were but the taliban themselves, they would deny that. you never can be certain if they have total control over their individual units. there were some attacks and the issue was lethal attacks. that is the fundamental piece. there was also specifics -- >> in other words, it depends on the definition -- >> not at all it says no attacks and congressman self has the agreement, no attacks on u.s.

and coalition forces. we are talking about lethal attacks. also, some specifics, i believe , doing this from memory, about no mass casualty tax. the problem is -- they did adhere to most of this, they did pick up the pace on attacks on afghanistan security forces. that is significant. by my memory, looking at somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 attacks. the peak of attacks occur in 2020 and 2021 on afghan security forces. leading to the summer of 2021. the idea of not attacking coalition and u.s. forces, largely adhere to by the taliban. >> the chair recognizes mr.

moran. >> thank you, both of you have called for transparency and understanding regarding the withdrawal from afghanistan and i agree. i want to also recognize and thank the goldstar families here today in this room and convey my condolences for their loss. i also want to recognize sergeant vargas-andrews, thank him for his dedicated service to this country and his testimony last year . it was very insightful. i want to come back to you. thank you both for being here today and undertaking this pursuit of truth. that is what we are here to do. you have had a long day, we are about done. the american people deserve the truth and the families who lost loved ones deserve it as well. i don't think anybody has asked this question, if you have advice for this committee as we look forward into the future as to how do we look towards

additional transparency and accountability in this regard? what further witnesses should we better understand what went wrong with the engagement and withdrawal and how can we do better next time? that is my first question, what additional witnesses does this committee need to engage with? >> i am not in congress. there are rules in congress. for you to get an accurate tactical picture of what happens, it seems that you would have to ask the tactical commanders. general donahue, baisley, sullivan. you are not the committee of oversight in jurisdiction, that is the house oversight committee. i don't know how you do that. if you want an accurate picture, obviously, you have interviewed sergeant vargas-andrews and others , a lot of people along the line. the second thing is, documents,

the chairman mentioned it upfront, there is a lot of documents, the vast majority of them are classified and many very highly classified. how that would work between the department of defense, cia, department of state, the various committees, but to get a full and comprehensive picture , you will have to get documents and all that that will take a long time. there are rules that govern all that and i think you know those rules. the specific military witnesses, i think that would have to go -- i don't know the rules 100% that would have to be in the house and senate armed services committee and not this committee. >> general mckenzie, let me ask you about your views, after action reviews, after the evacuation, who was involved,

when did the first one take place and the last ones you participated in? excluding any executive privilege discussions, can you talk about what were the top frustrations that were communicated during those after action reviews and top two of the consensus positions of what we could have done better and what we should do differently next time? >> they begin pretty quickly after the operation because you want to capture memories while they are strong and before they do other things. we had a series of those at every level, every unit does it, some at the centcom level and some not. a couple of things that i think i would hit on, first of all, the requirement to be better integrated with the department of state. we are only partially responsible for that but that is a key thing. the second thing, not a bad news story, but a story you need to continue to work on, understanding the strategic

lift requirements to get out of someplace, how to scope and scale that. those are very important. >> last, general? >> one more thought, one thing you may take a look at, the lead federal agencies with non- combative operations. who has decision authority back ambassador? combat commander? department of state? secretary of defense right now, the law is ambassador and secretary of state. command and control, the decision authority, who is in charge matters. when you make these calls matter . that is something, i believe it is codified in law, not positive. >> quick question about chain of command. when the team on the ground was

looking for authority to take out the prospective bomber and they saw somebody that matched the description, they were told leadership did not have engagement authority for us, do not engage. did we figure out what happened on the ground so they can figure out who may have been the bomber? >> i don't have personal knowledge of that set of asks or denials. i note the rules of engagement and what it authorizes you don't have personal knowledge of those conversations. >> let me clarify for the gentleman from texas, we we are working with armed services to get a document production, including the sniper photos, that tyler testify to that he

handed over to the commanding officer and the command center. in my opening statement, that has yet to be produced, we expect it to be produced. in addition, these two men are at a high level. the commanding officers on the ground, we have asked for them to testify before congress and we will vigorously pursue this. if we have to do it with a joint hearing, which has been done before, armed services and foreign affairs, that is our plan. we are not going to give up until we get the answers. we have a classified briefing after this. i want to get through this. >> thank you, mr. chair. my father was a world war ii veteran, he told the only thing generals gave him was a hard

time i fully expect to get that from you. you don't need to write that down. this is for either one of you -- my father was a marine in world war ii and he said the same thing. >> thank you. this is for either one of you, the taliban was in violation of the doha agreement , why did we remove our troops? >> that is a question for policymakers, not for either of us. >> you were not involved in the consultation of that? >> we were not. we pointed that out repeatedly, conditions were not being met. >> that is what i wanted to know. why the arbitrary deadline of august 31st was chosen as the date of removal from afghanistan and was the state department or department of defense the one that shows the date? >> did not choose the date but

i can tell you the logic that was going on behind that. the date of may 1st, the doha agreement , this current administration went into office on january 20th. the first week in february, the first meeting is the third or fourth or fifth, but that is the time when it was the beginning of a 10 week deliberation that was quite rigorous, a lot of meetings, by the national security council to include the current president. then, the guidance to the state department was to get additional time, work with the taliban, postpone may 1st. the most the state department could get was six months. that bounds your problem from time of decision, april 14th, not going to go with 1 may, it

takes you out x amount of days, until the end of august, september. that was the backstop because negotiations between the taliban , how much you could push it. >> 13 americans, including my constituents, and 107 -- 70 -- 170 afghanistan people were killed. would you consider that a success? >> as i said in my opening statement and i previously set it in testimony, i think, it is a strategic failure. i have said that openly several different times. at the same time, i want a clear , the united states military did his job and the united states military -- anyone who served in afghanistan or any family of the fallen, any of the wounded, every single one

of them did their job, with bravery and courage, they did it with professionalism and dignity, they did it with courage and compassion. i believe the united states military executed its mission and i think they did so with great professionalism. >> my dad had another saying, i am sure he stole it from somebody, old men make decisions and young men died. those old men being at the state department. would it have been better to choose a measure of success rather than the date of withdrawal? >> one of the lessons, if you want to call it a lesson, don't put date certain things, don't announce them and don't put date certain. you lose whatever leverage you have in negotiation. >> seems to me we never learn that lesson.

we announced these states, whether it be vietnam or some other debacle. it seems to always hit the same way. general mckenzie, i want to ask you a question, brother. what was the sin, assessment of the ties between the taliban and other terrorist organizations and do you agree in hindsight with those assessments? >> i think we had consistent assessments that the taliban was supposed to isis. they had theological disputes and the taliban would push isis out of afghanistan and they tried to do that on a couple of occasions with limited success. the ties with al qaeda were deep and profound and there was no way that they were going to separate from al qaeda. those are the two major organizations that use the operating in the region. isis, yes, they wanted rid of them.

today, isis-k is the more potent threat but difficult to predict in the future. >> to the families, i hope you find peace and the lord blesses y'all. mama lost her brother in the second world war and when the national anthem played, she always teared up. >> the chair recognizes mr. issa. >> general milley , good to see you again, general mckenzie . i was looking over your long and distinguished career and you are both on active duty before i left active duty. general -- , you are ported to first lieutenant within 18 months, i didn't get that lucky and i wasn't that good. you said something, general milley , i think was profound,

in fairness to the united states military, there were no military mistakes under military command in this case. this brings a couple of questions during the day, you said we should hear more and see more, if i could point out something and see if you have seen it. the question is, here is a public log that shows a vast amount of video i have not seen, i have not been made aware of it, some has been redacted but most you can read, and the timelines are pretty pronounced. do you believe that -- obviously this exists, have you seen any of these videos and do you think we should see them on the committee as a whole? >> i probably have seen most of these videos at one time or another. i should certainly see no reason why you shouldn't.

>> we have not. when we became aware of this, i wanted to ask. i want to point out, do you recognize dates, 2/12 and 2-13? >> i understand what it says but i cannot associated. >> general milley , during your career, rising to the ranks, i had four careers, one was here in congress. i do want to correct one thing you said, which is very unusual for a nobody private or captain to do. we do have the jurisdiction, and you said it very well in your own statement, and i want to pointed out for the goldstar families, this committee could all or in part change the question of who is in charge in

the case of an armed withdrawal. we could decide whether the chief mission continues to be accountable to somebody back in foggy bottom, whether he would have been in the direct chain going back to the pentagon. we could put primary responsibility on the amount of force is necessary in each and every -- general mckenzie, you know your marines and what they do , how many we have after benghazi, you know what happened after that. for the goldstar families, this committee has jurisdiction to decide whether or not the state department, that come in our own investigation, clearly made decisions that were counter to the safety of americans, counter to the safety of our allies, but not necessarily counter to their own safety, although, in

fairness, the decision not to move the embassy, either out of the country or to the military base instead, contributed. both of you, i have nothing but respect for your service and for the tough situation you found yourself in in this withdrawal. i will ask you to answer as much of a yes or no as you can, if you had had the authority to determine the continued presence, would it have been dramatically different from a standpoint of safety of american personnel? >> i want to make sure i understand the question, if -- >> if you had been told we are withdrawing, would you have done it differently as a military man rather than the way it was done? >> i would have begun sooner. that is the principal thing i would have begun. much sooner.

>> i would have brought the embassy and the state department out with the military. middle of july. if there was one thing, you don't get do overs in the stuff , but if there was a do over, that would be it. that point was debated and discussed. yes. >> last question, if i may, mr. chairman. if you had been given the opportunity to determine that you wanted afghanistan to stay free and independent of the taliban, would that have been possible during your chairmanship? >> i think, if you kept 2500 in the main force, not just any, a group of 2500 that were very highly talented special forces, that group of 2500, plus nato

forces, plus contractors, i believe, to this day, the afghanistan security forces and the afghan government would not have collapsed. but i also know and believe, i believe it would have happened, the war with the taliban would have reopened and that could have possibly meant another increase in forces. if the political and strategic purpose made by policymakers is to withdraw, the idea of keeping 2500 with the possibility of increasing that is cross purpose. >> if i could summarize what you said, if we had had the same attitude in afghanistan we have until today in south korea , in fact, if there is an adverse combat and force that is unrelenting, you keep sufficient forces in order to prevent them from prevailing even if it is more than half a century? >> if your strategic intent is

to prevent afghanistan from becoming a platform for terrorism to strike the united states, and to do that, you have means, the afghan security forces and the government of afghanistan, and if you withdraw , they will collapse, you either accept the risk of the collapse, and if you do that, withdraw completely, i agreed with general mckenzie , you have to withdraw fast, including state department people. or make a decision to stay. it is a binary choice. there is not a lot of gray in between. if you decide to stay, there are risks associated with that. the likelihood of the war when it started with the taliban. >> the marines conferred with the army? >> i thought i was done. i thought it was the closing

act. chairman. >> thank you to our witnesses and to our goldstar families. i wanted to be here because i am a 24 year military veteran, my brother served in vietnam, my husband has a 30 year vietnam -- my father was a career air force, six of his eight children served in the military. the box withdraw from afghanistan in 2021 was the single worst foreign policy disaster in the united states that has not been witnessed since the fall of saigon. i mention this at a homeland security hearing in june of that year. this completely preventable catastrophe resulted in the death of 13 u.s. service members, one of which included grew up in red oak, iowa. and 170 afghans. when president biden to control, the world was at peace and our enemies on guard, since the disastrous withdrawal

showed our weaknesses, russia has invaded ukraine, china has increased its aggression in the south china sea against taiwan, and the philippines, hamas has launched a horrific attack against israel. openly attacking u.s. and allied servicemembers in the middle east is the houthis. you recommended making a small force in afghanistan instead of a full withdrawal and general milley said the withdrawal was a strategic failure. was it less problematic to defend bagram airbase and why was the decision made to give up bagram airbase from which we can do counterterrorism and protect an urban area? >> i will let general mckenzie talk about the specifics, bagram was not a feasible course of action to keep open. once we had forces below 2500. to maintain security and bagram

as an open airbase would have required a combat team, looking at 5000+, and a battalion to patrol the 30 mile road between kabul and bagram. you are looking at 6000. you will still have to take care of the other one, 6000 americans, 8000 for that. and you're looking at 15,000, 20,000 people. if you want to withdraw from 2500 to zero, it does not pass the commonsense test to increase the 15,000. >> can you provide u.s. intelligence, it was inaccurate in predicting how quickly afghanistan would fall to taliban control and was this willful neglect by the biden administration and the state department? did you advise them there was a potential for a fall that would be rapid? >> the united states military

consistently indicated there would be a likely collapse of the government and the ansf on a full withdrawal of united states military and estimated it would be months, not in august, months. we thought it would be late fall. i extended it to maybe spring. the intelligence community estimated between 12 and 24 months after the full withdrawal of u.s. military. >> was there a recommendation to the biden administration that there would be a strategic intent to the benefit of keeping bagram airbase and troops within afghanistan? >> i am not sure i understand the question. >> was their value to maintaining a presence in afghanistan at bagram airbase ? >> you would have to have at least 2500.

i thought, personally, my assessment at the time, i have said this publicly before, keeping 2500, the value was to buy time to achieve the conditions of doha in a negotiated settlement. presidents are in positions to make very difficult decisions. i am looking at this from a military standpoint. two presidents in a row, much wider angle of view, taking in much more factors i do as a general, but they both decided the same thing with different timelines. >> with all due respect, even as a nurse in the army, i had to push back against majors and latina colonels and generals recommending things that were in our patients, not in the best interest and will cost them their lives and we expect to have pushback from the military when a state department or a commander-in- chief is doing things that are

not in the best interest of the country and in the best interest of our service men and women. with recruitment down, we have to wait until november or january of 2025 to finally get accountability for the disaster -- >> we have to go to a classified briefing, make this short. it has been a long day. wrap up your question. >> i just did, we have to wait until november or january of 2025 to finally get accountability to the disaster withdrawal from afghanistan. with that, i yield back to thank you. >> i would like to recognize the ranking member to our closing statement. >> i want to thank former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and general milley, former commander of the central command , general mckenzie . for testifying before congress again. and providing vital insight as this committee continues to use

its oversight authority on afghanistan, including the withdrawal, and including our oversight. your testimony reinforces the need to have bipartisan, good-faith oversight for our 20 years in afghanistan. i believe that the american public, and our service members, and those goldstar families, the 13 at abbey gate, and the 2461 that lost their lives at our 20 -- during our 20 years in afghanistan. the american people deserve nothing less. i would hope and joy and will say to those gold star families,

i will make sure we do the 20 year investigation so we can get and find out what we did right and what we did wrong, for the benefit of everybody in our military. i think, to do that, we don't need to do it in a political way, but in a bipartisan way. for the testimony of these generals, it is investigating what took place during the bush administration, the obama administration, the trump administration, and the biden administration. then, and only then, can we make that account to the american people in a thorough and nonpolitical and bipartisan way. >> thank you. we did establish

the afghanistan war commission on the national defense authorization. it is a board of highly esteemed people, like ambassador crocker, who knows these issues better than anybody. this is not a partisan group. i look forward to the recommendations. with respect to this investigation, we are focused on the evacuation. i do look forward to working with my friend. from lessons learned and recommendations to move forward and ensure that this never happens again. as we have heard today, it was the lack of a plan by the state department and the failure to timely execute the plan that led to the chaos and the suicide bomber, the abbey gate

terror attack. that truth will come out, we will get the commanding officer, the sniper photos tyler took, we will get it soon. with that, we will stand in recess as we move to the classified space to have the classified portion of the briefing. i apologize if i was impatient. it has been a long day. i appreciate your patience but we need to get to the classified space thank you very much and we will see you soon.