investments, artificial intelligence and quantum science, breakthroughs in the field can lead to a paradigm shift in the way the war is waged with the ramifications for the regional and global balance of power. we will start with of the senior fellow with the indo pacific security program at the center for the new american security. mr. stokes previously served in the white house on the national security staff for the vice president then joe biden and a senior advisor to the national security advisor as well as acting special advisor for asia policy. he will provide testimony on the battlefield applications as well as the broader geostrategic implications of the development for u.s. strategic, u.s. china strategic competition.

this is sister stokes first time testifying before the commission. the research at the rand corporation prior to joining, he was the editor of the jamestown foundation and he will examine the efforts to leverage the language models and its approach to cognitive warfare particularly for the purpose of manipulating information on social media. then scientist at rand where the current research focuses on emerging quantum technologies ai aim cybersecurity. prior to he received his phd in theoretical physics at the university of california santa barbara. his testimony will address the aspirations to integrate quantum technologies into its military

and drug comparisons between the u.s. quantum industrial base. thank you for the testimony. i would like to remind you all, all the witnesses please keep remarks and reserve time for questions and answers. i will begin with you but i do want to just quickly comment is with the last panel we are learning a lot if doctor parker, you can describe for me quickly later on quantum physics i wouli would appreciate it. i attended a full disruptive technology course at mit for three days and still don't know. so i appreciate mr. stokes. >> good morning. thank you, chairman and of the commissioners for inviting me to

provide testimony on the critical topic. my presentation will affect the progress at developing military artificial intelligence within the people's liberation army. applications related to unaccrued autonomous systems and battlefield functions and support. i will also look at implications for the military and security aspects of the china strategic competition. at the broadest level, china takes a view on military ai potential to help become by mid century if not sooner. beijing considers ai to be an essential component to reach the level of military technological development it calls intelligent where ai and other emerging technologies supercharge the power. in october 2022 the general secretary called to speed up the

development on unmanned intelligent combat capabilities. bolstered by its military fusion program which allows the pla to harness commercial sector technologies for military uses. with regards to implementation on the pla, they are engaged in the military ai research development and experimentation. but so far open-source information about the pla fielding the military systems upscale remains very sparse. on the unaccrued autonomous systems china has a large and sophisticated industry for both of the civilian and military sectors. but the systems appear to possess only partial forms of autonomy and cannot yet execute the advanced types that would be unable to buy artificial intelligence. in other words, they still rely heavily on human operators. as the department of defense

2023 chinese military power report says, it is pursuing greater autonomy across the range of systems for various battlefield purposes. regarding ai and the battlefield functions, china is already using ai for cyber applications where the technology is mature as well as intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance or isr tasks that have high levels of automation. it will likely be adopting the technology for the uses like logistics, maintenance and training and particularly when similar commercial systems exist and can be adapted into those purposes. eventually it could implement into more of its decision making and command and control functions to move towards what the analysts call command brain

where machines and humans are seamlessly integrated. of those applications would necessarily starve more at the tactical level where the tasks are more formulaic and only move up the handle to more complex tasks at the strategic level later on. it's important to note it could fall short of its military ai for multiple reasons including technological shortfalls, the lack of training personnel, bureaucratic competition, ramp and corruption, the need for control and lack of funding priorities compete with other areas compete for resources. to be clear, none of these obstacles need to be complacent. they should remind us effectively developing and fielding the cutting edge military technology takes much more than grand plans even for china. that said if it manages to overcome those obstacles, the military systems could pose risks to the united states to the several categories, and i

will highlight four. first his potential shifts in the military balance of power with small improvements and later on if china achieves the fundamental breakthroughs in military ai given the advantage over the united states. the second risk relates to unaccrued autonomous systems that might have more capabilities or which beijing might see is more acceptable to use because they don't risk human operators directly. the third area is in command, control and communications. both through improved for the pla itself and then the use of ai to degrade the allies see three. the capabilities allow the nuclear tracking or counterforce options or if it went to the nuclear complex in dangerous ways. so those are the risks. i will conclude with five recommendations for the

policymakers as they respond to the pursuit of the military artificial intelligence. they are first take bold action to constrain the progress for the military and repressive purposes and do so in the relatively narrow way. to build the military capabilities to stay on the cutting edge. a key part of which would be robust testing and evaluation to make sure the military ai systems are safe, reliable and effective. third, continue to shape the global rules, norms and institutions around the deployment and use of military ai and i would note china is already trying to shape the rules here and propose the global governance initiative last october. fourth, to engage in a clear way on military risk and then fifth and finally, the u.s. should prioritize the gathering and analysis as well as the met

assessment with the military ai capabilities which as i said are evolving quite quickly. >> i will wrap it up there. thank you for the attention and i look forward to your questions. >> more broadly on the evolution of the cyber enabled efforts especially honored also as the former commission staff. the potential to revolutionize cyber enabled influence operations and a supercharge the malign doctors ability to undermine the democratic process in the united states and around the world. the key breakthrough is the dramatic improvement and authenticity and a scale at a lower cost while also reducing

the human labor requirements and the probability of the detection. second, the pla is already known to be one of several chinese communist party's actors engaged in the cyber enabled operations. and there are many reasons we should be concerned that the chinese military will incorporate for the improved effectiveness at scale. third, congress and the broader u.s. government needed to be prepared to live in a world with a much worse information environment. more pervasive and maligned influence operations. i want to briefly touch on three main topics. the chinese military strategies, capabilities and intent as well as the potential policymakers. first on the strategy, it's long targeted and tailored influence operations and gave the targeted military's new overarching operations is cognizant and is

combining psychological warfare with cyber obligations to shape the behavior and decision-making with the likely intention with in the future conflict or as an offense of capability to shape the perceptions in the society. the shift in how the chinese military thinks about the battle space from the traditional air sea and land based in cyber. this year is not formally the doctrine but it's a transfer of the community. if it's by supercharging the performance and doesn't seem to be a significant shift in the tactics.

to summarize broadly, the writings are reviewed for the testimony. they absolutely recognize the potential for the ai to dramatically improve the content generation and distribution and recognize it as per scale, speed and cost among others. i observed the research discussing three main uses for influence operations. first, influencing public opinions on large-scale bot networks. second, producing intentionally biased publicly available models. third, specifically degrading support for adversarial leadership. this aligns with existing explicit interest by researchers for content sometimes called synthetic information as well as the large-scale populace. i want to note the writing on the topic of the generative ai and influence operations express immense concern about the potential use by the united states against the ccp in so many words undermine. the public reports on the u.s.

government activities especially those distributed to the department of defense are closely watched by the researchers and taken as validation of the intended against china. this is not just an academic point. some researchers recall for adopting cyber enabled i/o to respond. on the topic of the chinese military capabilities and options, so far we have no direct evidence the pla is specifically adopting the ai for its ongoing operations. however, i argue the pla is currently capable of doing so if it so chooses. the report highlights the researcher who's been working on the system for online public opinion struggle since at least 2016 and automated online influence system such as 2019. basically the technology vision in 2019 has come true with breakthroughs over the past years. other party state actors have

likely taken adopting ai and the evidence suggests it may be improving. last on intentions, it is supercharged objectives such as shaping foreign and public and domestic public opinion deterring the involvement in the conflict and degrading among other objectives. however, i want to specifically flag the risk. the declassified intelligence on foreign election interference in 2022 found it is approved efforts to try to influence the handful involving members of both political parties,." and the threat assessment said beijing, quote, showed a willingness with politicians. a 2021 article by the researchers suggest at least

some in the pla are already using social media to identify those that are pro- or anti-china in my analysis back for election interference. i provide more details in my written statement but in the summary with known views to train the model and then use it to predict how other politicians view china and validated by consulting intelligence analysts. in their own words, the capabilities intended to assist intelligence analysts and assessments in future past the u.s. china relations. i will highlight several and have more in my written testimony. first, require social media platforms to label the content and redouble their efforts to combat fake accounts. second, committed now the commiy releasing nonpartisan declassified assessment of the intelligence community following the 202014 election.

third, encouraged i want to information share both publicly and privately about and support taiwan's engagement with other democracies to share the lessons learned and best practices for combating. engaging dialogue with china on ai driven cyber enabled operations to explore the possibilities for an agreement of prohibiting the capabilities. fifth, conduct an independent assessment of the net benefits of the government information efforts including whether the dod combat and command activities aligned with of the data priorities and strategic messaging. thank you for the opportunity to testify. i look forward to questions. >> thank you. cochair, thank you for inviting me to testify before the committee today. quantum information science and technology has been recognized as a strategically important emerging technology by the

highest levels of leadership within the united states and the prc government. most applications are still early-stage and still many unknowns regarding which ones will eventually prove useful. but in the long run to greatly improve the capabilities to collect, process and transmit information with significant applications for both national security and economic prosperity. a specific potential applications relevant to the security include positioning applications, material science and decryption. quantum science is a highly international exercise, focusing on the individual nations does not capture the complete picture. at that having been said, the united states and china are the two clearly leading nations in quantum technology oriented be a most relevant metrics including patenting scientific publishing and demonstrating prototype systems. ..

i would say for the most important national security of boston technology. the nicest is a good fortune to lead and almost all of the mostt important areas of quantum technology. moreover it has a huge advantage the prc does not. a network of close alliances from the other leading nations in the field. in their country's military

appears to have integrated in a quantum technology other than atomic clocks into actual operational systems. the u.s. military has begun field testing quantum initial testers and clocks in operational environments. to be fairly close behind a few important areas such as superconducting quantum computing. there is a long road ahead. the highest impact quantum technology application are probably still at least a decade away. u.s. policymakers should not get complacent there's still plenty of time for global technology, leadership change hands. u.s. and china are each other's strongest research collaborators in quantum science. was in both directions.

chinese quantum technology firms. i'm not aware of any u.s. firms are considering doing severed private industry plays a relatively small role in the chinese quantum technology ecosystem. most development there occurs a national laboratories. i suspect executive order will have little impact on quantum efforts in the near term. i would like to conclude with a few thoughts regarding steps the u.s. government could take to help ensure continued u.s. strength quantum technology. if congress determines this technology should be a strategic priority most important step toward that goal would be to continue to invest in fundamental science research. another important step would be to strengthen the u.s. workforce including both the domestic and the foreign pipeline skilled talents. while ensuring that would be in

place. would run the risk of slowing scientific progress i believe it narrowly targeted export controls on specific chinese organizations of concern are low risk. congress should carefully consider the impact on the u.s. commercial industry of any proposed broad export controls on quantum technology. unless those export controls are directly tied to a concrete military capability. finally there are three aspects of the emerging quantum technology ecosystem the u.s. government should consider the flows of skilled talents at intellectual property between the u.s. and competitor nations, and the supply chain for critical components and materials. i do not see any clear needs for

immediate action regarding the topics. but all three of them represent potential risks to the long-term stability of the quantum -- the emerging quantum ecosystem or thank you i look forward to taking your questions. thanks thank you, each of you we will begin with questions. we are going in reverse alphabetical order. so i get to go first. jacob, let me ask some questions and appreciate your testimony. the first is and it may be something you have not looked at. i have seen a recent reporting open source reporting about ukraine's use of ai on battlefields in terms of target acquisition et cetera. number one, have you looked at that at all or are you aware of it or to, aware of any chinese efforts to study what ukraine has done and how it's been

applied on the battlefields so we have better understanding? ask absolutely. the war in ukraine has served as a laboratory for a lot of these emerging technologies. it's being watched around the world including china. not just how ukraine is doing it but how russia is responding and the technological tit for tat they have going on the battlefield there. it is certainly an area of key interest for china they have not fought a conflict in a long time and certainly not with the emerging cutting-edge technologies. one particular area that i am concerned about is that russia in the context of fighting that conflict is gathering a lot of data from it systems in the course of fighting that conflict that potentially could be useful in the china russia relationship that kind of data or insight and technology drawn from that might later be transferred to china. i think of that something will have to watch closely as we go

forward. and as it relates to ai and general there are four parts of it. there is the chips for computing power there's algorithms, there is data then there's the talent to make those things come together. we think about china's progress we will look at each of the component parts in the data probably the algorithm space this is a place for china may be able to gain some advantage indirectly through china. >> also how would you assess that you asked and i know some is in your testimony the utilization for example addictive maintenance and the other opportunities for ai. how would you judge u.s. capabilities and implementation? again you also talked about it's early for china but what visibility or lessons might be

gain? >> that u.s. has been very focused on this it's a pretty bipartisan way with things like the development of the chief digital and artificial intelligence office in the department of defense. recently announced dod replicator initiative focused on accrued systems in particular. and also a strategy on data analytics. ai adoption so there is certainly a recognition of what is at play here. the challenge is going to come up again the challenge that many other areas of weapons procurement and other systems procurement meat which is our procurement is based on the 20th century is not always well positioned to leverage technology in the 21st century. there's a lot of energy and dod and trying to get ahead of that there is the obstacles are pretty big. that is going to be a place of a remove from experimentation to

application and scale we are going to have to push forward to keep up with china. also thinking how to do that in a way for the system some are safe, secure, reliable with testing evaluation look like. in particular in systems that can change over time as they learn. you can basically assess a system when it is built but how do you monitor it over time? there are some unique challenges in testing for ai systems were working to get our arms around in dod and in the services as well. >> let me connect the last panel on this one and get your thoughts. the last panel a lot of it was about data collection. one component was data collection. for generative ai and influence cognitive impact et cetera there

is the broad application there's also the targeted application. it would seem to me the ability to target certain cohorts, whatever you will is significant. how do you view the last discussion about data acquisition platforms like tiktok which are able to gain a large data sets and everything from geolocation to particularized information. how does that fit with your comments about generative ai its impact on elections potentially other disruptive approaches? >> it is a great question. i would certainly say it fundamentally it recognized the importance data. talks a lot about data from open source perspective it's difficult to look behind the curtain as jake was sick once the quality of their data?

how well do they manage how did they leverage their data it's a really interesting question. it's hard to look at in depth from an open source perspective. but to your specific question on non- u.s. own social media platforms it's absolutely something that come into can play and looking at chinese military ratings i haven't seen much specific discussion of tiktok or geolocation data et cetera. the theoretical risk is certainly there. and that was something i would consider britt also note beyond a tiktok chinese government and affiliated organizations have been collecting vast throes of data not just u.s. citizens but globally. there is a question of how much researchers would have direct access to that data.

theoretically that would support their efforts to improve the use of generative ai. >> i would just say we have seen over many years some of us have been on the commission the theoretical risk turns into a realrisk in a short period of t. if we can think of it they have thought of it and they're and the probablyputting it into. commissioner schreiber? >> thank you, thank you to our witnesses for this is a very key point it strikes me the stakes are very how you have described it as potentially shifting the military balance in china's favor. some of this to be difficult to track from the concept and rnd envelop development of capabilities to understand the progress they're making in terms of application. seeing and training for contingencies. is this disinformation points that's a result of generative ai

or is it classical? i had a couple specific questions on recommendations and a follow-up if i have time. chinese further development of artificial intelligence with military applications i don't think i noted any specifically under that. are there particular things you have in mind that would constitute bold action in this case? >> to hear it we have to think about, thank you commissioner for your question. here we think about the categories we described earlier. if we think back to october 2022 semi conductor chip controls those are fairly bold and were updated in 2023. someone described them as a leaky that's a good way to think about them they are still a black and great market around

them. it is still possible to access that computing through cloud computing and china's making domestic advances in its capabilities. that is one node. we also have the think about how we look at open source algorithms the data and the question. i support the chip controls i think they were the right levels of boldness and in many ways cutting the feet out from china's domestic manufacturing capabilities at the high end. specifically japan and the netherlands or a lot of the most chipmaking is made. we are going to strike a balance as it reiterates on how it responds to those kinds of

controls. for example on cloud computing my understanding is the commerce department has put forward in u.s. cloud computing companies to report who their customers are. thinking about that comparing that against military entities that was updated just yesterday but those kind of actions we will think about across the full spectrum of ai. >> thank you. your recommendation about social media should be required to identify when const is a result of generative ai is that simple to do? no. is it simple technological to identify.

easy to get such a law passed? >> it is a good question i think there are two parts to this. one is social media at regulationfor congress, the u.s. government that certainly an ongoing conversation as you mention technological challenge to identify content produced by generative ai models. right now it does seem the offense has the advantage it's much easier to produce this then is to identify. over all at scale it seems offense has the advantage been part of my recommendation was indeed for the u.s. government to support investing and probably long-term abilities to. that is not to be just u.s. government it's beneficial in

private partner social media companies are very well-placed to support that technology. one because they have the data so it would be an opportunity to potentially work collaboratively with social media platforms help do that. >> thank you. it seems like that could be low hanging fruit if we could do it from a technological standpoint just labeling and identified. i'll have another question if there's a second round. >> commissioner vice chair. >> thank you, thank you all for your important testimony today. i want to jump in right were commissioner schreiber left off. but we are talking about this need to invest in understanding this and what the long-term need would be. what are we talking about as we give recommendations to congress what are our numbers how big you think this is?

and my second question following on what we just said do we do this media literacy training for others in government? >> those are two great questions. specifically the cost investment i do not have specific numbers available to me. it's worth it on this front. other colleagues have done random work the frequent recommendations is investing in civic engagement and immediate literacy. so for example eod employees who have security clearance go through an annual security clearance to update processing to specific training. so far to the best of my knowledge that training does not include learning the basics of media literacy.

there are opportunities for congress the broader u.s. government to mandate a requirement or otherwise support broader u.s. government employee literacy awareness of these risks. i would certainly say it doesn't have to stop at u.s. employees it's a whole of society challenge. generative ai does not make a new problem but it emphasizes the risks in the shortcoming so far makes an opportunity to support outreach and improve broader citizen awareness of these risks. and improve broader citizen awareness of these risks. mr. parker the end of your statement you talked about the three things we should be monitoring and understanding better. i want to give you a minute to expand on it a little bit more.

and why it particularly? >> thank you for the question, commissioner. the three things i list at the end which i described as a ruse the u.s. government has limited visibility are first financial health second bills and felt and third is the supply chain. briefly i will touch on all three of them. the financial help the technology is very early stage there are big questions as to realistic timelines for revenue-generating applications. most industry investments in quantum computing which is arguably the basic technologically healed with in quantum technology there is a lot of inter- capitol at this a lot of active sector activate the companies who have reported revenue fairly modest levels of actual revenue.

there is a question to the long-term financial stability of the technology timelines are aligned with the current state of industry. what steps might be taken if there was a recession which made the environment less favorable for deep tech technology secondly regarding the flow of international property there's a lot of foreign talent in the ecosystem and the many graduate students are from foreign countries. i think on the whole that is a good thing for the research enterprise but there are questions as to what are the appropriate protections for intellectual property not only among students but companies which may not have particular

expertise and cybersecurity for example. small start up companies. third is to the supply chain technology and there's many different approaches being pursued. i think there is a general lack of understanding as to resend the most important components are coming from. which countries they are coming from as we go at several levels the supply chain whether they're coming from competitive countries how robust that is if it's diversified across multiple vendors. what a auteur will look like. all three of those areas are we are areas where more information would be helpful for having a perspective on the ecosystem. even if immediate actions don't necessarily need to be taken. thank you. >> cochair.

i asked to kp remarks is a brief as possible. this the pla cognitive warfare is a war fighting domain as land, air, space and see? >> yes. >> how much do you believe in cognitive warfare? many of our other witnesses know? are you aware -- mike do you believe the pla is actually working to train a model of the operations and their cognitive war efforts? >> that is a good question. i cannot point to specifically publicly available research or directly discussing ai models. right now the research i have surveyed for my testimony i

would describe on the theoretical side of understanding value. i would not be surprised if they were beginning to experiment and work with these models yes. >> i agree with nathan's assessments. it would be prudent to assume that they are but i do not think we have good open source information on the topic right now. >> aware of the efforts to build an open ai rival called lego into either of you believe there's a plausible risk it's using tiktok data to train its lego? >> i do not have in-depth knowledge. i think in general the possibility any company is going to want to trade its algorithms on the very best data. i do not have specific information on that topic.

>> is working the types because they see that as a market opportunity. so again it stands to reason they probably are if they can access the data. >> for the record you believe there is a risk. >> yes. and they inherently dual use and usable in military context as well? wouldn't it be common sense for this country to bar social media application from harvesting and collecting can be repurposed to kill americans. >> i think it be prudent to do that. is that your assessment as well?

>> to think social media regulation is a challenging topic. i think it is obsolete worth considering whether ford owned company should build to harvest the date of u.s. citizens. >> we are talking about social media companies under control and influence before an adversary government as it applied to those types of companies is that right? >> yes. on a scale of one -- 10 how high do think the chinese leadership ranks in their modernization effort and would you say we are at an inflection point in the te character is fundamentally changing? i believe they rank it pretty high. by their standards and intelligent.

they're working on the next stage increasingly trying to integrate the last revolution i characterize and understand the environment. how should we respond to their embrace of ai in this intelligent concept they describe? >> we should think about it three lines. one is improving our own capabilities and making sure we can keep pace. to how do we slow down their capabilities. especially the most dangerous applications thereof. in the third working domestically and internationally including in some cases with china to shape the rules and norms to controlling this

technology. it has to be a three-part strategy. >> can you expand more on the first when you describe about enhancing capabilities? >> initiatives we described underway at dod. recognition warfare is changing or has the potential to change with new technology to make sure we are staying on the cutting edge not just the basic technologies themselves but integrating them into our institutions. having the right personnel to train and operate them and really across all the dod enterprises. that's really how we should understand what we need to do in that pillar. >> doocy the option is focus on a particular part like logistics or targeting or is it focused on all parts? >> i would say it's probably focus on all parts there might

be more emphasis to asymmetric approaches. not just kill the system as we go towards a more integrated command and control architecture for the u.s. and china is chinag in those same terms there is is multi- domain precision warfare. it is really across the chain i would say. >> my last question is for mr. parker. as commissioner wessel mentioned we are still in learning mode when it comes to quantum technology. agreed can be used to conduct underground mapping? sub surface magnetometer tree at

publicly acknowledges. they could be used for underground detection yes in principle. the technology is not there yet but it certainly is theoretically possible. >> thank you. >> commissioner glass? >> many thanks to you all. to what extent do you think we are gathering intelligence with some of our international allies around chinese use of ai in the military space is adequate enough or if not what kind of a risk assessment should be due how much prioritization should be give this? what could congress do in that regard? that is my first question. and to nathan, sorry i will mispronounce your last name and

my apologies. you mention ai in the social media influence influence of the campaign we have upcoming elections this year what could congress immediately do or the administration do to help safeguard your raising your testimony. >> thank you. we have to draw from our closest allies but across the world. everyone will have a little bit they got a different hand on the element to use the metaphor what's going on with china in this particular space. broadly speaking we do need to make it a priority in terms of its intelligence collection. i am not an expert on all of the way she might gather that intelligence but broadly speaking seeing leaders talk

about the need to change the enterprise to catch up with the emerging technologies. the way we gather tech intelligence and synthesize it and analyze it might have to change. i cannot imagine a more important topic of the united states to make sure we get our understanding that we get that right. >> it is a key question this year. i will give you for pillars to think about. first is, as i was talking with the other commissioners before considering social media regulation or engagement it could be positive and collaborative mixer social media companies are well-positioned to do with the kid on their platforms to identify if appropriate remove content and generative ai concert.

empowers much is it possible the transparency on these topics social media companies can only provide so much information only have so much information. sometimes u.s. government has additional information and deep classified transparency is really important for supporting faith in election integrity. third is specific as a role to play in supporting the efforts in investing in those efforts. in terms of services that is something congress can play on as a key touch point but the broader american public and then lastly i do think it is worth having engagement with beijing on the topic. i saw cnn report yesterday morning fishing pain has promised president biden i believe in and out twice he will not interfere in this year's

elections. fbi director wray asked about it i will believe it when i see ita pretty old enough to remember when she champagne president president biden he would not militarize the south china sea i am heartened by the promise the bite administration is at a high level with beijing on the topic. but as an analyst i look at capability equals risk or threats and both are there. and so i am concerned. even with shaping a promise is xi jinping to follow through? is the rest of the chinese communist party state going to follow through? it is not managed every day day today going on we keep sit here and third how do we define election interference? it might need something different for the u.s.

i think there's a lot of challenges to that it's good to see the vita ministration engaging with the last point i will make as jake mentioned briefly the china government put out a white paper ahead of the uk summit in october of last year and a global governance. one of those tenants actually said no one should be doing ai driven social media information that is low-lying fruit for the bite administration to say great, we agree let's not do it. so far i've not seen the bite administration see that as an opportunity. again we can discuss whether we should can trust chinese government pledge on that topic but it's an opportunity for positive engagement. >> thank you. >> commissioner i could continue with you. you said in your testimony that the ccp fears the united states would use and generative ai to

undermine. could you say more about what they are afraid of? is this an expression of genuine concern or is it a projection of the thing they would like to be able to do? >> thank you. this is an underappreciated aspect of ccp thinking. so i am reading these pla's they talk a lot about the foreign threats they discuss the western threat sometimes they specifically address the u.s. this is part of a long-standing broader ccp concern of u.s. information operations. nearly every single crisis at some point in time is blamed on the united states. we could go on and on and on. is very kindly put out several white papers of the last couple years neatly on longform list

their view of u.s. government activity. ccp mp elite butte doesn't mean we have to agree with that but it's understand the perspective as an analyst it's important. what really drew my concern was some of these writings described it as to fort tat and retaliation and response. a few of these report to congress last year said the same thing. i quoted in my written testimony rev pla perspective or engaging in justify a response. i think it is a perceived that's important to understand. >> you referred in your testimony to the supply chain for quantum computing and quantum devices. would you say a little bit more

about what is involved? with the computing devices were made out of entirely different components like the typical semi conductors that go with all the other computers. and who makes these things at this point? what are they and where did they come from? >> thank you for the question. it is correct to say the supply chain is very, very different from traditional computing technology. if you require or control. the true heart of it revolves around to get things down to 1000's of a degree in some cases. the refrigeration different ones work in different ways some revolved around rick there's no

supply chain by and large most devices come from allied nations i would say. relatively little comes from china or russia. the united states does not have domestic capacity either. that is one example the large majority of the market is controlled by a single finish company called blue force. on the laser side certain companies in japan and germany make high-powered high quality lasers which are difficult to source and other places. a difficult supply chain to categorize locally other than to say there other distinct types of technologies that are sourced all over the world by enlarged by allied nations the other thing i would say is because there's multiple non- overlapping supply chains that are on different technology approaches many may not be important in the long run.

one of these technical approaches quote unquote winds that supply chain becomes extremely important strategically the other six or seven technical approaches may become irrelevant it's difficult to know which one will win will track the different supply chain simultaneously. >> thank you very much. you made the case or asserted it's important is going to be limitations and controls that it's focused on military applications. how is it possible to do that with the technology having a general application which is in very early stages of development it is it possible to target controls on a narrowing military applications? what is more about targeting controls in their way that we control what we can without

undermining the commercial viability of some of our domestic industries that enable our area progress. i agree with goods very hard. it's not impossible to control military ai or commercial sector ai applications in the context. it's more about trying to understand the market dynamics in any given sector. an account for that. sometimes our instinct is to shut everything off soft and ofn good reasons to feel that way. to be effective over time the particulars of the market including what drives american companies. >> thank you. ing chair cleveland. please emphasize that.

the acting part. i had same questions doctor freeburg interested in the supply chain are likely winner. investment and all the export regimes transfer to china? there's no broad export controls that apply to quantum specific those couple caveats there. one is certain specific chinese

organization have been placed on the entity list. several of the leading chinese research organizations do not have legal access to u.s. exports. which are not specifically tailored to quantum sensors but would plausibly apply to quantum. may or may not it could well be an area they could use updating and clarifying. >> we appreciate that.

much of this is made in japan and were europe. if you could supply for the record and lives understand quantum primary understanding of what were talking about their i appreciate that. also said in your testimony ali baba, 10 cents, and others have invested and quantum and i assume there is some leader designated to undertake the usually designates a leader. they appear to have pulled back i managed to shut down labs in

november could you talk a little bit more about what may be behind that trend or series of actions? >> that is correct. much more heavily funded and national labs. it's an r&d effort is heavier and national labs in china than in the commercial industry. several of the largest chinese players mentioned 10 cents et cetera had quantum computing efforts. several of them if not all of them shut down in the past six months i announced it was selling all of its quantum computing hardware to a national lab. the concentration of national labs is consolidating even more in the past six months. i do have great visibility wide that i made that decision my

guess was they assessed they are not perfectly competitive in that space. they were far behind u.s. companies did not seem to be catching up. did not see it as a revenue generator. so to be something we can talk about chinese thinking as a whole they seem to be further doubling down on national laboratories. the chinese technology companies seem competitive globally ever. >> you would characterize it as an increase risk the government is consolidating under governor control? these along with an assessment by these companies is not profitable? >> i don't know that i would necessarily characterize it as an increased risk. frankly it doesn't really matter too much met u.s. national security perspective for this to chinese government of chinese industry control in the technology i think in china they are more or less the same thing. i would maybe interpret it as

cautious good news. at least one aspect of the chinese ecosystem does not appear to be self-assessed is not at the very top of the global competitive landscape there. i don't think it's a particularly increase or decrease in risk either way. >> think it will go to a second round. >> we will try and keep this round shorter so that everyone has a chance. i am going to fully "star trek" an issue here. it has baffled me. what we were talking i looked at it again. china is rumored to have successfully engaged in teleportation. which was seven years ago. you are nodding your head yes so i assume you are aware of this.

and i believe science magazine and others talk about the profound nature of that. that is seven years ago. number one, has not been. reviewed? an effect is it true? and number two what are the implications i cannot wrap my head around that. >> thank you for the question. it's a difficult question to answer briefly but i will try it. [laughter] the quantum teleportation is a scientific phenomenon may be assured. it's on a completely new scientific phenomenon. in the long term it could but beuseful for things like quantum computers. i think in the near term there's no immediately concrete applications that will prove transformative. but i think it speaks to a larger chinese focus and quantum which is they are focused on

communication technology in the use of quantum technology to secure their communication there is some degree meant about how significant that is operationally. whether it's useful capability. the chinese do you appear to have chosen that to be an area they want to excel globally one aspect of that is china has launched two different satellites capable of quantum communications from outer space which includes quantum teleportation of individual particles mediated by satellite communication. no other countries known to have launched quantum medication satellites. again u.s. national security agency publicly said that specific application is how a high priority. stuff like disagreement as to how seriously we should take this they do appear to be leading globally. one less technical note we think

about this quantum internet and how it might enhance survivability et cetera in terms of military facilitation. we are not expecting spock is beaming up somewhere. but we say that for the record. [laughter] commissioner schreiber? >> doctor parker thank you for up to end your sentence with it yet. [laughter] thank you. both mr. stokes and we mention the need for dialogue and direct engagement with the chinese and the pla on these matters. i think nathan you had a chance to expand on that a little bit. note mr. stokes, i am wondering how you see that as a useful engagement what topics you would

prioritize et cetera noting this is an air lock that still claims the spy balint was a weather balloon it went off course in the know we shot it down and collected it. what would the difference been such a dialogue? >> it is important to note the timing of this. that comes after major steps to put in place a regulatory framework for our own ai but to work internationally like the political declaration on responsible use of artificial intelligence and autonomy. would be endorsed about 50 countries it would set a framework for what we think normatively the rules and institutions ought to look like nai and engage china from that perspective. i think it is worth stepping back on our grand strategic

objectives is to support a rules -based order. the rules are being written in real time here. we need to think from that context. it makes sense to build china in if we can get china to accommodate and agree to a certain set of rules we put in place and are leading a coalition in defense of it. and relates to the specific talks sullivan talked will probably happen this spring. will likely be very, very basic about exchanging views on what we see as the actual risk from ai technology. china understands the risk. certain areas sharing information about how we test and evaluate our weapons are what parts of nuclear command and control complex would or would not have artificial intelligence those very basic topics are where you would have to start here.

look great arms control agreement and those type of things it's a good thing and that rate context and with the right low basic expectations, thank you. >> vice chair price. thank you. i have one quick questions mr. stokes on your recommendation for policymakers too. your last one you say we should prioritize intelligence gathering and analysis. are you flagging something or suggesting congress ask for something in particular? >> i think it will be beneficial especially for the opal sourcing communities i work in each of strathmoreopen source informatit

this. one potential way of doing that that congress could do is to mandate an additional section where it's related to some of these topics they've done with other topics in the past. you could also probably mandate the dod or intelligence community provide briefings on this particular topic to relevant committees and commissions those kind of actions because i think we are at a place in the policymaking process we are still getting up to speed on what the technologies are. what they do. try to get past that what should we do about them and having an accurate understanding of where china is relative to the u.s. in a robust way would be really helpful. that is where i would start the recommendation fits within that china military report. >> thank you for clarifying.

that's it. >> cochair? >> no additional questions. >> commissioner glass? >> you mentioned translation i think is a phrase something like controlling the brain. you had several categories of things they talk about. is not simply a figure of speech that they would influence you are thinking or is there more to that? >> you for us in the question i am happy to clarify. that was a reference to one of the popular kind of overarching conceptions of the technology that are often associated with cognitive. it is the most popular operational concept of per se. the chinese military researchers discuss operations more broadly.

there is some discussion of controlling the brain. that has a long understanding history of the chinese military some of the conversations you can find in chinese military writings are futuristic. that is certainly not unique to the chinese military when you look globally it's right about future potential breakthroughs in brain science and other things. but one of the more concrete examples which is a laser weapons and acoustic weapons the ability to use that cognitive function would make them uncomfortable and ideally they

would lay down their arms and surrender on the battlefield u.s. developed it. develop something like the area into an out weapon. which i stated in my testimony. there is some conversations and writings that are futuristic. there are some more concrete and not totally distant from what the dod is considered at the time. >> thank you. >> futuristic we just talked about teleportation. okay. [laughter] acting chairman. >> yes, yes, yes. for decades part of u.s. military policy calculations have been that chinese military doctrine is very hierarchical. in part of our strategy has

always calculated or presumed the decisions motivated by the top leadership and beijing. the idea that she is in charge and in control and it is the ultimate decision-maker on everything. this commission certainly has reinforced that idea. i am wondering is you say in your written testimony there are some military leaders who might not trust applications of ai that loosens that control i am wondering how ai is changing the idea that decisions may not be made in real time by beijing does that question make sense? i'm sort of wondering if there's a shift in thinking that more

control will be yielded to field commander or regional how are they changing our military thinking about their military doctrine? >> thank you acting chair cleveland for that question. my sense is a could work in one of two ways on the one hand as i wrote in my testimony could see a reluctance from mid-level commanders who will be held accountable for what the systems do to employ them. one of the characteristics of ai systems and sometimes they are brittle. sometimes they fail in unexpected ways sometimes you don't know exactly what it's going to do. when you are responsible for operational effects but the political implications of that. in other words you are in the pla you've got political commissar sitting next to you do you want to roll the dice i

think that is one thing that might hamper military action in the pla. on the other hand we see a lack of trust from the top leadership all the way down they could implement i'm sure you are familiar with the concept. if you have too much faith in ai systems or the machine will make the right decision and the machine is reliable make them from the top and let the machines push a dump of the system. i think it's still too early to tell. something absolutely important to watch which are the exercises

and training its absolutely it'e something as we've already mentioned how they assess trust his or her opportunity for at least making sure they don't trust the rug system as it's itsheard before is probably denigrated that's an amazing thing to say publicly. one of my concerns is indeed after some amount of time

if you were to say define some metrics for us to say if we see a consolidation of leadership, military leadership or e lame nation of a whole layer of leadership, what -- how might we think about what would be a measure of xi saying, okay, ai has to be better than what i've got? >> i think that's an analytical question that we grapple with. i think if we understand more -- one of the ways to look at it, what systems are out there and are being applied in the poa and probably infer from there about what level the control and orders are coming from and how

they are executed from there but we are still at the early stage where we don't really know specifics fielded by the pla and you can lack at training materials, the way grades and specialty for specific personnel are named. those subtle indicators might tell us something about the way the pla democracy and structure is working. >> cochair. >> i have one quick question for mr. parker and quick question for the witnesses at large. you mentioned earlier mr. parker that a censor can do subterranean mapping and if you attached sensor to a helium balloon guided silos wouldn't

that gather information about the silos? my question for the witnesses in general if you look at overall pattern of behavior and if you add facts about china that we know. the military drills, the cognitive warfare, adoption of ai, statements of wanting to unify for taiwan, is china preparing for war, is this the behavior of a peace-seeking country we will start with you and work our way down. >> i think china is preparing to have the ability to fight a war. we know that -- the u.s. intelligence testament is that xi jinping ordered the capability to invade.

it's clear that xi jinping wants china to be in a place to do that, have that as an option. i don't think that necessarily means he will do it. i think he can be deterred with the right set of actions and it's incumbent upon us to determine what those actions need to be and then to undertake them to prevent any such war from taking place. >> i agree with jake's comments and specifically on the topic of operations. i think we are at the beginning of the understanding and idea and there's still a lot of research to be able to -- i think it's really important topic to ups how does the chinese military conceive of activities that are acceptable

or prioritize versus crisis versus wartime. we have some information on that. there's always more to do but i think fundamentally in terms of xi jinping and i think it's important for the u.s. dod, broader, allies and partners support efforts for deterrence so we don't get to that point. i can say that i will not interpret efforts to increase war fighting capacity in the near term. i think the timelines are still fairly large, fairly long. i think they see areas big economic opportunity. a lot of it might be guying their economy, the third slightly more specific comment i will say a lot of their efforts

in quantum communications have the goal of ensuring up security of their communications against external access and i think the provocation of a lot of that was the -- decade a ago. they publicly said that alleged leaks reoriented their thinking about the wisdom of relying on western communication systems for their own internal communications. so i think that may have been a motivation for their communication system which is not directly related to any near term plans for warfare. >> well, a few people on the china committee seem to believe that there might be plans for military for the use of military force in not too distant future but thank you for response.

>> quick follow-up. >> is there discussion in open-source chinese military writing on potential risks or dangers of autonomous weapons? >> i think both in literature and chinese issues there are risks involved and what are talk thed about the catastrophic risks generally and specific risk that, for example, highly autonomous uncrewed vehicle could take an action that would precipitate a crisis unintended and i think there's a recognition and that relates to the control question that we were talking about earlier of my senses still, that's something, you know, china wants to -- there are times when it probably wants to start crises but do so at time and place of their choosing. they want a system that might start an unintended crisis, it's not something that they are seeking. i think they are aware of that

risk and probably see it in their interest to be able to avoid those kind of outcomes, thank you. >> thank you to the panelists, we will take a break until 1:50 and look forward being back at that time, thank you. [inaudible conversations]

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