okay, very good.

director ray, your testimony march the fourth time you have appeared before this committee. january 2021 permitting. thank you for the work that you and 35,000 fbi employees do to protect america. uphold the constitution. untroubled that the fbi is facing faceless claims that you have been weaponizing these purposes, and have dangerous causes from these agencies. this irresponsible charge has real consequences. this man from tennessee pled guilty to a 2022 december plot to attack the fbi? will and nox offices. we were looking at his co-

defendants participation in this plan. they played a critical role from the fbi, to the committees. i urge my colleagues to be responsible and respectful. i urge my colleagues as well, not to engage in bullying or conduct from this committee. one of the central concerns that i would like to raise, is the troubling increase of hate crimes in america. this includes the islamophobic attacks. this is in the wake of this contract. the fbi continues to respond quickly to these threats. in illinois, we are looking at the murder of a six-year-old palestinian. this is a violent attack on his mother. this is simply because of his national origin. we send out the support at all

times. they are recovering from their injuries in vermont. these three, young, palestinian boys, were shot. when they were attacked, two of them were wearing a traditional palestinian headdress. the jewish community has also experienced historic threats, vandalism, and attacks. for example, this man was recently indicted for making threatening calls to a jewish center of worship. i strongly urge the fbi to combat all of these threats. there is a need for continued improvement. especially as more hate crimes have been reported towards law enforcement. at the same time, the fbi addresses domestic actions, as well as national actors. they started from the indian national, accuses assassinating americans on american soil.

as i have said many times in this committee, medical, and political forms of violence, are not acceptable. race, gender, sexuality, religion, is not consistent with the values of america. every community deserves to feel safe. the threat of violent extremism is highlighted by the proliferation of guns in america. it is the re-enactment of the bipartisan community safety act, the community has looked at more than 1000 enhanced projects for gun purchases under 21. keeping firearms out of the hands of prohibited people. there is more to be done. i want to thank you for hosting the fbi headquarters for menstruation from the fbi's use. section 702 with pfizer. there is no question that it is a critical tool for collecting

foreign intelligence, and protecting america. i appreciate the reforms that you put in place. you're trying to address with the court is calling specific filing issues within the 102 rules. i'm still protecting communications of innocent americans from the surveillance. i look forward to continue to work with you, to reauthorize 702 with a significant forms of privacy protecting within americans. i now turn to the ranking member. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, director. we really appreciate you coming. right now, is the time to have an honest talk about the committee and the dangers that we face. this is what the fbi is doing everyday. we can make you stronger in the face of a lot of threats. you'll be asked about the fbi's role in the monitor is asian of many religious organizations. this was caused by another hurricane. we have concerns within the

world. we are going to move forward. you will be asked some tough questions. i appreciate you being here today. mr. chairman, one thing that i will be talking about, among the list of threats, is a broken board. since president joe biden, has taken off this week , six point million counters are here for the illegal aliens at the southern border. that is larger than 33 states. we are on pace the last seven days, averaging about $9500 a day. play that out. we are looking at 3.4 million this year. this is at that rate. that puts us at 10 million. that doesn't count the guideways. we are negotiating how to help you correct. count me in for helping ukraine as well. a robust package to help our

allies. it makes sense to me. upping the ability of taiwan to defend itself, it makes sense to me. helping israel, makes all the sense in the world. border security is the fourth plank of this supplemental action. we are widely apart. i appreciate the efforts. we made great progress on the side. the democratic party seems to be unwilling to address the problem. parole. the statute is pretty clear. the secretary has the ability to call an individual. supposed to be an individual. based on a case-by-case basis for urgent reasons. this includes significant public benefits. people have used that provision

to your parole to over 240,000 people from four countries alone. cuba, haiti, nicaragua, venezuela. it is not to be used in that fashion. why are we at an impasse? president joe biden demonstration refuses to follow the law as written. they refuse to give up this concept of humanitarian parole, because it is their way of managing the border. why are so many people doing this compared to before? the belief is, mr. chairman, if you get to america, you have a good chance of never leaving. catch and release is the policy. if you apply for asylum, this is way too low. you have been released in the united states. your parole to the united states. you are running out of bed

space. democratic governors, and large blue cities, or complaining. you are not going to get a deal from the republican party. $9500 a day on average. there risking their lives. that is what we are trying to do. clearly, as a party, you do not want to change the policies. this is attracting so many people. it is inhumane. we are luring people through

this journey. it is exceedingly dangerous to have lost control of the border. are they incompetent? are they born this way? president joe biden demonstration is here. a lot of people wanted this way. we want to be able to have the ability to be using parole, humanitarian parole. as a tool, they are controlling the flow. they are not interested in turning the flow. on the side, there are some republicans that won't vote for ukraine. they are an instinct style minority. it is at least evenly divided.

if we had another order security proposal as part of the supplemental, we are addressing the on national security leads. understand why we should help israel. we had to understand that we are not going to accept it. this is a national security problem in the making. governor abbott, has been on the tip of the spear. now, moving to arizona, to make it real to senators who seemed to have checked make the policy changes. a lot of emigrants comes step right through right here. this is pretty much them being

immune from the problem. hundreds of thousands of people, or coming across. this is on the past border times. fentanyl is at an all-time high in the country. a broken southern border, was made in china for the most part. we are never going to stop the flow of fentanyl until we regain control of our border. to those who have fallen within these negotiations, let me tell you where they are at. they are stuck. they are not going forward in a productive fashion until president joe biden's administration, is willing to change the policies that they are leading the last two days. in the last two days, these are the ones that we know about.

these are the last seven days. almost 9500 on average. 3.6 million. there will be no deal. you can change the policies that lead to this problem. i'm sorry. you shouldn't be too far for america. this is where we have lost control.'s this is the division on ukraine. i think they would hit the border security. some of the threats that the director would talk about. we are negotiating the border. there will be no deal, until the policy changes. these would lead to people not

coming. this is inactive. that is where we are at. they are making small changes to a big problem. it's like selling guns to ukraine without any bullets. come with it. we are playing another game. doing the least amount possible. trying to pick 10 or 12 of us off. i have been involved in this issue for 20 years. this is not about immigration reform. this is about securing a broken border. is that a time where the threats to our nation are at an all-time high. it started with afghanistan. the world is on fire. multiple fronts have been getting worse every day.

there will be no assistance to other nations who are deserving until we assess our own nation. we are trying to pick 10 or 12 of them off. it is not going to work. we are divided on ukraine. two thirds of our confidence is going to be with real border security. i know border security looks like. you are making a choice. this is going to be devastating to the world. >> i'm trying to swear in the director. he has five minutes to declare an opening statement. each will have seven minutes. peas -- please stay within your

five minutes. do you affirm the testimony you are about to give to this committee might be true and of its true self? >> i do. >> let the record reflect. director has answered affirmative. i will not recognize it. >> in morning, chairman, and ranking members of the committee. they have the threats and the bureaus 38,000 men and women that the tackle everyday. we are continuing to work relentlessly to say ahead. this is for example. we have disrupted over 40% more cyber operations, and arrested over 60% more cyber criminals than the year before. they have 270 million people.

that is about 80% of all americans. we are focused on other threats that have come through with the border. this is here at the same time. this calls for tax from the territory organizations. we are working around the clock. this is from hamas, including the horrific terrorist attacks in israel. we have seen an increase in hate crime investigations, including a particularly big chunk with the threats to the jewish community. we have been focused on this before october 7th. it has only gotten worse in the month since. i could go on about the important work that the fbi,

and the dedicated professionals have done across the entire spectrum of threats each and every day to read protecting their fellow americans. this is indispensable to our efforts to combat threats proposed by foreign adversaries. one of these is going to inspire them in a few short weeks. we are making it outside of the united states. this is posing a threat to the national security. is the expiration of the 700 to authorities. we have the americans right here from those threats. let me explain just a bit by what i mean by that. this is the overseas cyber criminal. this is in transportation of a

public utility. we have even a children's hospital. this is often little that we used defined victims, and get them what they need to get their systems back up and running. it helps us identify the next targets. they can defend themselves. we have recent cyber cases. along the fbi to alert for the victims. we are trying to make this part here. is coming to the foreign adversaries. these actions are across a whole host of threats. they are trying to seek to assassinate high-level officials. they have side effects here in the united states.

people's republic of china, poses in my review, a generational threat to our economic and national security. stripping the fbi at 700 to authorities. they have lateral discernment. they take the elevated threat of international terrorism. 700 to his key to our ability to detect a foreign adversary. a director operator to carry out an attack in our own backyard. it will allow us to identify the intended target. they are building out these things, so that they can start to get them. we have good stewards of our

authority. we are trying to address unacceptable compliances. this is within our own lives and demonstrations from our systems from the fbi headquarters. we have no accountability measures. we have internal auditing. these are from the pfizer compliance. most of the declassified performance are right here. they are involving compliance efforts.

we are trying to look at this report. this is showing a 90% compliance rate. they are having another effect. there shall be a greater than 98% compliance rate. we are proud of the progress we have made so far. we are by no means done. we recognize that this is an ongoing effort, and are determined to work with congress to get it right. as we enter this critical phase of the renewal process, it is imperative that we do not undercut the effectiveness of this essential tool, with a warrant requirement, or some other restriction that would paralyze us and our ability to tackle fast-moving threats like the ones i just described. it is crucial to our ability to use this information to

actually protect the americans. we are trying to look at this efficiently. to be clear, no court has ever held that a warrant is required for the fbi to query 702 data already lawfully in our holdings. considered 702 in their reform. this is trying to be constitutional. restricting the fbi's ability to collect under 702, or review what is already in our collection, that would be a legislative policy choice. if that is the path that is chosen, what are we going to say to the family whose loved ones care and sabotaging the hospital was taken off-line by a foreign adversary? the fbi was not able to stop that cyber attack. what is the justification for

not using every lawful tool to stop china from stealing our technology, and undermining our freedoms? i can assure you, they're not holding back. they are not tying their own hands behind her back. what if there was a terrorist attack that we had a shot to prevent, but couldn't take it because the fbi was deprived of its ability under 702, to actually look at key information already sitting in our holding cells? i was in fbi headquarters 22 years ago on 9/11. over the years, i have spoken with families of victims of that horrific attack. before that attack, well- intentioned policymakers have made the choice to build a wall to prevent access to national security information, sitting in our partners holdings.

i bring that up, because allowing 700 to two amended in a way that undermines it and its effectiveness, would be akin to laying bricks, to rebuild another pre-9/11 style walk. what could anybody possibly say to the victims families if there was another attack that we could have prevented, if we had given away the ability to effectively use a tool that courts have consistently deemed constitutional? that's not for ourselves. that is what is at stake with the reauthorization of 702. as the threats from foreign necessaries, to our homeland, continue to evolve, the agility and effectiveness of 702 will be essential to the fbi's ability, and the mandate from the american people to keep them safe for years to come.

we owe it >> thank you very much, director, i will start the question. thank you for the visit yesterday to your headquarters in the demonstration of, i think true advancements, in terms of 702 to try to avert any concern about constitutional issues. i still have some of those concerns, as you might expect, and we have proffered an alternative to current systems that we think is reasonable. it has an emergency exception, as it should, because the issue is of great national security. can't wait even for the process to continue, and secondly the victimization we allow consent by the victims to go forward with collection of information. in those situations, as it should be. since the enactment of the authorization act of 2018, the fbi has been required to obtain a court order from u.s. person

surgeons in a narrow subset of cases involving predicated criminal investigations unrelated to national security. has the fbi ever obtained a court order in order to perform a search of 702 data in this context? >> to the my best of my knowledge we have not and that is partly because that is not the way we 702 >> that is correct. the answer is zero. the office of the director of national intelligence statistical transparence who work for 2020 revealed that the requirement has been triggered approximately 100 times. is that true? >> that i can't speak to the number. i think the report in question may involve an instance that it all occurred before the reforms we were just talking about. >> i would appreciate if you take a look at that an answer for the record. let me take you to another topic that there has been an issue discussing before this

committee and voters on several different occasions and that is child sexual abuse materials. recently, the national association of attorneys general sent a letter to congress commit asking lawmakers to study the means and methods of artificial intelligence, or ai, being used to exploit children through generation of child sexual abuse material. in a letter, the attorneys general talked about how they can create new images of children in sexual situations or otherwise overlay photos on victimize children, of photos of using children. to put this in simple terms, i don't know of any parent or grandparent who is knowledgeable in this area that hasn't warned their children or grandchildren, please be careful what you communicate on the internet and who you communicated with. you have highlighted the fbi's quote prioritize and

individuals in exploiting children. i do note that the proliferation of c-span on the dark network can you elaborate on what the fbi is doing to disrupt technologies used to exploit children? what obstacles are you facing related to this work? >> so, i think there is no mission set, no threat that the fbi's men and women tackle that is more righteous and more at the heart of why we do what we do than protecting kids. and i know that last year we arrested something like 3000 child predators and rescued something like 2000 kids from exploitation. the vast majority of which is happening heavily online, but then often leads to what is even worse, which is the actual hands-on abuse and certainly, as you noted, mr. chairman, technologies have continued to

advance in a way that makes that threat even more pernicious, in looting ai, including the ability to create synthetic content for example. when you ask about challenges that we face, one of the biggest concerns that we have is that the companies, these technology companies are increasingly moving in a direction, where they are designing proof encryption, and what that means to everybody listening at home is that we are going to be in a situation, where the abuse that is happening on those platforms law enforcement won't have any ability, no matter how rocksolid the warrant, to get access to the information we need to protect those kids and take down those monsters and the companies themselves are effectively blinding themselves to abuse that is happening on their own platforms. so, what we really need is for the companies to work with congress, and work with the

executive branch, work with law enforcement to design their encryption in a way that make sure that they maintain the ability to respond to you know, rocksolid warrants. >> so, why aren't they cooperating with this? why are these companies resisting an effort to engage them in solving the problem? >> well, i, you know, i can't speak for them in terms of their motivations. obviously these issues get into balances of privacy and security and that is a long-standing situation. >> it comes to children for goodness sakes, what is the privacy concern there. >> you got me. i will tell you that we get, from some of these companies, millions of tips we have had, historically about child exploitation, and the idea that we would go into a model, where those tips just evaporate, let's be clear, when the tips evaporate the kids are still out there getting abused. the predators are still out

there. the only thing that has changed is our ability of doing anything about it, because the way in which the company would be designing their encryption. so, it is a way for them to essentially, and again i can't speak to their motivation, but it is a way for them to essentially blind themselves to what is happening on their platforms and then, indirectly blind us to our ability to protect kids and go after predators. >> we will be bringing some leaders in the industry before this committee next month. i hope we can ask these questions directly. but i will tell you, we passed overwhelmingly, unanimously, five different bills related to this issue. i thought that was going to be an avenue to bring them to the floor, the resistance from big tech to even pursue this issue, despite this overwhelming bipartisan vote trouble troubles me greatly. i believe they want to do the right thing, there's very little evidence of that. >> chairman, let's pick up on

that. you agree that social media systems as they are designed today prevent dangerous to american families? >> sure. >> thanks. >> i don't know where to begin, other than is now a good time to find the fbi below inflation? >> i think-- >> just say no. >> i was about to say no. >> you can say no if you want to. >> yeah, i think that is pretty dumb, given what you told us. how long have you been associated with the fbi? >> welcome-director a little over six years, but i and working with the fbi my whole career, really. >> let's put a fine point on where we are at today is america how would you describe the threat matrix? against america today? from your point of view, after having been at the fbi?

>> what i would say that is unique about the environment that we are in right now in my career is that, while there may have been times over the years, where individual threats could have been higher, here or there than where they might be right now, i've never seen a time, where all the threats were so many of the threats are all elevated all at exactly the same time. that is what makes this environment that we are in now so fraught and why funding our men and women, who are working shoulder to shoulder with state and local law and other partners every day makes it even more important not less. >> so, blinking red lights about 9/11, all of the lights were blinking red before 9/11, apparently. obviously all of us missed it. would you say that there's multiple blinking red lights out there? >> i blinking lights everywhere i turn. >> okay. who is driving all these problems? let's start with iran. what is iran due to america?

>> iran, the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism, let's start there. iran, just in the last couple of years, if you want to bring it home here to the homeland, and the last couple of years iran has tried to assassinate a former u.s. national security advisor on u.s. soil, has tried to kidnap and then tried to kill a journalist, american journalist and human rights activist right smack in the middle of new york city, has conducted a cyber attack on a children's hospital in new england and, for extra credit, as the director and i announced in 2020, try to interfere in the presidential election. that is just the start. >> other than that they have been pretty good? >> okay, let's look at-- we found enough fentanyl to kill 80% of american people? that is just in the last two

years, okay? you think we missed some fentanyl? >> absolutely. >> what role does china play of the fentanyl problem america has? >> well, i start with china supplies most of the precursors to the cartels in mexico which then leads to the sentinel that comes here, and that has been talked about a fair amount, and it is a huge problem. but in addition to that china is also responsible for an awful lot of the pill prices, manufacturing of the pill prices, which, of course, are also used. and in addition to that, a lot of people thought it know this, but china is also responsible for a lot of the precursors for the math that is manufactured south of the border as well. >> you see that getting better? >> i do not. >> let's talk about russia. what are they up to? >> well, besides their unconscionable aggression in ukraine? russia has one of the most

advanced, most widespread cyber -- offensive cyber programs in the world. they have invested in it very heavily, and have used it in different ways against us and our allies. they have intelligence officers here in the united states, too many. by any measure. they also provide safe havens to cyber criminals who-- whether they are working for the russian government or not, are conducting cyber attacks against , you know, us and our allies all over the world, so that is just a start. >> let's go to international terrorist organization. one of my concerns is after afghanistan we sort of put international terrorism on steroids. are you concerned that international terrorism threats in our homeland are rising as the border continues to be broken? >> i am concerned that we are in an elevated threat environment, a heightened

threat environment from a former terrorist organization for a whole host of reasons. and obviously their ability to exploit any port of entry, including our southwest border is a source of concern. you know, there's a lot of discussion about numbers and numbers are important, but let's not forget that it didn't take a big number of people on 9/11 to kill 3000 people. so, while numbers are important, numbers don't tell the whole story. and we have seen an increase in so-called kst's or terrorists attempting to cross, you know, over the last five years. >> would you say, kind of putting a fine point on this topic, that right now is the largest threat we face in the nation from international terrorist organizations since 9/11? >> well, it is certainly higher than it has been in a long,

long time, let me put it that way, because if you just look post october 7th, and i thought the threat was elevated before october 7th, but post october 7th you have seen a veritable rogues gallery of foreign terrorists. calling for attacks against us. >> okay, so, october the seventh was devastating in israel. so, your testimony before this committee since october 7th, the urging of foreign terrorist organizations happening in america has gone up, is that fair to say? >> yes, the threat level has gone to a hold other level since october 7th. >> okay, folks, you are on notice. what are we going to do about it? finally, what should we be doing differently? with all of these bad actors? i think it is fair to say we have lost deterrence, do you have any idea, quickly, of what we can be doing differently?

>> well, certainly deterrence requires consequences. and so, consequences need to be imposed on bad actors in a variety of ways to ensure deterrence. consequences are also part of disrupting, even without deterrence disrupting and degrading by dr.'s abilities to harm us. >> senator, white house? >> good morning, director, how are you? >> why, thank you. >> >> i apologize to go over old business, the responsiveness of the department. i want to talk to you about charles mcgonagle today. he is an fbi agent, who is interesting in two respects. first, he is pleading guilty, or has pled guilty to offenses, regarding his undisclosed

receipt of $225,000 from a foreign national. and he awaits sentencing for the crimes to which he pled, coming up in february. the second interesting thing is that he led the new york counterintelligence division during the time that it was quietly reported that new york fbi agents and former new york u.s. attorney, rudy giuliani were pressuring director called me to intervene in the hillary clinton campaign. and do its damage. which, as we unfortunately no, director, he did with press conferences that violated doj rules and procedures. so my experiences that, when somebody is in the

presentencing mode of a criminal plea, that is a very good time to get information from them and cooperation from them. i don't know what happened in the new york field office during that period, but there is a very good chance that mcgonagle does. i will put into the record three letters, one is made to attorney general garland, february 7th, asking about this, the second is the office of legislative affairs and doj, back to me giving something of an answer to this, and the third is a letter off of doj's website, reflecting the plea agreement between the southern district of new york and the attorneys for charles mcgonagle. so at this point what i ask in the letter was if somebody independent of the fbi take a

look and see if there were fbi shenanigans during that period in that office and i have received no confirmation that anything was going on. the plea agreement reflects no signal or sign of cooperation, which, as you know, is often a feature in plea agreement and sentencing. so, there's no sign he was asked to cooperate outside of the plea. i have been unable to determine whether or not the inspector general is even eyeballing this to see if somebody independent from the fbi, somebody in the department should take a look. what you know of the status of this? and are you-- would it make sense? would it not make sense? let's put it that way. to have a look at what mcgonagle knows about what to lace in that office at that time? while he is in this helpful position of being subject to sentencing?

>> well, senator, i appreciate you raising the topic. a couple of things. first, our counterintelligence division, of course, are the people who identified mcgonagle's wrongdoing, pursued it, arrested him, and are very focused on trying to determine in all the ways you would imagine, what, if anything, he might have impacted through his misconduct, that is one. second, there are, i think, two officers involved, both new york and i think the district of columbia as well, so, two cases. that are a presentencing, and that his cooperation, if you will, could potentially be relevant to, and we are, i can tell you, i want to be a little bit careful in how far i will go in this, but i can tell you we have involved the inspector general as well, because we,

like you, want to make sure we understand the full scope of what mr. mcgonagle did and what he knows. >> so, the doj, inspector general is involved or notified? >> it has been-- engaged. >> yeah. >> okay, well, that is good to hear. let's go back to 702 for a moment. i understand that 702 which was originally designed for a counterterrorism purpose has also been deployed against the international fentanyl trafficking apparatus? is that correct? and has 702 been important in combating the international fentanyl trafficking apparatus? >> 702 has been important in the fight against the score just fentanyl. more so, i would say, by our intelligence community partners . the cia, for example in their

work overseas, to pursue some of the foreign dimensions of the fentanyl crisis, which, of course, then have massive ramifications for communities all over the united states. >> so, that is in excess of 702? >> so, that is a success of 702. >> you also mentioned the role of 702 in reaching out to victims of crime of potential foreign intelligence operations, could you elaborate in our last minute together a little bit more on the role of 702 in supporting the government's role in letting americans and american companies find out that they are the victims, or have been the victims of criminal and intelligence attacks and helping them work through the consequences as victims? >> well, in the short time we

have i would say 702, especially the ability to run queries on ip addresses, email addresses and things like that, is statistically right now the biggest place in which it is used is cyber attacks. so, victims, overwhelmingly victims of russian, iranian, chinese, others, cyber attacks here in the united states, 702 is what allows us to figure out which company is being targeted, maybe what the entry point is, where the bad guys are going, and it allows us to then-- armed with that information, rush out to those companies that alert them so they can take steps to mitigate it, before it gets exponentially worse, and we find that there are a lot of instances, where we are coming to companies who didn't know they had been read breached yet. if we have 702, both they and we would have been on the list.

>> if you could share with us actual instances, make this a question for the record, obviously, you have to do some scrubbing to make sure that everybody is comfortable with information being released. but i think the more we can know about actual ways in which actual individuals, even if they have to be anonymized, were helped, and received the factual circumstances, that would be useful. >> thank you. >> thank you, chairman. >> thank you whitehouse. you testified before the senate intelligence committee that the richmond field office memo was quote, a product by one field office,". you testified before the house judiciary committee that the memo was quote, a single product of a single field office". but the richmond memo says two other field offices of the fbi were out, and that information had been redacted and versions provided to congress. why did the fbi redact that critical information and second, did you review the unredacted version, before giving your

previous testimony? >> so, senator, i think that this notion that other field offices were involved is a garble and let me explain why i might say that. the only involvement of the two other field offices was the richmond authors of the product. included two sentences or something thereabouts referencing each of these other office's cases. and they sent those sentences about the other office's cases to them, not the whole product and say hey, did we describe your case right? that's all the other offices had, so it was a single field office's product. and i stand by that. >> did you review the unredacted memo, before giving your previous testimony? >> i have reviewed the unredacted memo, exactly when i reviewed it, i can't right now tell you. >> okay. in july of this year, i made public what is now known as the

biden family 1023 fbi document. i have also reviewed several letters that the same-- of the same, mostly, recently, i think october 24th that letter of october said, in part that the confidential source in the biden family 1023 was not connected to known sources of information that confidential human source is also reportedly a high paid long-running fbi source that the fbi has used in many matters, according to former attorney general bill barr he says that 23 was deemed sufficiently credible for further investigation on may 31st of this year, the chairman and i had a call with you on

that call and you told him that biden 1023 was related to an ongoing investigative matter, very clearly you stated points show indicators of credibility. this is the i 1023 was serialized on june 30th 2020, over three years ago when where you first made aware of 23? >> i don't know if i could give you the next date, but i can tell you that i learned of the 1023 much, much, much more recently than anything around 2020, that is for sure. >> this paper document you have an obligation to tell this committee what you do about it, when you knew about it i guess

i better go on. the fbi generated 1023's that reference a game involving the biden's game, how many are there and what are the dates? >> senator, now you are asking questions that relate directly to counsel weiss's ongoing investigation. and respectfully i can't really discuss anything related to that investigation. i would refer you to that. >> the references the legend text, financial records and audio date have proved some sort of scheme involving money, with biden people. these are discrete documents that can be obtained if they exist, on a high paid, long used federal confidential human source, providing the fbi with evidence that three types-- different

types of records exist that prove a crime involving a political official. then standard fbi practice is to take steps to obtain that evidence. would you agree with that? what i've said so far about the fbi policy? and if not, why not? >> well, certainly i would expect people to do appropriate follow-up on anything in a 1023, but obviously every one of those and since is is a very specific case dependent. >> that answers it, okay. so, based on what you just told me, to the fbi seek these records in this matter? >> well, let me separate into two different things here, when it comes to the investigation being led by special counsel weiss. which is being supported by our baltimore field office that one i am not going to be able to

discuss because it is an ongoing investigation. when it comes to the assessment that occurred in the office of our field office in pittsburgh in the u.s. attorney, mr. brady has selected by attorney general bar to look at all of this back in the early period, you are talking about, my understanding is that there was agreement among the team about what steps needed to be taken, and with the closing of that assessment. >> have you communicated with white house officials, or use a third-party to do so about anything relating to the 1023 thousand people in the biden family, and if so, who and when? >> no. >> i want to go to special misconduct by the fbi. on october the fifth, 2022, i

sent you a letter and later made fbi records public that showed widespread sexual misconduct in the fbi against female members. the data also show that hundreds of fbi personnel retired to avoid discipline and that senior high level officials received reduced punishment if any at all on october the sixth, the fbi told the associated press that it intended to respond to me first and declined to provide sexual misconduct data to the press at that time. it is over one year later in the fbi has failed to provide this data to me. the fbi's blatant lack of action indicates that it isn't taking misconduct against women in the workplace seriously. why has the fbi failed to provide that very important data to this committee and when will it finally be produced, as

you told the-- or the fbi told the u.s. associated press it was going to do? >> first let me say, i could not disagree more strongly that we don't take it seriously. i can tell you, misconduct, sexual misconduct against our own employees is taken extremely seriously, and we have put in place all sorts of procedures and policies in place to deal with that and communicate, in no uncertain terms, how strongly i feel about that. as to the responsiveness to your letter, let me follow up with my team and see where that stands, but i do want to make sure that there is not anything fusion, none, about how seriously i take this topic. >> okay then, where is the data if that is what you are going to be willing to take it so seriously? >> i will follow-up. i will follow-up with you about your letter. >> thank you, senators. senator, clover char? >> thank you so much, director ray, for being here. i want to start out with hate

crimes, you and i have talked about them before i have think you and your agents in minnesota for their work in what was a clear hate crime with a prison sentence of a bombing of the islamic center in my home state back in 2017. and we know that since that time, we have seen increases in hate crimes, reports show a 216% increase, since october 7th and a request for help and reported incidents against muslims, another report showed a 388% rise in anti-somatic incidents. since this time last year. we know the facts. we know what happened in front of that restaurant in philadelphia. we know that in illinois a six- year-old muslim boy was targeted and fatally stabbed for being palestinian american.

in los angeles a criminal broke into the home of a jewish family and threatened him and screamed about killing juice. in vermont, a palestinian student from brooklyn university, whose parents had him stay in the u.s., rather than returning home for safety reasons was shot among two of his friends. in new york a woman was assaulted at grand central terminal, and when confronted, the assailants that it is because you are jewish. in brooklyn, a father and his 18-year-old son were allegedly assaulted by another parent for being palestinian, and last week three suspects were arrested for a 40 minutes free for an attack on jewish new yorkers. this is concerning for everyone -- democrat, republican, jewish, muslim, christian, anyone in this country. i know that you care about this very much, because i saw the work that your agents did in minnesota and i want to get some more details on what the

fbi is doing, and what the justice department is doing to detect the occurrence and investigate these crimes and then also the effect of social media, and i know there are limitations on what we can do and i have strong views on this, but could you also talk about that? >> well, i appreciate your long- standing interest in this topic and i know how important it is to you and not the least of which, because the attacks that have occurred in your home state. certainly we have seen an increase in hate crimes there are lots of different numbers out there, but i will just give 2 for this purpose. you know, one is, in 2022 we saw the highest increase, i think, in hate crimes reported that we have seen, since maybe 2008. and we don't have full data for 2023 yet, but we expect it to keep going up. second data point, october 7th,

just since october 7th we have opened, i think 60% more hate crimes investigations post october 7th than compared to the comparable period, pre- october 7th, and that is on top of that already escalating increase that i mentioned. as i testified in my opening statement, the biggest chunk of those are threats against the jewish community, but there are, of course, attacks, as you mentioned, several of them, what are we doing about it? a few different things. we have elevated the civil rights, especially hate crimes, to national threat priority and that has been the last couple of years, and so that brings with it more investigative resources of all shapes and sizes. second, we are trying to do a lot to engage in outreach, both to law enforcement and the communities, because one thing we know about hate crimes is that they are chronically underreported.

and there are lots of reasons for that. so, trying to get a better data, better fidelity of the data allows us to track the trend better, but also to ensure that we are finding the cases that need to be pursued. even when a hate crime's charge, a federal hate crime's charges not available, the fbi doesn't just walk away from the case, we provide forensic support, some cases even testimony and other things in state prosecutions if state charges are being used. so, those are a few of the things in our outreach efforts, i would say we also have tried to do things that are targeted at specific communities. so, for example, in new york, we tried to reach out to parts of the jewish community in new york, with outreach both in yiddish and hebrew, and not just english, for example, so, that is just a flavor. >> thank you.

i want to turn to fentanyl. we all know that there is so much work that has to be done at the border, and so much work that has to be done in the ports of entry, senator portman and i passed one a while back, but we also know that one third of drug cases have direct ties to social media, and we had a kid in minnesota, who died after taking fentanyl laced pills that he thought was percocet to help his migraines, purchased on snapchat and the judiciary committee actually voted with the german's leadership to advance a bipartisan bill with them to require social media companies to report fentanyl and other dangerous drug sales on their platforms. it is called the cooper davis act. could you talk about how this could be helpful in taking on these cases?

>> welcome i think what you have put your finger on is the degree to which online activity is inextricably intertwined with the fentanyl epidemic. and that is, and a variety of ways, and i know the administrator has a number of bills focused on this as well. we, certainly on the fbi's end, our focus on example the darknet, focused on dismantling darknet marketplaces of conventional and other dangerous narcotics. >> okay, thank you. and one other issue, you know the importance of protecting kids, you noted in your recent testimony that the fbi has recently reported a massive increase sextortion cases,

where kids and teens are coursed into sending sexual images only to be threatened. this has resulted in at least 20 victims committing suicide, and my bill the shield act, includes a threat provision and other things that would update and modernize our laws, when it comes to revenge pornography and sexual cases involving kids. while we are advancing this bill sadly we have been opposed by some members of this committee and i have found it incredibly frustrating, because they won't meet with me to try to make any changes to it and i am trying to change that. what threats do young people receive, how do you think we could make the tools that you have to take on this crime better? because i am just going to start going to this floor

and taking this on our colleagues and of actives. and i know senator cornyn has been very helpful, but i think it is absolutely ridiculous when you look at these numbers, please answer, thank you. >> well, i can't speak to specific legislative proposals, but what i can tell you is that sextortion is rapidly escalating threat and, as you say, there have been way too many teenagers victimized, and they don't know where to turn. so, having this discussion in a forum like this, people like you, and senator cornyn raising awareness like that, that in itself is hugely valuable. as for what we need, i will tell you, i come back to the answer earlier to chairman derman about the threat if you will of the proliferation of war encryption. if companies are going to take responsibility for what happens on their platforms part of taking responsibility includes the ability to, when presented

with a warrant, following all of the due process that that entails they will provide the information so that law enforcement, not just fbi, but other agencies can take action to rescue the kids and take down the predators. >> thank you very much. i will ask my remaining restaurant on carjacking. thank you for your work on that. we can't let it last in writing, thank you. >> thank you, senator, klobuchar. senator, warren. >> let me start with some basic concept. if you wanted to the supreme court of the united states over the arches, in the entryway, there are inscribed awards, equal justice under law. i think there is a perception, unfortunately, that we are not living up to that ideal in a number of respects.

senator whitehouse mentioned the shameful treatment of hillary clinton, somebody who i do not support, from a political standpoint, but who was subjected to the release of laboratory information of an investigation of director called me and the fbi conducting involving her, and that usurps the attorney general, when it comes to charging decisions and the statement he did. i think there is also the perception that president trump was not treated fairly during his time of office, particularly, because of the opposition research, things like the steel dossier, the russia gate investigation, all of which ended up in the-- basically amounting to no charges being filed i just want to say personally i appreciate your willingness to take on the

important task of restoring and rebuilding the reputation of the fbi. i think the fbi is an indispensable institution in our government. but it is also a big unwieldy institution. i think you have about 35,000 people who work at the fbi, somewhere like that, right? >> it's actually closer to 38,000. >> 38,000. and i am personally convinced that overwhelmingly these are good patriotic hard-working people sacrificing, putting themselves in harm's way in order to protect the rest of america, but like any other large organization, there will be some bad apples, people who abuse trust and who misbehave. can you just take a minute and describe what steps that you have undertaken at the fbi to try to restore the fbi's

reputation as an institution? something the american people can trust to pursue equal justice under the law? >> well, i appreciate the question. let me start with a statement of principle that i hold near and dear that explains more concretely what that means. my message, from day one, and probably every day since i've been in the job, is that we need to make sure that we are doing the right thing in the right way. and everything we do. and that means the importance of following our rules. that does not mean, and sometimes this is frustrating to people of all shapes and stripes, that does not mean that we can guarantee the results or the outcome that somebody would like in a case. so, how do i implement that principle? i have directed all sorts of changes in relation to the hurricane matter, for example, and that one matter alone i directed over 40 corrective measures, went above and beyond

anything the inspector general recommended, and have implemented dozens of changes since then. you mentioned the hillary clinton email matter, there too i accepted every recommendation by the inspector general that went above and beyond. in terms of personnel i have installed an entirely new leadership team. from when i started. as far as accountability, which is a topic that, of course, is important to a lot of people, within the tools that we have available to us and the circumstances that are available to us, i have taken action. what can i do? i can in the right circumstances remove somebody from the chain of command. and i have. i can, with the circumstances support it, have somebody's security clearance revoked, and i have. i can, when the circumstances warrant it, refer somebody to the inspector general or the hatch act office of special

counsel, or others like that and i have. what i can't do is prosecute people, and that gets to the heart of what you referenced that the very beginning in terms of my predecessor's handling of the hillary clinton matter. i'm very sensitive to the fact that part of the reason i'm in this job is because of the distinction between the fbi director's role and a prosecutor's role. and a lot of the criticism that the fbi has endured over the last two years has, if you look closely, revolved around frustrations about whether this person was prosecuted or not and what they were prosecuted for. and that, ultimately, is not the fbi directors or the fbi's choice. >> if i can ask you about 702, there have already been some discussions about that. i referred to section 702, before and surveillance intelligence access perhaps one of the most important laws that the american people have ever heard of.

and i know we have talked a lot about it. but there is a concern that the tools, including the intelligence surveillance act, 702 is-- can be abused and that it can be used to target u.s. citizens. let me just ask you directly, it is it possible to target-- lawfully target an american citizen under section 702? >> i think so called reverse targeting, targeting of americans through the enron of 702 is expressly prohibited. >> that is my understanding of the law as well. as a matter of fact, the surveillance act is exactly that. the targets foreigners, correct? outside of the united states, correct? >> yes. >> but a would-be terrorist calls an american citizen in the united states, then you

necessarily will no one who is both ends of that conversation correct? >> well, whether it is telephone he, or even electronic communication, which is more often where you see it. >> it can be an email, a text-- >> correct. >> if, for example, you want to investigate that american citizen, isn't it true that you have to go to the foreign intelligence surveillance court and demonstrate probable cause to conduct a further investigation of that american citizen as a target? >> yes, at that point, then that is of course the route that we pursue, which is part of why, to your comment at the beginning about how little people have heard of 702 is because, unlike the war on stage, when you are actually pursuing somebody for prosecution, for example, 702 is most used and most useful at the stage when you are at the

very beginning, trying to figure out what the heck we have here, what direction does this need to go? is this something we need to pursue? and so that is why people, including prosecutors, don't even hear about it that much, because when it is most useful to protect americans from the threat. >> i think you call that the crown jewels or perhaps words to that effect, how would you describe the importance of section 702, and what would be the consequences of willfully blinding ourselves to the threats of foreign actors? >> i think blinding ourselves through either allowing 702 to lapse, or mending it in a way that gets its effectiveness would be reckless at best and dangerous and irresponsible at worst. the reality is the whole reason we have 702 focused on foreign threats overseas is to protect america. from those threats. it is not to admire foreign

threats from afar and study them and think about them, it is to know what they are and make sure they don't hurt americans here. american businesses targeting cyber attacks. american victims targeted for assassination or terrorist attacks. that is why we have it. the fbi's piece of 702, we are the only intelligence agency with the authority to operate domestically and so where the rubber really meets the road, even though our slice of 702 as a percentage is quite narrow, that narrow slice in some ways is the most important slice, because that is what protects people here that all of us are sworn to protect. >> thank you. >> thank you senator korman. >> thank you, director ray, i look forward to continuing that conversation about 72, a topic of which i have not formally made up my mind out of boat, so i'm opened your input so i want

to start with thanking you and the men and women of the fbi to the service of our nation and rule of law. specifically your work in my community the past year, working with the state and local prosecutors on civil rights violation, robbery, on cyberstalking, on kidnapping cases, as someone who had a decade responsible for local law enforcement entity, before coming here to the senate, i greatly respect and appreciate the role the fbi plays, the academy, the resources you provide, the professionalism in wilmington, delaware and the whole country. let me go to that seven or two conversation. in the proposal put forward by the senators, rubio, it would prohibit the running of u.s. person queries, designed to find evidence of a crime, without first obtaining a court order, but could still perform warrantless queries with searches reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information. what you think of that compromise?

would it had off the significantly negative consequences you have laid out if we failed to reauthorize section 17? >> i think the bill put forward by senators warner and rubio provide a path that we can work together on. the reality is that pursuing 702 information for crime, as has been demonstrated, or evidence of crime, is extremely rare, because that is not the main purpose for which we use it, and many of the instances, the very few instances in which that has been implicated are actually instances, where it was used to find exculpatory information to turn over to the defense. so, it is a path that i think merits further exploration. >> i'm aware of specific

examples in my own community, where fbi agents came and visited a significant company that was unaware that they had been in attack and was able to take prompt action, because of that and i am familiar with the unique ways in which the domestic authorities complement some of the ability we need as a nation to defend against foreign threats. also highlighted in your testimony that there were significant compliance violations here and you are dedicated to taking action to clean house and address those. talk to me briefly, if you would about holding personnel accountable for past misuse of data and how that has unfolded. >> well, in addition to a whole host of other reports we have put in place, we rolled out new accountability measures designed to make sure that we are capturing, not just intentional or reckless compliance violations, of which there have been very, very few and none, since 2018, but even,

which has been the vast majority of the clients instances we have had, even negligent, or careless errors. we want to make sure that we have accountability for that too. a different kind of accountability, just because the state of mind of the employee is different. and that is somebody who is coachable, but we have procedures now that, even for that much more good faith noncompliance they temporarily, at least, lose access to information and there's a whole host of remedial training and escalating consequences, if they don't learn their lesson, it builds from there. that is a short oversimplification, but that gives you a flavor of the measures we put in place. >> a core concern i have, frankly is that a future administration or director might still be able to misuse authorities in a section that i have not previously voted to

extend the authorization of section 702. but the reforms proposed in this legislation, the actions you have taken have me waiting, what, if any assurances, could you provide that the rules of the system will hold, if we authorize similar to-- even if the bureau happens to be led by an appointee who doesn't share your commitment to reform? >> well, we put in place a number of things that would be extremely challenging to unwind, for one. we created-- i created a whole new office of internal auditing, for example, and brought in a former agent, who had gone on to be a big accounting for partner, to try to work with, yet another big accounting firm to help us build what i expect to be a world- class internal auditing program, focused specifically on compliance. in addition, there are external looks and oversight, most of the problems that have been identified over the years have

been identified, by things like the department of justice's reviews, of course, there's been inspector general reviews. the court takes a look, and that is part of why i understand why people might say, well, gee, director, you talk a good game, but we've had problems in the past, and why should we think it is different this time, and what i would say to you is don't just take my word for it. look at what the court, the same court that has rightly taken us to task in the past has said. that court, the same judge, in fact, that has been, perhaps most scathing. is the one that found 98% compliance and has all sorts of language and opinions about the reforms actually having the impact that we are looking for. so, why is this time different? because the court, the departments, and others taking a look at this and who have been not shy about siding problems in their past, they have found this progress. >> thank you.

two other issues i will raise briefly, first, the importance, the urgency of the nonprofit security grant program as your testimony highlights anti- semitic and muslim hate crimes have risen sharply in the united states, following hamas october 7th attacks in israel. i think it is urgent that we had several hundred million dollars to the nonprofit security grant program, whether it is supplemental or in our regular appropriations process, i am hoping that my colleagues, many of whom cosponsor the platform accountability and transparency act will recognize that the huge wave globally of views of hamas circulated social media content in the wake of october 7th deserves a tough look at whether the algorithms used by social media platforms promoted this content , whether it was targeted to certain groups. the last point i will make in

closing, director, is that your written testimony says that economic espionage and foreign intelligence gathering by the prc present, i think i am quoting, the greatest long-term threats to our nation's ideas, innovation and security. i couldn't agree more. i think it is critical that our response to those players be coordinated. i am glad to learn the fbi's leading investigations for the doj and the commerce disruptive technology strikeforce collaboration. and i am urging our caucus leader to take up and confirm the nominee for the intellectual property enforcement coordinator, deborah robinson, a position that has been taking far too long. director, thank you for your testimony today. >> thank you, senators. >> thank you, director for being here. in an important issue to be declassified in august, 2021, the director of national intelligence committed court, fbi personnel conducted quote, queries on an individual had

the same last name as the fbi personnel conducting the query. and upon further investigation, what they learned is that this query was made after this analyst that the fbi had a conversation with his own mother and his mother expressed suspicions about his father having an affair, cheating on her, having an affair with another woman. and so, as a result of that, we looked into it, and this particular analyst admitted that he ran the queries, because this came from his mother, that his dad was having an affair, because i got a lot of material to cover i would appreciate if you would give me a yes or no answer to this. was that analyst terminated? >> i am not sure that i can call the specific instance that you are talking about so i will have tolo at that. >> and you know whether the analyst security clearance would have been revoked?

>> again, same answer, but let me check and we will circle back to whatever we can share. >> let me ask it to you this way, yes or no, abuse of section 702, by an fbi employee, would this be something that would warrant the revocation of security clearance? >> well, certainly abuse, i think we would have to know what the circumstance is, sometimes people have used terms like abuse in this discussion, when it has been something other than what i would call abuse, but that is why we have this accountability procedure that has cascading -- >> for example. >> if it was abuse i assume you would not disagree with that. now, the september 2023 disclosed two intentional instances, wrong searches, from 2022. one, from 2022 in which one analyst domestic inquiries, about a person who was a potential tenant of a rental property owned by one of the analysts. and another instance from 2022, in which an nsa analyst conducted queries on two occasions, taking information

about two individuals that the analyst, himself, had met through an online dating service. were the fbi employees who conducted those two illegal searches, where they terminated? >> well, you lost me there for a minute, you talked about an nsa analyst? >> yes to magic nsa analyst, you know whether anyone at the nsa who was disciplined for that, and if they were to the fbi would they be subject to discipline? >> welcome i don't want to get into hypotheticals, but as far as nsa analyst, i think that would be a question for nsa. fo discipline? fo >> i do not want to get into hypotheticals, as for the nsa analyst that is a question for them. >> was the fbi involved in that? if >> were they involved in those. if they had been, with their security clearances have been terminated? >> i do not want to get into hypotheticals. we have both the disciplinary process, ic