view of government. we are funding that funded by these television companies. including medco. >> midco supports c-span as a public service, along with his other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. >> in the weeks that lie ahead, as this television series unfolds, the famous men and women who occupied those seats will have a lot to say about friedman's solutions to the views of our time. >> saturdays at 7:00 eastern, american history tv will air the series free to choose.

the series 1st aired on public television in 1980. the friedmans wrote a best- selling companion book of the same name. it takes us to locations important to americans. they limit government interventionand social policy. other topics include welfare, education, equality, consumer protection, and inflation. watch free to choose saturdays, 7:00 eastern, on c-span2. fbi director christopher wray testified about the increase of hamas terrorist attacks. this oversight hearing runs about three hours.

okay, very good. >> the meeting of the senate judiciary committee will come to order. we will restore the oversight role, which i have worked on. director christopher wray, this marks the fourth time you have appeared before this committee since january, 2021. i want to begin by thanking you for the work that you and more than 35,000 fbi employees do to

uphold our constitution. i am troubled that the fbi is facing baseless claims and dangerous calls to defund the agency. this irresponsible charge has real consequences. last month, a man from tennessee pled guilty to a december, 2022 plot to attack the knoxville office and killed the agents involved in the investigation of the january 6th enter -- insurrection. i urge my colleagues to take a responsible and respectful approach. i urge my colleagues as well not to engage in bullying or conduct unbecoming of this committee. i would like to talk about the troubling increase in hate

crimes including islamophobic attacks in the wake of the middle eastern conflict. the fbi must continue to respond swiftly to these threats. in illinois, we are grieving the horrific murder of a 6-year- old palestinian american and the violent attack on his mother by a man who targeted them, simply because of their national origin. we send our support. they are recovering from their injuries in vermont. these three young men of palestinian descent were shot while walking to dinner. they were wearing eight traditional -- a traditional palestinian headdress. the jewish community has also been subjected to attacks. a las vegas man was threatened.

i strongly support the critical work in combating all of these threats. but there is a need for continued improvement, especially at the same time that the fbi addresses domestic threats, it must respond to international actors. lastly, the justice department unsealed the indictment of an indian national accused of conspiring to assassinate a sikh american. as i have said many times in this committee, political violence, in all forms, is unacceptable. an attack on any individual based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, nationality, religion, or disability is not consistent with the values of america. every community deserves to feel safe and the fbi place an important role in guaranteeing

that sense of security. it is heightened by the proliferation of guns in america. since the enactment of the bipartisan safer communities act, the fbi has conducted more than 100,000 enhanced background checks for gun purchases keeping firearms out of the hands of prohibited people. but there is more work to be done. director wray, i want to thank you for hosting me for the demonstration yesterday of the use of section 702. there is no question that section 702 is a critical tool for collecting foreign intelligence and protecting america. i appreciate the reforms you put in place to address what the pfizer court called widespread and persistent violation of 702 roles. i remain concerned though, about protecting communications . i look forward to continuing to work with you and

reauthorize 702 with the significant reforms that we need to protect the privacy of innocent americans. i now turn to the ranking member, lindsey graham, for his opening remarks. >> welcome, inspector. not inspector, but, director. we really appreciate you coming, thou is a good time to talk about the dangers we face and what the fbi is doing everyday. and how we can, you know, make you stronger in the face of a lot of threats. you will be asked about the fbi's role in monitoring religious organizations. the crossfire hurricane hangs in the air in the conservative world. we will be moving forward and you will be asked some tough questions. i appreciate you being here. mr. chairman, one thing that i will be talking about, among the list of threats is above the board. since president biden has taken office, we have had 6.6 million encounters with illegal aliens at the southern border.

that is larger than 33 states. and we are on pace, the last seven days, averaging about 9500 a day. play that out. we are looking at 3.4 million this year, at this rate. that puts us at 10 million. so, we are negotiating how to help ukraine. count me in for helping ukraine. a robust package to help our allies in ukraine makes sense to me. helping the ability of taiwan to defend itself make sense to me. helping israel makes all the sense in the world. border security is the fourth plank of the supplemental. we are wildly apart. the negotiations by senator lankford and murphy, i appreciate the efforts. we have made great progress, i

think, on asylum. but the democratic party seems to be unwilling to address the key problem. parole. this statute is pretty clear. the secretary of dhs has the ability to parole an individual. it is supposed to be an individual, based on a case-by- case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. mayorkas and the people at dhs have used that provision to give parole to over 240,000 people from four countries alone. cuba, haiti, nicaragua, and venezuela. it is not meant to be used in that fashion. why are we at an impasse? the biden administration refuses to follow the law as written. refuses to give up this concept of humanitarian parole, because it is their way of managing the

border. why are so many people coming now, compared to before? the believe is, and mr. chairman, if you get to america, you have a really good chance of never leaving. catch-and-release is the policy. if you apply for asylum, the initial screening test is way too low. your case is to be heard years from now and you are released into the united states. your parole in the united states, when we have run out of bed space, or they just want to parole people, the democratic governors and mayors of large blue cities are complaining. but their answer is, more resources to process immigration. you will not get a deal from the republican party unless we change the policies that are leading to 9500, on average,

per day, coming into our border. what are we looking for? not hr 2. we are looking for policy changes that will spread throughout the world and people will no longer risk their lives, their family lives, and pay thousands to human traffickers to show up at our border, that is what we are trying to do. but, you do not want to do that. as a party, you clearly do not want to change the policies that are attracting so many people. it is inhumane, i think, to lure people through this journey. it is not fair to the american people to be overrun in the fashion we are, given the threats that exist in the world. it is exceedingly dangerous to have lost control of your border. are they incompetent? or do they want it this way, the biden administration? a lot of smart people in the biden administration, they want it this way.

they want to be able to have the ability to use parole, humanitarian parole, and there is no such creature that allows for blanket admission into the country, as a tool to control the flow, they are not interested in deterring the flow. they just want to control the flow, and manage the flow, we, on this side, there are some republicans that will not vote for aid in the ukraine. they are in a distinct minority in the senate and i think the house is equally divided. if it addressed our own national security needs at home, i think you could get a very large vote. i do not need any more lectures about the need for ukraine i have it and i understand it. you are right, i understand why we should help israel and i understand. you clearly do not seem to understand or you are not going to accept that the

situation at the border is a national security nightmare in the making. it is unfair to the border communities to live like this. i have urged governor abbott, now moving to arizona, to make it real to senators who seem to object to making policy changes. i know that chicago has had a lot of illegal immigrants sent there. there are a lot of senators who are refusing to fix the broken border. and the states are pretty much immune from the problem, in the sense that they are not having to deal with hundreds of thousands of people coming across and wreaking havoc on border towns. fentanyl, at an all-time high, made in china, for the most part. we are never going to stop the flow of fentanyl until we regain

control of our border. to those following these negotiations, let me tell you where they are at, they are stuck and they are not moving forward in a productive fashion until the biden administration, until they are willing to change the policies that are, last two days, let me say that again, the last two days. 10,200 people have shown up at the border, and those are the ones that we know about, the last seven, almost 9500 on average. we are on track to do 3.6 million. there will be no deal, until you change the policies that lead to this problem. if that is too far for you, i am sorry, it should not be too far for america, the american people are trying to regain control of a border where we

have lost control. generally speaking, there is division on the ukraine but i think ukraine would carry the day with border security. there are so many threats that the director will talk about. people ask me in the hallway, all the time, where are we? on negotiating the border? we are stuck. and there will be no deal, until the policy changes that would lead to people not coming at the levels they are coming today. that is where we are at. you seem to be comfortable, my friends on the democratic side, making small changes to a very big problem. nibbling around the edges of this problem. it would be like sending guns to ukraine without sending any bullets.

really robust when it comes to ukraine, i am with you. but when it comes to our border, you are playing a game of doing the least amount possible, and that is to pick 10 or 12 of us off. it is not happening and i have been involved for 20 years, this is not about immigration reform, it needs to happen, it is about securing a broken border when the threats to our nation are at an all-time high and it started with afghanistan. the world is on fire, multiple fronts are getting worse, every day. there will be no assistance to other nations, until we assist our own nation. so, this attitude of doing the least that you can, trying to pick 10 or 12 of us off, is not going to work. we are united. we are divided on ukraine, but i would say two-thirds of our conference would vote for a package that included ukrainian

aid, if it had real border security. here is the problem. i know what real border security looks like. so to senator tillis, senator cotton, senator lankford, and everyone else over here. so, you are making a choice, and putting your nation at risk and the consequences of this will be devastating for the world. >> after i swear in director wray, he will have five minutes, please remain within your allotted time. director, do you affirm the testimony that you give before this community will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? let the record reflect that the director has answered in the affirmative. >> thank you, good morning, ranking member graham, members of the committee, i am proud to

be here representing the fbi. the threats, that the bureau tackles every day are more complex and evolving more quickly than ever before. and we continue to work relentlessly to stay ahead of those threats and to outpace our adversaries. for example, last year we disrupted over 40% more cyber operations and arrested over 60% more cyber criminals than the year before. over the past two years, we have seized enough fentanyl to kill 270 million people. that is about 80% of all americans. we are focused on other threats that emanate from the border and impact communities. things like violent gangs and human traffickers. at the same time, given the steady drumbeat of calls for the attacks by foreign terrorist organization since october 7th,

we are working around the clock to identify and disrupt potential attacks by those inspired by hamas' horrific terrorist attacks in israel. in recent years, we have seen an increase in hate crime investigations, including a big chunk involving threats to the jewish community. that has only become worse in the months since. i could go on and on about the important work that the fbi's dedicated professionals are doing across the entire spectrum, each and every day, to protect their fellow americans. but in the time that i have here this morning, i want to emphasize the importance of one tool in particular. it is indispensable to our efforts to combat threats posed by foreign adversaries. one that will expire in just a few short weeks if congress does not act.

and that is the 702 authority for the fbi. as this committee knows, it allows us to stay one step ahead of foreign actors located outside the united states who pose a threat to national security. and the expiration of those 702 authorities would be devastating for the ability to protect americans from those threats. let me explain just a bit, about what i mean about that. when there is a breach of a transportation hub, a public utility, or even a children's hospital, 702 is often the tool we use to find victims and get them what they need to get the systems back up and running. just as important, it helps us identify the next targets so they can defend themselves against an attack. in just one recent cyber case, 702 allowed the fbi to alert more than 300 victims in every

state and in many countries around the world. many of those crucial victim notifications were made possible by our ability to conduct queries of our existing 702 collection. when it comes to foreign adversaries, like iran, whose actions across a whole host of threats have grown more brazen, seeking to assassinate high- level officials, kidnap dissidents, and conduct cyber attacks here in the united states, or the people's republic of china, which poses a generational threat to our economic and national security. stripping them of the 702 authorities would be a form of unilateral disarmament. take the elevated threat of international tele-terrorism. it is key to our ability to

detect a foreign organization directing an operation here, to carry out an attack in our own backyard. u.s. person queries, in particular, may allow us to identify the intended target or build out the network, before they strike, we can stop them before they kill americans. given the critical importance of 702, we are committed to being good stewards of our authority, and to that end, i have ordered a host of changes to address these compliances, many members of this have seen live demonstrations at fbi headquarters, we have improved and enhanced training, added oversight and approval requirements. we have adopted

accountability measures. we stood up a brand-new office of internal auditing that has been focused specifically on fisa compliance. most of the declassified reports that have come out have involved compliance errors that predate those reforms. and i have been encouraged by the more recent data, showing the significant positive impact that those reforms, those changes, have had. the most recently, a declassified report from the fisa organization shows a 95% compliance rate. i am quoting court, they are having the desired effect. and the department of justice semiannual reports likewise now show a greater than 98% compliance rate. and we are proud of the progress we have made. but by no means are we done, we

recognize this is an ongoing effort and we are determined to work with congress to get it right. but, but, as we enter this critical phase of the renewal process, it is imperative that we not undercut the effectiveness of this essential tool with a warrant requirement or something that would paralyze our ability to tackle fast- moving threats like the ones i just described, because, crucial to our ability to actually protect americans is our ability to review it promptly and efficiently. to be clear, no court has ever held that a warrant can query 702 data already lawfully in our holdings. in fact, every court that has ever considered 702 in its current form, three different courts of appeals, has found 702

to be constitutional. restricting the ability to collect or to review what is already in our collection, well, that would be a legislative policy choice. if that is the path that is chosen, what are we going to say to the family whose loved ones were sabotaged when the fbi was not able to stop the cyber attack, what is the justification for not using every lawful tool to stop china from stealing our technology and undermining our freedoms? i can assure you, the prc is not holding back. they are not tying their hands behind their own back. what if there was a terrorist attack that we had a shot to prevent but we could not take it, because the fbi was deprived

, under 702, of the ability to look at key information already sitting within our holdings. now, i was in fbi headquarters number 22 years ago, on 9/11 and over the years, i have spoken with families of victims of that horrific attack. and before that attack, well- intentioned policymakers had made the choice to build a wall preventing access to national security information sitting in our partner's holdings. i bring that up, because allowing 702 to lapse or undermining it in a way that affects its effectiveness, that would be rebuilding another pre- 9/11-style wall. what could anybody possibly say to victims' families if there was another attack we could've prevented if we had not given

away the ability to effectively use a tool that courts have consistently deemed constitutional, because let's not fool ourselves, that is what is at stake with the reauthorization of 702. as the threats to our homeland continue to evolve, the agility and the effectiveness of 702 will be essential to the ability of the fbi, really, the mandate to keep them safe for years to come and we owe it to them, to make sure that we have the tools that we need to do that. thank you for having me. and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, director. i will start the questioning. thank you for the visit to your headquarters, and the demonstration of, i think, true advancements, to try to avert any concern about institutional

issues. i still have some of those concerns, as you might expect and we have proffered an alternative to the current system that we think is reasonable and it has an emergency exception in it, as it should, because there are issues of grave national security. cannot wait even for the process to continue. and secondly, when it comes to victimization, we allow consent by the victim to go forward with collection of information. you know, there are situations like that, as it should be, since the enactment of fisa, the fbi has been required to obtain a court order for u.s. persons services that searches. unrelated to national security. at the fbi -- has the fbi ever obtained a court order to perform a u.s. persons search in this context?

>> that is not the way we use cyber material. >> that is correct. the answer is zero. the office of the director of national intelligence and your statistical transparency report for 2020 revealed that the statutory requirement has been treated approximately 100 times, is that true? >> that, i cannot speak to the number. i think the report in question may involve incidents that occurred before the reforms that we were just talking about. >> i would appreciate if you would take a look at that an answer, for the record. let me go to another topic that has been discussed before this committee and voted on, on several different occasions. that is the child sexual abuse materials, that was a letter asking lawmakers to study the means and mark -- ai being used

to exploit children through sexual abuse material. it can be used to create images of children in sexual positions or overlaying on abused images of children over abused children , to create csam. i don't know of any parent or grandparent knowledgeable in this area who has not warned their children and grandchildren, please be careful what you communicate on the internet and who you communicate with. you have highlighted the work to prioritize, highlight, and deter individuals in criminal networks from exploiting children and you have noted that the proliferation of csam on the dark web is threatening. what is the fbi doing to disrupt technologies used to exploit children and what obstacles you are facing?

>> so, i think there is no mission threat, no threat that the fbi's men and women tackle that is more righteous and at the heart of what we do, then protecting kids. i know that last year, we arrested something like 3000 child predators and rescued something like 2000 kids from exploitation. the vast majority of which is happening heavily online but often leads, to what is even worse, the actual hands-on abuse. and certainly, as you noted, technologies have continued to advance in a way that makes that threat even more pernicious, including ai and the ability to create synthetic content, for example. when you ask about challenges that we face. the companies, these technology

companies are increasingly moving in a direction where they are deciding worn it -- designing warrants-prove equipment. the abuse happening on those platforms, law enforcement will not have any ability, no matter how rocksolid the warrant to get access to the information that we need to protect those kids and take down those monsters. the companies themselves are blinding themselves to abuse happening on their own platforms. what we really need is for the companies to work with congress and work with the executive branch and with law enforcement to design their encryption in a way that makes sure that they maintain the ability to respond to, you know, warrants. >> why are they not cooperating ? why are these companies

resisting the effort to engage them in solving the problem? >> i cannot speak for them, in terms of their motivation. these issues get into balances of privacy and security. >> but it is children, what is the privacy concern? >> you got me. i will tell you, we get, from some of these companies, millions of tips, historically, about child exploitation and the idea that we would go into a model where those tips just evaporate. let's speak clear, when the tips evaporate, the kids are out there being abused, the predators are still out there, the only thing that has changed is the way we go about doing anything. it is a way for them to essentially, again, i cannot speak to their motivation. but it is a way to blind

themselves to what is happening and indirectly blind us to our ability to protect kids and go after predators. >> we will be bringing some leaders before this committee next month. i hope we can ask these questions directly. i will tell you, we passed overwhelmingly, unanimously, five different bills related to this issue and i thought that was going to be an avenue to bring them to the floor, the resistance from big tech to even pursue this issue, despite the overwhelming, bipartisan report troubles me greatly. i want to believe that they want to do the right thing but there is very little evidence of that. senator graham? >> do you agree that social media systems, as they are designed today, present dangers to american families? >> sure. >> thanks. i don't know where to begin, other than, is now a good time

to fund the fbi below inflation? just say no. >> no. i was about to say hell no. >> feeding the witness? >> you can say that. i think that is pretty dumb, given what you have told us that how long have you been associated with the fbi? >> i have been working with the fbi my whole career, really. >> let's put a fine point on where we are at today. how would you describe the threat matrix against america today, from your point of view, after having been at the fbi most of your adult life? >> what is unique about the environment we are in, there may have been times when individual threats could have been higher, here or there, then merit -- where they might be right now, i have never seen a time when so many of the

threats are all elevated, all at exactly the same time. that is what makes this environment that we are in right now so fraught and why funding the men and women who are working shoulder to shoulder with other partners every day, makes it even more important, and not less. >> the blinking red lights about 9/11, all of the lights were bring blinking -- were blinking red and we all missed it. >> i see blinking lights everywhere i turn. >> can't say it better than that. whose job with all of these problems, let's start with iran. >> iran, which is of course, the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism, let's start there. in the last couple of years, if you want to bring it here, home, to the homeland, in the last couple of years, iran has

tried to assassinate a former u.s. national security adviser on u.s. soil and has tried to kidnap and then tried to kill a journalist, an american journalist and human rights activist, right smack in new york city. they have conducted a cyber attack on a children's hospital in new england and for extra credit, as director ratcliff and i announced in the fall of 2020, tried to interfere in the last presidential election. >> other than that, they have been pretty good to work with, right? we found enough fentanyl to kill 80% of all american people? >> that is in the last two years. >> do you think we missed some fentanyl? >> absolutely. >> what role does china play in the fentanyl problem? >> china supplies most of the

precursors to the cartels in mexico, which then leads to what comes here. and that has been talked about a fair amount and it is a huge problem. in addition to that, china is also responsible for a lot of the manufacturing of the pill presses which are also used. and in addition to that, a lot of people do not know this, china is responsible for a lot of the precursors for the math that is manufactured south of the border. >> do you see that getting better? >> i do not. >> let's talk about russia, what are they up to? >> besides the unconscionable aggression in the ukraine, they have one of the most advanced and most widespread offensive cyber programs in the world. they have invested very heavily and have used it in different ways against us and our allies, they have intelligence officers here in the united states, too

many, by any measure. they also provide safe haven to cyber criminals, whether they are working for the russian government or not they are conducting cyber attacks against , you know, us, and our allies. that is just a start. >> let's go to international terrorist organizations. after afghanistan, we put international terrorism on steroids. are you concerned that international terrorism threats to the homeland are rising as the border continues to be broken? >> i am concerned that we are in a heightened threat level from heightened terrorist organizations for a whole host of reasons and obviously their ability to exploit any port of entry is a point of concern.

there are a lot of discussions about numbers and numbers are important. let's not forget, it did not take a big number of people on 9/11 to kill 3000 people so, numbers are important but they do not tell the whole story. we have seen an increase in so- called kst, known or suspected terrorists, attempting to cross within the last five years. >> putting a fine point on the topic, would you say that right now is the largest threat we have faced as a nation from international terrorist organizations since 9/11? >> it is certainly higher than it has been in a long, long time, let me put it that way. if you look, post october 7th, the threat was elevated before, but post-october 7th, you have seen a veritable rogues gallery . they are calling for attacks against us. >> october 7th was devastating

to our friends in israel. your testimony since october 7th before this committee, urging a foreign terrorist organization to attack america, it has gone up? >> it has gone to a whole new level since october 7th. >> okay, folks. you are on notice, what are we going to do about it? finally, what should we be doing differently? with all of these bad actors? i think it is fair to say that we have lost deterrence. do you have any idea, quickly, of what we could be doing differently? >> well, certainly, it requires consequences and so, consequences need to be imposed on bad actors in a variety of ways to ensure deterrence.

consequences are also part of disrupting, even without deterrence, degrading the bad actors' ability to harm us. >> senator whitehouse? >> good morning, director wray. i seem to always use our time together to go over old business and i apologize, but such is the responsiveness of the department. i wanted to talk to about charles mcgonagle today. he is an fbi agent who is interesting in two respects, he is pleading guilty or has pled guilty to his undisclosed receipt of $225,000 from a foreign national and he awaits sentencing for the crimes to which he pled, coming up in february and the second interesting thing is that he

led the new york counterintelligence division during the time that it was widely reported that new york fbi agents and former new york u.s. attorney rudy giuliani were pressuring director james comey to intervene in the hillary clinton campaign. and do it damage. as we unfortunately no, director call me did, with press conferences that violated doj rules and procedures. so, my experience is that, when somebody is in the presentencing mode of a criminal plea, that is a very good time to get information from them and cooperation from them. i do not know what happened in the new york field office during that period, but there is a very good chance that

charles mcgonigal does. and i will put into the record three records. one is made out to attorney general merrick garland asking about this. the second is the office of legislative affairs at doj, back to me, giving something of an answer to this. and the third is a letter off the doj website reflecting the plea agreement, between the southern district of new york and the attorneys for charles mcgonigal. thipoint , what i asked in the letter, if somebody independent of the fbi could take a look to see if there were fbi shenanigans during that period in that office and i received no confirmation that anything was going on. the plea agreement reflects no sign or signal of cooperation. that is often a feature but

there was no sign that he was asked to cooperate outside of the plea. i have been unable to determine whether or not the inspector general is even eyeballing this to see if somebody, independent from the fbi, somebody from the department, should take a look. what do you know of the status of this, and are you, would it make sense, would it not make sense, to have an independent set of eyeballs take a look at what took place at that time, while he is in the helpful position of being subjected to sentencing? >> i appreciate you raising the topic. first, our counterintelligence division of course, they are the people who identified mcgonigal 's wrongdoing and pursued it and arrested him and

they are very focused on trying to determine in all the ways that you would imagine, what, if anything he might have impacted through his misconduct. that is one. secondly, i think there are two attorneys offices, new york and i think the district of columbia, as well so, two cases that are presentencing and that his cooperation, if you will could be potentially relevant to it. and i can tell you, i want to be careful how far i go on this. but i want to tell you that we have involved the inspector general as well. because we, like you, we want to make sure that we understand the full scope of what mr. mcgonigal did and what he knows. >> so the doj and the inspector general has been notified. >> he has been engaged.

>> let's go back to 702 for the moment. i understand that 702, which was originally designed sort of to a counterterrorism purpose, has also been deployed against the international fentanyl trafficking apparatus. is that correct, and has 702 been important in combating the international fentanyl apparatus? >> it has been important in the fight against the scourge of fentanyl, more so i would say by our intelligence community partners. the cia, for example and their work overseas to pursue some of the foreign dimensions of the fentanyl crisis. of course that has massive ramifications for communities all over the united states. >> so that is the success, of

702? >> it is. >> you mentioned the role of 702 in reaching out to victims of crime and of potential foreign intelligence operations. could you elaborate in our last minute together a little bit more on the role of 702, in supporting the government's role in letting americans and american companies find out that they are the victims or have been the victims of criminal and intelligence attacks and helping them work through the consequences as victims? >> in the short time we have, what i would say is that 702, especially the ability to run queries on email addresses and ip address is statistically right now it is the biggest place in which it is used for

cyber attacks, victims, overwhelmingly victims of russian, iranian, chinese, and others, of cyber attacks in the united states, 702 allows us to figure out what company is being targeted and what the entry point is and it allows us, armed with that information, to rush out to the companies and alert them to take mitigation steps before it becomes exponentially worse and there are a lot of information where we are coming to companies that did not know they were breached yet. if we had not had 702, we would've been unaware. >> if you could share with us some actual instances and make this a question for the record. obviously, you must do some scrubbing to make sure that everyone is comfortable with the information being released. but the more that everyone can know about actual ways that actual individuals can be receiving factual circumstances, that would be useful, thank you. >> thank you, senator whitehouse. >> you testified before this

committee with the richmond field office, quote, a product by one field office, end of quote. you testified before the house judiciary committee that the memo was a single product of a single field office, but the richmond memo says two other field offices of the fbi were involved and that that information had been redacted in versions provided to congress. why did the fbi redact that critical information? second, did you review the unredacted version before giving your previous testimony? >> so, senator, i think this notion that other field offices were involved is a garble. and let me explain why i say that. the only involvement of the other two field offices, the

richmond authors of the product, they included two sentences or something, thereabouts, referencing each of the other cases. they sent those sentences, to them, not the whole product, they asked them, did we describe your case right? so, it was a single field office's product. i stand by that. >> did you review the unredacted memo before giving your previous testimony? >> i have. exactly when i reviewed it, as i sit here right now, i cannot tell you. >> in july of this year i made public what is now known as the biden family 1023 fbi document. i have also written several letters about the same. most recently, i think, october 24th. that letter of october said, in part, with the confidential

human source in the biden family, 1023 was not connected to known sources of information. that confidential human source is also reportedly a highly paid, long-term, long-running fbi source that the fbi has used in many investigative matters. according to former attorney general bill barr, he said that 1023 was deemed sufficiently credible for further investigation. on may 31st of this year, chairman comber and i had a call with you. and you told us that the biden family 1023 is related to an ongoing investigative matter. now, very clearly, these data points show indicators of credibility. this question for you.

this fbi 1023 was serialized on june 30th, 2020, over three years ago. when were you first made aware of 1023? >> i do not know that i can give you the exact date. but i can tell you that i learned of the 1023 much, much, much more recently than anything around 2020, that is for sure. >> this is a public document. you have an obligation to tell the committee what you know about it and if you cannot give us that information, i guess i better go on. are there additional fbi- generated 1023 referencing the biden family and if so, how many, and what are their dates?

>> senator, now you are asking questions that relate directly to special counsel vice that night weiss investigation. i would refer you to that. >> the 1023 references alleged text, financial records, and audiotapes that prove some sort of scheme involving money with biden people. these are discrete documents that can be obtained, if they exist, from a highly-paid confidential human source providing the fbi with evidence that three types, different types of records exist that prove a crime, involving a political official, then- standard fbi practices to take steps toward obtaining that evidence, would you agree with

what i have said so far about the fbi policy? if not, why not? >> certainly, i would expect people to do appropriate follow- up on anything in the 1023. every one of those incidents is very case specific. >> based upon what you just told me, did the fbi seek these records in this matter? >> let me separate into two different things. when it comes to the investigation being led by special counsel vice, which is being supported by our baltimore field office, i cannot discuss that because it is an ongoing investigation, when it comes to the assessment that occurred in what was being run out of our field office in pittsburgh and the u.s. attorney, mr. brady, as

selected by attorney general bill barr, to look at all of this, back, back in the earlier period that you were talking about. my understanding is that there was an agreement between the team. about what steps needed to be taken and the closing of that assessment. >> have you communicated with white house officials or used a third party to do so about anything relating to the 1023, as it involves people in the biden family and if so, who and when? >> no. >> i want to go over the sexual misconduct by the fbi. on october 5th, 2022, i sent you a letter and i later made fbi records public that showed widespread sexual misconduct in the fbi against females. the data showed that hundreds of fbi personnel retired to avoid discipline and that senior high-

level officials received reduced punishment, if any at all. on october 6th, the fbi told the associated press that it intended to respond to me first and declined to provide sexual misconduct data to the press at that time. it is over one year later and the fbi has failed to provide this to me. the lack of action indicates that it is not taking misconduct against women in the workplace seriously. why has the fbi failed to provide that important data to this committee? and when will it finally been -- be reduced. the fbi told the associated press they were going to bed

>> i could not disagree more strongly that we don't take it seriously. i take misconduct, sexual misconduct against our own employees, extremely seriously. and we have put in place policies to communicate in no uncertain terms how strongly i feel about that. as to the response to your letter, let me follow up with my team and we will see where that stands. i want to be sure there is no confusion, none, about how seriously i take this conduct that >> okay, where is the data, if you are willing to take it so seriously? >> i will follow-up. i will follow-up with you. >> thank you very much, mr. chair. thank you so much, director wray , for being with hate crimes that you and i have talked about them before. i have, i thank you and your agents in minnesota for their work in solving what was a clear hate crime. with prison sentence of a

bombing of alfarouk islamic center back in 2017. and we know that since that time we've seen increases in hate crimes. our reports show a 216% increase since october 7, in request for help and reported by incidents against muslims. another report showed a 388% rise in anti-semitic incidences. we know the facts, we know what happened in front of a restaurant in philadelphia. we know that a boy was stabbed for being housed by an islamic american. a person broke into a islamic family home. was shot along with two of his friends. in new york, a woman was

assaulted at grand central terminal and when confronted the assailant said it's because you're jewish. a father and his 14-year-old son were allegedly assaulted by another parent for being palestinian and last week three suspects were arrested for a 40 minute spree of attacks on jewish new yorkers. it is concerning for everyone to, democrat, republican, jewish, muslim, christian anyone in this country. i know that you care about this very much because i saw the work your agents did in minnesota. and i want to get some more details on what the fbi is doing and what the justice department is doing to detect and investigate these crimes. and then also the effect of social media. i know there are limitations on what we can do. i have some strong views on this.

but could you also talk about that? >> well i appreciate your long- standing interest on this topic. and i know how important it is to you, not the least of which of the attacks that have occurred in your home state. certainly, we have seen an increase in hate crimes. and there are lots of different numbers out there but i will just give two for this purpose. one is in 2022, we saw the highest increase i think in hate crimes reported that we had seen since maybe 2008. and we don't have full data for 2023 yet but we expect it to keep going up. second data point, postoctober 7th, just since october 7th, we have opening i think 60% more hate crimes investigations, postoctober 7th and compared to the comparable preoctober 7th that's already escalating prethat i mentioned.

as i tensioned in my opening statement, the biggest chunk of those are threats against the jewish communities but there are of course attacks and you mentioned attacks against others as well. what are we doing about it? a couple of different things. we've elevated hate crimes to national threat priority and that's been true for the last couple of years so that, brings with it more investigative resources of all shapes and sizes. second we're trying to do a lot to engage in outreach both to law enforcement and the communities because one thing we know about hate crimes is that there are chronically under reported. and there are lots of reasons for that. but so trying to get better data, better fidelity of the data allows us to track the trend better but also to ensure that we're finding the cases that need to be pursued. even when, a hate crime charge,

a federal hate crime charge is not available, fbi does not walk away from the case. we provide state prosecutions if state charges are being used. so those are a few of the things in our outreach efforts i would say we also have tried to do things that are targeted to specific communities. so for example, in new york, we try to reach out to parts of the jewish community in new york with, with outreach both in yiddish and hebrew for example not just english. >> we also know that 1/3 of

drug cases have direct ties to social media, and we had a kid in minnesota who died after taking a fentanyl laced pill that he thought was percocet to help his migraines purchased on snap chat. the judicial committee voted with the leadership to advance a bipartisan bill with senator sheheen and marshall to require law enforcement to report these cases. >> what you put your finger on is the degree to which, online activity is intertwined with

the community. certainly we on the fbis end are focused on for example dark net marketplaces and we have something called jeco who is focused on dismantling dark net marketplaces focused on narcotics. >> you mentioned the importance of protecting kids you noted in your written testimony that the has reported a massive increase in net cases sending explicit photos and videos only to be blackmailed or threatened for financial gain. in 2022 alone these scams resulted in at least 20 victims committing suicide. my bill with senator cornin the shield act includes a threat

provision and other things that would update and modernize our laws when it comes to revenge important and sextortion cases involving kids. while we are advancing this bill. sadly we have been opposed by some members of this committee and i found it incredibly frustrating because they won't meet with me to try to make any changes to it and i'm trying to change that. what threats do young people receive, how do you think we can make the tools that you have to take on this crime better. because i'm going to just start going to the floor and taking this on. my colleagues can object if they would like. i know senator cornyn has been very helpful but i think it's just absolutely ridiculous when you look at these numbers, please answer, thank you. >> i can't speak to specific legislative proposals but what

i can tell you is that sextortion is a rapidly escalating threat. and as you said there have been way too many teenagers victimized and they don't know where to turn. so having this discussion in a forum like this people like you and senator cornyn raising awareness of it, that itself is extremely helpful. as to what we can do about it, i go back to the question i had earlier about the threat if you will about the proliferation of warrant proof encryption. if companies are going to take responsible for what happens on their platform includes the ability to when presented with a warrant following all the due process that that intails, they will provide the information so

that law enforcement, that entails, they will provide the information so that law enforcement can get that information. >> if you walk into the supreme court of the united states over the arches in the entry way there are inscribed the words equal justice under law. i think there's a perception unfortunately that we are not living up to that ideal in a number of respects. senator white house mentioned the shameful treatment of hillary clinton, somebody who i do not support from a political standpoint but who was subjected to the release of derogatory information of an

investigation director comey and the fbi conducted involving her. the fact that he usurped the authority of the attorney general when it comes to charging decisions and made the statement he did. i think there's also a perception that president trump was not treated fairly during his time of office particularly because of the opposition research, things like the steel dossier, the russian gate investigation, all of which ended up in basically amounting to no charges being filed. i want to just say, personally i appreciate your willingness to take on the important task of restoring and rebuilding the reputation of the fbi. i believe the fbi is an indispensable institution in our government. but it's also a big unwieldily institution.

i think you have about 35,000 people who work at the fbi. some where like that, right. >> it's actually closer to 38,000. >> 38,000. and i'm personally convinced that overwhelmingly these are good patriotic, hard working, people sack tpaoeuzing putting themselves in harms way to protect the rest of america. but like any bad organization there are going to be some bad apples. people who misbehave. can you just take a few minutes to talk about what you have done to try to restore the fbi reputation as an organization that the american people can do to protect. >> let me start with the of principal and then explain a little concretely what that

means. my message from day one and probably said every day since i've been on the job that we not need to make sure that we're doing the right thing in the right way. in everything we do. and that means the importance of process and following our rules. that does not mean, sometimes this is frustrating to people of all shapes and stripes sometimes that means we cannot consider a case or outcome in a case. how do i implement that principal? i have directed all sorts of changes in relation to the cross fire hurricane matter for example. in that one matter alone, i directed over 40 corrective measures, went above and beyond. you mentioned the hillary clinton matter. there too i accepted every recommendation then went above

and beyond in terms of personnel. i installed an all new investigative team from when i started. in the topic of i can remove someone from the chain of command and i have. i can when the circumstances support it, have somebody security's clearance revoked, and i have. i can when the circumstances warrant it refer somebody to the inspector general or office of special counsel or others like that and i have. what i can't do is prosecute people that gets to the heart of what you reference at the very beginning as far as my predecessors handling of the hillary clinton matter. i'm very sensitive to the fact that part of the reason that

i'm in this job is because of the distinction between the fbi directors role and a prosecutors role. and a lot of the criticism that the fbi has endured over the last few years has if you look closely reinvolved around frustrations around whether this person was prosecuted or not. and what they were prosecuted for. that ultimately is not the fbi directors or the fbis choice. >> if i can ask you about 702. there's already been some discussion about that. i refer to the surveillance act as perhaps one of the most important laws that the american people have never heard of. i know we have talked a lot about it. but there is a concern that the tools including foreign intelligence act can be abused. and that it can be used to

target u.s. citizens. let me just ask you directly. largely target an american citizen under section 702. >> i think so called reversed targeting of americans is expressly prohibited. >> that's my understanding of the law as well. as a matter of fact, the foreign intelligence surveillance act is exactly that. it targets foreigners correct. outside of the united states. >> yes, but if a would be terrorist calls an american citizen in the united states, then you necessarily will know who's on both ends of that conversation, correct. >> well whether it's telephony or electronic conversation. >> it can be e-mail, it can be a text. >> correct, correct.

>> and if for example, you want to investigate that american citizen, isn't it true that you have to go to the foreign intelligence surveillance court and demonstrate probable cause to conduct a further investigation of that american citizen as a target. >> yes at that point then that's of course the route that we pursue. which is why to your comment at the beginning how little people have heard of 702. is because unlike the warrant stage when you're actually pursuing someone for prosecution for example. 702 is most used and most useful at the stage when you're at the very beginning trying to figure out what the heck do we have here. what direction does there need to go. is this something that we need to pursue. that's why people including prosecutors don't even hear about it that much. is because it's when it's most useful to protect americans from threat. >> i think you call it the

crown jewels or perhaps words to that, effect. how would you describe the importance of section 702 and what would be the consequences of willfully blinding ourselves to the sector. >> i think it would be dangerous at best and irresponsible at worse. the reality is the whole reason we have 702 focused on foreign threats from overseas. is to protect america from those threats. it's not to admire foreign threats from afar and study them and think about them it's to know what they are and to make sure they don't hurt americans here. american businesses target cyber attack. americans are targeted for

assassination and attacks. we are the only intelligence agency with the authority to operate domestically. where the rubber really meets the road, everyone our slice of 702 as a percentage is quite narrow. that narrow slice in some ways is the most important slice. because that's what protects people here that all of us are sworn to protect. >> thank you senator cornyn. >> thank you senator cornyn. i look at continuing the conversation about 702. i just want to start by thanking you and the men and women of the fbi for your service to our nation and the protection of the rule of law. and specifically thank the fbi for your work in my community in the last year. you've worked with state and local prosecutors on several rights violations, on robbery, on cyber stalking, on kidnapping cases and as someone who had a decade responsible

for a local law enforcement entity before coming here to the senate, i greatly respect and appreciate the role the fbi plays, the academy, the resources you provide and the professionalism in willington, delaware and all other the country. let me go to that 702 conversation. the proposal put forward by senators warner and rubio would prohibit warrant queries in a crime. what do you think of that compromise. would it head off the significantly negative consequences you laid out if we fail to reauthorize section 702. >> i think the bill put forward

by senator warner and rubio would prohibit. prohibiting 702 investigations for evidence of crime as has been demonstrated is extremely rare because that's not the main purpose for which we use it. many of the instances in which that has been implicated or instances where it was used to find brady information, exculpatory information to turn over to the defense. so it is a path that i think merits further exploration. >> i'm aware of specific examples where fbi agents came and visited a significant company that was unaware they had been hacked and were able to take prompt action against that. and i'm familiar with the ability we need as a nation to defend against foreign threats.

you also highlighted in your testimony that there were significant past fisa complaint -sz and you have been able to take action to clean house. talk to me about holding accountable responsibility about a past fisa data and how that has unfolded. >> in addition to a whole host of other reforms we have put in place. we rolled out new accountability measures designed to make sure that we are capturing not guilty just intentional or reckless compliance violations of which there have been very, very few and none since 2018. but even which has been the vast majority of the compliance instance we've had, even negligent or careless errors we want to make sure we have accountability for that too. that's a different kind of accountability. just because the state of mind

of the employee is different. that is somebody who is coachable. but we have procedures now that even for that much more good faith noncompliance they temporarily lose access. and there's a whole host of remedial training and so forth. then there's consequences if they don't learn their lesson and they grow from there. that gives you a flavor of what we put together. >> a core of what we put together is a future administration or director might still be able to misuse authorities in this authorization. but the reforms proposed in this legislation, the actions you've taken have me weighing. whrapl -- what if any

assurances could you hold. even if the bureau happened to be held by an appointee that doesn't share your commitment to reform. >> we put in place a number of things that would have extremely challenging to unwind for one. we created, i created a whole new office of internal auditing and put in a former agent who had gone on to be a big four accounting firm partner to try to work with a big four accounting firm that would help us to build what i call an auditing program focused specifically on fisa compliance. in addiction there are external looks and oversights. most of the problems that have been identified over the years have been identified by things like the department of justices reviews. of course there's been inspector general reviews. the court takes a look. that's part of why, i understand why people might say, gee director, you talk a good game but we've had

problems in the pastment -- and why should we think it's different this time. i would say, don't just take my word for it, the court, the task force that has taken us in the past is the one that found 98% compliance and has all kinds of language. why is this time different? the court, the department others taking a look at this and who have been not shy about siting problems in the past they've found this process. >> the security grant program as your testimony highlights anti-semitic and anti muslim hate crimes have risen sharply in the united states following from last october 7 attacks in

israel and i think it's urgent that we add several hundred million dollars to the nonprofit security grand program whether in the supplemental or regular appropriations, a process and i'm hoping my colleagues many of who sponsored the act. that the huge wave globally of hamas in the wake of october 7th deserves a tough look on whether the algorithms used by social media platforms promoted this content. whether it was targeted to certain groups. the last point i will make in closing director is your written testimony says that economic espionage present and i think i'm quoting the greatest long term threat to our nation's ideas, invasion and i couldn't agree more. i think it's critical that our response to theft by the prc and other players could be

coordinated. i'm glad to learn the leading investigations for the doj and the commerce technology strike force in collaboration and i'm urging our caucus leader to take up and confirm the nominee for the intellectual process investigator. robert johnson a position that has been vacant for so long. thank you for your testimony and your service. >> thank you director for being here. in a report issued declassified in august of 2021 the director of national intelligence stated quote, fbi personnel conducted multiple queries of an individual who had the same last name as the fbi personnel conducting a query. in further investigation what they learned is this query was made after this analyst in the

fbi had a conversation with his mother. and expressed her thoughts that her father was having an affair. was that analyst terminated? >> i'm not sure that i can recall the specific incident you're talking about. so i'll have to go look and that and follow back up with you on that. >> do you know whether the analyst security clearance would have been revoked. >> again, same answer. but let me check into that and we'll circle back to you whatever we can share. >> let me ask it to you this way, yes or no. would abuse of section 702 by an fbi would that warrant the relocation of security clearance? >> well, certainly abuse. i think we would have to know

what the circumstances. >> sometimes people have used terms like abuse in this discussion when it's been something other than what i would call abuse. that's why we have accountability procedures. >> the example i gave you is abuse. the i'm sure you would not disagree with that. two additional intentional, wrong searches from 2022. one instance from 2022 in which two analysts conducted queries seeking information about a person who is a potential tenant of a rental property owned by one of the analysts. another instance from 2022 in which an nsa analyst conducted queries on two occasions seeking information about two individuals that the analyst himself had met through an online dating service. were the fbi employees who conducted those two illegal searches, were they terminated. >> well you lost me there for a moment. you referred to an nsa analyst.

>> yes. nsa analyst do you know whether anyone at the nsa was disciplined for that and if they worked at the fbi would they be subject to discipline? >> i don't want to get into hypothetical. but as far as nsa analyst i would say that's a question for nsa. >> were fbi employees involved in those. and if they had been, would their security clearances have been terminated. >> again i don't want to get into hypotheticals but we have both a disciplinary process which is separate from the security clearance process. somebody who takes, who engages in a compliance allegation related to 702 could be relevant to both. >> i would hope the default answer would be yes. they would be subject to having their security clearance stripped and be subject to dismissal. in an april 2022 opinion, the surveillance court noted the following searches of americans communications. 19,000 donors to a particular

congressional campaign. i heard in 33 americans in the vicinity of the capital. not necessarily inside the capital but in the vicinity of the capital in 2021. the dni semi annual assessment disclosed illegal queries conducted in 2019 to 2020 quote using only the name of a u.s. congressman. the fisa court disclosed two particularly egregious searches. in june of 2022, an analyst conducted two queries of 702 using the last name of a u.s. senator and state senator without further limitation. on october 25, 2022, a staff's operation specialist ran a query using the social security number of a state judge who had quote complained to fbi about alleged civil rights violations perpetrated by a municipal

chief of police, close quote. were the fbi employees who conducted those illegal searched of the query stripped of their security or no? >> all the instances you listed off all involve conduct that happened before the reforms put in place. >> reform, a text that we don't even have access to. reforms you put in place. i've been on this committee for 13 years during the entirety of those 13 years i've expressed concerns to fbi directors pointed by presidents of both political parties and three different presidential administrations. every one of them have told me the same thing. don't worry about it. we have new procedure, it's never different. you haven't changed. you keep referring to these policy, these new procedures we haven't seen that. we are not allowed to have

access to them and we have no reason to trust you. because you can't behave in a matter that's trustworthy. you can't tell me that people who knowingly, deliberately violated the rights of american citizens were fired or even had their security stripped. only 16 of which were evidence of a crime only searches that returned information. i would like to ask to give a yes or a no answer to these questions. were the three related batch queries relating to the events of january 6th were those evidence of a crime only queries, yes or no. >> i don't know the answer to that. >> the answer is no. i do know the answer. the answer is know. will the 126 queries in

connection with the george floyd protest, here in washington, d.c. evidence of a crime only queries. >> those were noncompliant queries. again they all predate the reforms that we put in place which before. >> other reforms, other fbi directors have told me about every darn year. how about 19,000 donors to a political campaign. the answer there is no. what about the query for a sitting member of congress. the answer there is no. what about the query involving a u.s. senator who could be any one of us, the answer is no. so what does that tell me? well, what i'm hearing and what these data points all point to is that a warrant requirement with prohibition relating to only a line query of the abuse we've seen under section 702. the fbi is already required to obtain a court order in some

circumstances before accessing the contents of american communication and 702. since 2018 how many times has that requirement been triggered. >> are you talking about this so called f2. >> yes. >> how many times has it been triggered in. >> yes. >> i think there's been two instances where i think is maybe the number. >> 103 times it's been triggered. out of those 103 identified times the fbi should have obtained a court order how many times did the fbi actually obtain one, do you know? >> of that i think the answer is none. >> zero. so are you telling me the fbi ignored the that. you have the audacity to come here and tell us that adding a warrant requirement to 702 even for queries involving u.s. persons on u.s. soil that that would lead to a disarmament.

you have a lot of gall sir. this is disgraceful. the first amendment deserves more than that and you know it. even prior to the founding of this country there were protections built into the laws of the united kingdom. even then the government was making the same argument you're making today. which is too hard: it makes it hard for the government. it's why we have a constitution, sir and you must comply to it. >> mr. chairman may i respond briefly. when you ask why things are different this time i will point you again to the findings of the court and the department themselves both of which have not been shy about identifying some of the same instances you sited in our.

has not found to be 702 to be uninstitutional. every court that has looked at it has found it constitutional. >> >> that is not an argument sir. >> in some of the instances in particular that i know about those are instances where the queries were run in order to get to a public official, member of congress to warn them about foreign influences targeting them. and a warrant would not have enabled that. >> we call those consent searches. consent searches do not require a warrant sir. and you know that. there's nothing that you have done that is not entirely within the fbis control.

and supervision. you're asking me to believe something that is not believable because you're, your agency has the made it unbelievable and i refuse to accept it. >> thanks mr. chairman. thank you for being here today and thank you to the thousands of fbi agents who are right now out there trying to keep us safe. i think we often fail to express our gratitude to law enforcement. i know how dedicated and hard working they are. so, that is something that should go without saying. but it's worth saying. mr. director, i want to focus on election interference. which is in my view one of the

most pressing important to our democracy. there's a lot of talk about the dire effects potentially of the outcome in 2024. and the country's of china, russia, other foreign adversaries we're not talking here about hamas or a terrorist organization. nation states interfering in our election process to pick winners that are more favorable to them. that's no secret here. no mystery about who would be more favorable to putin or to

xi to ukraine or taiwan. >> whether it's russia, whether it's china, iran or others would seek to interfere in our elections. >> you've said that all threats are elevated at exactly the same time. this one seems to me much more elevated than we've seen in any recent election, am i right. >> i think it's fair to say they are elevated from what they were before. just to elaborate just slightly on that point. obviously we saw and it's not disputed that the russians tried to interference in the 2020 election. attempting to take a page out of the page book. in the fall of 2020, about the iranians efforts to interference in that election. more recently, we've had an

indictment involving the chinese government attempting in a very aggressive way to interference in a particular congressional candidacy, first trying to dig up dirt on the candidate and then when they couldn't find it to make up dirt on a candidate. after they couldn't find that, openly talking about how to inflict physical violence on the candidate. that's a pretty stark form of election interference. >> you are focused rightly on this problem as an urgent one for the united states of america, correct. >> yes, sir. >> and what can we do in congress to support this effort? what additional powers do you need? do you need more resources? seems to me that our democracy is on the line here. and all of the speech making, all of the rhetoric we're expressing today go for not if we lose our democracy because china, russia, iran, these nations state have a free feel

to interfere with our election. >> i think there's a couple of things. on the one thing on the money side in terms of appropriations we're not in an environments that none of the threats that we're facing are going backward. they're all elevated and increasing. so now is not a time to go backward in terms of funding of the fbi across cyber, counter intelligence and a whole host of other issues. but second, we talked about 702, 702 is of course focused on foreign adversaries, many of these same intelligence services and their ability to engage in malicious foreign intelligence authorizations. and that's why reauthorizing 702 is important to that threat among a whole host of others foreign threats. >> there are now fifth circuit decisions. the courts are making decisions. that if upheld would create

additional obstacles to your enforcement against foreign interference. >> as you know there is the subject of ongoing litigation. the findings of the lower court in that litigation are things that are hotly contested through the department's findings. as you know, the department has asked the supreme court to not only stay that injunction but to grant serve. and it's done both. i will say, i think it's important for people to to know, it is not seriously dispute had the our foreign adversaries have tried and are continuing to try to interference in our elections and it is not seriously disputed that those foreign add adversaries are using social medias as part of that effort.

historically our work in this space has enjoyed widespread bipartisan support. in fact, president trump himself rightly in 2018 or 19 issued an executive order on this very subject calling it a national emergency. the intelligence committee on an overwhelmingly the áf asked for more involvement with social media companies and not less. we continue to stay focused on the foreign actor not on the content itself. >> just so everyone is aware director wray, facebook announced and i'm quoting that, the threat sharing by the federal government in the u.s. related to foreign election interference has been paused since july end quote.

that is a profoundly troubling change that threatens our national security. the fbi and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies are in effect handicapped, they are straight jacketed by this ruling. and on that score and on so many other areas where election interference. it's real and urgent, a clear and present ongoing threat to our democracy. and i hope that my colleagues will heed your warning, its expressed in characteristically under stated terms but i think it is a profoundly important warning to this committee and to the country. let me ask just about in the brief time that i have left,

hate crimes, the rising incidents. i am deeply disturbed as are many of our colleagues about what's happening on college campuses. free speech, has a place obviously on campus. intimidation, physical threat, violence do not. are you satisfies that the leadership of our colleges and universities are doing enough to stop violence and physical intimidation? >> well, it's hard to paint with a broad brush. i know that we're working more closely than ever with leadership of universities to try to increase their awareness and their resolve on this subject. and we now have campus liaison responsibilities assigned to campuses as far as that effort. we have seen from some of these

foreign adversaries we have been talking about occurring on campuses and not other. >> have you looked into hamas. >> i have to think about that one. >> dr. wray welcome. as you know i'm deeply concerned about the fbi. i think the department of justice has been politicized under garland and the fbi has been as well. and unfortunately i think you've been willing to stand up

to the senior because doj being treated. i want to talk in particular about the investigation into multiple allegations of corruption involving hunter biden and joe biden. because the department of justice has i think from the outset tried at every step to stop investigation into corruption from joe biden. as you're aware a whatsapp text message was send to henry zall a senior communist which names as follows. i'm sitting here with my father and i want to know why the commitment made has not been fulfilled. tell the director now now means tonight. if i get a call or text from anyone involved the from anyone

other than you, zhang, or the chairman, i will make certain that between the man sitting next to me and every person he knows and my ability to forever hold a grudge that you will regret not following my direction. i am sitting here waiting for the call with my father. this is a text that is direct evidence that is stating that it is his father that is going to retaliate. now, an irs whistle blower testified before the board of represents to extort millions of dollars from a chinese communist. when he tried to find out whether joe biden was sitting

next to hunter, ha the doj block getting the data on joe biden's phone. did the fbi try to ascertain where joe biden was when this text was sent? >> i think the questions you're asking go to the ongoing investigation being led by a special counsel wise. so i'm not going to be able to. >> there's been testimony under oath and you're right, david wise special prosecutor is in charge of it and it is david wise and his under links, they allowed the statute of limitations to run on many of the most serious violations. not only that, irs whistle blower testified that explicitly told investigators that despite having probable

cause to search, there is no way a search warrant would be approved when the evidence in question was located inside of vice president's guest house. stating that the optics prevented such a search. >> my instruction is whether anybody likes it, we have to follow the investigation. >> director wray you and i have gone round and round on this. every time you're asked about this you say it's an ongoing investigation. the investigation cents -- the investigation is not ongoing. you are hiding behind the skirts of the attorney general.

look the whistle blower also testified that came before congress lied under oath to this committee. the attorney general testified to this committee in response to my questioning, i have pledged not to interfere with the hunter biden investigation i have carried through on that threat. the fbi whistle blowers lied under oath a felony. >> i can only tell you what our instructions have been to other people. >> has there been political interference into hunter biden

or joe biden. >> there is an ongoing investigation. >> i'm asking you about corruption from doj. were they allowed to investigate joe biden or is the whistle blower telling the truth that doj said joe biden is off limits. no questions about the big guy. >> as to what is in scope or not in scope. s that is not me hiding behind anything. it's a long-standing policy going back years and years and years through many administrations. >> you have the responsibility not to allow it to be a partisan tool and a partisan weapon. the testimony and by the way the fbi has done nothing. >> and i have not and i will not. >> have you opened an investigation on whether the attorney general obstructed justice. >> i'm not going to go down that road here. >> i know you're not. that's the point. nobody thinks you've opened an

investigation because you're not willing to. and the amazing thing is, director wray you're not a partisan. you are standing by. and you are damaging the fbi and you are damaging the department of justice. let me ask you also, the whistle blower testified that invest investigators wanted to execute a search warrant is it typical fbi practice to tip off the subject of a search warrant before the search warrant so they can remove any evidence that's incriminating. >> what is typical is when you're hearing an individual who has a protective detail, it is typical for agents to be in contact. >> does the protective detail guard the storage unit. >> i can't speak to the storage

unit specifically. >> why, why would the fbi tip off the subject of a search warrant about the storage unit that was going to be searched beforehand. does that not under mine the very essence of an investigation that doj is proporting to under take? >> i'm not going to be able to discuss specific. >> who is, if you're not, nobody answers these questions and it's why people are furious with the cover up. because you don't believe the fbi is accountable to congress or to the american people. >> your time is up. director wray has requested a five minute recess. five minutes. >> senator, if i might just quickly responds then go the break. >> respond. >> i understand why this is frustrating, i do. it is also the case these policies i'm referring to about my inability to discuss ongoing investigations and certainly internal deliberations related

to ongoing investigations, are polllies -- policies that have not only been in place, but in fact, these are policies that were actually strengthened under the last administration and scathed for not following. thank you. >> you have an obligation to call out corruption.