september, each of will in your own way remember that day what it meant to this nation and to what it meant to us individually, collectively. and take a moment, thank those people that sacrificed so much that and that live on in our memories. thank you and have a great evening.

i saw one. i was in the constitution of the united states against all enemies, foreign and defend the constitution of the united states against all enemies, foreign and domestic. the constitution of the united states. against all enemies foreign. then the constitution of the

united states. i can support and defend the constitution of the united states against all war. and defend the constitution of the united state. and defend the constitution of the united states. as american soldiers, we've all taken this oath. we sworn allegiance not to a king, not even to the president. we've pledged our support to the constitution. this remarkable document was drafted and signed here in independence hall, the old pennsylvania state house in philadelphia, during the summer. of 1787. one way to better appreciate the meaning of the constitution is to understand why and how it came to be. some of us may think that the united states of america came about simply as a result of colonization revolution, and

then the establishment of our present form of government. it wasn't, of course, quite that simple. as a matter of fact, the constitution that governs our lives today was our second effort. the first one, the articles of confederation, didn't work. our present constitution only came about after great debate and compromise. during this program, we'll examine the origins of the constitution, placing special emphasis on those provisions that deal with the creation and control of our army. by the time the second continental congress met in may 1775, the battles of lexington and concord had already occurred. it was this second congress that created the continental army. in fact, the second continental congress also declared independence from england.

directed the revolutionary war. and drafted what we consider to be our first constitution. the articles of confederation. from the time the articles were first proposed in june 1776, until they were finally ratified. in february 1781. five years had elapsed even in the face of a common foe. the states did not want to surrender their sovereignty to a central government. article two, for example, stated each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence. the articles of confederation read more like a trade agreement than a basis for national government. article three read the said states hereby enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defense. there was neither a separate executive to enforce the laws of the congress nor an independent judiciary to settle disputes

among the states. after the american french victory at yorktown in october 1781 and the treaty of paris two years later, the states saw a little likelihood of foreign invasion. the glue that had once held the fiercely independent states together was gone. without it, the american confederation began to come apart at the seams. weaknesses, as in the articles of confederation, became increasingly obvious. one serious physical shortcoming was that under the articles only the states had the power to tax or to print money. article eight, for example, stated all charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense shall be defrayed out of a common treasury. to fill that common treasury. congress had to request funds from the states due to a growing economic crisis, which ultimately developed into a full fledged depression. the states could not or would

not provide the congress funds to pay off the charges of war. one of many government debts was backpay for the officers and men of the continental army. during the two years between the victory at yorktown and the departure of the british from new york city. general washington kept his army camped at newburgh, new york. this was a tense, awkward period of neither war nor peace. washington could not relax so long as there remained the possibility of a renewal of hostilities. this possibility was very real following the april 1782 defeat of the french fleet, which had played a key role at yorktown. general washington was also having great difficulty maintaining morale and discipline at newburgh. he had even found it necessary to rebuke a colonel louis nakoula, who suggested the general set himself up as a king. in addition to providing no pay

for several months, congress was considering reversing its promise for half pay pensions to the continental army's officers upon demobilization. some congressional delegates and supporters of a strong national government felt that they could advance their cause by playing on the army's grievances. general washington was alarmed, and in a letter to his friend and former military aid alexander hamilton, he warned the army considering the irritable state it is in, is a dangerous instrument to play with the situation in the states. deteriorated further during the winter of 1780 283. mutinous talk abounded throughout the rank and file of the continental army. anonymous petitions soon began to circulate within the newburgh encampment, threatening that the army would soon take matters into its own hands by marching on philadelphia and taking over congress. the plotters called for a secret meeting, but general washington got word of this and acted

quickly, just as the proceedings were about to begin. he walked in and took the podium. on march 15, 1783, before the assembled officers of his veteran army, he began to speak. gentlemen, by an anonymous summons, an attempt has been made to convene you together. how inconsistent with the rules of propriety and how subversive of all order and discipline this summons was calculated to suggest an idea of premeditated injustice against the sovereign powers of the united states. and how did the author of this summons see the interest of the army being advanced by moving westward into the unsettled country, leaving an ungrateful nation to defend itself if war should break out again, or if peace should take place by turning your arms against your own country. in her hour of distress. unless the congress can be

compelled into instant compliance. my god, this is so shocking. humanity revolts at the idea. general washington reminded his officers how his own service had demonstrated his dedication to the army and its needs. how he had shared their distress and understood their grievances. plotting. but he was convinced that congress recognized the suffering of the army and would eventually establish pension funds. he promised to personally press their cause with congress toward the end of the address. general washington began to have obvious difficulties with this text, and he his next action proved dramatic and had an emotional impact on his officers plotting the ruin of. as he fumbled for his new spectacles, he revealed a physical frailty he his officers had been unaware of. the general was having trouble seeing gentlemen. you must pardon me. i have grown gray in your service. and now i find myself growing

blind. let me in treat you. in the name of our common country. as you value your own sacred honor. as you respect the rights of humanity. and as you regard the national and military character of america. to express your horror and to defeat the insidious designs of your enemies, you will thus give one more distinguished proof of one example patriotism and patient virtue rising above the pressures of this most difficult situation. general washington succeeded in convincing his officers to stand by congress. he had turned to threaten mutiny into an opportunity for the

officers to display their loyalty to the young republic. the general who could have been a dictator or perhaps even king, had established by his example the military and national character of america. the principle of civil control of the military. george washington proved himself committed to the high ideals of the revolution, while at the same time acutely aware of the deficiencies of the government as it was then organized. even during the war, he had written, our measures are not under the direction of one council, but 13, each of which is actuated by local views and politics. we are attempting the impossible. many leaders recognized that the articles of confederation were in need of wholesale revision. the ink was barely dry on the newly ratified document when james madison and others were appointed. the report necessary changes. this was to be the first of many attempts to amend the articles. it was, however, an impossible

task since article 13 stipulated that no amendments could be made unless confirmed by the legislature of every state. as a result, the situation went from bad to worse. each state attempted to protect its own interest and to assert its own independence. the states even dealt unilaterally with foreign governments, interstate squabbles prevailed. virginia quarrel with pennsylvania over the pittsburgh area. settlers in western north carolina organized a free state of franklin and elected their own governor. vermont, not yet a state held secret talks with canada on annexation. new york collected taxes on the inhabitants of new jersey. many states quarreled over borders. in the west, a new military threat was developing from the indians. but new york informed congress it would not allow massachusetts troops to transit the state on their way to maine ports along

the frontier. requests from congress for funds to pay war debts and to run the government went unheeded by the states. george washington wrote to john j. our 13 sovereign indiana pendent disunited states are in the habit of refusing requisitions at their option. requisitions are actually little better than a just the legislatures laugh in your face. finding themselves unable to amend the articles of confederation, many politicians and businessmen began to consider other alternatives. one of the most logical choices in the minds of some citizens who had grown up under the rule of an english king was to establish some form of limited monarchy in america. sentiments toward a monarch were still strong, and many americans, for example, congress requested and received a portrait of louis the 16th and marie antoinette to hang and its meeting hall.

nathaniel golomb, then president of the continental congress, was reported to have written prince henry of prussia, asking him to accept power in the face of the apparent failure of the confederation, a a group of businessmen in boston wrote privately to king george and second son frederick, duke of york, with a request that he come to america as king. even george washington and briefly considered the necessity of a monarch, might become evident in time. alexander hamilton, who genuinely admired the british form of government, doubted that anything short of monarchy would do in america. the economic chaos and political factionalism of the mid 1780s led noah webster to write. i was once as strong a republican as any man in america. now a republic is the last kind of government i should choose. i would infinitely prefer a limited monarch.

yet another possible solution to the troubles of the day was the division of the confederation into separate countries organized along regional lines. dr. benjamin rush wrote from philadelphia. some of our enlightened men have secretly proposed an eastern, middle and southern confederacy in april 1787. newspapers in philadelphia and other cities published widely the following letter. instead of attempting to amend the present articles of confederation, would it not be preferable to distribute the united states into three republics? some states were working at resolving their differences, but meetings between individual states provided no solutions to the confederation's. bigger problems. as early as 1782, the new york legislature here called for a general convention of all states to review and revise the articles. congress appointed a committee to consider this proposal, but

no further action was ever taken. in 1784, richard henry lee of virginia wrote to james madison that the laws of congress were subjected to being overruled by any one petty, insignificant state, refusing to accept them. william grayson wrote to madison in 1786 the present confederation is utterly inefficient and if it remains much longer in its present state of imbecility, we shall be one of the most contemptible nations on the face of the earth. but congress took no action in january 1786. the virginia legislature passed a resolution inviting the states to send delegates to meet in annapolis to review and revise the articles dealing with commerce. however, the opening session on september 11 revealed that only new york, new jersey, pennsylvania, india, delaware and virginia were represented.

delegates from the other states had either failed to arrive or had simply not been appointed before joining on september 14th. however, they drafted a call for all the states to meet in philadelphia on the second monday of may 1787, in order to devise such further provisions as shall appear to be necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the union. with this latest call for a general convention, be just another of the many which had been founded since 1782. it would not for this time, as luck would have it. events in massachusetts got everyone's attention. soon after the adjournment of the annapolis convention, daniel shays organized several hundred impoverished farmers and marched to springfield. such rebellions by the people had been occurring quite regularly throughout 1786. in massachusetts, new hampshire,

connecticut and vermont. rebellious farmers had closed courts, broken up farm auctions and attacked state legislatures. by the end of the year, nearly 9000 rebels had been organized with no real federal army and an inadequate militia. the situation threatened to get out of hand. during this period, abigail adams wrote to thomas jefferson regarding the rebellion. it is true, sir. the uprising has have been very alarming. they have even stopped the courts of justice in several counties. a few weeks after the final defeat of shays by the massachusetts militia in january 1787, the continental congress endorsed the annapolis proposal for a general convention and called upon all states to send delegates to philadelphia in may. daniel shays rebellion had once and for all convinced the majority of the states leaders that strong measures had to be taken to avoid the disintegration of the united states.

the rebellion had driven home a feeling already felt strongly abroad that the american experiment in democracy was failing. or, as an english friend of young america wrote from london to benjamin rush, the conclusion here is that you are falling to pieces and will soon repent your independence. finally, by the spring of 1787, others had reached the conclusion. alexander hamilton had expressed five years earlier in confronting the dilemma of liberty for the people versus power of a central government. hamilton had written an excess of power leads to despotism. too little power leads to anarchy, both eventual lead to the ruin of the people. may 1787 philadelphia the federal convention after the dismal representation in annapolis the preceding

september and in spite of the stamp of approval by the continental congress, many leaders still wondered whether everyone would appear in philadelphia, not everyone did. of the 74 delegates selected by the states, only 55 actually made it to philadelphia. rhode island didn't even appoint delegates. the delegates to the constitutional convention were all men of prominence. many had actively participated in the struggle for independence. 22 had seen military service. 34 had studied law. 13 were businessmen and ten were planters. three were physicians. and two had been religious ministers. among them were eight, who had signed the declaration of independence. six who had signed the articles of confederation and seven who had attended the annapolis convention. most were well-educated.

some of them in england. it was in this english based education, and the general moral and legal developed of those american leaders that the deep roots of the british values system lie. the war for independence came about primarily because americans rebelled against the infringement of their rights as british subjects. in fact, english traditions and english heritage actually had a very positive impact on the framers of the constitution. their belief in man's natural inalienable rights and representative government goes back to these traditions. lieutenant colonel barry berryman, a british exchange student at the united states army command and general staff college. we, the british, are indeed proud of the fact that the political and legal heritage of colonial america was primarily english. english common law and many of

our historic documents. the magna carta of 1215, the habeas corpus act of 1679, and the bill of rights of 1689. all these had significant influence upon the framers of your constitution. in fact, our political and legal philosophers, such as locke and blackstone were often quoted here on the floor of independence hall in philadelphia as regards the military debates. there is no doubt that the delegates were only too well aware of those crises in english history, where king or parliament used excessive power over the army. as a result, the british army act, which is somewhat similar to your army appropriations act, must be passed by parliament annually. if this were not to happen, the army would essentially cease to exist and i would be out of a job. your constitution limits the

period of appropriations for your own army to two years. still, although much of the heritage and outlook of the framers of your constitution was english, they also showed some great ingenuity in coming up with some unique combinations of checks and balances on your central government's control of the armed forces. these checks and balances were partially inspired by the writings of a frenchman, montesquieu. the founding fathers recognized that french military assistance during the revolution was crucial to our winning independence. but the framers of the constitution owed an even greater debt to the writings of french political philosophers. lieutenant colonel dominique mariotti, a french exchange student at the command and general staff college. the 18th century is often called the age of enlightenment. france played a leading role in this period of intellectual

history. your thomas jefferson, james madison, george washington, among others, was a strongly influenced by many of our philosophers. one of the leading political thinkers and writers of the time was how the sugar daddy montesquieu, in his most important work, les prix de laval, the spirit of the laws montesquieu planted the idea of a separation of powers. that concept is a fundamental element of your constitution. with the creation of the congress, the president and the supreme court and other influential writer of the enlightenment was jean-jacques rousseau. although technically, it was a swiss citizen, he lived in france and was accepted as a leading philosopher of the

enlightenment. in his book, the social the social contract, rousseau declared that the best form of government was the one in which the people limited the authority of a central government. this idea was basic to your revolution and to the writing of your constitution. the convention was originally scheduled to start on may 14, but on that day the only delegates present were from pennsylvania and virginia. it was not until may 25th that a quorum was established and deliberations began. most of the great debates that summer in philadelphia centered around how to best allocate representation in congress between the larger and smaller states. the debates concerning the creation and control of the army were symptomatic of this constant struggle between the

delegates who did not want to give up hard won liberties, and those who believed a stronger government was the best guarantee of just those liberties. although the state militias had contributed greatly to the war effort, there had been problems with their training and discipline. now, with the war over, many militias were either unfit to form a national military force or the states did not want to yield control over them. the debates on the convention floor focused on this critical issue of control. no better transcription were made of the convention debates, but based on a journal kept by james madison, we can reconsider some of the arguments. let us observe how such a debate may have proceeded. here we see general charles pinckney from south carolina greatly deteriorating. the confederation and has produced no security against foreign invasion. nor can it check the quarrels between the states. the prospect for anarchy is

real. first of all, then we must find a way to provide for the common defense and to secure liberty and the general welfare. i agree, mr. pinckney. james madison of virginia. however, the militias appear inadequate for preventing rebellions even within their own state borders. i believe in the power of regulating the militia to be given to the federal government. i certainly hope that there will be no standing army in time of peace. george mason of virginia. but we do need a military force. unfortunately, i fear the 13 states will never agree separately to one system. so it seems we must give this power of regulation to the federal government authority over the militia, or by no means be taken away from the states. elbridge garry of massachusetts says, and i might add, they'll never give it up. perhaps as a compromise, a small

percentage of the militia could be set aside under federal control, with the remainder to be dealt with at the discretion of the states. i do not see how we can divide them between two authority. the fact is the states at present neglect their militias and their discipline is of national concern. in any case, they should all have the same training and discipline. that can only be attained by federal control. the standard training, regulations and the discipline code could be provided by the federal government and then the actual training could be conducted by the state with officers selected by the state. if indeed we are here in convention to provide the central government with more power, so be it. but i shall never see to stripping the states of its last great bulwark against tyranny if agreed to by this convention. this plan will have as black a

mark as what sat on cane. states will see the necessity of surrendering their power over the militias, at least when called to the service of the united states. i must confess, however, that in such cases i have very little faith in the abilities of the militia. we must have a real military force. i find your remarks. my good sir, to be very ominous. if the states will trust the government with a power over the public treasury, they will buy the same argument. granted, the control of the public military forces. after all, our primary object is to secure effective militia. we can never have uniform training and discipline without federal government control. let us then act to have the militia placed under federal control for training and discipline and leave the appointment of its officers to the states and. and thus the final wording in

the constitution became to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the united states. reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers in the authority of training the militia. according to the discipline prescribed by congress. many delegates at the convention either objected to or felt uneasy about having a national army during peacetime in the first place. they remember too well their experiences with the british army before the war. secondly, they saw little likelihood of invasion by a foreign power. but last and by far not least, many were afraid the new central

government might use the army as an instrument of oppression. still, other delegates for the future defense of america being closely linked to a well-trained, professional army under the exclusive control of the national government. now back to independence hall. states do not where we see mr. gouverneur morris from pennsylvania addressing the fact that congress has no power. so the authority of congress's work nothing if it cannot be enforced. we must furnish a means to protect our nation from within as well as from without. we must have an army under the national legislature. you suggesting a standing army? a national army? mr. morris, you do mean a standing army in peacetime. if we pursue this approach, then we will give too much authority to the federal government. standing armies are the engine of arbitrary power.

we don't need it. we have a militia for our defense. no militia can ever acquire the skills necessary to overcome a regular force. our esteemed commander in chief himself has pointed out that the firmness needed for the real business of fighting can only be attained through a constant course of discipline and service. if we have a standing army. when the british invaded offshore us, was it a standing army that won the battles of lexington and bunker hill? and which of you? my fellow delegates are afraid of invasion from any foreign power that our brave militia could not repel immediately? oh, but one of the disturbances from this last winter. or have you forgotten the shays rebellion? i tell you, if we had had a standing army, then they would not have grown to the proportions witnessed in that rebellion. gentlemen, i have kept my counsel long enough. alexander hamilton of new york.

we are told the militia would at all times be equal to national defense. such thinking would have cost us our independence. now, the american militia in the course of the late war have by their valor on numerous occasions distinguished themselves. yes, they proved themselves. but and i beg the indulgence of the gentleman from massachusetts. but the best of our militia will readily admit that war is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligent perseverance, by time and by practice. gentlemen, with respect to standing armies, i feel there is no one here who does not feel some indignant nation at such an institution. but though it is dangerous, i fear it may also be a necessary provision. i can understand the fears

expressed here by the delegates, but i do not see how we can continually rely upon the sovereign states to provide us assistance on every occasion. we have already seen indeed. that is why we are here in convincing. and we have already seen that there are times when the good of the nation takes precedence over the good of the states. if we must a national army in peacetime plans for war are generally made during peacetime. or would you prefer that we wait until we are attacked to raise troops? if we must have a national army and i still oppose the notion. well, at least it should be limited to two or 3000 men. perhaps we should make it unconstitutional then for an enemy to attack us with a larger force. so we have a paradox. on the one hand, standing armies

are presumed dangerous, and on the other they're necessary. i suggest that we limit the army's appropriations. yes, well, that would certainly be an effective way to insure some control over an army. exactly. so let us regulate the armies appropriations to that of one or two years, just as the british did in 1689. then the need for a standing army could be reviewed by the legislature. each time the appropriation were due. article one, section eight of the constitution reads the congress shall have power to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. this provision in the constitution is the one. lieutenant colonel thurman, earlier compared to the current british army act. but now the provisions which were being written into the

constitution to balance the legislate nature and the executive were about to play a role also in the control of the national army. congress could raise an army and appropriate money for it. but who would the officers and who would command the army? english history had shown during the time of oliver cromwell that even parliament could acquire too much power over a standing peacetime army. again, general pinkney and swift resolve the issue of having a federal army, as well as ensuring that the states will maintain their militias. let us now determine how best to control command, if you will, that army regarding control. we have already placed an important constraint on the army by limiting appropriations period to two years. who will appoint the officers? who will command the army? i propose that the president be commander in chief. commander in chief of the federal army.

only or both the army and the militia. when the militias are called to the service of the united states, the president should command them, as well as the federal army. what safeguards would there be if the president also commanded the militias? this would present grave danger to our liberty. but only congress can call the militia to national service. i view military command by the president as just another step toward giving him the powers of a monarch, an elective king, if you will. i should rather see the army's command vested in a powerful power. experiences in the late war have clearly shown us that a military force is best directed when it is united under one man. and that man should serve at the pleasure of congress. congress, too, could become. need i remind you, sir, of the misuse of power by cromwell's parliamentary army. and the officers who would

appoint them. i believe it would be most appropriate that the president to appoint the officers, since he is also charged with the appointment of ambassadors and supreme court justices. but only with the advice and consent of the senate. then let us also require him to seek the advice and consent of the senate for the appointment of officers from such debates. came the final wording in article two. section two. the president shall be commander in of the army and navy of the united states and of the militia of the several states. when called into the actual service of the united states. he shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the senate shall appoint officers of the united states with the military and political issues resolved by debate and compromise. the delegates were ready to sign the final draft of the constitution on 17 september in

was to be a final call for reconciling nation of differences and for unanimous support of the new document, which was to become the primary law of the land. the elder statesmen of the convention, benjamin franklin. i ask for permission to address the delegates. gentlemen. i beg your indulgence that i have had to commit my remarks to paper for my advanced age. i cannot trust to memory. dr. franklin. i would consider it an honor if i could assist you by reading your speech before this convention. oh, that's very kind of you, james. yes. perhaps that would be better. mr. president. and i confess that there are several parts of this constitution which i do not at present to prove, but i am not sure i shall never approve them. for i have lived long, i have experienced many instances of

being obliged by better information to change my opinions, even on important subjects. it is therefore that the older get, the more apt i am to doubt my own judgment and to pay more respect to the judgment of others. so i agree to this constitu with all its faults, if there are such, because i think a national government is necessary for all of us. i doubt to whether any other convention would be able to make a better constitution. it therefore astonishes me, sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does. and i think will astonish our enemies who are even now waiting with confidence to hear that our counsels are confounded, like those of the builders of babble. thus, i consent, sir, to this constitution because i expect no better and i am not sure that it is not the best.

on the whole, sir. i cannot help expressing a wish that every member of this convention who still have objections to it would with me on this occasion, doubt a little of his own infallibility. and to show our put his name to this instrument. among the 39 delegates who signed the constitution and the convention secretary who authenticated the document were 23 veterans of the revolution. every war given here with their revolutionary war ranks. these men were brigade chaplain abraham baldwin, captain richard bassett, regimental paymaster. william blunt blunt.

colonel david bradley. adjutant general. pierce butler. captain. jonathan dayton. brigadier general john dickinson. colonel william. few. captain thomas fitzsimons. captain nicholas gilman. lieutenant colonel hamilton. major william jackson. the convention secretary. major rufus king. colonel john langdon. brigadier general william livingston. major james mc. henry. major general thomas mifflin. volunteer. governor.

morris. lieutenant charles pinckney. colonel charles coatsworth. pinckney. lieutenant colonel. richard dobbs. speed. surgeon general. hugh williamson. and commanding general. george washington. you know, painters have often found it difficult to distinguish in their art arising from a setting sun during the course of these sessions, i have often observed the sun on the back of general washington's chair. given my hopes and fears for the success of our business at the convention, i also pondered the same question. but now, as i see what we have accomplished, i have the happiness to know that it is indeed a rising and not a setting sun. ultimately, of course, dr. franklin was right.

but the debates were far from over. on september 20th, three days after the signing ceremony, the constitution was delivered to the continental congress. in an attached letter, george washington, president of the convention, noted it was perhaps not to be expected that every state would fully approve of the constitution. he was right. the congress submitted the constitution to the states on september 28. at first all went well. delaware, new jersey and georgia ratified unanimously within three months. connecticut ratified in january 1788. and although pennsylvania had ratified in december 1787, opposed to the constitution did not subside, but rather led to riots in at which men had supported ratification, were burned in effigy. only after john hancock and sam adams had been won over to the

cause did massachusetts narrowly ratify by a vote of 187 to 168. maryland ratified in april 1788. south carolina the following month on june 21st, 1788. new hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the constitution, thus triggering the formation of the union. shortly thereafter, virginia ratified by a vote of 89 to 79. in july, by a narrow margin of only 30 to 27, new york ratified both north carolina and rhode island ratified the constitution. only after the new government had been set up. north carolina. in november 1789, rhode island. after rejecting ratification 13 times. finally approved by a vote of 34 to 32 in may 1790.

altogether, as many as 145 amendments were proposed by the states. congress approved 12 and recommended them to the states for ratification. the last ten of these 12 were accepted by the states and became on 15th december 1791. what is now known as the american bill of rights. we have seen how the framers of the constitution divided control of the army between the president and the congress. records of the conventions suggest very little, if any, discussion took place regarding the judiciary and the army. major clevenger addressed this issue in a recent interview with senior judge arthur j. stanley jr of the us district court for the district of kansas. judge stanley, would you comment on how the judicial theory relates to the army under the constitution? well, first of all, it constitution gives the congress the response ability for regulating and disciplining the army. congress establishes a military

court system, defines military offenses, and prescribes the punishments. of course, congress has delegated much of this authority to the president as commander in chief. it seems that control of the army is divided between only two branches of government. the judiciary has very little to do. the army, in many respect? that's correct. the court knows that the military is a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from civilian society. judge stanley pointed out that as citizens, soldiers enjoyed many constitutional guarantees, including the right to challenge courts martial. if constitutional issues are at stake, judge stanley noted, however, that there are instances such as barracks inspections, where accomplished men of military mission take precedence over personal privacy. what about other legal issues dealing with the army and the constitution? i have in mind, sir,

specifically the war powers act and control of the national guard. well, these issues not only deep historical words, but they are also alive and well today. the judiciary role is one of interpretation of the law. it's here that the courts perform their most important constitutional function. in fact, through the years, the constitutionality of various military related questions had been and probably always will be decided in the court. i believe this is further proof that our constitution is a living document. yes, the constitution is a living document born of the need to strike a balance between the freedoms our forefathers had come to expect as their natural right and the need to set up a strong central government that was both enlightened and efficient. the provisions of the constitution that we have paid

particular attention to have been those dealing with the establishment of the army. the delegates here in philadelphia during the summer of 1787 laid the groundwork for a combination of militia. our modern national guard and a regular professional army. our history has demonstrated that a popular democratic government and a professional standing army can be mutually supportive throughout the last 200 years. the constitu nation has been subjected to many trials. its provisions for the armed forces to insure domestic tranquility and provide for the common defense have played an important role in the constitutions. passing the test of time. it is this wonderful document, the constitu portion of the united states of america that we soldiers swear to uphold and defend.