up next, a look at the top global threat with the direction of national intelligence avril haines and the defense intelligence agency director, lieutenant general scott berrier. they testified regarding foreign intelligence surveillance, the ongoing

russia ukraine war, u.s. competition with china, and other emerging threats. this hearing is about two and a half hours. along with the select television providers giving you a front row seat to democracy's interests. >> next look at the top global trends with the director of intelligence defense intelligence agency director lieutenant general perry. they testified before the senate armed service committee about foreign intelligence surveillance and ongoing project ukraine more, u.s. competition with china and other emerging threats. the hearing is about two and a half hours. good morning. before we begin today, i would like to take a moment to acknowledge the passing of general stewart this past weekend. general stewart was an inspiring, trail blazing marine who served the nation with honor for more than two decades. rising from a --

all the way to director of the senate intelligence agency. he committed himself entirely to the defense of our nation, and his leadership will continue to be felt throughout the marine corps and the dia for years to come. my thoughts are with his wife phyllis and his children and family. now, turn into today's hearing, the committee meets to receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing united states and our international partners. i'd like to welcome the director of national intelligence, avril haines. and the defense intelligence agency director, lieutenant general scott berrier. think you both for joining us. please convey the committee's gratitude to the men and women of the intelligence community for their critical work. as the dni's annual threat assessment makes clear, the united states faces threats for a number of state and non state actors. as well as health and environmental security challenges. among these wide-ranging issues there is a common understanding that the future of our national security is tied to the success

of a strategic competition with china. this competition is occurring across every field of national power, military, economic, political, technological, and more. and across every region of the world. for several decades, the people's liberation army has -- and focused his efforts on counting our advantages. has invested in all technologies like anti-access and intel and i'll systems, artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and of course, nuclear weapons. further, the prc has leverage the competition of military and civil -- against its neighbors, including statecraft, economic pressure, coercion, and to section. beijing -- to achieve its national objectives while avoiding a direct confrontation with the united states military. as the defense department's new joint concept of competing puts it, -- to win without fighting. the strategy warns that if we do not adapt our approach to compete more effectively, the

united states risks seedings to check influence, advantage, and leverage while preparing for a war that never occurs. indeed, the document warns that the u.s. could lose without fighting. just as chinese leaders have stated, we -- with that in mind, i would ask our witnesses for their assessment of how china has evolved and they're competitive strategies and objectives. i would also appreciate an update on what military and non-military -- most likely to impact chinese decision-making with respect to the potential coercive action against taiwan and our other regional partners. even as we compete with china, we must address russia's violent destabilizing activities. the ukrainians have fought with incredible courage and skill to repel russia's assault, defending the same values and freedom that we cherish. ukraine is achieving notable successes, but there is hard work ahead. let there be no doubt that the united states will continue to

help ukraine succeed on the battlefield. america's assistance to ukraine is also an investment in our own national security. i want to commend the leaders of the intelligence community for their skill full release of intelligence throughout this conference. it has routinely expose russia's intentions and aided ukraine's war fighters. intelligence facials are understandably cautious about revealing hard-won insight on adversaries, but this strategy has proven highly effective in strengthening the international community's response and creating dilemmas for putin. this is a great example of competing effectively in the information domain, and i hope we will continue to make use of this kind of creative war craft. with that in mind, russia's initial strategy in ukraine was a failure, and it seems to be changing. director haynes, general barrier, i would ask or suspend of the ukraine conflict in the larger context of the evolving international order. i hope you will also address the extent to which russia and

china are aligning under this so-called lip no limits partnership, and the potential implications to u.s. national security. finally, nations like iran and north korea continued to push the boundaries of military brinkmanship and issues like terrorism and -- remain persistent. iran has made concerning advances, and is reportedly seeking russia's help to make even further gains. its proxies continue to mount -- throughout the middle east, including against bases in iraq and syria, with the u.s. military presence. north korea has conducted nearly two dozen missile tests this year including icbm and has reportedly stopped its routine military communication with south korea. i understand it's the intelligence community's view that climate change will continue to exacerbate risk to u.s. national security, as issues like rising temperatures, pollution, changing precipitation patterns, and other climate effects, are

likely to lead to an array of human challenges such as food and water and security, and threats to human health. i would appreciate our witnesses perspectives on each of these complex elements. thank you again for your participation, and i look forward to your testimony. as a reminder, for my colleagues, there will be a closed session immediately following this hearing in room sbc to 17, now let me turn to the ranking members. >> thank you, mister chairman. i want to congratulate you on your statements concerning the threat we see from china and russia. and i also want to join you in observing and memorializing the life of general vincent stewart and his untimely death. and i want to thank our witnesses for being here today. it comes at a pivotal time. the u.s. is confronted with the most complex and dangerous global security environment

since the second world war. our adversaries are growing in their military capabilities and engaging in provocative and destabilizing behavior across the spectrum of competition and conflict. they are actively trying to displace the united states as the global leader and we can long-standing and critical alliances and partnerships. we are at an inflection point. the decisions we make this year will have far reaching implications for the united states military, whether it is properly positioned, and equipped to deter our adversaries, and if necessary, to defeat them in conflict. regrettably, the president's budget request lacks urgency. this will require us and fails to make the necessary investments in our nation's defense, for the third year in a row, the budget request cuts to defense spending. make no mistake, our adversaries are taking notice, and i do believe on a bipartisan basis, we will

rectify this failure. our foremost adversary is the chinese communist party, they are in the midst of an unprecedented buildup of their conventional, strategic, and asymmetric military capabilities under the direction of its most powerful and ruthless leader since chairman now. at the same time, vladimir putin's brutal and unprovoked attack against ukraine has entered its second year, and has upended global security, caused untold loss of life, and further isolated his autocratic regime. now, it's not the time to question our commitment to our ukrainian partners, to protect u.s. interests, we need to provide ukraine with the tools it needs to bring this war to a successful conclusion. not to be outdone, north korea may now possess enough missiles to overwhelm our homeland missile defenses. iran inches closer to developing a nuclear weapon of its own, while it continues to sow chaos across the middle east through its terrorist proxy network.

additionally, president biden's disastrous and chaotic withdrawal from afghanistan has emboldened terrorist networks around the world. i.s.i.s. and al-qaeda affiliates across the middle east, africa, and south asia are reconstituting their capabilities, and remain intent on killing americans. i remain deeply disturbed by the scope and severity of the recent disclosure of classified materials, and the impacts such disclosure has on military operations and intelligence collection, and cooperation with allies. although i understand multiple investigations are ongoing, i expect this committee will be kept fully informed as details come available and as corrective actions are taken. this committee deserves answers on how such a junior service member in a support role was able to access, print, and post online highly classified documents for over a year without detection. for over a year. we need to understand whether

the department of defense is insider threat and security procedures failed, or simply were not followed. again, i think the witnesses for being here, and thank you, mister chairman, and i look forward to a very important discussion. >> thank you senator. let me now recognize director haines. >> thank you very much, chairman reed -- >> could you bring the microphone as close as possible? >> is that better? >> that is. >> sorry about that. thank you very much for your kind words about general stewart, who really was just an extraordinary leader in the intelligence community, and someone who is -- who has inspired a lot of our folks over the year, and brings together integrity and skill in a way that is rare and extraordinary. thank you for the opportunity to be here today, alongside my wonderful colleague, lieutenant general scott berrier, and for your support of the intelligence community who serve our country. i'm grateful for the opportunity to present this

annual threat assessment, and would like to acknowledge the many people who have contributed to this work. from the collect, out to the analyst, to everyone in between. this assessment is a product of their efforts, and they have our gratitude. this year's report notes that during the coming years, the united states and its allies will face an international security environment dominated by two strategic challenges, that intersects with each other, and existing friends, to intensify their national security. first, great powers, rising regional powers, and evolving it rays of non state actors are vying for influence and impact of the international system, including over the standards and rules that will shape the global order for decades to come. and second, challenges that transcend borders, including transnational criminal activity, climate change, health and human security, and economic need made worse by energy and food insecurity, as well as russia's invasion of ukraine. these are intensifying as the planet emerges from the covid-19 pandemic. and further compounding this

dynamic is the impact of rapidly emerging technology -- governance, economies, communities around the world. the intersection of these challenges underscored the importance of working together with partners and allies to address the threats we face, and how critical it is to counter efforts to -- principles and mechanisms, that promote and underpin transnational cooperation. which is an implicit theme in this year's threat assessment. the report starts with the people's republic of china, as it is increasingly challenged in the united states economically, technologically, politically, militarily, and from an intelligence standpoint, around the world. often most of my time on china and, russia among our top priorities, and focus on updating our views, rather than repeating what's in the annual threat assessment. we assess that the chinese communist party, or ccp, under president xi jinping will continue efforts over the next year to achieve xi's vision of making china the preeminent power in east asia, and a major

power on the world stage. what is perhaps most concerning is that the ccp is increasingly convinced that it could only fulfill xi's vision at the expense of u.s. power and influence, and throw tools of coercion, using demonstrations of strength, as well as economic and political coercion, to compel governments to acquiesce to the ccp preferences. including the land, sea, and air claims in the region and its assertions of sovereignty over taiwan, and the relationship between united states and china. this relationship has consequently become more challenging. she's public reference to americas suppression of china in march of this year reflects his long-standing distrust of u.s. goals, and his belief that the united states seeks to contain china. his speech was the most public and direct criticism that we have seen from him to date, and probably reflects growing pessimism in beijing about china's relationship with the united states, as well as his growing worries about the trajectory of china's domestic economic development and indigenous technology

innovation, which he now seeks to blame on the united states. even as the rhetoric has become more heated, we continue to assess that beijing wants to preserve stability and avoid triggering additional technology restrictions or sanctions from the united states and our partners. they seek to narrow the gap in their economic and technological competition with us, perceiving the u.s. as a threat. the prc seeks to undercut u.s. influence and is looking to portray the united states as the root of global problems. china seeks to divide us from our allies and partners, frame u.s. actions as provocations that provided bases for planned prc aggression, which they then can claim are simply responses, such as china's expansion of its military presence surrounding taiwan, which the prc asserted was in response to president tsai's recent transit to the united states, as well as her meetings with two speakers of the house over the past year. and china's leaders are focused

on spurring domestic economic growth this year. but in the long run, spurring indigenous technology innovation is paramount. president xi remains confident that beijing can innovate its way to the technological frontier, regardless of u.s. and allied restrictions. and at doing so will give china that competitive advantage that is crucial to achieving his vision for china as a world power. nonetheless, we are likely to see more dissident messaging and action coming out of beijing, such as recent charm offensive by premier li chung, welcoming foreign direct investment as the china development forum juxtaposed against beijing's pressure on foreign firms and executives including investigations of u.s. firms and a clampdown on previous non sensitive data flows out of china. -- assesses that china's long term economic growth will continue to decelerate, because china's era of rapid catch up growth is ending, and structural issues such as debt, demographic,

equality, over reliance on investment, and inadequate domestic consumption, remain. and although the ccp may find ways to overcome its structural challenges over the long term, in the short term, it continues to take an increasingly aggressive approach to external affairs. often to bolster its domestic agenda. china's leaders are increasing their investment in a world-class military, expanding their countries's nuclear arsenal and cyber threat capacity, pursuing counter space weapons capable of targeting u.s. and allied satellites, forcing foreign companies and coercing foreign countries to allow the transfer of technology and intellectual property, in order to boost indigenous capabilities, continuing to increase what will supply jane dependencies with the possibility of using such dependencies to threaten and cut off foreign countries during a crisis. the ccp is also seeking to reshape global governance, in line with xi's preferences, and government standards that support the monopoly of power

than china, and expanding influence operations, including to the expert of digital repression technology. and furthermore, we've observed the expanding strategic ties between china and russia, as mentioned by the chairman, and other critical priorities for the eye -- which has been strengthened by the conflict in ukraine. we are now over a year into the war, which is reshaping not only russia's global relationship and strategic standing, but also our own. strengthening our alliances and partnerships and ways that the president -- president putin, almost certainly didn't anticipate. often precipitating the very events he hoped to avoid. such as finland's accession to nato and sweden's petition to join. while also increasing his leverage over putin. on the battlefield, the fighting is principally focused in the east around bakhmut and remains a brutally grinding war of attrition, in which neither military has a definitive advantage, with day-to-day fighting over hundreds of meters. russian forces gained less territory in april than during

any of the three previous months, as they appear to transition from offensive, to defensive operations, along the front lines. russian forces are facing significant shortfalls in munitions, and are under significant personnel constraints. but they continue to lay minefields and prepare new differences and positions in occupied ukrainian territory. both sides are focusing on preparations for a potential ukrainian counteroffensive this spring or summer, designed to push russia out of illegally annexed territory. the ukrainian armed forces are still finalizing these specific priorities, timing, and scale of the offensive in western assistance will be crucial in preparing the plans and forces. with the support of the congress, the u.s. is doing a great deal to bolster the ukraine's chances for success. but even if ukraine's counteroffensive is not fully successful, the russians are unlikely to be able to mount a significant offensive operation this year. in fact, if russia did not initiate a mandatory mobilization and secure

substantial third-party ammunition supplies, beyond the deliveries from iran and others, it will be increasingly challenging for them to sustain even modest offensive operations. at the same time, ukraine remains heavily dependent on external military aid, and would likely be unable to counter russia's natural man power and resource advantages if western military aid ceased. furthermore, while we continue to assess that putin most likely calculates that time works in his favor, and prolonging the war might be his best remaining pathway to eventually securing suffrage interest, we expect he has probably scaled back his immediate ambitions to consolidate control of the occupied territory in eastern and southern ukraine, and ensuring that ukraine will never become a nato ally. putin's willingness to consider negotiation pauses maybe based on his assessment that a pause would arrives -- provide a respite for russian force says as they try to

regain strength before resuming offensive operations at some point in the future, while buying time for what he hopes will be an erosion of western support for ukraine. yet he may be willing to claim, at least a temporary victory, based on the territory he is occupying. the challenges that even as putin may be scaling back his ambitions, the prospect for russian concessions to advance negotiations this year will be low, unless domestic political vulnerability is altered. and of course, as the conflict continues, the human toll is only getting worse. in addition to the many tens of thousands of casualties cash suffered by ukrainian and russian military, more than 8 million people have been forced to flee ukraine since russia invaded. moreover, in addition to moscow 's continued assault on the civilian infrastructure, there is widespread reporting of atrocities committed by russian forces. russia and its proxy groups are using so-called filtration operations to detain and forcibly deport tens of

thousands of ukrainians civilians to russia. we are engaged with other parts of the government to document and hold russian actors accountable for their actions. moscow has suffered military losses that will require years of rebuilding, and leave it less capable of posing conventional military threat to europe and the global stage. as a result, russia will become even more reliant on asymmetric options such as nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities, and on china. our annual assessment also covers iran, north korea, the regional challenges we face, including in africa, where we've seen a recent outbreak of fighting in sudan, which is no stranger to conflict. the fighting in sudan, between the sudanese armed forces and the rapid support forces, is, we assess, likely to be protected. both sides believe they can win militarily, and a few incentives to come to the negotiating table. both sides are seeking external sources of support which, if successful, is likely to

intensify the conflict and create a greater potential for spillover challenges in the region. but even so, the fighting is exacerbating already dire humanitarian conditions in sudan, forcing relief organizations to curtail operations and raising the specter of massive refugee flows and aid needs in the region. even before the fighting started, roughly one third of population, or approximately 15.8 million people, required me insistence because of disease outbreaks, inflation, localized conflicts, internal displacement, and whether related food insecurity. and throughout the world, as i noted at the outset, state actor challenges we inventory are undermining our capacity to work together with our other countries to address what are utterly critical transnational threats such as climate change, public health challenges such as the current covid-19 pandemic, the threat from illicit drugs, terrorism, irregular migration. the for concluding, i want to raise with you a legislative authority to a fundamental importance to the intelligence

community and the work we do which will expire at the end of this year if congress does not act. i'm referring to section 702 of the foreign intelligence surveillance act, and i can tell you without hesitation but section 702 was relied upon and gathering some of the intelligence that formed basis of this assessment. as it is hard to overestimate the importance of this authority to our work. fisa section 702 allows the intelligence community to collect on the communication of specifically targeted foreign persons located outside of the u.s.. and in doing so, provides unique intelligence on foreign intelligence targets at the speed and reliability that we just simply cannot replicate any other authority. section 702 was originally enacted to enable the u.s. government to quickly collect on its on the communications of terrorist located abroad by allowing the icy to acquire foreign intelligence from non-u.s. people located outside of the united states, who are using u.s. electronic communication service providers.

and 702 is still vital to our counterterrorism mission, but now it is also principally relied upon for key insights across a range of our highest priority threats. in fact, it has been used to acquire information and protect against a series of conventional and cyberattacks posed by china, russia, iran, and north korea. i can tell you several to acquired information that enable the u.s. to gain insight into the prc's efforts to monitor, track, and persecute shiny's nationals believed to be dissidents. several to acquire information that is also been used to identify multiple ransom attacks, against u.s. critical infrastructure, allowing the u.s. government to respond to, mitigate, and in some cases, prevent attack. seven up to acquired information has been used to prevent components for weapons of mass destruction from reaching foreign actors, and 702 acquired information has resulted in the identification and destruction of hostile foreign actors attempting to recruit spies or send operatives to the u.s.. i realize that 702 is a powerful authority, and it's incumbent on all of us in the

intelligence community, to ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of americans are built into its design and implementation at every level. over the last many years, we have significantly expanded oversight and dedicated resources to compliance, in order to do just that, and we welcome the opportunity to help you understand better, the oversight framework we've built as we work to authorize its critical authority. thank you so much for your patience, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, director haines, lieutenant general scott berrier please. >> thank you for the opportunity to discuss the ice assessment of the global security environment. before i began, i too would like to take a moment to recognize and honor lieutenant

general vin stewart. director pence plan passed away in his sleep last friday. we lost a giant, an intellectual giant, a trail blazer, and a really good friend. vince with a gifted and talented marine intelligence officer who led positively and touch the lives of many in every organization he served in or lead. we mourn his loss, we grave with his family, and we honor his memory. i'm pleased to join director haines today to discuss the complex threat landscape and our work to provide timely, insightful, and rigorous intelligence. we are transforming our approach to meet threats to our nation posed by strategic competition with china, russia, and other foreign nations with your continued support. we will continue to excel and all source analysis, commit and technical collection, open source collection, material exploitation, modeling, and simulations, and other unique mission sets. this will most likely be my last time testifying before

this committee, as a push by 39th year of service in our army, and pending retirement. it's become somewhat reflective -- i become somewhat reflective on how the threat landscape has changed. in 1984, it was a bipolar world, u.s. and our partners at a cold war with the ussr. my first assignment, i served as an infantry giant intelligence officer or an s to in alaska. one of our patients was to protect critical infrastructure in the high north from us that snow as attack. my 23-year-old self didn't think much of that mission at the time, it wasn't exciting, but in retrospect, it was an important mission then and protecting critical infrastructure is a really important mission. today, the difference in the threat landscape is exponentially more dangerous than it was in 1984. we are now in a multi polar world with acidic competition at the forefront. the events of the past year clearly demonstrated our competitors are emboldened and they are tempting to forcefully recast the rules based international order and challenge u.s. interests. from russia's unprovoked and unjustified, full scale invasion of ukraine, to china's military assertiveness in the indo-pacific region, to an unprecedented number of north korean missile launches, to

iranian directed action against u.s. forces in the middle east. the united states now faces a multi faceted security environment in which authoritarian regimes are testing our resolve through their provocative military actions, developing capabilities to hold the homeland at risk, and showing greater risk tolerance for potential escalation. like you, i am very concerned about ongoing threats from china, russia, north korea, iran, and violent extremist organizations. china is our biggest challenge and our top priority. beijing is expanding and stepping up its campaign against taiwan, as observed by a sharply increased rhetoric and military activity over the last year. she jinping's detain obtainment of a third term -- and operational goals that will challenge the u.s. during the next year and beyond. the war in ukraine is also a priority for us. the new look army is gone, and

in my view, we are at a particularly dangerous place with russia. putin is not seeking an off ramp, and moscow has asserted publicly that remains committed to achieving its objectives in ukraine through military force. china and russia are seeking to incorporate advanced technology to erode our advantages, china is pursuing a whole nation approach to technology development, and the pla believes that integrating a, iantha will constitute a major revolution in military affairs. as director, i have pressed us to up our game, and transform our missions to meet company needs and address unprecedented challenges in national security. transformation and change our imperative, and i am pleased that the eye is making real world progress on our mission sets. we have exceptional expertise, responsibilities, and missions that you trust us to lead. and as such, foundational military intelligence, human intelligence, measurement, and signature intelligence --

our strategic, operational, and tactical defense fighters, defense fighters, policy makers, and the acquisition community, and i look forward to discussing real world examples of our progress. one final area i would like to highlight is the workforce of the d i. as you know, our workforce spans the globe, and these talented and dedicated experts are making drives to defend the rights and our allies. from our defense attachés, two analysts, two collectors, two are enabling force, these professionals are mission focused and working tirelessly behind the scenes for our nation. the d.i. is investing in the workforce and the infrastructure that supports their behind the scenes work, bringing together talented officers with experiences and giving them the tools and authorities to conduct investigations, investing in our people is a critical step to modernizing the next generation of intelligence capabilities. i'm proud to represent a workforce that provides intelligence on foreign actors to prevent and win wars and to

illuminate opportunities to enable the united states to outpace our strategic competitors. i welcome your questions on the global threat environment, and thank you for your continued support. and the opportunity to testify today. >> thank you very much. thank you both for your detailed testimonies. director haines, secretary yellen indicated that we will exceed the debt limit by june 1st requiring action before then. have -- has the intelligence community assessed the international consequences of defaulting on our debt? high deb t.>> thank you, chairman. we don't have certainty on the outcome of the financial markets, in our opinions, the economic and political leadership that might be effected by a default on the debt. but i would say that what our assessment is is that regardless of its duration, of the default duration, almost certainly it would create global uncertainty.

uncertainty about the value of the u.s. dollar and u.s. institutions and leadership, leading to volatility in markets that are priced in dollars. and that's basically as far as our analysts are able to provide. >> i have a follow-up, and you might want to take this -- as well, but our adversaries, i presume, would want to exploit any type of difficulty that we have, do we have any indication that china in particular is preparing for exploitation of this through disinformation in the united states or through financial, or other moves? >> i don't have any information that suggest that they are planning for that, but i do think our analysts would agree with you that it would be almost a certainty that they would look to take advantage of the opportunity, and they generally >> would look to

perceive -- such as an event as demonstrated -- not capable of functioning as a democracy, and sort of the governance issues associated with it. they've done that on a range of things. >> thank you. general scott berrier -- he indicated that russia remains a formidable force, despite their significant losses in personnel in ukraine. because the air, maritime, cyberspace, forces have not really been committed to that. what is d.i. this a segment? >> very similar, still an ex central threat with a nuclear arsenal they have. general tivoli is correct, they are strategic forces have largely been untested here and are still formidable. >> the significant

redistribution of our forces out of europe would still be a challenge, because of their existing capacities? >> i think from a deterrence standpoint, russia fears strength. even though they are ground forces are degraded right now, they will quickly build those backup. >> and director haines, as i said in my statement, the intelligence community has done some remarkable work with respect to russia and ukraine, by exposing the activities that russian people were complicating -- contemplating, not only embarrassing them, but frustrating their abilities to do it. are we ready to use that same approach to other adversaries, such as china, in terms of strategically using intelligence to disrupt their operations? >> thank, you sir. i think we can talk about this in close session a bit more,

but as a general matter, we have learned some techniques and mechanisms that will not be forgotten coming out of the conflict with ukraine, that i think we can deploy in other scenarios, which have allowed us to do more sharing, and downgrading the information. working as a team across the i-sea to try and preserve sources and methods. i think we will look to do that. but what will be more challenging, in different areas, depending on what the sources and methods are, and how we can manage that concern as we move forward. >> just quickly, for both of you, we've had this incident with the international -- four, that's noted. this isn't really new. we thought, and we think, every time this happens, we put in place things like heatstroke logging, more restriction controls. but we still are having

problems. quickly, director haines, what can we do to make sure we have more appropriate controls? >> yeah, thank you, sir. it's been absolutely, extremely frustrating, obviously, and demoralizing, for folks in the intelligence community who work so hard, frankly, to put together the kind of intelligence that then gets disclosed and leaked. and the damage that it does to our national security is just unacceptable. on every level, obviously. i appreciate their support. what i could tell you at this stage is only an interim answer, because we are still getting the information from the investigation, as to what exactly happened. and to understand that is obviously then to have greater competence -- and confidence in saying things we are doing are making a difference, ensuring this doesn't happen again. right now, what we are doing, is looking to ensure that we, in fact, have the best user activity monitoring, other techniques we use, that we are

scrubbing and reviewing our processes for ensuring there is only information provided on a need to know basis. when there are user privileges, that they are properly granted, that we have additional controls around these issues. and we can obviously talk this more in closed session. >> senator worker please. >> thank you mister chairman, director haines i don't want to get into a lot of discussion about the debt limit, but it is a fact that the house of representatives has passed a bill that would raise the debt limit, if it were passed by the senate and signed into law by the president, a default would be avoided, that is correct, is it not? >> sir, i will confess that i am not tracking the ups and downs of this, but i'm absolutely sure you are right. >> i think i am right. i just wanted to point that out. house has done its work. the senate now needs to pass the bill and get it to the president's desk. but let me ask you this,

director haines, the general said, since he was a young officer, the threat has changed. the threat has exponentially increased. do you agree that this is the most complex and dangerous threat environment since world war ii? and i'll ask that to both of you. >> director hands first? >> sure, thank you sir. i feel as though you always feel as if the time that you're in the most complex and challenging. i do feel that way. but i am a little bit conscious of the cognitive bias that associated with that. but i think as our annual threat assessment -- >> well this is a very complex and dangerous threat environment, is it not? >> i -- >> general, is this the most complex and dangerous threat

environment since world war ii? >> senator, i believe it is. when you consider the advances in technology, precision of weapons, globalization, information. the rise of china along with what russia has been up to, and then you consider dangerous regional actors like iran, north korea, and the continued threat of violence, extremist organizations. it seems like the most complex -- >> and do you then agree, general, that the authorization bill, and the appropriations bill, that congress passed this year, should represent acting accordingly to address this greatest threat? >> senator, there is a threat there. i support the president's budget, and i'll just leave it there. >> okay. i think that's that answer. it speaks loudly. china, give us a figure

lieutenant general mr. berrier, about how much they spend. they say -- billion dollars annually. do you agree that they spend significantly more on military than they admit? and what's your best estimate of how much their annual defense spending is? >> senator, there are a number of factors that go into an estimate, i'd be more comfortable in a closed session discussing that. >> and director haines i guess you also don't want to discuss that publicly? let's then let both of you discuss what this ukraine war has done to russia's military capability. not only today, but over the next 10 to 15 years. >> a number of factor as well, i think just the combat losses, i spoke about this -- the reorganization that the russian military took in the early 2000s meant that they

would be better, faster, smaller from what they were in the soviet era. at that army largely is gone. and they are resigned -- relying on reserves and reserve equipment, older soviet stuff. it's going to take them a while to build back to more advanced kits, it goes from 5 to 10 years in estimates based on how sanctions affect them and their ability to put technology back into their force. they got a setback on the ground forces. but still very capable. >> director haines, the next 10 to 15 years, based on what has happened to the russian conventional military capabilities so far? >> i absolutely agree with the lieutenant general. unanimity in the intelligence community -- i will take -- it will take years for the russians to build back up their ground forces. they've really significantly degraded them. but they nevertheless have, as indicated, strategic forces, other forces. that doesn't mean they aren't a powerful military force. >> okay, well let me just say

this with regard to my previous question. there is an unclassified department of defense annual military power report, that's not secret, it doesn't need to be. it stays that china is, quote, actual military limit spending is likely significantly higher than what it states in its official budget. unquote. you don't disagree with that, do you? >> i think one aspect is the civil, military fusion that we see in china. so much of their civilian industries actually adapted and used by their military. when you consider that it's as ignorant boost. >> thank you very much. senator shaheen please. >> thank you both for being here, and for your service to the country. director haines, i want to go back to your comments but the

702 reauthorization, because i returned from -- along with a number of my colleagues, including senator budd, we've returned from south america police go, where we visited for countries. the 702 came up, or at least the ability of the intel community to use those authorizations to address the challenges facing the country, and i was particularly interested in that count of counter-narcotics efforts. because we continue to have a huge issue in new hampshire with the opioid epidemic. >> those authorities are very important, but there are also some very real concerns about privacy. can you speak to how important it is for these authorities to help us continue with counter-narcotics efforts and

also what we are doing in terms of addressing the privacy concerns? >> absolutely, senator. i think this is one of the challenges for us in the intelligence community. frankly, trying to declassify examples of how it is that we've used seven up to, so the public has a better understanding of the value of this authority, and the collection that we have. i'll say, as a general matter, it has been an important authority for -- in the context of -- narcotics trafficking, and in many respects, used to help support our foreign partners in introduction, as a general matter. and that is something that has been critical. in terms of the privacy and civil liberties, pieces of this, what i would say is -- we have a number of things that we do in order to try to monitor and assess our compliance, and then to

ultimately design the system in such a way as to incentivize and promote compliance, making it, in other words, technically hard to do things that are noncompliant. and then ultimately, have increased extraordinary investments into training, who would use the system. making adjustments as we go through the process. we see something go, wrong and we actually address it, and we try to hold people accountable in the context of any compliance -- just to give you a couple of things, on an annual basis, the entire program is reviewed and re-certified by the foreign intelligence court. as one piece. also, we do semiannual compliance reports to congress, we have a joint, 60 day review, my office and the department of justice, of targeting decisions of any u.s. person -- through the database that

exists, and dissemination. we have targeting and minimization procedures for each element, that are not just reviewed by the attorney general, but go to the fisk court. again, we go through a variety of ways in which to try to ensure that we've created an effective virtue cycle, where we can ensure that everything that we are doing is, in fact, promoting compliance. and then monitoring it to see if that's, in fact, what's happening, and then addressing challenges as they come and move forward. and then we also have been providing reports, publicly, about noncompliance instances, so we can show the american people we can have all new and your constituents look at what's happening, and see where we made progress, we make mistakes, how we address it, and then how we move forward on it so we can actually build the trust that's necessary. thank you. >> thank you. you both mentioned cyber -- i think you did, in your remarks. but i didn't hear either of you talk about the efforts to

address disinformation. and one of the places where our adversaries have certainly been very effective -- i think, more effective than we have been in responding, in many cases, has been in the disinformation arena. can you speak to what we're doing, and how were coordinating with other operations, like the global engagement -- and state department? >> sure, i'll start, and lieutenant general if you want to add? congress put into law, that we should establish a -- influence center in the intelligence community. we have stood that up. and it encompasses our election threat executive work, essentially, looking at foreign influence in interference and elections. but it also deals with this information more generally. and what we have been doing is effectively trying to support the global engagement center, others throughout the u.s.

government in helping them to understand what are the plans and intentions of the key actors in this space. china, russia, other -- iran, et cetera. and then give them a sense of what it is that we are seeing in terms of techniques they use, how they go about this, and provide that for policymakers so they are able to take that information and hopefully counter it, and address it. thank you. >> i think the d.i.'s perspective is speed. we want to be able to attack that with our open source collection capability, working with our combatant and command partners, happening all over the world. debility to turn something quickly with them, under the right authorities, to counter that disinformation. >> thank you both. >> thank you. >> thank you mister chairman, thank you both for being here today. director hands, last year you testified that, quote, china will continue to essentially

expand their nuclear arsenal and diversification for a period of time, and quote. has that assessment changed, or does the intelligence community still maintain it? >> that assessment has not changed. >> and in public reports, we've seen that the cia has assessed that china will deploy 1500 -- by 2035. -- commander, general cotton, has also publicly confirmed that u.s. -- china has now surpassed the united states in the number of fixed and mobile land base -- for i b.c. am. general, do you agree with that assessment still? >> i do. >> thank you. director haynes, does the intelligence community assess that china has any interest in pursuing arms control agreements that would restrict their development of nuclear

weapons? >> no, as a general matter, we have not -- expressed interest in arms control agreements in this area. >> and general barrier, we've seen reports that russia is providing china with plutonium for chinese -- reactors. in fact, it was reported by a uk think tank, they noted that between september and december of 2022, russia provided seven times more highly enriched uranium to china than the united states, and the international atomic energy agency have secured over the past 30 years. what are the implications of that increased level of cooperation of their nuclear programs? >> the layers of cooperation between china and russia go very very deep. i cannot speak to the specifics of the iranian aspect of, that is true. it's a acceleration of programs and development in technology

transfer. >> and director haines, did you've anything to add? >> no. >> is there any movement within the administration to look at, first of all, to set up agreements, again, with russia, and is there any -- i would say, false hope, by this administration, to believe they could pull in russia, let alone try to pull in china in those talks? >> i couldn't speak to that. it's obviously in the policy community, and i'm not sure i would know, frankly, what it is that they are looking at. >> okay, thank you. also, director haynes, looking at afghanistan. do you access that i.s.i.s. still seeks to conduct external operations against the u.s., our forces, allies, and partners? >> yes. >> do you agree with the assessment that we had in march, from general corolla, about how

long it would take ices to generate capability to conduct, external operations? he told us at that time that any operation between -- or against the united states and western interests abroad could have happened within six months with little or no warning, would you agree with that? >> i have to take that back, to be honest. there's been a number of developments since general koalas apparently testified on this issue of keeping out key external optics within i.s.i.s.. and i think that might affect the timeline. but i'm happy to take that for the record. >> do you feel we've lost information gathering capabilities, and also cte operations in afghanistan, since our withdrawal? >> we certainly, the intelligence community, has been clear about the fact that we are not able to collect as

much information today as we were able to when the troops were in afghanistan. >> how would you, i guess, rate the amount of intelligence that we are able to gather in afghanistan? because it's my understanding of our cte operations arm, basically nail, we are looking at hardly anybody on the ground. no one to help. so how do you rate what we are able to get, when we are looking at a threat against not just the united states interests in persons, but also our western allies, of growing threats we are facing? >> to be specific, we have to do this, i think, in closed session. but as a general matter, what we sought to do is to try to -- i'm trying to think how did this in an unclassified way. but develop enough collection opportunities so we can monitor the threat.

it's definitely, as you indicated, degraded from what we's had previously. and we can discuss the details. >> thank you, thank you mister chairman. >> thank you senator fischer, senator gilbert, please. >> director haines, the d.i.o. d and the icy our gauge and cyber operations every day, and gain intelligence about how these adversaries operate and intend to operate in the cyber domain. however, in the event of a large-scale cyber attack on the homeland, -- is in the leading role. how much of your intelligence, for example, in the prc cyber threat, are you able to share with this organization, and how much -- ? >> we share almost everything with cisa, on a sly. they get our analysis on these issues, they see ron televisions. we have overlap in terms of intelligence that we get from commercial threat indexes and so on. it's quite open sharing in that

respect. >> and when will you rely on allies across the globe for operations and assistance, are we able to leverage our efforts with what we do with cisa, with those allies? >> yeah, it's a great question. in fact, we have talked to allies about, for example, recognizing that so much of the critical cyber threat information exists in the commercial sector because we are trying to see how it is that adversaries are attacking them. we have talked to allies about working together in order to obtain and leverage each other's commercial threat information, where that's permitted, based on the agreements that we've had with the commercial sector. and working with these to ensure they have access to information. that's an example of working with allies and partners in a way that can help better the

landscape and picture the need for the work that they do. >> >> in the event of a substantial cyberattack by china on our infrastructure, what with the chain of command looked like, in terms of defense and response? >> i think it would depend on, this is probably not the best question for, me but it would depend on where the response is being conducted and how they are -- the president is the final authority in any event, but how it would work through the system i suspect might -- >> on this question. >> nothing to add to that, ma'am. >> our government often talks about how our allies and partners are a strategic advantage from the perspective of china, russia, and iran, who are the -- building closer relationships with and how would building closer relationships with those countries impact regional deterrence? and as context, i took a trip

to the middle east to study the impact of the abraham accord, the uae on morocco and israel. with regard to that, obviously there was concern when saudi arabia decided to engage china in their negotiations with iran. what is the impact of being able to bring saudi arabia into the abraham accord in the context of a larger question? >> forgive, me i missed the very first part of your question. can you just repeat the first sentence? >> we often talk about how our allies and partners are our strategic advantage. from the perspective of china, russia, iran, who are they most concerned about? as an example, the abraham accord i think is a very strategic partnership for us

that should be seen as a very powerful and how did the recent efforts by china to negotiate with saudi arabia and iran a fact that strategic alliance and whether that was a powerful alliance we should have been pushing for. >> yeah. i think what our analysts would point to as a general matter would be a whole series of key countries that are sometimes referred to as hedging states and that are in the space between -- you indicated uae is an example of this in a sense. there may be other, is probably easier to talk about this in a closed session. but there are a variety of countries where in effect they are looking at the united states and china and russia on the other side, in effect, and

trying to diversify their relationship in a way that allows them to maximize their interests. while at the same time pursue a set of economic and other security strategies in each of these spaces. with saudi arabia in particular, i would say that the abraham force more generally, we do think there is been kind of a value of bringing these countries together under certain circumstances. and that that interaction has provided some security benefits to the united states and others. but i think, you know, each case would have to be looked at on a case by case basis to identify where some of the pros and cons are. i'm not sure that was very helpful. >> senator, i would say your question hits the bulls eye on

the discussion of strategic competition and what is -- we know china and russia are seeking partnerships with countries that have historically been u.s. partners. this is the nature of the changing landscape and the complexity of the environment i described in my opening statement. and we have to be there and we have to be a better solution, whether that's through the intelligence sharing or other partnerships. i don't think it's a lost cause. i think there's a lot we can. do i think people see the goodness in what the united states brings and we have to go forward without. >> thank, you senator. senator -- >> i want to extend my condolences to the family of general stewart, a trail blazer. i'm surprised -- nobody has raised the fact that russia is a government institution trying to assassinate president putin and the united states goaded him into it. that's kind of a big deal. big if true, as the kids say today. what do you have to say about these claims from russia's government?

>> obviously, you've seen the ukrainian government deny having engaged in this. at this stage, we don't have the information that would allow us to prevent an independent assessment on that. >> okay. general barrier? >> i think it gets after senator sheen, the information. >> some grounds maybe these claims are saturated. and we know that vladimir putin denies the kremlin all that much, is that correct? >> yes. >> the kremlin is not like the white house, in other words. it's not the primary residence of the president of russia. even if he were there, these videos don't appear to be the kind of size of weapons that could do significant damage to the kremlin. >> that's correct. >> also would be the kind of drones requiring relatively close strike control, which means someone on the ground in moscow ledges -- not a friendly city to people

hostile to the russian government, is that correct, general berrier? >> potentially from the photos i've seen, yes. the most attacks on russian soil have been ambiguous or solid about response to the attacks. in this case, they've explicitly disclaimed any responsibility. >> yes. >> i think you might have been on to something. sounds like misinformation. i want to move on to another matter, director haynes, about mexican drug cartels. they are causing now more deaths in america than we lost every year in the vietnam war. for every year in america, almost twice what we lost in the vietnam war due to fentanyl alone. has the committee produced a national intelligence estimate on the direct -- post to america? >> no we have not, sir. >> and i.e. is the most and

authoritative -- on national security matters, is that correct? >> it is authoritative. -- >> do you have any plans to produce on the threat the cartels posed to america? >> we do actually have something on our calendar that is on the transnational criminal organizations, including cartels. >> think you. i think that is warranted. i will look forward to seeing it. director haines, you mentioned earlier that it will take russia years to rebuild its ground forces. i believe you are saying that in agreement with general? berrier and general berrier, you believe it will take years for russia to rebuild its ground forces? >> i do. >> thank you. most intelligence agencies inaccurately judged the early days of the war. they thought russia would roll to kyiv very quickly and conquer most if not all of ukraine. general berrier, was that the result of agencies

underestimating in the ukrainians or overestimating the russians? >> i think it was a combination of both, senator. >> when you are making your own operational plans, you have to make assessments about the adversary, correct? >> correct. >> when you are operating at the national strategic level. it is fair to say based on the fact that we now know we overestimated russia's capabilities in february and we've seen their forces degraded to the point where it will take years to rebuild them, they are a much weaker fighting force than we thought 14 months ago. >> that is what we currently assess, yes. >> should an operational plans about a potential war with russia in europe then be changed to reflect that new understanding? >> i think in the purview of u.s. european command and the department -- they are looking at all, that senator. >> they need to urgently because one of the reasons we heard on this committee about the slow pace that would limit certain weapons is their operational plans.