for the very first time we're able to watch live coverage of the u.s. house of representatives on c-span. and to mark this very special occasion, shop our c-span 44th anniversary sale going on right now home at c-span shop dot org. use the promo code c-span 44 and save 15% site white on all our c-span products including apparel, accessories, home decor, and books. there's something for every c-span fan, and every purchase helps support our nonprofit operations. scan the code on the right to shop during c-span's 44th anniversary sale, now through thursday at c-span shop.org. >> up next, a discussion about the ongoing russia ukraine war. the top focuses on the liberation of the crimean peninsula and ukraine's military and humanitarian needs, from the hudson institute. it's about an hour.

good morning, ladies and gentlemen. thank you for joining us for this second and final panel discussion for our event today, looking at the situation in ukraine in 2023. we have a very distinguished and experienced panel today that i will be introducing in a moment. i just wanted to first though take an opportunity to thank the hudson events team and our tech team for their hard work putting together this event.

some were here over the weekend. if you ever want to stress out your tech guy, tell him you want to incorporate, as part of your event, a live stream with a commander on the frontlines of a war zone. that will do the job, but it all worked out. it all went off without a hitch. so i want to thank my hudson colleagues here for their hard work. [applause] the focus of this panel is on the military situation in 2023, and specifically crimea. as our soon to be speaker, ben hodges, has been saying crimea is, in his words, decisive terrain in this conflict. i would also say it's a decisive terrain in the great power competition that we face around the world. russia has used crimea as a springboard to launch its operations in places like libya and syria.

and of course, for as long as russia controls and illegally occupied crimea, ukraine will never be safe. that is why we are focusing specifically on this issue today in this final panel of this event. i will introduce the three speakers. then we will go do the rounds and then we can open it up to q and a. our first speaker will be lieutenant general retired ben hodges. he really needs no introduction. former commanding general of u.s. army europe and currently now senior adviser at human rights first, which is a leading international human rights organization that has been around since i believe the late 70s. i think 70 or 79 that it was founded. our second speaker is maria tomak, she is the head of the crimea platform department at the mission of the president of ukraine in the autonomous republic of crimea.

maria has been, before taking on this role, maria has had a very distinguished and courageous career focusing on human rights and documenting evidence of russia's war crimes and crimes against humanity. in her current role, she's focused, laser-like focus, on the situation in crimea. then last but not least, my dear colleague bryan clark, who's a senior fellow at the director of the center for defense concepts and technology. at the hudson institute. brian and his team have done amazing work analyzing some of the more technical aspects of the war in ukraine, analyzing what platforms are needed, what systems are needed, really focused on the capability the ukrainians need. oftentimes we talk in terms of

the equipment platform names like patriot or abrams, but his team and him dive deeper and talk about what capability needs to be delivered to ukraine, and how to best get it to ukraine. with that, i will kick it off with ben. thank you for joining us, ben, live from germany. during your very, very busy schedule this week. >> thank you, and i'm grateful for the opportunity. you've already said the most important thing, that crimea is decisive. the donbas is important, but if crimean forces were to liberate all of donbas right now, that would not necessarily change the outcome of the conflict for the long term future. crimea will, and i think if ukraine is able to liberate crimea, which is feasible this year, by the end of this summer in fact, if we do certain things then donbas will follow.

why do i think crimea is decisive? obviously, as long as russian forces occupied crimea it will be able to use it as a launching pad for their next attack. so there's some sort of peace settlement or agreement where russia was allowed to keep crimea, then ukraine would never be safe because russia would be able to use their black sea fleet, their air force, the logistics, other things. it would be a place from which they would start their next iteration of this war. that is surely what they will do. they will wait for us to lose interest over two or three years, repair their mistakes and things they did wrong, and then it will be game on again. so that is part of the reason i think it's decisive. it's also decisive, and by the way because we have not given ukraine anything with the range beyond 90 kilometers, the rockets fired from himars, crimea is in fact a sanctuary for russian forces even today.

it's also decisive because i think it would be impossible for ukraine to rebuild its economy as long as russia controls crimea. obviously, they would not allow ukrainian vessels to go in and out of the azov sea, so even if mariupol is liberated, and it will eventually be liberated, russia will control the access to the azov sea just like they did in 2019 when they intercepted a type three ukrainian navy vessel attempting to head towards the kerch strait. so that part of ukraine's economy will never get going again, and of course it's an economy that depends on the export of grain, iron or, rare earth materials and so on. then of course odessa, already there are more than 100 ships

loaded with grain in and around odessa waiting to go through the straits, that they can't because of the russian black sea fleet and and this agreement that's in place requiring russian inspectors to approve each vessel before it can go. so this is only possible because of russia's ability to operate out of sevastopol. russia will continue to lay claims for exclusive economic zone around crimea, which means ukraine would not be able to explore or exploit the gas reserves that we all know are underneath the black sea. so decisive for those reasons. that's why it's impossible to imagine any sort of scenario where russia is allowed to keep, i should not say that way, i cannot imagine that we would want ukraine to have to accept crimea as belonging to russia in any sort of the

circumstances. now, what do we do about that? first of all, we've got to get clarity on what our strategic objectives are for this conflict. there's still so many senior people, including our own vice president, when the security conference said we will stick with ukraine for as long as it takes. what does that mean? what is it? we've got to hear from the president, the vice president, the secretary of defense and state, and our strategic objective is for ukraine to win. what does win mean? total restoration of all of ukrainian sovereign territory. and of course, immediately someone would say to that mean crimea? well yes, it's like florida's part of america. bavaria is part of germany. so you have to deal with this mindset but people think somehow crimea has a special sort of status.

it doesn't, it's part of ukraine. so winning means all sovereignty of all ukrainian territory. it also means bringing back the thousands of ukrainian children who have been deported, to bring them back home. it means accountability for russian war crimes. it means an ironclad security guarantee. biden is going to invest in a martial plan, if there is not an ironclad security guarantee, for ukraine. that means as long as russia occupies crimea, there will not be a martial plan. there will be no serious investment in ukraine as long as russia occupies crimea. that's a problem not only for ukraine, that's a problem for europe because that means 4 million or more refugees will continue to live in germany and poland or other places in europe. so what is needed? how do we do this? first off, of course, all of

you are already very familiar with ukrainian geography. there's really two land lines of communication into crimea. one goes over the kerch bridge, which has already been severely damaged. i would anticipate ukrainian general staff will revisit that bridge when the time is right. they want to keep the russians from being able to repair that bridge. the other is the so-called land bridge that connects crimea to russia via sevastopol and mariupol and into rostov. so you have to isolate crimea first. you do that with long-range precision strike capability that keeps repair crews off the court branch, and can begin to sever the land bridge by knocking out bridges around melitopol, and other places along that route. then you further isolated with what i anticipate will happen probably late spring or early

summer, next ukrainian counter offensive that will be an armored force that will attack on a narrow front, penetrating russian defenses, in the direction of melitopol. that is what will happen i believe. what's happening around bakhmut's terrible fighting, but the general staff can see they are having success at least stopping or limiting what russia is able to do, despite the thousands of russian casualties and effort, they're able to do that with largely territorial defense force, national guard units, so that they can preserve and build up this armored force, which i anticipate will be somewhere between three and six armored brigades with mechanized infantry, thanks, self propelled artillery, and armored engineer is. it would be an adequate force to penetrate rushes linear defenses. once that is done, then you can start bringing out the long range precision weapons closing

up where they begin to make the crimean peninsula untenable for russian forces. when precision weapons start landing in sevastopol, the russian black sea fleet will have to relocate somewhere else. the same thing for the large logistics hub at -- the russian air base at sake, and a dozen or so other places that the russians have facilities. on the crimean peninsula. this can all happen by this summer if we decide we want ukraine to win and if we deliver what they need, which is long-range precision strikes. it could be f-16s, attack drones, small ground launched bombs, there are various other solutions for long-range strikes. but that to me is the priority capability that is required.

blasting embassy, of course, is that people have heart attacks when you say you have to get crimea. we've got to get crimea. it will say, but wait won't that make them angry? isn't it special? won't that cross a red line? isn't that something where the russians would use a nuclear weapon? yes, it will make them angry. yes, they think it's special. no, they won't use a nuclear weapon, and we are the ones that are putting red lines against ourselves. we are deterring ourselves, we've been doing it for an entire year. we need to stop this. i think there's almost a zero chance russia would use a nuclear weapon if we were to enable ukraine to liberate it. i think the russians believe president biden, that there will in fact be catastrophic consequences for them if they use a nuclear weapon. they clearly aren't going to use a strategic nuclear weapon, so the only other choice is a tactical nuclear weapon, which offers no advantage. it won't change anything on the ground. it might rubble more towns and

kill innocent people, but -- from a purely operational standpoint it gives them no advantage. and will. and so as i try to imagine what they would think about this, of course, i don't assume the kremlin uses western logic, but there's no positive outcome for them in any scenario. so this is why i think those russian nuclear weapons are really most effective, when they don't actually use them, because they can see that we will continue to deter ourselves. >> thank you for that fantastic overview. a lot of food for thought there. i love the optimism. i completely agree with you. when you said that this summer the ukrainians could liberate crimea if we decide we want them to win. it is so crucial. we have to start wanting ukraine to win more than we hope russia is going to lose. we have to start arming and

planning that way. is our next speaker up? yes? perfect. all right. maria, thank you again for joining us. you just heard what ben had to say. as the head of the crimea platform department, what is your take? what are your opinions about the situation in crimea and the prospects of full liberation of crimea and the near future? >> thank you so much. good evening, or good morning, everyone. first of all, i would like to thank you for having me at this panel. it's an honor to be a part of this panel with such distinguished speakers. although i'm not an expert in military issues, i'm rather

specialized in humanitarian issues. indeed, prior to shifting to working for the government of ukraine, within the presidents administration actually in a broader sense, i used to work for a long time as a human rights defender at activist. i was witnessing the process of occupation of crimea. i was there at that point. at some point, i was also witnessing within the case ukraine versus russia at the european court for human rights, bringing my materials and testimonies supporting the fact that russia was in crimea prior to the so-called referendum on march 16th of 2014. that actually rushes little green men, so-called, where there and russian army was there at least since late

february. throughout all these years actually, international community supported ukraine and the general assembly of the united nations supported the fact that crimea is ukraine basically. paradoxically, what we have been witnessing throughout the past month or two months is after the liberation of carson, crimea started to be highlighted within the international expert community. and suddenly we have seen the kind of fear or even that mindset that the previous distinguished speaker mentioned, that it seems like crimea has always been russian.

we lack the support of the international community for the d occupation of crimea. i'm not saying in order to judge or to condemn someone, but it's just an interesting thing that we try to combat, so to say, in our day to day work. it's just to change that mind set, which actually, interestingly, is a result of russia -- policies. that is how russia sees crimea. somehow that vision was absorbed by the western public, paradoxically. in reality, and it's great because not only we ukrainians are telling this, but some international important researchers like the head of ukrainian studies at cambridge, he's not ukrainian, he's a british researcher, but he studies very deeply ukraine and

crimea in particular. you just have to look at the map to see that crimea is actually interlinked with ukrainian mainland. and it has been a part of ukrainian step land threat centuries. i don't want to go deep into history because maybe it's not the proper argument, but if you consider those linkages, that russia has to crimea, you can see those linkages are actually the output or the consequences of the annexation of crimea. all the atrocities that were committed by stolen and soviet authorities in crimea, and then actually eliminated all the crimean tatars, which are the key in red -- indigenous people in crimea, and have been the majority in crimea before the first annexation in 18th century. now you can see that russian

policies in crimea are really similar. even in details, because when i talk -- tried to learn for instance what policies have been used by moscow during the times of the russian empire in order to bring to crimea russians because there were no russians in crimea prior to the annexation. so they used this same kind of total. they brought their people that were representing the state, but they also used various incentives to bring their civil population. to actually change the demographic composition of crimea and colonize it. that's pretty much the same as they are doing now. at the same time, i think, i mean for me, as a former human rights defender, but also now as a citizen of ukraine, and a person who works for the government, i think that this argument of the support of the ukrainian faith -- space, by the indigenous people,

the crimean tatar's, who suffered a lot, who went through all things, and who put so much effort in order to go back to crimea. now they are, again, forced to flee because of the mobilization and repression. the fact that crimean guitars at large are supporting ukraine, the absolute majority i would say, including the representative body of crimea guitars, this fact i think it makes this legal effect of crimea being part of ukraine, a very important one. and like just to prove that this legitimacy is absolutely fair. what frightens me in this whole situation is that even the legal and political argument behind the fact that crimea is a part of ukraine, i mean they don't work. so we live in this world of

soft truth, the soft truth era, and russia somehow manages to meddle in this discussion. and even though we have the decision of european criminal court that crimea is occupied, even though we have multiple resolutions proving that crimea is ukraine, and that crimea is occupied, even though we have the reports of the -- criminal courts. we have the whole range of arguments, political ones, i'm not even mentioning -- statements from the side of the government. i'm speaking about purely legal, and unfortunately and very sadly, they just don't work. it's interesting, because now, i mean yesterday it was in kyiv, but today i'm in warsaw and my colleague we're heading towards

southeast asia. it is our first kind of working trip to this region, the global south. and i should say that for ukraine, crimea is a great opportunity to talk about colonial russian politics, imperial policies, with the global south countries. both because the indigenous people of crimea, crimean tatars, are muslims and it's very important to follow their history of oppression, repression, of elimination in crimea, and to explain the history of ukraine and the history of crimea via this history. also for ukraine it's a window to the global south. if you look at russian perspective, for them crimea is a window to the west, so to say, but in the military sense. the use crimea in order to attack the mainland ukraine, as mr. hodge is absolutely correctly stated, and also the use crimea in order to threaten

the whole mediterranean and whole black sea region, and actually the whole rest. so that's a difference in perspective, how ukraine sees crimea as an opportunity, as a place for diversity. by the way, just to mention that during soviet times, there were not only crimean tatars who were deported, but greeks were deported, bulgarians were deported, german people were deported, and i'm really glad that this issue is also being raised. for example, by the crimean platform in august of the previous year and, we mentioned russian chauvinism has targeted not only ukrainian, not only indigenous people, but also greeks, for instance, who had been living there for centuries and were suddenly deported by russia. so i will stop here because i don't think that i have to develop more on the human rights violations taking place in crimea because i think it's

more or less widely known. but if needed, i can talk about it this more. i really think that it's now important to change again the mindset, because we have to decolonize this imagination and perception of crimea, and also decolonize the perception of ukraine. thanks to our military, thanks to ukrainian army, the fact we are supported by our allies, but we still i think have the problem with the the call on us in the perception of crimea, which remains in the long shadow of the russian empire and its legacy. thank you. >> great, thanks maria. how interesting to learn that you are in warsaw now to head out to the so-called global south, to southeast asia, to try to meet with your colleagues and interlocutors in this part of the world to

explain that colonialism isn't just something that europeans did to africa or southeast asia. this is happening today in europe by russia against your country. so it's a great message and hopefully it's a message that will resonate. i'm also glad -- i thought you were in ukraine, so all of the times i sent you for this event i was using the ukrainian time. so i'm glad it all worked up. anyway, brian, thank you for joining us here in person. you've done a lot of writing on the military aid to ukraine. one thing you have been saying, which i completely agree with, is that we have to start allowing and arming ukraine to fight russia like we would be fighting russia. or like nato would be fighting russia.

>> right. >> so i hope you can expand on that a little bit today on your comments and give us an overview on how you see the situation develop. >> thanks, it's great to be here. i appreciate the opportunity. it's great to be with my hudson colleagues and all of you. to get to your point, then brought up a great point, that crimea is being used as a sanctuary by russia. so they employ that is a strategic rear area, as a strategic depth so they can launch attacks on their, but also bring their troops back for reconstitution. that is how they are we -- using it as a logistics hub to resupply ships. there's many benefits to crimea benefit -- operationally to russia right now. if crimea is going to be able to regain that territory or the territory in the east, they will have to start fighting like nato would. so not this battle of inches using artillery in duels across a very short battle line, but instead start reaching back into your opponents rear areas and undermining his logistics, his ability to keep troops

resupply door reconstituted at the front. nato never built up the kind of inventory of munitions that we are seeing being used in ukraine because nato never really intended to fight this war. because if we were going to be fighting russia, it was going to be long-range strikes, taking out russian transportation network, information networks, undermining the ability of russian troops to -- to provide to the front. then we would start taking territory back in big chunks and then maybe isolate parts of russia, kind of like an island campaign in world war ii. that approach to warfare where you start taking out the adversaries main nodes and then watching the rest of them fall apart is more of the western way of war, and we would argue, it is more consistent with precision strike warfare that we have executed against iraqi troops and anticipating executing against the soviet union in the cold war. to equip ukraine to be able to

execute that kind of fight has, has been said, they need longer in strikes. so one thing i think that gets often lost in the conversation about ukraine is how effectively they have created what we call in the, west battle networks, or the ability to take information in from surveillance sources, turn that into targeting, and then convey that information rapidly to people in the field that can take action on it. so in the case of ukraine they don't have the kind of long range missiles or the aircraft they would use so they are doing this with artillery, without rockets, so they have been very effective at being able to take information in from a variety of commercials. their own unmanned vehicles as well as u.s. government sources, and to synthesize that, social media, which is a very effective source. so the challenge is always fusing that into something that it is operationally useful. and then quickly conveying too commander who has got control

over a himars battery or in our killer battery. what they've been able to do is use commercially available software, there are companies in the united states and have helped with that, using commercially available sources and using starlink and other satellite communication systems, they are able to get information rapidly to command centers and out to field leaders to be able to execute these kill chains in relatively short order. more importantly, at the time they they need to be executed. so the timing in orchestration is really important to affective warfare. and it is something the west is sort of pioneered and we have honed to a fine degree. ukraine has failed to do this on their own because we have not equipped them to allow them to fight in this way. they have built this whole command and control, isr, very effectively. they lacked weapons to then exploit it fully. so without longer range missiles, without strike aircraft like the f-16 that can drop weapons deeper inside

russian held territory, they are sort of just finding a very effective and very efficient battle of inches at the front. so that is why you see even though russia has a much larger military, came into the fight with much more capable systems, we have given them some equipment. so even though they were evenly matched from a capability perspective, the much smaller ukrainian military has fared very well against russia, and that's because of his ability to more effectively employ their force due to their use of surveillance, targeting, and command and control, that they had built on their own. so we have to honor that investment on their part and give them the capability that allows them to exploit it to really execute precision strikes more at the scale that nato would if we were fighting russia. that is the only way you are going to get back into crimea and take away rushes sanctuary. that they have been employing very well to execute strikes on ukraine. the reason russia needs that sanctuary, both in crimea and in the eastern part of ukraine, is because before the war, and

even today, the russian military was more or less defensively constructed. so it's constructed to protect against invaders coming into russia. russia had not built a military that was really designed to go and take some other territory and hold it very rapidly. so that is why you have seen, for example, logistics were not a high priority in the russian military. the electronic warfare systems they had were all defensively oriented, focused on how do i deny sensors, and attacks against me. they don't have the ability to suppress or defeat other peoples air defenses. they have long range strike capabilities, but they don't have the ability to rapidly redeploy troops in support of the strikes. so if they attack a node of the u.s. or ukrainians, they really can take advantage of that because then there is no way for them to get troops out there. whereas nato would do that. so if we take a note out of there is, we are going to rapidly take that territory, even if it means we've got troops thin side enemy lines and then we will eventually cut them off and isolate them. so the russians have been --

unable to really do that. that is what you are seeing russia slowly attempting to gain territory and they need these sanctuaries to continue to funnel troops and material to the front because they have no other way to rapidly deploy forces into enemy held story. so there are some things that i think sometimes get missed in the conversation here. so one is the f-16s and air power. the argument is, well, you know, the airspace over ukraine is largely denied. no one is flying airplanes, but because no one has air defense supression capabilities. the u.s. would never think about saying, oh, we will honor this air defense threat of the russians and not fly into ukrainian airspace. we would use electronic warfare aircraft to go jam those radar sensors and then use strike capabilities like radiation homemade missiles to attack those air defense radars and air defense systems. so there's a whole suppression of enemy air defenses that the u.s. military and nato militaries that we don't see

being used in ukraine today, because ukraine is not equipped to do it, and russia is not equipped to do it either. so if we were to give ukraine f-16's, they are going to come with the capability to duke jamming, electronic warfare, jamming their defenses storms. we will have to acquit him in a way that allows them to strike these air defenses stems using ground surface to surface missiles, which is how nato would do it. so you can restore the ability to use that airspace. there's ways to take advantage of capabilities that are available in the west, but that have not been employed yet, to restore the ability for ukraine to do these long-range strikes with airplanes or with missiles, by taking out of the spare defense systems that russia has put in place and been allowed to operate in a unfettered manner. that is something that then gets lost in the conversation about giving airplanes or long range strike capabilities to ukraine. the last thing i will say is that, and i know both maria and ben got at this, long term crimea is a strategic benefit to russia in a lot of ways.

it allows them to turn the black sea into more or less or russian like. the black sea fleet, with a couple of dozen ships, obviously they have lost a few, it's the largest force in that region. other nations sort of just give way to the russian forces. that is because they've got a warm water port in ukraine that allows them to deploy those ships and maintain them in the black sea. it's also, as we said, a strategic depth for russia to allow them to conduct strike operations into ukraine. it is also the main russian warm water port in the region. right? artists is theoretically a russian port in syria, but again that's not a very hospitable region and it's hard to get to. so if they were to lose crimea and their port there as an ability to get to the sea, you really constrain russia's options in the maritime domain. so losing crimea is an important element in trying to contain russian aggression in the future as well as deal with him in this particular conflict. >> that's a great point for you

to end on. in america we have to view crimea is not only being important to ukraine, but for our own national security and our strategic interests as well ben, i want to go back to you for the opening question. based off your experience as a commanding general of u.s. army in europe and all of the experience that led you to that point, based off your contact and what you are seeing and hearing on the ground has russia's offensive started. or are they still prepping on the battlefield? >> it's interesting, the question was cut off with respect which is filled up a lot in the past battlefield, i think that says something about their great offensive, not being sure that it's actually started. >> i think it has, and i think

their offensive, with so much talk about, it remember, people were talking about 500,000 russians over the border and all that up. and this weekend i heard that people were anxious because they heard russians were pushing aircrafts out of storage for this offensive. i think, if you were to give me a russian aircraft that police applied conflict into the meat grinder. i don't see, so far, i'm not looking at information but i do not see the sort of things you would expect for good offensive. it is not a big red arrow coming in from a different

direction, concentration will capability, forces that could exploit some sort of a breakthrough. and, even if bob moot fell tomorrow, then what? i mean, there is nothing that could exploit that. so i think, i could be totally wrong, they could be deceiving this. there could be a colossal intelligence for us as well as ukraine could be giving us a large capable force for us out of nowhere. it is trained and ready for us to actually do something. we know the russians are having their own ammunitions totals right now but they are constantly talking about not getting supported by the staff. of course you're not getting supported by them. he spends a long time criticizing them, and they actually want to see him fail and they want to see their own forces succeed. thank goodness that they still

have not figured out that after nine years of conflict, they joint innovated command structure that ensures unity of command and unity of members. you've got -- who hates these other guys, and then you've got [inaudible] , you don't see any videos of god chechens out of there. dead -- out of there. he is keeping them out of the fight, he is keeping them out for their protection. and when he sees an opportunity, or maybe he sees himself as the savior. and so i saw several excellent points were just made about russian capability, if we are launching an offensive, we obviously are going to get to that job done. and then we are going to sever

the enemy's ability to reinforce, to resupply. so after the lines of communication. just like we did in 1944 in the months before the invasion of normandy, we rolled our force in the u.s. army air force was daily bombing the german and french railroads, and trains, so that they would not be able to come out the way they started. i don't think the russians destroyed a single train or a single convoy bringing things from poland into ukraine. , i mean, how could it possibly be and i think it is because i don't have the dynamic to do targeting where they could have an aircraft up waiting to hit a moving target. . that are obviously well known

fixed targets for. you could launch a multi million dollar prism again. so i don't think these kind of problems tell me that, yes, they probably have started their offensive, it is going to fail, i think they are going to culminate by man, probably, and then they have to be ready to strike. >> thanks, ben. i -- maria, i wanted to turn back to crimea. since 2014, we have seen tens of thousands of crimeans leave crimea, kicked out of crimea, forcibly removed from crimea. we have seen probably a similar number of russians brought into crimea, of course, this is nothing new for crimea's history. as you alluded to, this has been going on since the time of

catharine the great, but when ukraine liberates crimea. there will be some sort of humanitarian situation, humanitarian crisis. you are going to have a lot of russian civilians who probably want to get out of there. overtime you are going to have a lot of ukrainians who have been forcibly removed who want to go back home, which will create a very high level of expectation for the ukrainian government to deliver on that. and you are going to have, presumably, at least in the medium term, fighting going on elsewhere against russia and inside ukraine. so what sort of thinking and what sort of planning is being done now to think about these challenges that might happen when crimea is liberated? >> thank you, that is a very important question. and i have to say, first of all,

that we are not naive thinking that it will all be very easy. we understand that we have multiple, multiple, challenges ahead of us. we know that this is the process of the information, but we are also optimistic and focused on the operation of crimea because we are already working -- so we think that we might be able to start this work very soon. so we understand that there are no easy answers those questions, and those questions that you raise are just a part of all of those problems that we are going to face, and now, actually, we are working upon the several strategists related to restoration of the government, the ukrainian government in crimea, and another part is related to the economy and infrastructure and that is, i should, say it is a

huge priority for the purpose of ukraine itself in terms of the crimean policies in general. they want us to present and communicate with ukrainian citizens in crimea, how do we see crimea after the occupation. so how is it going to look, unlike the current situation, once crimea is isolated, militarized and highly oppressed so to say. we would like to bring another perspective and, as for the first part, we could look into the very issues relate to humanitarian policies. what we are going to do with all the court decisions that have been made throughout the court throughout this years. how do we deal with issues like amnesty or actually the situation in crimea is quite unique.

even if to compare to the territories in eastern ukraine that have been also under the occupation for almost nine years. so the situation is somehow different there, distinguishes there in crimea. because they are trying to an exit, and that makes a huge difference, i should say, in terms of the situation in there. so that will require the same situation that is different. and, of course, we somehow lack the clear understanding of what is going on on the ground with crimea, because we have more control, but since we have more control, our citizens in crimea and we try to be accurate and what policies could be applied after the de-occupation. and as of, now we come up with

some visions and strategies with the state institutions of ukraine and with other members of the other crimeans, and so we are trying to be realistic, but at the same time trying to think about all of those challenges that we would have to face and it commands on the issue of russian citizens in our position is that russian citizens who came to crimea would have to go back to their homelands and they are currently in crimea,, so that on itself is position as a general one,. we also have no preserved guarantees for relating to -- but still, we need to make sure that there is a notification of the russian aggression in the territory of ukraine, and of course, crimea, and there is almost no certainly going to get rid of maybe you know that now, crimea, and the ukrainian

constitution, has mentioned the republic of crimea, has a special status. they should not have the special status, it should just be crimea has some sort of autonomy, but not in the way that it is implemented. now, we don't have the

capability to make any changes to the russians. now it is trying to acknowledge the indigenous people of crimea, as i said, and in general, it is going to be important for the ukrainian future. >> thanks, maria. i know that you have a hard stop at 6 pm central european time, so when you need to drop off, feel free. thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule, i don't want to make you late for your next appointment. but in the meantime, brian, i'm going to go to you for a quick question. are we learning, as the united states is nato learning from ukraine's innovative spirit to learn quickly on the battlefield these teepees to keep them alive and keep them victorious? >> i think, i hope we are. it seems like we are. we are learning some of the lessons and values about commercial technology, about how you can write software in the field to be able to nip together units that would ordinarily not be able to talk

to each other. you know, not too different than what you do with an iphone to get a software update that allows a new program to work with it. that is what's happening with ukraine in a daily basis. you are seeing some of that being applied in the d.o.d. and in some of the nato military's outside of the united states. it is not happening very quickly. i will say a couple of lessons that we are not really learning are the utility of unmanned systems of drones. we are seeing, on both sides, how russia and ukraine have both really effectively used chief drones to execute military operations that previously would depend upon a cruise missile to do. as well as do structured attacks. this is an area where u.s. could really empower ukraine even more is to allow the use of these cheap drones to be the precursors or the front wave of a strike attack, which has a smaller number of more expensive weapons in the rear. russia has done this numerous times. 'reit works, you can deplete the

enemies our defenses which he drones and when the cruise missile comes in, there's a lot less to shoot at it. that is something that we are learning but the u.s. and nato, generally, has not invested in these cheap drones that would allow you to exploit that approach. i think that is something we need to think about buying to equip ukraine with. one thing i get feedback from ukrainians's, things like the switchblade is really high-end emissions is not that useful. they find the highs around does a great job of attacking troop formations. if you had a sophisticated drone in a mid side range, where can actually carry a big enough drone where you put 100 pounds of payload on it and it can blow something off and hits it, that is the kind of jerome size that we probably need to build a lot more to help with ukraine but also it's something -- >> you can finish watching this program if you go to our website c-span.org.

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