i shall resign the presidency effective at noon tomorrow.

vice president for will be sworn in as president at that hour in this office. and that was august 8th, 1974, when president nixon went on national tv to announce his resignation from office. that followed a compel long series of hearings in the us senate the year before and a threat of impeachment by the house of representatives. thanks for joining us for the american history tv series. congress investigates where we look at significant congressional investigations over our history. this week, it's a look at the watergate hearings and their aftermath. our guest is kate scott, who is the senate htoan and author of the book reining in the state civil society and congress in the vietnam and watergate era era. ms. scott, what was the defining

event that led to the senate hearings in 1973? the trigger that set off the hearing, the call for the senate hearings in 1973 had happened the prior year in june of 1972, when five when burglars broke into the democrat national committee headquarters in the watergate office and apartment complex here in washington, d.c. those burglars were arrested. and in the course of reporting about that, there unusual arrest and some of the unusual things that were found in the bags with these burglars. a couple of intrepid reporters, carl bernstein and bob woodward, began making connections between those burglars who had been arrested and the nixon administration agents committee to reelect the president. it was 1972, was a presidential election year. and the connections between the

burglars and the president's committee to reelect became ever more clear over the course of that late summer in 1972. nixon won in a landslide reelection in november of that year, but the senate members of the senate remained unsatisfied by that about the information they had, about that burglary and its connections to the president's reelection campaign. and so in january of 1973, the senate formally created a special committee to investigate presidential campaign activities. of that 1972 year. and the official name of the watergate hearings committee was a select committee on presidential campaign activities. it was created with a 77 to 0 vote in the u.s. senate. but was there a contrary urgency about creating this committee? there wasn't so much a controversy as there was a

concern that this investigation may be seen as or dismissed as a partizan witch hunt. so the democrats controlled had the majority in the senate in 1973. and, of course, richard nixon was a republican president. and so mike mansfield, the majority leader of the senate, looked around very carefully in making his selection to the special watergate committee, and he settled on a chairman who he thought was had unimpeachable credentials as sam ervin, democratic conservative from north carolina, had been in the senate since the 1950s. he was at that point in his seventies, he had no desire to become president. later on, he was just content to be a united states senator. and importantly, he had a couple of interesting credentials that made him really perfect for this role in this political sensitive position. he was the senate's

constitutional expert recognized by his colleagues as such, and he was incredibly interested in some of the issues that the watergate scandal had exposed, issues of surveillance, issues of breaking and entering, issues of invasions, of privacy. he'd been investigating some of these issues, actually, for about ten years prior to the break in at watergate. and so senator sam ervin in being selected to to chair this special committee, that that vote, i think of 77 to 0, that unanimous senate vote was really a vote of confidence in senator ervin's ability to lead a fact based, nonpartisan investigation on the other democrats, on the committee. daniel, in a way of hawaii, joseph montoya of new mexico, herman talmadge of georgia, the republicans, howard baker of tennessee, who was the ranking member, edward gurney of florida, and lowell weicker of

connecticut. kate scott what struck me about that was this was a 4 to 3 democrats republicans committee. that's not very that's pretty close. it is pretty close. and actually, it's interesting because it didn't reflect to the party breakdown in the senate at the time. the democrats had a larger majority than those than than than was reflected on the committee membership. but the membership itself was really important, not just with the selection of sam ervin as chairman, but howard baker, a moderate from tennessee. really important to serving in that vice chair role in this politically sensitive committee. in fact, it's interesting with baker because in the beginning, initially, his instinct was to try to protect the president. he and his top staff would meet with the president's aides and discuss what the committee was talking about, the information that they were finding, how the course of the investigation was rolling out. and then over the course of the summer, as the evidence began to pile up, suggesting the

president's involvement in the watergate break in and cover up, howard baker cut his ties with the administration and really dug in to in search and pursuit of the truth. a couple of those other members let me just say a couple of words about them. daniel, in a way, was this fabulous member of the of the committee a quiet member, but very interested in getting to the bottom of the investigation. very interested in finding the truth. and he was in his second term here in the united states senate, a decorated world war two veteran, fairly quiet member of the committee. but interestingly, the first member of the committee to publicly call for richard nixon's resignation. he did that in october of 1973. lowell weicker, a republican from connecticut, really interested member of the committee. he he pursued a kind of side investigation. he actually had his own investigatory team, which ruffled some feathers on the committee from time to time. but again, he was appalled by some of the allegations and

evidence that they uncovered over the course of the investigation. he would often, in his role as a republican, take a stand and say, you know, what's happened with this administration? that is not what the republican party stands for. he could be a bit of a wild card, but ultimately he was committed in his search for the truth. kate, scott, would you call any of the members of the watergate committee hyper partizan, or were any looking for political advantage? yeah, i think that edward gurney might best fit that category. he was a republican from florida. he was strongly partizan and just to the extent that i think he allowed his partizanship to interfere with his pursuit for the truth, i don't know that he ever broke from his support for president nixon, even when all the evidence piled up against him. well, because of the fact that these were televised that entire summer of 1973, both the

counsels, the majority counsel and the minority counsel became pretty well known. sam dash and fred thompson. right. right. and, you know, that was such an interesting phenomenon because prior to the watergate committee, senate staff on even famous investigations would not typically become associated or recognizable figures in the public's imagination. but the fact that the two counsels did become recognizable members and you know, would often have people come up to them in public and ask for their autograph or tell them how they felt about the watergate investigation and how it was unrolling, speaks to the fact that the watergate hearings in the summer of 1993 were an absolute national phenomenon. every body knew something about watergate. every american household was tuned in to these hearings. i mean, that's a slight exaggeration, but not by much.

millions of american households watched these hearings live during the day, if they could, or if they were at work and weren't able to, they would watch the rebroadcast on pbs's each evening. it was it was a nationwide sort of living room experience where people had this extraordinary, eerie look into the operations of an american presidential administration in. and they were pretty horrified by what they saw. but at the same time, the support for president nixon was still relatively high when the hearings began, correct? it was, you know, in if you look at the gallup polling from 1973, richard nixon enjoyed really high approval ratings in february of 1973. so that's even after that. some of these allegation have become public and even after the senate has created its watergate committee. i think he has something in the upper sixties approval rating in february of 1973. but those approval ratings begin

to sink over the course of the year. and by november of 1973, his approval ratings are in the tank. i think he has like a 24, 25% approval rating. now, interest strongly his approval rating goes underwater, meaning his disapproval rating is higher than his approval rating. only two weeks after the senate launches its public hearings in the watergate investigation. i don't think that's a coincidence. kate? scott, can you give us a sense of what the atmosphere was like in this town during the summer of 73 with the hearings going on? well, i it's it's hard to exaggerate the sense of importance that this senate investigation had held. it's hard to exaggerate the level of public interest in the senate. watergate investigations and its hearings in particular. you know, we have collected a couple of stories in interviewing a few people who

were around and members of the watergate committee staff at that time. and they recall that being present in that in the senate caucus room where these hearings were held in 1973, the feeling was electric. first of all, every single seat was absolutely packed. every day. and there was a line in a public line out the door and out onto the street and around the building to get in and take a take a seat and be part of this historic moment. i mean, people were riveted by the committee and what it was telling the american public about these allegations as it sort of developed its narrative account over the course of the summer in 1973. how long did the select committee on presidential campaign activities sit? well, it sat a technically from january of 1973 until the fall swing spring of 1974. but it didn't. it only held the most popular

portion of the public. hearings occurred in the summer months of 1973, really made june and july in august. the senate traditionally breaks for recess, and it did with the intention with the senate watergate committee broke with the intention that they would reconvene public hearings in september and october to explore some of the other issues that had arisen as a result of their investigation. and the public interest in the senate. watergate investigation in those hearings really waned in the fall months. so the the the most compelling part of the senate watergate hearings happens in the summer months of 1973, and one of the early testifiers was former white house counsel john dean. here's some of his testimony. from 1973. it's a very difficult thing for me to testify about other people.

it's far more easy for me to explain my own involvement in this matter. the fact that i was involved in obstruction of justice, the fact that i assisted another in perjured testimony, the fact that i made personal use of funds that were in my custody far easier to talk about these things myself than to talk about what others did. some of these people are referring to our friend as some are men i greatly admire and respect, and particularly with reference to the president united states. i'd like to say this. it is my honest belief that while the president was involved that he did not realize or appreciate at any time the implications of his involvement. and i think that when the facts come out, i hope the president is forgiven. after that, the next time i recall meeting liddy was at a meeting in mitchell's office in

january 27 of 1972. magruder called my office to set up the meeting, and only after i call him to ask why he wanted me to attend the meeting that i learned that he was going to present his intelligence plan. i met magruder and liddy at mitchell's office, but he had a series of charts or diagram forms which he placed on an easel. and the presentation valerie began. i did not fully understand everything mr. liddy was recommending at that time, because some of the concepts were mind boggling and the charts were in code names. but i shall attempt to reconstruct the high points that i remember as best i can. liddy was, in effect, making a sales pitch. he said that the operation he had developed would be totally removed from the campaign and carried out by professionals and called for squads. kidnaping teams up to compromise the opposition and electronics

of it. he explained that the mugging squad could, for example, rough up demonstrators that were causing problems. the kidnaping teams could remove demonstration leaders and take them below the mexican border and thereby diminish their ability, the ability of the demonstrators to cause problems. at the san diego convention. the prostitutes can be used at the democratic convention to get information as well as compromise. press involved. i recall that he saying that the girls would be high class and the best in the business when discussing the electronic surveillance. he said that he had consulted with one of the best authorities in the country and his plan and vision far more than the bugging and tapping of telephones. he said that under his plan, communications between ground facilities and aircraft, but also be intercepted. i might also add at this point, he also gave an an elaborate description of intercepting various microwaves that traveled around the country through various communication

facilities. and i cannot explain to the committee what that was, because to this day, i don't understand it. each major aspect of his proposal was on a chart with one chart showing the interrelations with the others. each operation was given a codename. i have no recollection of these codenames with regard to surveillance. i do not recall if this was necessarily limited to electronic surveillance. he suggested several potential targets. i cannot recall for certain. it was during this meeting or a second meeting in early february that he suggested the potential targets, the targets that i recall. he suggested were mr. larry o'brien and the democratic headquarters and the fontainebleau hotel during the democratic convention. mr. liddy concluded his presentation by saying that the plan would cost approximately $1 million. i do not recall a reaction during the presentation of the plan because he was sitting beside me.

but i do recall mitchell's reaction to the mission impossible plan. it was amazed. at one point, i gave him a look of a element and he winked. knowing mitchell, i did not think they would throw liddy out of the office or tell him that he was out of his mind. rather, he did what i expected. when the presentation was completed, he took a few long pass on his pay and told that he that the planning and develop was not quite what he had in mind and the cost was out of the question. he said he suggested to leti that he go back and revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the demonstration problem. i remained in mitchell's office for a brief moment after the meeting ended. as the charts were being taken off, the eyes on dissemble and mitchell indicated to me that mr. liddy's proposal was out of the question. i then joined magruder and liddy, and as we left the office, i told liddy to destroy the charts. mr. lee said that he would

revise the plan and submit a new proposal. at that point, i thought the plan was dead because i doubted if mitchell would reconsider the matter. i wrote back to the to my office that liddy and magruder. but there was no further discussion of the plan. the next time i became aware of any discussion of such a plan occurred, i believe on february 4th, 1972. excuse me. magruder had scheduled another meeting in mr. mitchell's office on a revised intelligence plan. i arrived at the meeting very late, and when i came in that he was presenting a scaled down version of an earlier plan. i listened for a few minutes and decided i had to inject myself into the discussions. mr. mitchell, i felt, was being put on the spot. the only polite way i thought i could end the discussion was to inject that these discussions could not go on in the office of the attorney general of the united states and the meeting should terminate immediately. at this point, the meeting

ended. i do not know to this day who kept pushing for these plans, whether liddy was pushing or whether magruder was pushing, whether someone was pushing magruder? i do not know. i do know in hindsight that i should not have been as polite as i was and merely suggesting that liddy destroyed a chance after the first meeting. rather, i should have said, forget the plan completely after i ended the second meeting. i told liddy that i would never again discuss this matter with him. i told him that if any such plan were approved, i did not want to know. one thing was certain in my mind while someone wanted this operation, i did not want any part of it, nor would i have any part of it. after this second meeting in mitchell's office, i sought a meeting with mr. haldeman to tell him what was occurring. but it took me several days to get to see him. i recall that mr. higby got me into mr. holman's office when another appointment had been canceled or postponed. i told haldeman what had been

presented by liddy and told him that i felt it was incredible, unnecessary and unwise. i told him that no one in the white house should have anything to do with this. i said that the reelection committee will need an ability to deal with demonstrations, but it did not need bugging. bugging prostitutes and kidnapers and were rejoined by u.s. senate historian kate scott. ms. scott. what did the committee learn from john dean? what they learned from john dean was abso lutely astounding. he told the american public. in the course of reading more than 240 page prepared statement, it took him hours and hours to read that statement. and before the senate watergate committee, what he revealed as as is that as white house counsel, he had been present in the oval office and in meetings

with top white house staff in which they had responded to americans protesting of u.s. government policies, particularly vietnam war policies. u.s. civil rights groups. women's liberation groups, all of these groups that had been involved in sort of exercising their fundamental first amendment rights to protest government policies that the nixon administration had seen, those dissidents and viewed those protests as dangerous to the nation, and particularly an end and worthy of a forceful government response. and the response took all kinds of forms from burglaries to breaking and entering to trying to to to black bag jobs, all kinds of illegal, immoral, unethical activities,

unconstitutional activities that that aspects of the government had organized in response to these protests. and john dean was was honest in that he did explain that he had participated in these discussions. he had encouraged this kind of response from the administration. he had helped orchestrate some of these programs and projects. he had interfered with government investigations after the watergate break in. he had helped to destroy evidence and he had encouraged others to do so. it was announced it was an astounding series of revelations that john dean made to the american public and it was not too long after john dean's testimony that senator sam ervin staff were in contact with members of the house judiciary committee at the behest of house

judiciary committee chairman john rodino. and why were they in touch with them? because they had begun to concern vitter very quietly and off the books. if you will, the possibility that they may begin an impeachment inquiry into president richard nixon. well, that was a little later that summer, that deputy assistant to the president, alexander butterfield, became a household name. here's his testimony from mid-june ly of 1973 at the butterfield. are you aware of the installation of any listening devices in the oval office of the president. i was aware of listening devices. yes, sir. when were those devices placed in the oval office. approximately the summer of 1970.

i cannot begin to recall the precise date. my guess, mr. thompson, is that the installation was made between and this is a very rough guess april or may of 1970 and perhaps the end of the summer or early fall of 1970. are you aware of any devices that were installed in the executive office building office of the president? yes, sir. at that time, were they installed at the same time they were installed at the same time. could you tell us a little bit about how those devices worked, how they were activated, for example. i don't have the technical knowledge, but i will tell you what i know about how those devices were triggered. they were installed, of course, for historical purposes to record the president's business

and they were installed in his two offices. the oval office and the eob office. kate scott what was the country's reaction when they learned of the recording devices? well, it's set up a classic battle between two branch co-equal branches of government. the revelation by alexander butterfield that the white house had recorded conversations with voice activated devices and that those conversations were in the custody of the white house, set off a scramble for access to those tapes, because the tapes it was believed, would either collaborate, corroborate or refute john dean's testimony, which very much implicated richard nixon in the watergate cover up. was the white house at all co-op trading with the senate committee at this point throughout the summer of 73? well, it's interesting because the white house took a decided,

oddly obstructionist stance in early 1973. in fact, it so irritated sam ervin that he held an unusual press conference, unusual for sam ervin, and that in the course of his more than two decades serving in the united states senate, he had only held two press conferences before this moment, but he was so disturbed by the president's claims of executive privilege and separation of powers as justifications for not cooperating with the senate's investigators. that ervin held a press conference in which he expressed a great deal of moral outrage, and he said that the president essentially was taking the position that he had the right of a king, that he was not accountable to another co-equal branch of government, that was trying to fulfill its constitutionally obligated right to investigate. and not only did he i mean, he he liked to use a lot of folksy charm in his in his he was a

very folksy person in his demeanor. but at this press conference, he also called the claim of executive privilege, executive poppycock. he said it was a ridiculous claim. the president couldn't be making the claim of executive privilege to cover up or refuse to participate in an exchange of information related to criminal activity. and so to get back to your question that the nixon administration evolved over time in terms of its collabo relation and cooperation with the senate watergate committee by the summer of 1973, richard nixon had relented and allowed some of his former now former staff to testify before the committee. but he still remained intransigent in his efforts to prevent the committee from gaining access to those presidential recordings. and it was former white house chief of staff h.r. haldeman, who was asked the now infamous

question by leading republican howard baker. here's some of his testimony. the one thing that keeps recurring to me and the one thing i've tried to put to every witness that has unique information in addition to their own personal information and knowledge, is what did the president know and when did he first know it? now, you were closer to the press in the united states, more on than probably any other person in the world outside his immediate family. i want to know what you can tell me in that respect. what did the president know and when did he know it? i've tried to tell that in the recounting of my statement, but what the president knew about the watergate and if, again, if we can divide to pre june 17 and post june seven, 18, what he knew was basic. what has been clearly established here. there doesn't seem to be much contention about what he knew and when. on the prejudge 17 activities as

i see it, he knew through the normal channels that the event had occurred. he knew as ongoing developments in the in the course of the investigation and prosecution took place that specific individuals were charged tried and convicted. he was informed and acted on the basis of the information given in that the information that was was made known was the complete information. he was told, as i think has been recounted here several times, the only one in which i believe i was present was an occasion which perhaps the vice chairman was also present, which was a breakfast of the cabinet and the some of the republican leadership in the congress and the senior members of the white house staff in septem ber, i

believe on september 12 of 1972, and it was just for the record, i was in tennessee campaign for my political survival at that. all right, sir. a number of your colleagues were present at that breakfast meeting, and the purpose of it was to review the upcoming campaign of a number of these people who are going to be out campaigning for the president, so on. and the course of the meeting covered campaign issues, and i question and answers on various things that the speakers would want to know in the process of that, the attorney general of the united states spoke on the subject of the watergate and reported to this group that the facts of the investigation of the watergate, including the statistics of numbers of interviews and know all the facts that have been gathered and so forth and then reported to this group. and the president, as he had reported earlier, that the indictments would be brought down in the next few days and that they would complete the

investigation. the investigation had been completed and that there it was clear to him and to the to the investigators and prosecutors that that the guilt for the commission of the crimes at the democratic national committee was limited to those people who would be indicted, that it did not rise further in the membership of the staff of the committee to reelect the president or the white house. i me pick up one or two switches. and by the way, let me say for the record that there's a vote in progress, which i've now already made. there's nobody else on the committee here. and i'm going to continue past my 10 minutes and yield commensurate amount of time out of my next round and equalize things. but let me continue in this way. rather than put a rather rhetorical question, which i did, what did the president know and what do you know? what which illiterates pretty well but doesn't elicit much information sometimes. let me ask you two or three things that are of interest to

me. what did the president say to you when he found out that liddy and mccord, two officials of the crp and important officials, were caught in the watergate raid or in connection with the watergate situation? can you tell us that now? he expressed at any time that you got the discussion turned to the the question of the break in at the democratic committee, just utter incomprehension as to how such a thing could have happened and why such a thing would have happened. did he ever ask to talk to mccord or to liddy? no, i don't believe so. was it ever discussed? not not to my knowledge that anyone ever suggested to him. i don't believe so. did you ever talk to mccord or liddy? no, sir. i see. senator. and i always return now. and i asked my time, if i may,

i'll ask one more question before i yield him. and on this tape situation has gotten be a pretty celebrated affair. yes, sir, i understand that. and you understand that i made the motion to institute litigation, to test the privilege of the president, to withhold that information from us. and then i feel strongly about that subject. and as i've indicated earlier, i thank my concern in that respect is heightened by your testimony and your reference to portions of that tape. i also remark apparent directly to mr. wilson that i gazed deep into his eyes and couldn't, divined quite what was going on. and i still can't. and i want to continue to tantalizing with that level. but what i want to point out to you is that one statement in your addendum seems to me to be extraordinary importance, and i want to test the accuracy of your recollection and the quality of your note taking from those tapes and referring to the last to the next to the last. no, the third in the last

sentence on page two, the president said there is no problem in raising $1,000,000. we can do that. but it would be wrong now if the period were to follow after we can do that, it would be a most damming statement if in fact the tapes clearly show, he said. but it would be wrong. it's an entirely different context now. how sure are you, mr. haldeman, that those tapes, in fact, say that? i'm absolutely positive that the tapes you hear it with their own voice? yeah, with my own ears, yes. i mean, with your own ears. was there any distortion in the quality of the tape in that respect? no, i don't believe so. mr. haldeman, my final question is a follow on from that. do you have any idea whether or not other witnesses who were present at other president conversations that relate to the mandate of this committee to inquire might also be entitled to hear those tapes as they relate to their conversations in

order to refresh their recollection. i don't know, senator, but i it is my understand that no one would first place almost i don't think anybody that that has appeared or will appear before this committee knew of the existence of the tapes. what about john dean? he knows now we know about idea that mr. dean would be permitted to go to the white house and listen to those tapes. no, sir. it's my understanding that no one has been or will be is the rationale for your utilization of them that it's an aide to the refreshing of your recollection for recording to the president as a former staff member? yes. wouldn't that precisely exact same situation apply to john dean? not at this point in time, no. would you be agreeable, mr. haldeman, if it could be negotiated otherwise, would you be agreeable personally, as far as you're concerned, would you be agreeable to bringing those tapes up here, those two tapes, and playing them?

senator, you're asking me to take a position on a legal issue, contrary to the position that the predicate confer with your counsel if you wish. i'm not asking. will you ask the president to do it? i'm not asking you if you think we violate the doctrine of separation of powers. i'm simply saying what bob haldeman, a witness before this committee, may agreeable as an individual. if we can otherwise procure the tapes to them being brought here and being played in public. then. having been advised by counsel that in their opinion, i'm not creating a legal problem by the answer that i would give and that i would want to give without even talking to counsel, is that i would welcome that opportune pity because they would confirm what i've told you. kate scott what did the president know and when did he

know it? well, that was the question of the moment, and that's why this battle over the tapes went on as it did. the it's interesting that howard baker asked that question and he asked the question on a number of separate occasions. it isn't just that one time. it's so many times the course of the investigation. howard baker asking that important question and really what it boils down to is this the only way to understand when or if the president knew was to get access to those tapes. and it's fascinating that howard baker is the person who, in a closed door session with watergate, the senate watergate committee members is the one t propose that the senate take the president to court over access to the tapes. did the watergate committee issue a final report and what did it say? it did issue a final report in

the spring of 1974. and i have to say that the watergate story by the time the senate watergate committee issues its final report, the watergate story had moved far past the senate's important contribution. and so the watergate final report issued by the senate committee is a bit of a it doesn't gain as much attention as people, particularly the investigate was on the committee would have liked what the watergate final report says is that there had been a number of illegal activities, unethical activities that had been accepted by this administration and that had become a sort of way of doing business that the the administration's view of people who oppose the president's policies or oppose the that they were viewed as political enemies was dangerous

to an american democracy and. the watergate committee final report issued a couple of important legislative recommendations, which are passed into law. one of them relates to campaign finance reform. it's important to remember that. 48 individuals were charged and convicted of crimes related to watergate. 20 corporations pled guilty to campaign finance infractions. and so the watergate committee in its final report, including legislate recommendations, does try to address some of these issues by proposing campaign finance reform, which the congress adopts and is signed into law. it also leads to a couple of other interest setting pieces of legislation that happened a few years after. one of them is called the government in sunshine act, and that act is an effort to make government a broadly defined, more accessible and transparent

to the american public so that these types of things, these types of activities can't happen behind closed doors. there are a number of other issues that are taken up. in 1974, the u.s. congress passes the privacy act, guaranteeing some privacy rights to americans. also reforms the freedom of information act. in 1974, again, to provide greater transparency and allow american citizens and the news media new and stronger tools for trying to get information from the american government. well, after the senate wrapped up its work, the attention turned to the house of representatives. one of the members of the house judiciary committee was representative barbara jordan, democrat of texas. here's a little bit of what she had to say. my faith in the constitution is whole at its complete. it is total. and i am not going to sit here and be an idle spectator to the

diminution, the subversion, the destruction of the constitution. who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation, as the representatives of the nation themselves? the subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men. and that's what we're talking about. in other words, from the abuse law violation of some public trust, it is wrong. i suggest it is a misreading of the constitution for any member here to assert that for a member to vote for and article impeachment means that that member must be convinced that the president should be removed from office. the constitution doesn't say that the powers relating to impeachment or any central check in the hands of the body, the

legislature against and upon the encroaching of the executive, the the division between the two branches of the legislature, the house and the senate as signing to the one the right to accuse and to the other, the right to judge the framers of this constitution were very astute. they did not make the accused us and the judges and the judges the same person. we know the nature of impeachment. we've been talking about it a while now. it is chiefly designed for the president and his high ministers to somehow be called into account. it is designed to bridle the executive if he engages in excesses. it is designed as a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men. the framers confided in the congress the power, if need be, to remove the president in order

to strike a delicate balance between a president swollen with power and grown tyrannical and preservation of the independence of the executive. then kate scott us. she's the senate historic. and kate scott, what did the house of representatives what action did they take? so i mentioned earlier that the house committee, some of the staff on the house judiciary committee reached out to the senate, watergate in the summer of 1973 and quietly began conversations how those two committees. right. cooperate with one another. that is could the senate watergate committee provide information that it was gathering in the course of its investigation to a house judiciary committee that may be convened to explore impeachment options? eventually the house judiciary committee does in 1974 vote and

approve three articles of impeachment. that's powerful. speech by barbara jordan, texas. really helps to define the historical context in which this vote is taking place. the last presidential impeachment trial had happened more than a century before, when congress when the house had impeached andrew johnson. so 100 years later, the house was now considering these articles of impeachment. and barbara jordan, i think, explained so well the gravity of the moment that members of the house judiciary committee and even the larger house membership felt themselves in. this was an extremely powerful and important moment. it was not a moment for it was a moment for protecting the united states constitution and for really exercising the co for for a co-equal branch of government to exercise its constitutional

prerogatives. if it believed that the president had served in violation of his constitutional duties and obligations, the impeachment tool, as barbara jordan explains, is meant for exactly to answer exactly this kind of situation. and they took it very, very the house judiciary ultimately does approve three articles of impeachment against richard nixon. and that, of course, sets in motion his decision in is in part part of his decision to resign from office. so in this never reached the floor of the house because president nixon resigned before or after the committee vote. and the republicans on the committee, for the most part, voted for the resolution as well, didn't they? they did. and there were some powerful speeches made by republican members of the house judiciary committee, really, that describe lived there. but they how they had approached

this very solemn task and why they were casting their vote the way that they were. they were proud republicans, of course. they were. they had been partizans, but they felt that at this moment in time they had to rise above partizanship and think about the health and security of the nation and its constitutional government. you know, you mentioned that the house judiciary committee approves these three articles. the house never takes up that the full house membership never takes up a vote to impeach because president richard nixon announces his decision to resign from office. there's another important meeting that happens. another important moment, if you will, that happens with republic and members of congress. senator barry goldwater, the 1964 republican presidential nominee, and hugh scott, the senate minority leader, go to a white house meeting with, i'm sorry, the republican leadership on the house side. and they they have a meeting with richard nixon in the oval

office in which they describe to him that if the house impeaches the president and the senate sits in a trial of impeachment, that the president does not have support among enough senate republicans to prevent his conviction. and that's, i think, really the moment where it becomes clear to richard nixon that he won't survive this politically. and the only tool left to him is resignation and that's what led to august 8th, 1974. i have never been a quitter to leave office before my term is complete. it is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. but as president, i must put the interests of america first. america needs a full time president and a full time

congress, particularly at. this time, with problems we face at home and abroad, to continue to fight through the months ahead. for my personal vindication, with almost totally absorbed the time and attention of both the president and, the congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home. therefore, i shall resign the presidency effective at noon tomorrow. well, the capitol visitor center has a display on congressional investigations, and the curator of that display is christine blackerby. here she is looking at the part that reflects on watergate. so i wanted to point out several documents in this case.

one is this security log right here from the watergate complex. and in this log, you can see the date of june 17th, 1972, which was the date of the break in at the watergate hotel. and the log has a note written by the security guard from the watergate frank wells, who made a note there in the log that he had seen a piece of tape on a door that prevented the door from latching and made the door accessible from the outside. first, he removes the piece of tape, but later, the same night as he was continuing his rounds, he found another piece of tape on the door and that tipped him off that something was happening and there might be intruders in the building. he called the police. and when the police arrived, they found the five burglars inside the democratic national committee headquarters inside the watergate complex, and they were arrested. so this log, this security log here marks the very beginning of

the watergate scandal. the event that triggered all the other events that followed. another item i wanted to talk about here was the tape recorder right here. so after the watergate break in happened, there was some investigate did reporting indicated that president nixon might have been aware of it and might have been involved in the break in. so the senate created a special committee to to look into it. the special committee to investigate presidential campaign activities, better known, the watergate committee and one of the most important facts that the committee uncovered as part of the investigation was that president nixon had recalled had installed a secret tape recording system in the house and in other locations to record the conversations he had with his advisers. so as soon as the senate and watergate committee discovered

the existence of these recordings, they wanted to hear them to know if they contained evidence that the president himself was personally involved in the crime. that's when the senate issued the subpoena right here, you can see on the back of the wall there, the first ever congressional subpoena of a sitting president. and they subpoenaed this is the subpoena for the tape recordings. they also subpoenaed other documents as well. and were rejoined by kate scott, the u.s. senate historian and author of this book reigning in the state civil society and congress in the vietnam and watergate era. what is your book say about this era and the mood of the country? well, it says a couple of things. what i found with watergate and vietnam, these sort of twin crises that the united states government had navigated over the course of a few years time is that americans became very concerned about the ways in

which their government was responding to the needs of its citizens. they felt that the wasn't responsive. they wanted government to listen to them. they wanted government to be more transparent. they didn't like secrecy. they felt that the government wasn't reflect the needs of the nation. and that's why so many of them took to the streets during this era to protest. one of the lasting cultural contributions of, the watergate investigation, is it's really twofold. it suggested to a number a generation, if you will, of americans that people who served in highest of elected office were seeking their own political interests rather than pursuing the interests of the nation. and it led to a lot of people feeling a great deal of apathy for the democratic process. the second thing it did, i think, interesting from the perspective of someone who

studied senate history is that it led to a kind of revived interest in and trust for congressional investigations. the senate watergate committee serves as really a model for by partizan fact finding truth. that's the there were squabbles among committee members at times. there were squabbles among staff. but the fact is the senate conducted this investigation that had the utmost political sensitivity, if you will, in a really honorable fashion. and think a lot of americans put a lot trust and faith in the process of congressional investigations and their power to address urgent needs. it's interesting that right after the senate watergate investigation, 48% of americans polled said that they approved of of how congress was operating, of how congress worked. you know, if we compare that with the numbers today, i think

there's a big difference there. americans really felt that this committee had looked out for the national interests and put partizanship really aside and that was refreshing to a lot of people. and from the c-span archives, here are some of the voices of those involved in the watergate hearings. i think it's the first time in anybody's memory that somebody challenged the president of the united states up until richard nixon. the position was inviolable and nobody questioned the president. after watergate, everybody felt they could go ahead and question a president of the united states. in other words, we established the fact that a president is not above the law. and up until that point, that wasn't the case. and i think watergate was significant for a number of reasons. i mean, first of all, it dealt

with the very fabric of what we are as a nation, our values and our distaste for corruption. secondly, i think it was successful because sam dash knew how to tell a story. he started at a lower level and he built it up to a crescendo. and during the summer of 1973, watergate was the best soap opera on television. and, of course, the other reason that watergate was successful is that we found the white house tapes. the great thing other than the investigation that senator ervin did, his final report, which is for. 5000 pages. and in it, he asks the question, what was watergate? and he answered it. and he said, watergate was an attempt to subvert and destroy

the process of selecting presidential candidates and a president. exactly. and then he goes through this. you know, he wouldn't and never evaded the tough questions. and he said, why watergate? why did this happen? and his answer and it's the end of his report the lust for. so senate historian kate scott, final word. 50 years on, have we revamped our thinking about watergate? well, i don't know that we've revamped our thinking about watergate. what i find interest doing is that we continue to find new and exciting detail about this very dramatic political moment in the nation's past. i think about a book published in the last couple of years, garrett graf's book, watergate a new history. it's just a phenomenally

detailed account of the watergate scandal that goes way beyond the the far earlier, i should say, than the break in at the watergate office complex in 1973 and also looks at all the various components in and pieces of the puzzle that are happening at the same time that the watergate investigation is going on. i can't recommend that book enough to people out there with with a lot of curiosity about watergate history. we're still uncovering things even today that help us further understand this really complicated moment in the nation's history. and u.s. senate historian kate scott has also written about that era in her book reingn the state civil society in congress, in the vietnam and watergate era. we appreciate your parts supporting in our congress investigative series. oh, it's my pleasure. thank