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>> welcome back, everyone. so i'm so glad to welcome everyone to our first panel for this k and what we are going to with this first panel is really kind of lay out some of the broader themes and dynamics around china's growing attention and strategicl south at this moment where we're clearly at an inflection point in the global order, look a bit at what are china's goals how china's going about achieving those goals and what we think isg the likelihood that china will achieve those goal, what will its success be. anding we could not have a better group to kick us off here with g this first panel. so let me introduce them very briefly. i won't go through their full bio, those will be. on your virtual program so i'm just going to give a quick introduction of each of our sts now. we have the chairman of the middle east institute at the national university of singapore. we have next to mesearch associate at the africa

center for strategic studies and national defense university. we have a distinguished fellow in china studies at the national bureau of asian research, and and on the screen joining us from beijing is michael schuman who's a nonresident senior fellow with the global china hub as well as a contributing writer for the atlantic magazine. so i should just say at the outset is here that w take audience questions for the last 10 minutes of our panel today and audience members can submit questions via ask a a c.org ask ac.org. so we'll get to that at the end and please feel free to jump in and ask questions. so what we're going to do now is just jump into our moderated discussion for in this rest of the conference. we won't be having o remarks, we just want to have a free-flowing conversation. what i want to start off with is really a question just very broadly, why is beijing so interested in the global south

to begin with? >> thank you very much for having me today. it's great to be here and and to focus such important request question -- questions for a couple of days. well i think that china's interest in the global south what we call the global south is not new. you know, it dates back to the decolonization movement. over time it has evolved obviously, and during the reform and opening periods china's interest was more focused on economic developments and getting resources raw materials from the developing world and also using it as a way to asphyxiate taiwan's diplomatic space. but for the past ten yearsa vision that's much more strategic much more comprehensive, it is a look at multi-domains sta islamic one an interest in, you know developing the markets

for its companies. in the diplomatic area, trying to build coalition ares with countries and international institutions to align with china's political and diplomatic interest. and politically par the way that that a countries in the developing wworld are helping china maybe shaping norms on the global ng stage. so it's a much more strategic vision where beijing looks at these countries as a, you know, vast area in which conclude expand its powers, exexpand if its influence -- expand its infl by saying that domestically china dun talk abouty the global south -- doesn't talk about the global south. it talks about developing countries and the emerging world. and that tells you how i think the vision is about this emerging force on the international scene that will basically upend the current

order that is dominated by western countries and if being replaced with that emerging force, with china as its leader and composed by non-western countries. so it's the west and the non-west in the world that's the focus of their breast. >> and as josh kind of outset of the conference, i mean, this is not a new dynamic, right, in terms of china's bid to lead the global south.h. g77, this is kind of a return to that dynamic. >> right. yeah and i mean, obviously during thee, 50s throughout the '70s the interest was somehow similar in the sense that it was a global zigs, something that was -- global vision, something that would end the world order. but that's the only thing that is very similar in that way. today, of course it's not about -- [inaudible] if revolution -- communist revolution it's more about

malleable and flexible coalitions to reduce the influence of western what beijing thinks is a western-led order, western concepts and to instead replace it with ways t for a world that's very different and in which beijing thinks that the developing world can be partners and >> so i think it's worth at this point digging into this question that you touched assistant secretary touched on which is, you know, this notion of the global south. nobodyue likes that terminology but we don't seem to have a betterno one. so what is this creature we're calling the global south? is a useful terminology? if is there a betterbout this? because i think it's manager that's on everyone's mind as we kick off our conference.

>> that's a very good question. and thehe short answer is there is no such creature. [laughter] we use what we now call the global south and i think from political correctness we used to call it the third world we used to call it theless developed countries we used to call it the developing countries. we used to -- now we can call it the non-western world all right? it really represents a certain mood a mood which is partly a hangover from the colonial experience, a sense of being disadvantaged economically and politically in the global system -- [inaudible] inequalities ofhe system, the sanctimoniousness of certain aspects of western diplomacy particular ifly european diplomacy but also american. and a sense that western definitions of norm ins -- norms are not the onlyefinitions of norms.

but i think it's also -- and it takes form in organizations such as the -- [inaudible] movement the g77 and most recently brics. but this mood and this tolerance, i wouldn't call them organizations, do not create any coalition of interest except perhaps at a very high are level of generality. so high and yo general -- so general that it really describes nothing very practical in of policy. the g77 they have a certain relevance in international organizations like the u.n., but i wouldn't overstate the case. perhaps if because i did some evil things in a previous life, i spent a lot of youth as a young diplomat working in the g77, and i can tell you there is very good cohesion in them.d be taken seriously. and china insofar as it's had

any success in cultivating -- [inaudible] is because it takes that mood or it pretends to take that mood seriously. and it's -- perhaps even more so the result of the west, europe, north america not taking that mood serious enough. i think i think what was said at the beginning is all correct. but i think one of the reasons china is making a concerted effort -- not new but a renewed effort to cultivate the global south iso really because its policies towards the developed countries, the global north if you like, towards north america towards europe, towards japan -- [inaudible] if i can't think of any country in the so-called global north

and, i in fact, manyn the global south that are not -- [inaudible] about a one aspect or another of chinese baer. now, i think that's -- behavior. they also have uncertainties about western behavior, one aspect or another. but i think it's understand that these generalities like global south is third world developing world -- [inaudible] of interest. and it's much more important or as important as the mood. it doesn't mean that these countries are however resentful they may be about different aspects of western policy, willing to drink deeply of chinese kool-aid. they have their own interests they have their own agencies. some ofru those interests maybe even many of those interests were aligned with china's interests but not all of them. some are aligned with western interests, and somere of them will not align with either chinesen interests.

and that is certainly very clear in my part of the world t i think the it's clear generallyld speaking, in this acor more nows animal we call the global -- aa m nows animal we call the global south. >> thank you. that's a great way to tackle, i think, this drift question around terminology. and -- >> [inaudible] so we have to use it. >> exactly. after a laugh i was hoping you'd give us, you'd make news and and give us the terminology we could all use going forward but i guess we're stuck with global south for now. so building on that,s i wanted to ask michael you know, bilahari was starting to talk a little bit about china ease shifting breasts with -- china's shifting interests with countries from the global south and i'm curious if you wanted to talk about as china has a grown richer, more have its interests in the global south changed and what impact

is its having on those relationships it's having across this creature we're calling the global south? if. >> yeah, thanks, david. well, you know, as we've already mentioned, china likes to see itself as -- or present itself as kind of a fellow traveler with the global south just another developing country poor country that was a victim of western imperialism and and therefore, has a shared experience andha therefore a shared interest. but i think that's becoming less and less true. you know, the chinese economy is only a little bit smaller than the entire rest of the global south combined. and and china's becoming an incredibly dominant player within the emerging world. it's for many countries in the global south china's the

reliable trading partner china is the largest official ditor, it is a major creditor for many low income countries in some cases the largest. and this is based this is creating -- well, in the old days when i was in college i won't tell you when that was but we would have called this a kind of a first world third world relationship. that in some ways isn't all thatdifferent between the relationship between the north and the south. and in many ways, the chinese have not particularly generous dominant partners when you look at the way that they're handling, for example the debt restructuring for low income countries where they've been extremely reluctant to give these countries significant debt relief. so i think it's this power balance that shifted, it's opening divisions between china

and the rest of the global south and potential points of disagreement and conflict. and my sense actually those sitting here that the chinese government actually likes this unequal relationship on thep sort of level because my sense is that the chinese don't want to see -- don't really want to see r a multilateral global south. they want to leave the global south -- lead the global south and they want the global south to fall in behind china and support chinese interests and chinese ambitions on the global stage. and you can see this in the way that china deals with the global south and certainly it's always china offering the initiatives china offering the programs and other countries are expected to kind of sign up whether it's the belt and road initiative, global security initiative, global development initiative. and because of the way that this

unequal relationship is developing i think what you're also seeing is the emergence of othere voices within the global south that don't see it in their interests to have china lead the global south in the way that it intends. you see this, for example with india which is trying to exploit some of these new tensions and divisions that china is facing within the global south. so i think going forward in terms of what chinese aims are globally in terms of remaking the global order and the conversation with the united states and the west, this changing nature of the relationship between china within the global south and its role within the global south is going to be increasingly important. >> so it's fair to say t others

that china now views the relationship withla the global south, the global south generally as a kind of fundamental and central to its geoto-strategic objectives. >> yeah. >> i mean -- >> i agree with that. i think from a diplomatic e point of view, yes. but domestically, no. i'm sorry my friend, i didn't mean to interrupt you. >> no, that's okay. well, my view on this is that chinese policy towards the global south i think is becoming increasingly e manyin as assets of chinese policy -- with the global competition with the united states.ed and it's, beijing is starting to relation with the global south more and more in the in that context. and i think because of that, the chinese government is actually, i depending on kind of weaponizing the global south against the u.s. and and its allies. to use the global south as a foundation to promote its own strategic aims, its own vision

for a new global order. and i think that too is also going to be creating problems for china within the global south. as has already been mentioned you know, most members of the global south really don't want to take sides between the u.s. and't china. they don't want to take sides with the u.s. against china and they certainly don't want to take sides against chai -- with china the united states. they benefit from both these riches. i think china sees the global southh increasingly in geopolitical terms and sees the global south as more and more of a foundation to support its own interests and power on a global stage that this is going to create more divisions within the negotiable south -- global south as a well. >> i mean, china doesn't need the developing world to take sides.cessarily, you know? i think they're very much aware that each of them is their own

interests and their own agencies. it just needs the their support in some areas. but some areas are actually very consequential for the shape that the global order is going to have in the future. and so i necessarily that it's going to be, you know, two separate camps with the west isolated on one hand and china and those developing countries on the other. it's more fluid and complex than that. but it doesn't mean that using those relationships increasing influence that china has economically, politically in terms of security, in terms of governance in those countries it cannot sort of fear them -- steer them in a direction that is more beneficial to china's ownhi interest withs andlate and reduce the influence of western countries and universal values. so that's, i think that's the picture

here. and i think that china's economic slowdown is going to change that to the contrary because china is going to feel more more cornered in a way maybe more with reduced options. going to use more diversity of tools for influence that are cheaper than just, you know, investing in big infrastructure projects. already happening. it started to decline back in 201515 already big ticket infrastrucit was never the objective anyway. so investing in other areas tha are more shaping governance training and i think we can talk about that in other areas that are not as costly, but very

consequential for the future shape of the world. >> that's great with. yeah i mean,s a lot of subjects that have just been brought up that i want to come back to, especially the impact of the struggling economy and the demographic changes. but, yes want to bring paul inining and the security aspects here in term of china's interests and engagement around the global south and how big a factor that is that china's looking at its engainment.. -- engagement. >> thank you for that, david. it's great to be on a again with nadeje and many other colleagues i've worked with for many years. let me with remarks that were made earlier which is this term the global south. ifhi you talk to africans, they don't use the term global south at all. they'll talk about developing countries, developing regions regions that were once colonized, regions that feel not well represented in

international, multilateral institutions. basically constitute the vast part of the world's population but have very little voting power in institutions like the imf the world trade organization or the world t bank, right? that's the language that you're going to hear or from african diplomats. now, global south yes it will be used in different ways, but it's really not seen as a fundamental term of art when it comes to african countries. and i think we saw this in the recent narrow line movement, the summit which i was -- [inaudible] and when you listened to the discussions many in thosese rooms and you listened to what developing world were talking about, there was very little usage of this term global south. people talked about group of 777, group of 24 -- group of 77, group of 24 which is a group within the g77 that defends african interests inside the imf

with the secretariat in new york. those are the social conversations that were taking place there. but in terms of, in terms terms of china's security vision, i would say perhaps four in thisn. region, in africa and latin america in particular, one is to socialize -- [inaudible] if so the chinese defense establishment believes that it has, you know, thatt the military -- china's military and its military influence around the world has grown to such a level l that china has a legitimateer promoting, right its visions and its ideologies of security and security management. and i think that is fundamental. there are quite a number of platforms. i wouldn't call them institutions the sco the

african-china defense forum similarat defense forums in latin america or which areaf younger e because if i think the african ones are much older having been established between 2000 and 2006. latin america these were only established in 2014. but nevertheless you see these as a mere or image right? -- mirror image. quite a number of platforms in beijing which gathers african latin american, asian officers once twice threevery year you know, to discuss global concerns, global problems but from an alternative kind of perspective. so i think this is key. the second is to build alternative defense dialogues and, again these are not institutions. if we look at the xinjiang forum that took place two years ago for the first time african countries were invited to participate in it. and if you -- so the, you know, it was hosted by, you know, the

pla national defense university. one of the things at the dean said was that these forums provide an opportunity for african, latin american, asian countries giving them a space to discuss their issues frankly and freely right? these are the terms that he used. sort of like -- he didn't mention the -- [inaudible] if dialogue, but you could see that's where it was hea again there's that sense of of trying to construct different or alternative different dialogue which think is consistent with the larger policy. china does have a vision of international order does have viewlús of h is organized how it should be organized. and a a lot of those views whether we like it or not do dovetail with the statements released the policies of the non-aligned movement and all these other organizations.

if one looks at the non-aligned movement outcome document that was released after the meeting you know, you can clearly see you know, in these different areas that you're looking at, you can see there's a lot of alignment with some of these position that we're talking about. the other element is to market a professional military education. now, this is a major area of chinese engagement. i believe the most important i would say or on the military side is. i m the african, on the african side, for instance, from 2015 or '16 or thereabouts when african countries demanded for the inclusion, they demanded that, you know, the peace and security, you know, need to be included as part of the -- [inaudible] china corporation. there was agency from the african side. it was not an imposition from china, right? was very reluctant to get into that space because china was very aware of the sort iss of relationships the united states military, for instance, had african country.

so from that period we've seen that the chinese side educates more african officers than any other industrial the eyesed country. and this becomes exstreamly important -- extremely important. and if you - look at the chinese officer, candidate officer officer schools and officer academies, you know, there's been that the reorganization. african countries now access er half of those right? if the military academy and different a qualities so on, we could say the same thing about latin america. so i think this is a major low cost but high impact. it's really high impact in terms of exposing foreign officers to of doing things. now, as to whether those concepts are actually adopted and applied that's a different story. i worked on a number of projects that have been looking at how african officers perceive, you know the education that they receive in chinese institutions. and i think the --

[inaudible] after the pme element you know, general to developing countries is reenforcing other lines of effort. so the people eat liberation army has been -- people's liberation army heecialized and schooled and raised to see is itself as a part off the architecture of the communist party of china. it's a political army, right? it serves the cc pnchts it does not serve the constitution, it does not serve the nation. it is an army, it's the backbone of the chinese communist party. so pla officers are political cadres inre their own right. right? and we this in the the strategic guidance, right that the chinese release regularly lyafter, you know, four or five years or so. thisce construct that the pla or the chinese military supporting larger objectives, cultural, ideological, the party-to-party work right? you do have uniformed officers

that a participate in party-to-party work with african political parties for instance, and that sort of thing. and latin america you know, the same thi countries in latin america and the same thing for pakistan in south asia. it's not just purely right? it is much more global than that, and i tend to term this as a blended security approach where, you know, the pla also discusses the belt and road process, it doeses culture it discusses confucius institute training confucius institutes areot doing with african institutes. it's not military, but it's being done with a stage thetic kind of framing in mind. so i think david these would be thehe four or five issues that the i would say characterize the chinese security engagements within the developing, within developing countries. >> that was fantastic. thank you paul. and you put so much out there in terms of not just whatn temples of, you know, military -- in terms of military education and

engagement but pointing out how this ties into other dynamics that china -- ways in which china's engaging across the developing world and other aspects. and also, i think importantly noting this is not something china's i a imposing on countries. inaf many cases at least in the african cone tech, you're saying there's agency here and a demand signal -- >> le yes. little bits of agency. there's variation. >> yeah. >> i mean, some countries negotiate better than others. some countries get better deals with china. but the point i'm making is that there is a level of agency, you know? ifl the tendency to rook at african -- to look at a african countries's as supplicants who do china's bidding the story's a little more nuanced that -- than that. >> i think this is a good way to transition into the with question of what is china offering many developing countries that is working that they want, that they appreciate, and is china ultimately at this moment getting what it wants out of its increased attention to

the global south and the developing world? if so i don't know if anyone wants to jump in, maybe i'll turn to michael to kick us off if you want to answer that, that question is china getting what it wants out of the global south right now? is it working? >> i think it's getting some of what it wants out of the global south. i mean, i think that the chinese see the global south as a huge economic opportunity that they're doing a very good job of captainizing -- capitalizing on. if belt and road nichety was about developing -- initiative was developing -- [inaudible] between china andnd the developing world and chinese companies see the developing world as future markets, future consumers to buy their products. the chinese are challenging japan right now for the title of wod's largest car exporter. those cars are not going to the united states, they're e going to southeast asia and africa,

latin america. so in that way the chinese are getting what they want. i also think they're getting a fair degree of diplomatic and politicalup support. the chinese view the global south as being more receptive to its ideas about reforming global governance and some of its political and ideological principles, the kind of things enshrined in a the global security initiative. targeted at the global south. you can see chinese benefiting from support from members of the global south in promoting its ideas and initiatives at the international institutions like the united nations. but they're not getting everything that they want. i thinknk that going forward things will be more difficult going back to what we were talking about earlier. i think that the chinese see their relation to the global south more and more in terms of

geopolitical competition with the west. i think they may find themselves somewhat disappointed as, you know, we've all reiterated at this point. there is no such thing as the global south that has one common interest. there's multiple interests. i think the chinese would like to see as many members of the global south more or less fall ins line behind china and behind chinese interests. and increasingingly i think that's what the chinese want. you see that, for example in my opinion, with the recent expansion of thehe brics and how that played out. you can see the rent belt and road forum in october in beijing where i think the chinese increasing wily want to see the global -- members of the global south act to a certain extent as client states or supportive states for china's own ambitions on the global stage. andi think that's where going forward the chinese may find

themselves a bit disappointed. >>yo bilahari, did you want to jump in here? >> well, i just want the jump in to support what michael just said as a accurate. i think the chinese insofar as they see -- [inaudible] in terms of this competition with the u.s. is almost bound to be disappointed. a cohesive grape. group. it's -- somebody earlier mentioned, i can't remember who that most of the countries that make up the global south certainly in southeast asia and asia always say we do n.s. and china. so what do we really mean by that? it's not that we m want to do no, lay low ando hope not to be noticed. what we mean t is that we want to have the agency to take a collective approach to our

interests. some of our interests may align with the u.s. or europe, some may align with china and some may align with neither of these -- [inaudible] but it is b our interest even if it aligns with one or the other. i think that is a -- [inaudible] i think china plays the game in international market institutions like the u.n. much better. it understands the mood or -- to understand the mood that constitutes thes global it avoids what i would call sanctimonious with diplomacy insisting that its interpretation of values is the only possible interpretation of values and the conceit that one of the -- [inaudible] values needs to be the norm. a myth, you know? it doesn't exist except at a very high-- [inaudible]

nothing practical. so i think this is a game request. it's a diplomatic game that china mace not badly but it will not get what it wants if what it wants is some weight on its side vis a vis a vie the u.s. or sees see the west -- vise a see the west -- vis-a-vis the west. where it is most important markets, perhaps one day they will be inn the global south. s inner they're -- in fact, they're already there in certain ways like evs for example. they're quite good automobiles. you can see them in southeast asia so why should we not buy them right? but their own interest, their most important if interests in technology and so on are, in fact, with the global north. and that is true of countries at the top. india is a very important member

of the global south. it's an important member of the non-aligned movement, but there is interests aligned with china. i don't think so. indonesia, some of their interests align with china but not. in fact, i think there are two things that have become more and more evident over the last 10 is years -- 10 years at least in my part of the year. one is a growing awareness that in order to deal with either a china or the united states effectively, you have to deal with both simultaneously. secondly, there a -- [inaudible] that we have concerns about both. certain aspects of chinese behavior ask and certain aspects of american behavior. ..

nobody is going to light up all interest across all domains in one direction or another. and that since there is a new world orderits anymore.ny there is energy create in the united states and europe. look at the world in binary terms but most of the countries in the global south i dare say do not look at the world that way. >> and one would think may be that this kind ofam dynamic you are talking about where countries any negative sense perhapswith have to think about dealing with the credit and china simultaneously but there's also benefits to that as there was during the cold war in terms of playing the united states and shut off one another and gain benefits from that perhaps your. >> i don't think it'ss so simple. i don't understand why you say if i heard you correctly lysates difficult to do with both u.s. and china.

it's not binary choice. and i think this idea you buy one against the other that's -- [inaudible] you don't get into trouble. even during the u.s. so the cold war people tried to play that, eventually to consult out you know? >> fair enough. >> folly or interest in whichever direction they take you. some will take in the direction of china some in the united direction. some india or africa or europe. it's what i call dynamic multiplayer dirty. you will have a central axis of u.s.-china relations because that is sort of thean most important relationship in the world. but around that you are going to have coalitions forming and reforming themselves around

different interests. you already s see it actually in the nation in asia at least. >> welcome others to jump your but this comes back to what you were saying, nadege in terms of china's perspective which is, i don't try to paraphrase that using it's not china necessary wants countries to choose n or the needs to be this new order that china is setting up but in kind of achieving what bill was laying out there in terms of this much more multi polar order in which countries have this choice, china has already to some extent succeeded in some of its answer. >> i would think so. i believe it's very binary, for sure. there's only one obstacle between its objectives and where it is now. it's object of being of risen power on the global stage and where it is now it is the west,

it's the western influence. so in a binary zero somma perspective as beijing government has it can be difficult to -- i mean, there's no other way to then isolating the west. it's like this. your power grows my power grows, your zero-sum. and in that game, if i can put it that way countries in the developing and in the emerging world are part of, like putting the numbers on the shifting weight of power. so this is when this idea of the democratization of international relations come in because the multiplicity of countries that are non-western and if you look at the list, just by numbers

one country one road, it's very important for china to in order to achieve this shift in the balance of power. i basic but this is the main objective. and yes i think in some, in some issues more important from beijing's perspective that others there is like flexible malleable coalitions that we are all starting to see emerging, might be very consequential and sometimes you don't need 160 countries on your side to be hape the direction that the world is taking. you can have 54 that go with you the fact that they are not a violation of human

rights. and it's that consequential but i believe it is. it is flexible and there are ny, there's a lot of dynamic and we are always saying the same thing it's not like these countries are pawns in the hands of beijing. beijing certainly sees himij as such andt's a very, it's a very binary vision for what the world order looks like. the rejection of the existing one and it's trying to shape it in a very different direction. >> right. i wan point you made earlier in terms of the capacity to be able to shape the order in the way that fits china's interests better, and that is the point about what is the impact of china's slowing hieconomy, which i think we all agree now is not can be

returning in ten sent to the galloping growth of the past. you will be the pullback from the massive infrastructure ot projects of the past, although it is not entirely gone but certainly a pullback on financing with the belt and road initiative. you talk a little bit about other ways in which china will receive also is but i am curious, do think both with this economic slowdown and with the demographic changes and then the shrinking of china's population that it looksks like we are going to be witnessing over the next couple of decades i the case china is going to continue to be able to have the kind of influence and achieve the kinds of things it's trying to achieve through its engagement in the developing world or is this going to fundamentally alter my shape the way countries you the value of a relationship withhi china? >> i think what we're going to see - is, we have racing belt and road 2.0. so what wasoa the belt and road 3.0. the belt and road isot not going to go away. i don't think it was designed to be an economic speedy yes.

>> is doing a lot of economic work. but that's somewhat the belt and road is. the belt and road fundamentally is an ideological vision. it's an ideological vision that is telling of the parts of the world look, the world is not binary you know, and international arrangements can be shaped in different ways. and this is what china is, this is a vision that china is offering. i tnk that's what the bri is. the physical element of the belt and road the connectivity, the infrastructure and sotu those are physical manifestations of this concept but fundamentally the belt and road is fundamentally an idea. nk it's going to live on. now, certainlyin there's less -- we've only seen this with african countries right? a kenyan government has been trying to get china to extend --

i mean these are very, very clear whether the chinese would do that. of the governments of and trying to get china revive the zambia and what we are not the only one spirit we see this in a room. we sit in nicaragua. they are all basically thesete governments have become much tighter in terms of the diplomatic terms of the way they're trying to get the chinese government to find different initiatives in the context of an economic slowdown. so i think we're going to see less to do think it's to be much more targeted. hink what has happened is the belt and road has encountered problems along the way problems in terms of, you know, environmental impacts complaints that have been made by civil society and so on. so i don't think it's going to disappear. secondly i think that belt and road program was it's part of a

much larger effort, right? silviculture when i mentioned earlier, the political party to party training, the workshops which even which recruit which high school student at solar it's such a wide array of domains in which china is engaging that i don't think influencet may change somewhat, but i don't think that the chinese government put its eggs in one basket, so to speak. i think it's a multiplicity engagement and whether it is succeeding or not is another question altogether but but i think on the diplomatic front as ambassador bilahari was talking about, i think this is some success. if you look at the african behavior or issues of xinjiang, in hong kong, on taiwan, right? it's very, very clear right?

which we african country which were african countries are voting. when the speaker the former speaker of the house nancy pelosi when xi made her visit to taiwan, if you look at the condemnation that flew in, they came in, a lot of them came from african countries right? on theon diplomatic side i think there's some wins.an of the china needs to win edward and i think the chains understand this but i think in terms of volume, terms of what you put out there and or 30% that's fine. so i think that is really the strategy really a multi-domain - operation. and that's how i see the belt and road. it's not just an infrastructure building initiative. so i think responding to the belt and road cannot just be about infrastructure. i think it should be about something much more fundamental and that's really the power of ideas. >> actually helpful and that will be the subject of many other panels to come over the next two days as what is an age

of belt and road at how to respond to it. michael, or bilahari, anything to add on those points? then we will turn it over to -- >> go ahead. >> please go ahead. >> yugo. >> well, i wouldt as the chinese economy struggles that china is going to be even more aggressive in promoting its leadership of the global south that i think you can make a case that the chinese leadership has come to recognize that they may not be able to overtake the united state economically, but the goal of overtaking the united states and the global order remains t same. so how does china do that if it's not going to see the

economic gains going forward that should have expected and hoped for. and i think the way that the chinese are going to do that is there going to try to basically overcome the united states in aggregate, which is trying to build a coalition of support mainly within the global south and use that as a foundation basically overwhelm the u.s. by numbers. and so i think the slowing economy actually makes the global south more important to china economically of course, but also diplomatically inns. >> let me jump in here now. i think further on the dri i tend to agree it is not just -- it is a vision. i wouldn't even call it an idea. it is a vision, a very ambitious

vision. but ambition and vision are just that. that does not mean they are not i came to see the global south the dri as a collection of projects very disparate collection