these rules. at that empowers all nations to continually raise the standard of living for their citizens and one that is free from aggression coercion and intimidation. that is our vision for the international order. the strongest possible coalition of the nations to advance this vision and to improve the lives of the american people and people around the world. thank you very much for inviting me out for the opportunity to be able to share our views and i wish you a very successful conference. thank you. [applause] have about a ten minute break here. we are going to reconvene for the first panel. ..♪

♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ >> welcome back. i'm so glad welcome everyone to our first panel for this conference. and what we are going to do with first panel is lay out the

broader themes at the moment where we are at an influction point in the global order and how china is going about achieving those goals and what we think the likelihood that china will achieve those goals what would the success be. we could not have a better group to kick us off with the first panel. let me introduce them briefly. i won't go through the full bio. those will be in the virtual program. i will give a quick introduction, chairman of the middle east institute at the national university of singapore. we have next to me paul, research associate at t african center, distinguished fellow and china studies at the the national bureau at the asian

network and joining us from beijing michael shuman as well as writer for the atlantic magazine. i should just say at the outset here that we will take audience questions for tur panel today and audience members members can submit questions via askac.org. so we will get to that at the end and feel free to jump in and ask questions. we will go to moderate discussion we won't be having opening remarks free-flowing conversation and so what i want to sta really a question for you broadly why is beijing interested in the global south to begin with? >> thank you very much for having me today. great to be here and focus on such important questions for a couple of days.

well, i think interest in the global south is not new. dates back to decolonization movement. over time it has evolved over time and during the reform and opening period china's interest was more focused on economic developments and getting resources, raw material from the developing world and also asia way to affixuate taiwan's diplomatic space. it's looking at multidomains starting with the economic one developing the markets its companies in the diplomatic area trying to build coalitions with international institutions to align with

diplomatic interest and politically partnering or shaping the way the countries in the developing world are helping china maybe shaming norms on the global stage. it's much more strategic vision where beijing looks at the country as vast area in which it can expand its power expand influence and should maybe start by saying that domestically global south. it talks about developing countries and city merging world and that tells you how i think the vision is about this emerging force on the international scene that will basically up-end the current order that is dominated by western countries and being replaced with the emerging force with china as its leader and composed by nonwestern countries

and focal of interest. refer as josh discussed at the outset of the conference this is not a new d right in terms of china to lead the global south this is a return to that. >> right. >> right. >> and i mean, of course, during the 50's throughout the 70's the interest was some -- somehow similar in the sense that it was a global vision, something that was supposed to up-end the world order but that is very similar in that way. today, of course, it's not about communist resolution revolution, it's about those coalitions to reduce theinfluence of western -- what beijing think is a western-led order, western concepts and to

instead replace it vision for a world that's very different in which beijing thinks the developing world can be partners and allies. so i think it's worth digging that you touched on. nobody likes that terminology but we don't seem to have a better one. what is the crelling the global south is this a useful terminology is a better way to be thinking about this because i think it's something on everybody's as we kick off our conference? >> well, that's a very good question and the short answer is there's no such creature. what we call the global south i think from political correctness the third world

the less developed countries we used to call developing countries. we used to call them -- [inaudible] >> it really represents a certain mood mood which is partly hangover from the colonial experience, a sense of being disadvantaged economically and politically in the system, certain resentment of inequalities of the system, certain aspects of western diplomacy but also amecan and sense that western definitions or norms are not the only definition of norms but what i think is -- organizations such as the nonalliance movement and the g7 and most recently brics

but i wouldn't call them organizations do not create any coalition of interest except by very high level of generality. so hig that it barely prescribes nothing very practical in term of policy. g77, international organizations like the un but i wouldn't overstate the case

i think -- i think what nadegesaid at the beginning is all correct. but i think one of the reasons china is making a conceew but renewed effort to cultivate the global south is really because its policies towards the developed countries, the global north if you like, towards north america towards europe towards japan has been -- i can't think of any country in the so-called global now and in fact, many countries in the global south that o are not without concerns, anxieties about one respect of chinese behavior. i think they also have concerns

about western behavior in one aspect or another but global south, third world developing world can see interest anducmore important and as important -- it doesn't mean that these countries are ever however resentful they may be of western policy are -- [inaudible] >> they only trust agencies. only those who trust many of those they trust would align with china's interest but not all of them. with western interest and some will not align with either chinese or western interest. and that's certainly -- that is certainly very clear in my part of the world. southeast asia but i think it's clear generally speaking in this

animal that we call the global south. >> thank you. that's a great way to tackle that i think difficult question around thisminology. >> i was hoping that you give us the -- make news and use the terminology that we can use going forward but we are stuck with global south for now. building on that i wanted to ask michael bill was starting to talk a little bit about china shifting interests and relations with members of the global south and what it means for china's influence there. >> yeah, thanks. as we've already mentioned

china likes to see itself as -- represent itself, this is another developing country poor country that was a victimwestern imperialism and shared experience andd interest. the chinese economy is only a than the entire rest of the global south combined and china is becoming dominant player within the emerging world. for many countries the global south, china is trading partner. china is the largest bilateral predator low-income countries and many cases the largest.

in the old days when i was in college, i won't tell you when that was we would have called a first-world, third world relationship. that in so many ways all that different between relationship between the north and the south. in many ways the chinese have not been particularly generous dominant partners when you look are handling, for example the debt reconstruction for low-income countries. i think the power balance has shifted, the opening divisions between china and the rest of the global south and potential points of disagreement and conflict and those in beijing is that the chinese government actually likes this relationship

on certain level because my sense is that the chinese don't t -- don't really want to see a multilateral global south. they want to lead the global south and they want the global south thatd china and support chinese interest and chinese ambitions on the global stage and you could see it some way that china deals with the global south and certainly china offering the initiative china offering the program and other countries are expected to kind of sign up whether it's the belt and road initiative and because the way this relationship is unequal relationship is developing i think what you're also seeing the other voices within the global south that don't see it in their interest to have china

lead the global south. you see, for example with india which is trying to exploit some of the new tensions and divisions that china is facing within the global south. i think going forward what chinese aids are globally in terms of remaking the global order and local confrontation with the united states and the west that this change in nature between the relationship with china within the global south and the role of the globa be increasingly important. >> so it's fair to say that you would say and i think others that china now views the relationship with the global south, global south generally as kind of fundamental and central to strategic objectives?

>> yi didn't mean to interrupt. >> no, that's okay. well my -- my view on this is that the chinese policy towards the global south i think is becoming increasingly many aspects the chinese policy with the global competitiontaunited states and it's starting beijing is starting to see its relationship with the global south more and more in that context. so i think because of that the chinese government, it's actually intending on weponizing the global south against u.s. and allies. ambition for new global order anding i think that too is also going to be creating problems for china within the

global south as have already been mentioned. they don't want to take sides with u.s. against china and they certainly don't want to take sides with china against the united states because they benefit from both of these relationships. so i think china sees global south foundation to support inte areststage that this is going to create more divisions within the global south as well. >> china doesn't need the developing world to take sides necessarily. i think they are very much aware that each of them have their own interest and their and agency. it just needs to have their support in somee areas are actually very consequential for the shape that the global order is going to have in the future. and so it's not necessarily it's going to be, you know, tith the west

isolated on the one hand and china on the other. it's more fluid and complex than÷ doesn't mean that using those relationships, using that increasing influence that china has economically politically in terms of security, in terms of governance in those countries itnnot serve and steer them in the direction that's more beneficial to china's own interest and isolate and reduce the influence of western universal values. so that's -- i think that's the broad picture here and i don't think that china's economy is going to slow down. it's going to change to the contrary because china is going to feel more -- more cornered in a way and more -- maybe more like reduced options. it's going to use more diversity

of tools for influence that are cheaper than just, you know, investing in big infrastructure projects. we've seen that already happening with the governor start today decline. it was never the objective. so investing in other areas that are more, you know, shaping governance training, i think that -- can talk about that in other areas that are not as but very consequential for the future shape of the world. >> that's great. a lot of subjects that have been brought up that i want to come back especially the impact of and demographic changes but yes i want to talk a little bit about the training, the security aspects in terms of china's around the global south and how big a factor that is and the way that

china is looking at engagement. >> thank you thank you david and great to be on our panel again with nadege and many colleagues that i've worked with in this room for many years. let me first associate myself with remarks that nadege made earlier which is the global south. you talk to african diplomats they don't use the term global south at all. they talk about developing countries, developing regions regions which were once colonized, regions that feel not well represented in international multilateral institutions regions that are basically constitute the vast majority of the world'sja little voting power in institutions like the imf the world trade organization and the world bank, right. that's the language that you're going to hear from african diplomats. now, global south yes it will be used in different ways but

it's really not seen as a fundamental term of art when it comes to -- when it comes to african countries and i think we saw this in the recent nonaligned movement and the group of 77 summit which i was credited to observe and when you listen to discussions in the room and you listen to the delicates that we are talking about, there was very little ushis term global south. people talked about group of 77, group of 24 which is a group within the g77 that defends african interests inside the imf with the secretary in new york. those were the conversations that were taking place there. but in terms of -- in terms of the -- the security picture in terms of china's security vision i would say perhaps four things in this region. in africa, latin america is to socialize

concept so the chinese defense establishment believes that it ha the military -- the china's military and military influence around the world has grown to such a level that china has a legitimate interest in promoting but its vision and ideology of security and security management and i think that is fundamental. there's quite aouldn't call them institutions, defense dialogues develop the african china defense forum similar defense forums with latin america which are younger because i think the african ones are much older having been established y know between 2000 and 2006. in latin america these were only established in 2014 but nevertheless you see these mirror image quite the number of platforms that have been

established by the national defense university in beijing which gathers latin american, asian officers once twice, three times every year to discuss global concerns, global problems but from an alternative kind of perspective so i think this is -- this is key. the second is to build an alternative defense dialogues and again these are not institutions. if we look at the -- the forum that tlawo years ago for the first time african countries were invited to participate in it and if you -- if you -- so the -- it was hosted by the pla national defense university and the dean of that university is up with of the things he said which was very interesting that these forums provide an opportunity for african latin american asian countrg them a space to discuss the issues frankly and freely, all right these are the

terms that he used as sort of didn't mention the dialogue but you could see that's where it was heading so there's that -- there's thatrying to construct different alternative defense dialogues which i think is consistent with the larger policy. china does have a vision of international order. that's abuse of how the international system is organized, how it should be organized and a lot of those views do dovetail with the statements release today the policies of the movement and all the other organizations. looks at the nonaligned movement outcome document that washe meeting. you can clearly see you know, in the different areas that they're looking at you can see there's a lot of alignment with some of these positions that we are talking about. the other element is to market the professional military education. now this is a major area of

chinese engagement probably the most important i would say on the military side. i mean, if we look at on the african -- on the african side, instance, from 2015 or '16 thereabout when african countries demanded for the inclusion, they demanded that, you know, peace and security need to be included as part of the agency from the african side. it was not an imposition from china, right and china was very reluctant to get into that space because china was very aware of the relationships that the united states military for instance have built with different african countries so from that period we've seen that the chinese side educate more african officers than any other industrialized country and this becomes extremely important and if you look at the -- the reorganization of the chinese officer candidate officer schools and officer academies there's been that reorganization.

african countries now access over half of those right the military academy different colleges and so on. we could say the same thing about latin america so i think this is a major -- impact. it's really high impact in terms of exposing foreign officers to the chinese way of doing things. now as to whether those concepts are actually adapted and applied, that's a different story. i worked on a number of projects that have been looking at how african officers perceive, you know the education that they receive in chinese institutions. then i think the fourth one after the pme element which is very general to developing countries is reinforcing other people's liberation army had been socialized and schooled and raised to see itself as part of the architecture of the communist party of china. it's a political army, right it

serves the ccp. it does not serve the constitution and it d serve the nation. it is an army, it's the backbone of the chinese communist party so pla officersre political in their own right right and we see this in the -- the strategic guidance right the chinese release regularly after four, five years or so. this concept that the pla or the chinese military establishment is supporting larger objectives, cultural ideological the party to party work, right you do have uniformed officers that participate in party to party work with african political parties, for instance and that sort of thing and latin america you know the same thing can be said about latin america on countries like pakistan, south asia.ust purely military, right, it is -- it is much broader than that and i tend to

turn this blended security approach where you know, pla also discussing the belt and date cousins institutes and a lot of training that institutes are doing and it's not military, b is being done you know, with the strategic kind of framing in mind so i think that these would be the four, five issues that i would -- that i would say characterize chinese engagements within the developing, within developing countries. >> fantastic, thank you. you put so much out there in terms of not just what china is offering countries in terms of military education and engagement but pointing out how this ties in to other dynamics that china in ways china is developing across world and also i think importantly noting that this is not something china is imposing on countries that in many cases at least in the african context yougency here and there's a demand signal for this

engagement? >> little bit of agency. there's varia some countries negotiate better than others. some countries get better deals with china than others, but the point i'm making is there's a level of agency. tendency to look at african countries are simply -- basically do china's bidding. the story is a little bit that. >> i think this was a good way to transition into the question of you know, what is it that china is offering many developing countries that is working that they -- that they want that they appreciate and is china ultimately at this moment getting what i wants out of its increased attention to the global south and in the developing world. so i don't know if anyone wants to jump in. maybe i will turn to you want to answer that, that question is china getting what it wants out of the global south is it working with what it's doing? >> i think it's getting some of what it wants from the global

south. i think the chinese see the global south as a huger economic opportunity and doing very good job of developing new bonds of trade finance, technology between china and the developing world and when you -- and chinese companies see the developing world as future markets future consumers to buy products. the chinese are challenging japan right now for the title of world largest car exporter. in that way the chinese are getting what they want. i also think they are getting diplomatic and vocal support that the chinese in the global south are being m receptive to its ideas about reforming global governance and some of logical principles, the kind of

things and china global initiative these are very much targeted at the global south. you can see chinese benefiting from support from members of the global south and ideas and the international institutions like the united nations but they're not getting everything that they want and i think it's going forward things will be more difficult and going back to what we were talking about earlier. i think the chinese see the ore and in terms of political competition with the west. i think they find themselves somepointed as, you know, we have all reiterated. there's no such thing of the global south that has one common interest, multiple interest. i think the chinese would like to see as many members of the global south more or less fall in line behind china and behind chinese interests and increasingly i think that's what

the chinese want, you see that, for example in my opinion in the way the expansion of the brics and how that played out. you can see it at the belt and road form in october and in beijing where the -- i think the chinese increasingly want to see the global to certain extent client states or supportive states for china's ambition in the global stage and i think that's where going forward the chinese may find themselves a bit disappointed. >> did you want to jump in here? >> i just wanted to jump toal t and to add to it. in terms of the competition with the u.s. is almost bound to be disappointed because it's not a

-- it's somebody earlier mentioned, i can't remember who that most of the countries that make up the global south always say we do not wish to choose between u.s. and china. now what do we really mean by that? what they really mean by that is that we want to do nothing lay low and hope not to be noticed what we mean is that we want to have the agency to to take approach to our interest. some of the interest may align with u.s. or europe, some may align with china and some may align with neither of the major priors but it is our interest even if it or another. i think a point to bear in mind. i think china plays the game in international multilateral institutions like the un better. understand the mood that

constitutes the global south better than the west it avoids diplomacy, insisting interpretation of values is the only possibility of and conceit one interpretation of values needs to be universal. the idea of universal of norms is a miss, it doesn't exist except again as i said high level -- so i think it's a game. big diplomatic game that china plays not badly but it will not get what it wants some way on its side vis a have you vis a the u.s. and for china it's most important economic interest, where are the most important markets, perhaps one day it will be in the global south and they are already there in certain

domains like v's for example automobiles, they are quite good automobiles. you can see them in southeast asia and why should you not buy them but the most important interest in technology and so on are, in fact, with the global north. and that is true otries in the south. india, india is certainly a very important member of the global south, important member of the nonalliant movement and so on but that is interest aligned with china. i don't think so. indonesia, some of indonesia's interest align with china and many do not. s that have become more evident over the last ten years at least in my part of the world one is growing awareness that in order to deal with either china or

united states effectively you have to deal with both simultaneously. second there's a growing sense that we have aspect of chinese behavior and certain aspects of american behavior. what it means countries are maximum flexibility to align their interests in any particular -- in any direction they tnk i most advantageous to them. nobody is going to line interests in one direction or the either. in that sense there's a new world order already. it's not a binary world anymore. and there is a very strong tendency particularly in the united states and europe to look at the world in binary terms but most of the countries in the global south i dare say do not look at the world that way. >> one would think maybe that this kind of dynamic you're talking about where countries in

a negative sense perhaps it's a lot to deal with have to think about dealing with the united states and china simultaneously but there's also benefits to that as there was during the cold war in terms of playing the united states and china off one another and gaining benefits perhaps? >> i don't think it's so simple. i don't understand why you say if i heard you correctly it's difficult to u.s. and china simultaneously. it's not a binary choice. i think this idea that you play one against the other that's a -- you'll get into trouble. [laughter] follow your interest follow whatever direction will take

you. some in neither. some india or africa or europe, you know, it's what i call dynamic multipopularty. you will have a central access of u.s.-china relations because that's certainly the most important relationship in the world but around that you are going to have coalitions forming and reforming themselves around different interests. you already see it actually in the nation form in asia. >> i welcome others to jump in here but this comes back to what you were saying in ter china's perspective i will try to paraphrase that you were saying it's not what china necessarily wants countries to choose or there needs to be this is setting up but in kind of achieving what bill was laying out there in terms of much order in which countries have this choice china has already to some extent succeeded in some of its answers.

>> i would think so. i believe that it's very binary for sure. it's -- there's obstacle between its subjective and what it is now. it's subjective of being a risen power in the global stage it's the west, it's it's the western influence and in a binary zero-sum perspective as beijing government has it be difficult to -- there's no other way to then isolating the west. it's like thi power grows your power is declining so it's very zero-sum and in -- in that game i'm going to put it that way, countries in the developing and emerging world are part of -- putting the numbers on the

shifting weight of powerhen this idea of the democratization of relation came in because the multiplicity of countries that are not western and if you look at the list just by numbers one country one road it's very important for china to be able to work with these countries in order to achieve this shift in the balance of power. it's very sort of basic but it's -- i think this is the main objective and -- and yes i think in some -- in some issues more important from beijing's perspective than others there is like flexible coalitions that we are all starting to see emerging might be very consequential and

sometimes you don't need 160 countries on your side to be able to shape the direction that the world is taking, you can have 54 with you on, you know, the fact that -- are not a rights. it's that consequential. i believe it is. so it's -- it is flexible and there are many -- there's a lot of dynamic and the we are saying the same thing the countries are ponds in the hands of beijing beijing certainly sees them as such and -- and it's -- it's a very -- it's a very binary vision for what the world order looks like. the rejection of the existing one and trying to shape that in

a very different directions. >> right. and i want to come back to a point you made earlier in terms of the capacity to be able to shape that fits china's interest better and -- and that is the point about what is the impact of china's economy which i think we all agree now is not going to be returning any time soon to the growth of the past. you already mentioned pull back from the massive infrastructure projects of the past, not entirely but certainly pullback on financing with the belt and road initiative and you talk a little bit about other ways which china will achieve influenc with the economic slowdown and with the demographic changes and then the shrinking of china's population that it looks likel be witnessing over the next coming decades is it really the case that china is going to continue to be able to have the kind of influence and achieve the kinds of things it's trying to achieve through its engagement in the dropping world or is this going to

fundamentally ultimately shape the way countries view the value china? >> i think what we are going to see -- we are seeing built and road 2.0 and at point belt and road 3.0. it's not going to go away. i don't think it was designed to be an economic -- >> yes. >> it's doing a lot of economic work in terrastructure but that's not what the belt and road is. the belt and road fundamentally is an ideological vision, ideological vision that it's telling other parts of the world, look, the world -- the world is -- is not binary and you know, and international arrangements can be shaped in different ways and this is what china is -- i think that's what the bri the connectivity the infrastructure, and so on, those are manifestations of this concept but fundamentally the

belt and road is fundamentally an idea and i think it's going to -- it's going to live on. now certainly there's less funding. we've already with african countries. the african country has tried to get china -- these are tough negotiations, it's not very clear and the governments have been trying to get china to revive the zam it in perú and nicaragua. they are all basically the governments have become much tighter in terms of the diplomatic -- in terms of the way they are trying to g chinese government to fund different -- different initiatives in the context of an economic slowdown. so i think we are going to see less. i think it's much more targeted. i think what has happened is the belt and road has encountered problems along the way problems

in terms of -- in terms of, you know environmental impacts complaints that have been made by civil society and so on and adjusting as it moves along. i don't think it's going to disappear. certainly i think that belt and road program was -- it's part of a much larger effort, right so, you know, theulture the confucius institutions, the training that recruit -- high school students and so on. it's such a wide array of domains which china is engaging that i don't think influence -- it may change somewhat but i don't think that the chinese government puts all its eggs in one basket so to speak. i think it's a multiplicity of engagement and whether -- whether succeed or not is

another question altogether i think what the diplomatic s as ambassador was talking about earlier i think there's been some success. if you look at the african behavior on issues of shingshang, taiwan it's very, very clear right which way african countries, which african countries are voting. when the speaker the former speaker of the house nancy pelosi, when she made her visit at the condemnation that is flew in, that came in, a lot of them came from african countries. so on the diplomatic side i think there's some wins. i don't think china is going to win everywhere and i think the chinese understand this but i think it's in terms of valium, in terms of what you put out there and if you can get me 20 or 30% that's fine, you know, so i think that the really, that is -- multidomain operation. that's how i see the belt and road. it's not just an infrastructure

building initiative. so i think responding to the belt and road should not just be about infrastructure, i think it should be about something much more fundamental and that's really the power of ideas. >> that's really helpful and i think that will be the subject of many of our panels to come over the next two days is what is the nature of the belt respond to it. michael, anything to add on those points? [laughter] >> i would argue that as the chinese economy struggles that china aggressive in promoting its leadership of the global south that i think you can make a case that the chinese leadership has come to recze that they may not be able to overtake the

united states economically but the goal of overtaking the united states and the global order remains the same, so how does china do that if it's not going to see the economic gains going forward that should have expected and hoped for and i think the way that the chinese are going to do that, they are going to try to basically overcome the uniteta aggregate which is trying to build a coalition of support mainly within the global south a foundation basically overwhelmed to u.s. by numbers and so i think the slowing economy actually makes the global south more important to china economically, of course, but also diplomatically in pursuing geopolitical ends.

>> let me jump in here now. i think -- i kind of agree. it is not just -- it is a vision. i wouldn't call it an idea. it's a vision. very ambitious idea. vision and ambition, that does not mean they are reality and i came to see the global south the dri as -- as a election of projects very -- presented as a strategy. [laughter] >> secondly, i agree with michael that and we all said it too the numbers game is important but important only in certain specific and narrow domains. vote in the un, both in the

human rights council. that kind of thing yeah, it has a certain importance we should not completely dismissutr should exaggerate the importance. i agree with michael that as china's economy slows and we shouldn't exaggerate that, right, last year they said 5.2 5.3, let's say it's to 5 it's not the same as in the past. it will never be the same in the past. that's adding one to the chinese economy. that's not in consequential even slowing down. but i think it's wrong to draw too close correlation -- of course it has a road. in so far china has influenced in the global south in the number's game which is important only in specific domains it is not just due to economic weight

and not just due to ability to build infrastructure it's viewed basically to exploiting the mood and muc t failures of western diplomacy and understanding and trying to work rather than lecture to go the global south all of the time. my last point is this, there's a very fundamental paradox in chinese approach to the world. they thought eloquently and great length of dem testimonyization of international relations of the world, but that comes from a instinctively internal revenue radical. the chinese view of the world is irradical. when they talk about democratization they mean replacement of one with the other. i don't think many people in the global south are as foolish or naive as some peoybody, not this group

certainly. it's not so, you know. i'm often reminded, it is true that government is an issue in part of the global south including southeast asia, right and the chinese exploit that. let's be frank about that. but honestly my chinese friends not to forget even the most corrupt can be nationalist. this is not a contradiction therefore, they have a sense of agency and their own interest and there's one very big country in my part of the world indonesia. indonesia has taken money from the soviet union has taken from china, has taken money from japan, from europe, from the united states and has only gone its own way.

so i think this is something chinese friends -- they are being disappointed. they will face further disappointments. disappointments is trying to be a global follower and being global player. >> thank you for that, we can spend a whole another with indonesia and relationship with china. we only have a couple of minutes left. one question that i wanted to ask from the audience. we've talked about africa, we talked about indonesia we haven't talked about south asia much. there's a question here about india and you know, india's question is what does it mean for india the things we are discussing here which is part of the brics part of the alliance corporation and what does it mean toina and india's response to china's bid to lead the global south, that was my -- anyone

want to jump in on the roll of on this. i think it's become very clear that new delhi has woken to the danger of the global south dominated by china. these are countries -- two countries that don't get along on their own bilateral interest but have truly different world views, different views about where global government -- what bal governance there should be, very different relationships with the west, different relationships with the global south and i think it's clear from prime minister moody's enhanced diplomacy within the global saw and we saw that and more broadly we saw it role last year that he has

decided that india has to take more challenge to challenge china's aim to be the leader of the global south and i think that this is important because a couple of people have discussed we are too prone to see the world in bilateral terms if this is a the world has been u.s. confrontation. more assertive power within the global south it's just i think the most prominent example of that and china is not increasing large role within the global south and driving that dynamic as other countries with other visions will want to get their voices out and expand their own china's influence within the global

south. >> all right thanks, michael. >> when we look at is always the big elephant in the room in these sorts of discussions but if you look at the relationship with africa which i will focus on, india has a very, very special relationship with africa and african countries. that goes way back. in fact, you know, the convention thinking goes as senior leadership visit african countries than any other industrialized country that may be true, it's highly institutionalized within the chinese state but india when you look at the foreign ministers of india independence to today there's actually been much more engagement with african leadership than china for instance. china came in much later in the day. and so india has a very multifaceted approach in africa

obviously huge indian diaspora in africa that -- that supports that to som i find very interesting and which goes back to the discussion of dynamic multipluralty india and china on the african continent and if

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