have a- lot of power, to change something in our society, in our government, one thing, you could only do one thing and would be immediate, what would be the one thing? >> shut down the fourth branch of government. we have three branches of executive, legislative and judicial. let's go back to what our founders set in motion and the rest becomes that much easier. shutdown that deep state. everything else follows. i would be the one thing. >> give it up for vivek ramaswamy. >> thank you, guys. may our best days to be head of us. i'm confident they will be. thank you. ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ >> democracy faced its greatest threat to the civil war, and today though bruce come our democracy remains unbowed and unbroken. [cheers and applause] >> thursday, march 7 present bite delivers the annual state

of union address during a joint session of congress to outline his priorities for the country. watch our live coverage beginning at 8 p.m. eastern with our preview program followed by president biden's state of the union speech, then republican response and we will get your reaction by taking your phone calls, texts and social media comments. watch the state of union address live thursday, march 7 at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span, c-span now our free mobile video app, or online at c-span.org. >> former u.s. ambassadors to ukraine took part in a discussion at the two-year mark of the russia-ukraine war. they discuss foreign aid, china's relationship to russia and the resilience of the ukrainian people. the event was cohosted by the u.s. institute of peace and the atlantic council.

my name is lise grande, head of the united states institute of peace, congress establishes in 1984 as a public nonpartisan independent institute that is dedicated to helping prevent, mitigate and resolve violent conflict brodrick would like to describe ourselves as a part of the government of the interagency that this conflict prevention. our purpose today is to mark the second anniversary of russia's brutal full-scale invasion of ukraine, and the tenth anniversary of russia's illegal annexation of crimea. eait's an honor for us to cohost the special event with atlantic council. joining us today are several former u.s. ambassadors to ukraine. we have ambassador john herbst,

ambassador steven pifer, john tefft, alongside ambassador bill taylor who is usip's vice president for europe, and ambassador yovanovitch. when russian troops invaded ukraine on the 24th of february in 2022, most people expected that ukraine would fall to russian troops in the matter of days. ukraine, against all odds, still stands. this is because ukrainians reject russia's attempt to occupy them, and are determined to defend their territory and protect their democracy. it's also the case because your many friends, because countries all around the world who are committed to freedom and the international rule t of law are standing with ukraine. we stood with you for two years, were going to keep standing with

you, and were determined to provide as much support as we possibly can. two years on, while allied powers are grappling with war fatigue, and some question whether they can continue their essential aid, some, ukraine continues to fight for its operative and cultural heritage of against one of the most theessive countries in world. as we think about the path forward and the many challenges ukraine and all of us are facing in trying to secure sustainable peace and security, today is an opportunity of responsibility to remember and honor those i who have fallen defending freedom. it's now my privilege to welcome to the stage the deputy chief of mission for the embassy of ukraine. [applause] >> thank you so much, lise, and

thank you, everyone for being here. it's really a circle of friends, and i can feel that, and thank you for everything you do for ukraine. you have been doing this terrible two years of full-scale aggression, for every word you say, for every message you bring here and elsewhere, to help ukraine fight for our common future. cooperation and determination, these are my answers to the questions of ending the war and bringing peace closer. the less determined we are, the further putting encroaches on our boundaries. the russia-ukraine war has been going on for ten years as you

know, exactly tinges ago so-called little green man flooded ukrainian peninsula. and, unfortunately, the lack of robust international response has led us to what we have today. 200 rounds of talks between russia and ukraine took us over between 2016-2022. all 20 ceasefire regimes were broken by russia. so while we were seeking peace, putin was preparing for a major attack shattered billions of ukrainians two years ago. 220,000 russian troops invaded

ukraine from nine directions from the east, from the south and from the north. most countries, as lise said, with believe that ukraine with we stand, but we did. under more than 3000 3000 d bombs since february 2022, more than 7500 missiles, more than 3700 drones, the war cause huge destruction, huge casualties. so many people died, so many people became victims of russian war crimes, whether it's torture, rape, using civilians as a human shield. basically whatever comes up to your mind about the war crime

wasn't there, and is still there what russians do to ukrainians. putin has made it clear that the only language he can speak is the language of force. and thanks to ukrainian resilience we were able to withstand this genocidal war, but it is obvious that we would not have been able to do that without international support, without you. and i want to express my sincere gratitude to all americans come to all of you, to all our partners around the world for standing with ukraine in those difficult times, and not to allow russians have that deadly advantage over ukrainians.

thank you for all who understand that giving ukraine weapons is not to escalate but to deter the aggression. so important to keep this in mind. we've been feeling, you know, for so long that sense of that, well, we don't want to escalate the situation on theal ground, t to provoke putin to do even more harm doesn't work. and we have proven that with the necessary assistance we can show the results. we liberated 50% of ukraine territories occupied by russians since 2022. we cleared black sea from russian military presence. we destroyed one-third of russian black sea fleet. it's a lot. we secured the grain corridor,

and at the same time we remain committed to conduct vital internal reforms in ukraine to ensure the gdp growth, to ensure rebuilding the ukraine economy, and that's during the wartime. and at the same time the total in any losses far exceed the ukrainian losses in times, but the difference is that we value every single ukrainians life lost. putin doesn't. and that is what he openly said he's ready to send more and more russian troops to die in ukraine. and on the other hand, we can see that the lack of necessary resources leads to new territorial gains i russia. an example of -- is evident.

unfortunately. ukraine is open to a political settlement. let me be clear, and that is what the president of ukraine propose the peace formula and we are working on the first peace formula summit, because it is the only realistic plan to restore ukraine's territorial integrity and to ensure the just and lasting peace. however, as we talk about peace, we must be ready to win it. and in case with russia, to win it by force. this year is crucial, not only we but putin can feel the momentum. and robust steps must be taken. i'm talking to increase sanctions against russia, andiscation of russian ss

diverting them to rebuild ukraine's economy, preparing grounds when putin faces justice in front of the international tribunal. but this list will never be full without ukraine being able to fight for its future, for our future, for the global order that has been undermined so much already and canan be ultimately ruined at any time. that is why the new supplemental for ukraine is so vital. we need more missiles, long-range missiles, air defense, munitions in order to be able to be booked the russian troops that rebuke -- that exceed us in number. putin has said that the russian border doesn't end anywhere, and

ukraine is a test for russia. if ukraine loses, russia will turn it, and already are,, ukrainian resources against you, against the west, have no doubt in that. so it's putin either defeated or the whole international system collapses. there is simply no middle ground, i'm afraid. so the international alliances must be strengthened, no doubt. more investments must be made into our own security, that's for sure, but all this may be too late if ukraine doesn't receive the necessary tools now, this particular moment. and if russia is not stopped in ukraine, the cost of restoring the order in the world will be much higher. and eventually, unfortunately,

every household around the world will be affected by the russian aggression. so let w me finish by saying tht we might have to answer one simple question today. what world we all want to live in today? whether it is the putin's world, or the world we had been working for so many decades to ensure peace and stability working for our kids and for our future generations. i thank you for your support. thank you so much. [applause] >> thank you very much.

>> denys, thank very much. lise, thank you for opening, setting the stage. we have joining us here john herbst, as lise mention. we are cosponsoring with the atlantic council. john, thank very much. ambassador yovanovitch in the middle here as she wanted to be. john tefft ambassador tefft is joining us and steven pifer is doing us as well online. this is a great, it is about the only ambassadors here. with a of other ambassadors in the room i see. i see bill courtney and i see bob. there are probably others desha i said bill, yes. got it. who can miss bill courtney? this is a solemn time. imn mean let's be clear, two yes of this fight. and as both lise and denys just said, this has been a hard time, it's our time. john, you are just back, back yesterday, just of the point yesterday afternoon.

i'm going to ask you just delete us up, talk about what you heard over the past week but also talk about your a careful observer of what's going on in washington. .. supplemental. what are your thoughts? >> i will start with what is going on in washington, for a very simple reason. i believe strongly since week three of moscow's big invasion of ukraine, that as long as americans support for ukraine did not diminish, ukraine would ultimately win this war. of course, if u.s. support of ukraine were >> war's end come sooner, i've had my disagreements with the administration about their reluctance to send longer range or more advanced weapons to ukraine. and i think that a problem

which has kept our policy to be nearly an adequate response to the great challenge of russia's invasion to ukraine, which is a threat, a serious direct threat to american core interests. but the inadequacy of an overall adequate policy is far better than the problem we face now coming from the quasi isolationists right wing of the republican party. this is a relatively small group. some of whom, no more than six or 10 want to kill you with the aid to ukraine. and they have no clue for american interest. and some whom it's not a high priority. and the two seat majority, six to 10 people can do a great deal of daniel, something that kevin mccarthy experienced and

mike johnson does not want to. >> the senate passed an aid package, 61 billion of assistance, actually essential assistance to maintain its ability to fight and stop a russian victory, and that package has been held up since roughly the end of september, five months. i suspect this package of some kind will pass. perhaps a little less than the $60 billion, not a terrible result if it does get passed because while speaker johnson has claimed, i don't think we should dismiss this as malarky, he understands that america has a great interest in getting aid to ukraine. he also has a personal interest in his job and a pretty good bet if he were to put the bill on the floor, he would lose his job because that group of

determined, let's use a plight word, folks that don't america's national interest with the determination to not make that happen. the good news there's a second way to get the bill on the floor, it's called a discharge position, and requires a majority of the people in the house to sign and the democrats and those who vote with the democrats represent a very sizable minority, but there's still a few short. but there are at least 20, 30 republicans in the house who really believe this is important and i suspect that it would be possible to get five, six, seven of them, maybe more, if necessary, to sign that discharge petition. my understanding is that the speaker is trying to come up with a magic formula who enable him to put the bill on the floor without him getting kicked out of the speakership. i'm not sure that that's a possible task. i suspect some point in the not

too distant future that will be recognized, at which point he has a decision to make, either to put the bill on the floor and risk his job or to see a discharge petition which will take more time, play out, and get that bill to the floor, which would then be approved by a substantial majority, similar to the vote you had in the senate and we had about 70% in favor, and that would also make him a lame duck, so his position would not be any more tenable than if the-- again, the folks who don't understand american interests were to push him out of the speakership. that makes the optimistic that it will happen, it doesn't make me optimistic about the timing for it to happen. i was saying not incorrectly, but precisely correctly, to get this bill passed, things have changed, but i think you're talking about six, eight weeks at a minimum and maybe more. now, this then brings us back to the situation on the ground in ukraine.

it is not a good situation. we all know that the russians finally took the town, the almost completely destroyed town, that has as much significants as a town they took in may or june of last year. they paid an extraordinary cost in personnel and equipment for that, but nonetheless, it's a step forward and they're celebrating it almost like victory of stalingrad in world war ii because they don't have much else to celebrate. there's a great deal of talk that this is the first of many gains for the russians to achieve because, in fact, as a result of the shortsightedness or worse, of again, the folks in the house that don't have a clue, ukraine has a shortage of ammunition and that's one of the two principle military reasons, perhaps the greater, we can argue about that, for the fall. and the second was the

timidity of the administration sending to ukraine, specifically f-16's, had we made the right decision 18 month ago to send scores of hundreds of f-16's we have in storage to ukraine so they had them on the battlefield in say august or september of last year, the ukrainian counter offensive would have been more remarkable on the ground and it would have been in the ukrainians hands. because the russians have substantial air dominance over ian ukraine, they were sending glide bombs, and they had to retreat. so, here is a clear example of bipartisan incompetence in the united states contributing to a bad result in ukraine and a blow against our interests. because again, if ukraine were to lose this war, we would have to face russia further to the west at much greater coast.

american leadership would be in the gutter, more polite word than what i had in mind, as a result of this failure of leadership. i think i've-- >> john, you've done well. >> bipartisan. >> bipartisan in your criticism. that's exactly right and you talked about what's going on here and-- . oh, excuse me, bill, one more thing. >> yeah. >> a lot of folks in ukraine, well-informed, well-intentioned, and more people outside of ukraine who don't know that much, but have a need to opine, think that moscow is going to make serious gains in the months to come. i can't rule that out. i'm not a prophet. i'm not a foreign military guy. i've talked to lots of foreign military guys, we have a great network of ex-generals. i don't think that's true. i believe that moscow can make small gains in the coming months even without the ammunition problem resolved, which -- sorry, because russia

is distanced from strategic objectives, even if you consider something like a minor strategic objective and ukraine has the ability to limit their advance. what i just said is heightened by the fact or made more likely by the fact of one really good thing that happened at the munich security conference, actually two good things happened. the first and more important was that a real statesman, the president of the czech republic commented at munich there are hundreds of thousands of round of ammunition on international market for purpose if the west was so good to purpose and deliver to ukraine which can be done in weeks, things would be notably better for the short-term. canada volunteered to buy it, so this is something that could be short-term help. let's watch the space. the other good thing in munich reiterated in kyiv, was the prime minister of denmark,

another stateswoman, i've got the guts as well as the brains to do things, offered ukraine in the welcomes of -- armed services of denmark, the danes are not at war now, ukraine is, and ukraine is citing denmark's the west and the war and to kyiv with zelenskyy to nail this down. would that we had such strong leadership in the great powers of the alliance. >> thank you, john. >> i'm done. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> so, ambassador pfeiffer, you served in kyiv early on. you have also, when you came back, when you were in washington, you had something to do with some of the niftier

decisions that the united states and ukraine made. the deputy chief of mission asked this question about escalation, which by implication has a nuclear component. do you want to make a couple of comments about both the previous efforts and how they are playing out on the nuclear issue and how they're playing out today? >> yeah, well, i think we've seen, actually going back to february of 2022, that moscow has tried to play the nuclear card. three days after the major invasion was launched in february of 2022, vladimir putin said we have put our nuclear forces on a special alert status. the pentagon, which of course watches these things very carefully said, we have seen no change in the russian nuclear posture and a couple of russian analysts said, well, they've added a few more people from headquarters. let me be clear, vladimir putin

doesn't want a nuclear war, but he wants to use the nuclear card to unnerve ukraine's friends in the west. and i think mr. putin is the one to listen to. there are lots of, for example, russian television pundits who talk about nuclear war in ways that i would consider borderline insane. and my favorite one is the one that says we should drop a nuclear weapon on paris and london and this thing will be finished and never asks what happens to moscow an hour later. but to putin, if you look at putin, his nuclear rhetoric hit a peak in september of 2022, just when he claimed that russia had annexed donetsk and he tried to say these are russian territories, and we'll use all at our disposal. my sense is from talking to people and u.s. officials,

september '22. putin, i think, was trying to do two things. he was trying to dissuade the ukrainians from launching counter offensive back into hersen and trying to des suede the west from supplying weapons to ukraine. and kept on fighting and i think that john could confirm from the trip just there, ukrainians view this war as existential. if they lose, their vision of ukraine as a normal european democracy is gone. so nuclear weapons didn't change that calculation. they continue to fight on. like wise, i think the west stumbled a bit and for the first couple of days and the west came up with a pretty consistent reaction in washington, at n.a.t.o. headquarters in london, berlin, if russia were to use tactical nuclear weapons against ukraine, there would be catastrophic consequences to

russia, period. now, i also think that in the couple of weeks afterward, the russians or the kremlin concluded the threat wasn't working with ukraine, it wasn't working with the united states and europe, and it was provoking a very different reaction in china and india, and in places that were important to russia, they're saying that nuclear weapons, what are you talking about? if you then go and look in october and november of 2022, there's an organized effort by the kremlin to ratchet down the nuclear rhetoric, so, mr. putin goes to the discussion end of october of 2022 and he's asked, well, what about the nuclear threats? he said that's not part of russian doctrine. that's just the west trying to tarnish our good image. a week later the russian foreign ministry puts out preventing nuclear war and as

lavrov, the foreign minister goes to the g20 summit, language, nuclear threats and nuclear use are inadmissible. i think the russians recognized their threat wasn't working and that it was, in fact, playing badly with audiences important to the kremlin and they ratcheted it down. you've still got the crazy, but putin, i think, has been much more sober. looking at the impact of that threat, i think going back to february of 2022, the biden administration has said, they have two goals, to support ukraine, and to avoid a direct n.a.t.o. russian military clash. those are the right two goals, but where i would be critical of the administration is in balancing the goals they have been overly cautious, they have deferred to russian red lines that aren't really there, and the result has been, i think, in the end, the administration ends to come to the right decision, but as john

mentioned, it takes them a long time. you know, and had decisions been taken more quickly, had weapons been provided to the ukrainians more quickly, the situation on the battlefield might be very different today than it is in reality. >> steve, thank you. exactly what we needed on the discussion on the nuclear and of the possibility now reduced even as bill burns has said recently, reduced concern about this escalation. ambassador, john, you were there in the run-up to the first invasion of crimea and so you saw that kind of -- that concern rising. no one saw that coming. i certainly didn't see that coming. be interested in your thoughts of what you were seeing there in kyiv. and then you went to moscow. you -- your next post was ambassador to moscow after that so you saw that aspect, too.

can you talk a little about both of those periods in your tour? >> thanks very much, bill. glad to be with you, if only via zoom. you know, i'm in the process-- been in the process for while of writing a memoir and i've been able to get a number of documents from that period declassified and so, you know, we all forget stuff, especially diplomates. we have too many things going in our mind at the same time, but some of those documents that help remind me. i guess i would characterize my last year in kyiv, 2013, i was there until july and then jeff hyatt took my place. we saw a lot of things starting to develop, and i would highlight three key points. one was the crumbling, the

greed level had gotten to the point everybody knew who the quote, the family, as they called them. and this was not just the sons of yanukovych, but others living in russia with yanukovych, they were in the process of getting-- literally we heard stories they would print it and cash it at the market and carry suitcases full of dollars down to the gulf to the bank. it was that obvious. and what happened was that not only did this erode any support that yanukovych had. i remember, i think 19% was the support he had in the last poll before i left 5-20-13. but it even started eroding the people in the party of the region, the people who were the supporters of yanukovych. the second big thing, of course, was the growth and empowering and influence of civil society and this was

something that has grown over a long time, all of the ambassadors who were there on the stage and worked hard on this. this was a key part of american policy, to support the development of civil society, even if we couldn't influence some of the political developments at the top, we could support those people who sought democracy, who sought a european future, who wanted to build a country that was very western-like, a country they thought was the country they wanted to live in and they wanted their kids to live in. the third big part of this, of course, is the european future and throughout most of my time in kyiv, we had a development or we had a negotiation with the european union over an association agreement. and that association agreement gradually grew and grew in importance because the people of ukraine saw that as not only opening up the future and access to europe, being part of europe, and not just part of a soviet empire, but it also, i

think, many people felt provided a guarantee that the european union supported by the united states, would be able to insist on rule of law and fight corruption and all of the things that they saw the yanukovych regime practicing at the time. now we all know the story in november of that year. putin pressured and bribed mr. yanukovych to give up the european union association agreement and civil society, people went to the streets, went to-- and i think everybody knows the history of that. i was back in washington at that point. i'd been told that i was being considered to go to moscow. i hadn't yet got the final word, but i followed things pretty carefully, particularly when putin invaded crimea and the war really started, but also, started the subversion,

for want of a better term, in the donbas. i got to moscow in september of 2014. and of course, by this time you had lots of people in russia thrilled that putin had reclaimed crimea. nationalism was going strong, st. george ribbons were on everybody. the cars flying flags, it was a very nationalistic moment in russia. putin got a huge bump on popularity during that period, but as i worked my -- or engaged in my initial contacts there, one of the things that really struck me was how little the political elite, and i'm defining this not just people who are in the government, but people who are in the society, you know, people who are a part of the russia, the putin group, whatever it being business or whatever. they didn't understand ukraine at all. you know, it was just striking

over and over again. people would argue that, well, all those people in donbas they all speak russia so they must want russia. i'd been in the fortunate situation between, i think, april of 2013 and the end of june, i was in hersen, donetsk, luhansk and talked to a lot of people and kept finding myself in conversations, private, most of them were private saying, well, you know, what you're saying just isn't true. i had to find a way diplomatically to kind of get the point across that they were just not consistent. my bottom line here, and i'll stop with this, i could see even then what we all have seen so much over the last two years, this illusion about ukraine as if the sense -- unwillingness to understand that these are an independent people who did not want to be a

part of russia. they did not want to be a part of a russian empire and it was very obvious back then. anyway, i'll stop at that point, but i guess i saw a lot of the seeds of what was happening. of course, the war was going on in donetsk by the time-- thousands had already been killed and we had a situation where the minsk agreements were being negotiated, the germans and the french working with the ukrainians and the russians in the normandy group, but it didn't really go anywhere. i mean, i have to say i was very skeptical of that from the very beginning and it became pretty obvious when tory and celeste came out for talks with putin's point man on ukraine. it was clear that the russians were kind of feeling us out trying to figure out where our bottom lines were on this thing, but really we're not in

any mood for any kind of compromise. we of course respected the germans and the french and we didn't get deeply engaged-- didn't get engaged in the negotiations, but tried to keep track of what was going and pretty clear there wasn't much compromise. nobody at that time, my last point, expected putin to do what he did in february of 2022, but you know, history has shown us how brutal and that invasion is and how much it totally lacked understanding of what was going on in ukraine. >> and he's paying for it. you're exactly right. he's paying for that misunderstanding. >> yes, i think this is-- i've always said when i give speeches that this was a strategic mistake of the first order and i think today what we, americans, i was encouraged by what john said. i wish we passed the supplemental bill earlier, but we can't make a strategic mistake and not give assistance

to ukraine. >> absolutely right. >> (applause) >> so-- please, please, sorry? >> a slight modification to what john just said. i don't think that putin's decision in february of 2022 was a strategic mistake, it was a strategic blunder, which is worse. >> blunder. >> if you look at russia today, it's military loss, equipment, economic loss, a geopolitical loss, yesterday, sweden got the last vote needed to join n.a.t.o., so, you know, mr. putin's action among other things have energized n.a.t.o. and enlarged n.a.t.o. >> you're absolutely right, steve. and before we open this up, let's assume that we don't make this mistake, that we do provide these funds, that the congress figures out a way to get a vote on the house floor. when that happens, it will, as

we all know, it will pass as it did in the senate, 70-29 as john said in the senate. it will pass in similar fashion on the house floor, so let's assume that. let's assume further that over the next year or so, there's progress on ukrainian's part and talk about winning the war, winning the peace. you've been eloquent in identifying what the ukrainians really want in this piece in the end, after this war, after the victory, as they say. what does this look like? what do are they after? how can they achieve that? how can we help them achieve that? >> so winning peace in ukraine, i think this conference is 10-year war and it's been much longer, it's been on

independence. we're looking at the dissolution of the soviet union and the perfect peace shall we say ensued after that, not only ukraine, but the former soviet union and i think the ukrainian people have spoken many, many times and to and through the revolution and through this war that started in 2014 and is, you know, continuing now with the total war or total war on ukraine that started in '22. and what the ukrainian people have said is that they want to live in freedom, they want to be a part of the west. they share western values of democracy and rule of law. the revolution of dignity was all about living according to the rule of law, something, again, coming back to what john

tefft noted, the russians didn't understand ukraine. i think in part they didn't understand that ukrainians are a distinct people, a distinct culture, they have a distinct language and a geographic space that is ukrainian. and now they are perhaps beginning to understand that there is a ukraine. there are ukrainian people, and the ukrainian people know what they want and that, you know, on the one hand, i think, that the russians didn't understand that from the beginning or putin didn't understand that from the beginning. on the other hand, i think they sensed it, they sensed the change is happening in ukraine since 1991 that got a boost in 2024 and bigger boost, and that was propelling forward and leaving russia behind and that was profoundly threatening, i think, to russia. so how does ukraine win the peace? i think with more of the same

and i think that winning the peace, you know, it started in 1991, but it continued today. and it's part of all of the things that we have been talking about, the three areas, one is, of course, security, moving forward with the ukraine's relationship with other countries in the west and particularly n.a.t.o. countries, and particularly making that relationship with n.a.t.o. as close as possible and i think many of the people in this room would say ultimately n.a.t.o. membership. we've got an n.a.t.o. summit coming up in july of this year. the administration has an opportunity to make history. let's hope that it does so. and i think that on the economic side, again, this is something that needs to start now. we are seeing the ukrainian people constantly rebuild. they are rebuilding faster than russia is destroying. when you look, for example, at the energy network, which is

still-- it is unbelievable, considering the attacks on ukraine. the ukrainians are managing to keep that electrical grid running and many other-- many other things as well. so the rebuilding continues and you know, one of the things that i find particularly amazing about the ukrainian economy is not only is it operating, it's innovating. so, you have years ahead of the u.s. where you can basically do anything online, including assistance to rebuild your house or apartment if it was struck by a russian missile. that's ongoing and obviously, there are plans for the bigger reconstruction, that's ongoing as well working with western partners. lots of big issues, you know, how -- how is that plan put together, to what extent is it determined by central authorities. to what extent are local

leaders empowered to make decisions, you know, what part of the economy, what sectors of the economy does the government boost and invest in. lots of big issues, and they are being addressed now, so that ukraine is ready when that peace treaty is finally, finally signed. so that is important and i would say, you know, there's a lot of historical precedence. fdr started thinking about what the peace would look like after world war ii in 1942. so, you know, we need to be ready, all of us together. and then the other piece of reconstruction, of course, importantly, how does it get paid for. so part of it is bilateral partners, especially coming from europe and the eu. part of it's going to be institutional. world bank, imf, and part of it, i think, is going to be

coming from russian funds. importantly, i think there are steps forward with regard to the $300 billion of frozen russian money out there and hopefully, hopefully our congress moves forward on our part of it and that also unlocks other countries moving forward. but i think, you know, there's also that other word of reparations. i think an important part of the peace is going to be holding russia accountable. that's certainly true for war crimes issues, but it's also true with regard to the rebuilding of the ukrainian and immense destruction that they've caused and then finally, on the values piece, on the political piece. what kind of a country is ukraine going to be in this new era, and again, the ukrainian people have spoken, it is very clear, they are not fighting this war to recreate the old system, to make the oligarchs rich again, they're not.

they're fighting for their family, their freedom, their future and they want it to be a better future so i'm betting on the ukrainian people, on that. i would just end with one other note, which is that, you know, there's a lot of people eloquently indicated, not a lot of people, not the majority of americans or even of our elected leaders, that throw up all sorts of arguments about why should we, the united states, support ukraine and support ukraine militarily and i would just note that the ukrainians have been brave, they have been courageous, they have been principled, they have been resilient. they know why they're fighting, just like we knew why we were fighting in 1776. we knew why we were fighting. just like the ukrainians, there was for us, there was no hope that we were going to win. we were taking on the mighty british empire.

this rag tag group of colonists, no hope and yet, we were determined. we wanted to live in freedom, we didn't want a king, we didn't want to be part of an empire. does this sound familiar to you. with the help of the french and other countries, we won and i think history can repeat itself. >> (applause) >> well said. well said, all. i would right now, with that kind of opening, you've got your -- you've the got ability now to ask any of these questions, any of these people questions, these are former ambassadors, on issued that they've raised and i am going to ask them to bring the mic right here. let us know who you are. if you've got a specific question for a specific person, please let us know. >> sure, doug brooks with fti solution we're actually doing

investments and procurement inside ukraine already, but my question is really on what happens if the russian empire fails? and so we have a large reconstruction development effort going on in ukraine and then all of a sudden you have all of these new republics, we can't ignore those, this could be a massive, massive period of reconstruction and development. how can we handle that? >> that's an interesting question and i'm going to ask ambassador tefft to -- but i will remind us, there were people who were concerned in 1991, early in 1991 about what would happen, oh, my goodness, what would happen if the soviet union were to disappear or break up? well, turns out they did and the sky didn't fall. we were able to manage that, but it's a very fair question. john, do you want to take a shot at that? >> sure, i'll take a start at least and some have their own views. i know there's a lot of people

out there. i've been on panels with people who think the russian federation will fall apart, that chechnya and other places will start pulling away. i've also read a lot of things by russians who are opposed to putin, who are opposed to the war, and who just don't think this is going to happen. in the main argument there, is that all of the people in these regions have a vested interest in staying a part of a federation. even if it's in much more economic peril than it is right now, perhaps. so if i had to bet and you know, i wouldn't put much money on this, i'm not a betting kind of guy, i would say that it would not at least in the short-term, but as we've seen in this war, and we've seen in the last 30 years, it's pretty hard to predict specific events like this. you know, i remember being on

the soviet desk when yeltsin went out in the woods and they basically got rid of the soviet union in a day and there was nobody i know of in the intelligence community or the analytical community, academic community who had any idea that that was going to happen that quickly. everybody knew the soviet union was going to come to an end, but it surprised us. so i don't have a lot of confidence in saying that i had to bet i wouldn't see that falling apart. last point is, though, that several had mentioned the problems in russia and while putin has got things stable now, spending a huge amount of money on the war, which has driven the russian economy. the long-term trends, economically, demographically, have only gotten worse as a result of this strategic decision to invade ukraine and i think a lot of people know about that. the more i read about this, the more convinced i am that, you

know, russia will have its nuclear weapons, but it will not have an economy. itle not have a democracy and think of all the places now that don't have men or women able to work because they just don't have them. so many of them have died in the war. it's a folly in many ways for the long-term for russia. >> thanks, john. steve, anything else to add on that? great. priscilla and then bob and then-- priscilla? another-- you are, you are, introduce yourself. >> yes, i am. >> and you are? >> i am priscilla. >> yes, you are. >> i'm senior advisor to the asia center so i'm going to give you an asian perspective on that, however, i must say in

the late 1980's, john, steve and i had a front row seat in the embassy in moscow for the beginning of the end of the soviet union and so we have a long history here. i am now asian oriented and i was the chief of mission in burma 20 years ago, and so i'm watching russia in a way from an asian perspective and i think what you're missing when you talk about future influences on russia is what's coming in from these, the chinese are in the process-- inned process of repopulating siberia. there are millions of chinese there now, they've built industries and another one of putin's strategic blunders may have been the alliance he's made with xi jinpings because xi jinping has much larger ambitions, vis-a-vis russia,

than what's going on in ukraine. we have to look at what's coming at them from asia. they don't understand. i've had this conversation before with russians and they don't understand. i see what's happening with chinese influence in asia and it's moving ever, ever westward. and i think we have to-- it's not just xi jinping, it's the chinese. so i think we have to watch that. >> priscilla, thank you. that's a great caution. a great observation. if there's-- john, you want to comment on that. >> part of putin's strategic incompetence is focusing on ukraine and the west as a problem as opposed to china. we all hear about china loves to play the long game. i'm not going to dispute that. part of the chinese long game

is being played out along its border with russia. right now we hear about this historically unprecedented friendship between china and russia. we read about it in the papers, the russians talk about it all the time, the chinese also to a lesser extent, but still talk about it, but yet, even in this unprecedented period of warm relations, chinese media and a third secretary of the chinese embassy in islamabad talk about a chinese city. the chinese claims vis-a-vis not just russia, but kazakhstan, not just-- kyrgyszstan are not being hidden. and i've actually written about this going back three, four years ago.

this is where at some point, be a little provocative today, you will find a natural u.s.-russian partnership after moscow gives up -- i know you don't like that, and neither do some of my ukrainian friends. once russia gives up some of its imperial ambitions in ukraine, it will then begin to understand there's a problem with china. just as we have defended our interests and our principles, although not strongly enough to stop the russians in ukraine, you will have a similar interest doing the same, keeping russia territorially intact, the far east, beijing.

and because of the chinese economy, which the russians have not been able to. the russians are driven 99% by putin. all russians experts understand this, but they can't talk about it because this is a fix for putin every bit of the much as the united states as its principal adversary. >> thank you very much. brad and then toby i should say ambassador. >> i'm bob bradkey, a former colleague of everybody on this panel at the state department. i want to come back a little bit to what john was saying about russia and what's going on in russia, the kind of medium term future and we've just launched a new round of sanctions against russia related to navalny's death. the press has been full of reporting that the sanctions have put russia under any pressure shall the russian economy is doing really well.

i'm curious to get a sense from any or all of you as to what pressure there is on putin, if the economy is doing okay, the sanctions aren't working, he's got control of dissidents and people who wanted to have a different policy. if he's under no pressure, how does that change this equation? just seems to me that i think he's not coming under any kind of pressure. >> bob, thank you. john, do you want to start that, start the response to that and others. >> yeah, it's a very good question. i think maybe make a couple of points. first of all, i have never thought that putin would be necessarily pressured to give up his views and while i agree with john at some point, the idea of empire-- they're going to have to tailor this back because russia needs to start focusing on modernizing its country and looking forward to the 21st century and not looking back to the 19th century as their

model. i think that as long as putin's around, it's going to be hard to do that. and he's going to push back against anybody who would make that argument. i suspect over time the political elites are going to-- or the economic elites, the oligarchs and others will eventually push back although i read this morning that a metals oligarch had his assets nationalized yesterday after putin criticized him last week. putin's also taking as assets from western, that belonged to western companies and giving them to other members in effect creating new economic elites depending on-- dependent on him. so he's working on these things to try to maintain his support among the elites. i think everybody on this panel knows that in the end, what changes in russia is the political leadership changes come, it usually comes at the

hands of the elites. right now nobody's got their heads above water for obvious reasons. i think that still doesn't undercut the argument that i was trying to mack and others have made it much more eloquently than me, that this is a long-term disaster for russia and you know, i just gave a speech to a fellow who works at the american enterprise institute, eberstat, who has done work that's fascinating to see how this country is falling apart. the life expectancy of a 15-year-old in russia is less than a 15-year-old in yemen. it's just staggering some of the statistics of things they have discovered. so it's the long-term that they're doing and this doesn't-- nobody can factor in the loss of all of these soldiers.

i think so far, 315,000 as the number of casualties that russia has suffered inside of ukraine alone. and these are all, i mean, some of them are criminals were prison, but these are able bodied men who they need for the future and there was a demographic problem before. so i guess my sense is that, you know, putin will do everything he can to not just keep the war going because he's invested his whole future, his legacy in this, but he will be as ruthless as he has to be to try to stifle any opposition and to try to show the world that the people of russia still support him. but if you want to look into that, i think the best guy writing now is andre for carnegie has some brilliant pieces analyzing what's going on inside of russia, the attitudes of people towards the war and toward the future. i'll stop there. >> john, thank you.

any other comments, john? >> yeah, i think that there's a widely believed misconception about the state of the russian economy. bob you mentioned the economy was doing okay and i heard the former general say the same thing this morning on tv. that's all based on the use of official russian economic statistics, i with i think is -- and amazingly, the world bank and the imf use those russian economic statistics to come up with a 2 or 3% growth rate for last year. why anyone would want to believe them and putin is trying to demonstrate sanctions have no impact is beyond me. there's a professor at yale who has written extensively on this and you were doing that in the mid '80s, cia was basing it on official soviet statistics and

we know how that turned out. i would not take that with a grain of salt, but a whole shaker. >> if i could asked one thing, the question, is there pressure on putin? i think it's just really hard for us to know. i don't think we have, you know, john was mentioning that the accords kind of came out of nowhere for us. and i think, you know, it's just hard for us to know what's going on in the inner sanctum. when i look from far, far, far away, where the-- i mean, i think we'd probably all agree if there were free and fair elections in russia, putin would probably win, but he's also stacking the deck. he's making sure that navalny not only goes to the furthest away prison in the arctic circle, he's making sure he's dead. he's taking anybody that might have a prayer of getting some votes, like help me out -- and taking them off the ballot and i think we're probably going to see other, you know, not to

mention all the other repressive measures we're seeing in russia, but focused around the march elections as well. and that to me, i mean, it's certainly a sign of authoritarianism, but it's not a sign of strength so he must be feeling some pressure. >> thank you. so toby-- >> i'm sorry, steve. >> just two -- just a second with john and john has said. even if you accept russian state statistics, remember last year, russia massively increased its defense spending so to expect that the economy is seeing growning a little bit or steg nant. it's because of defense spending, it's not making the average life of a russian better. and the second part of it, the importance of the west making clear that its commitment to

provide ukraine with the weapons and the ammunition and the wherewithal to continue the fight. how important that will be, bus i think if you're in the russian public or the russian elite and even in the inner circle. at some point, you have to ask yourself how long can you continue this fight and continue to see your husbands, your sons, yours brothers, coming home in body bags from ukraine because of one man, vladimir putin and his obsession with ukraine. so i think the western commitment is very important and that may ultimately have some impact on how the russian elite and how the russian public view this war. >> thank you, steve. thank you. toby. >> and during the clinton administration-- i'm sorry, i was in the clinton administration in clinton white house, and what i recall very early in that period is the

distrust of ukraine at that time, as corrupt, as not a reliable partner and believe it or not the reliable partner was going to be russia. obviously a lot has changed because it's an important point because it's the way we treated the country the way we saw it, the expectations we had and the ability to work with it. so, i think it's really-- we had a big learning curve and you guys have done it a job in educating the rest about ukraine, but you know that anyone who was a russian major had very little to do with ukraine in any way and i see some people shaking their heads, but i just, now, from the literature to everything else, and so it's really important when ukraine became able to stand on its own. we had a big, you know, our education didn't permit it. i know john, as you would know

a lot of this from the classification which none of us has been doing very much, but there was really a focus on russia, almost exclusively in terms of economics and whatever and we spent two years helping russia with its economy and by the third or fourth year, we ran out of steam. does that sound familiar? so when we talk about ukraine and russia's problems, i think we ought to talk about the united states which you've done, as a problem. my question or two. the first is your discussion of russia has been almost exclusively putin's russia. so my question is, what are the russians who are the other russia? how do you view them? do they have any role, the exiles or any of the groups, to play? because they still do talk to ukrainians. they don't advertise it, but they do. is there anything that can be

done here to build that lower level of trust or of-- that's the wrong word. talk would be fine and can we, you know, in europe there's a whole discussion about decolonization which for us is kind after crazy word, but they mean the decolonization of the russian empire and we ought to listen a little to that. my second question, and to you, i like 1776 big time. hamilton and all of those -- but for most americans, i wonder if the real analogy, and to the europeans, the real analogy isn't 1936. and i really think that we should be talking in terms of what happened after that because 1776 is, you know, maybe so the supreme court is

really important, but for the rest, it was a long time ago. >> thank you. this is-- very -- two good questions. john, you want to do the kind of people to people question that toby asked and do you want to dot 1776 one? this will be the last question. so several people will be here to answer questions after we wrap this up. but john. >> yeah, i think that the people to people issue is something that, you know, not just in russia, but in ukraine and other places we state department diplomates and the people who work with us, we work hard on this. even in russia when i was there 2014 to 2017. my wife and i traveled as much as we could and em embassy

officers traveled as much as they could. and we'd have lunch or dinner with russians who had been on grants coming to the united states, these are educational or the billington grants, the open world grants and it was a good chance to kind of reconnect with that. i don't think that lynne tracy, our current ambassador is able to really travel and do that much right now, but i do know from talking to her that she and her staff are working to the extent they can. it's a very limited staff as i think everybody knows to try and maintain some of the people to people ties. and i know that there's a lot of people in this country, in academic institutions and others where we're staying in touch with russians who are in exile who have fled the country for obvious reasons. and i think we need to continue to do that. as i look back, and this will resonate with most of the others on the panel, one of the

great things that the united states did in eastern and central europe since 1991 was to invest money. we could have invested more in different grants and in the people to people kinds of programs. it built the-- i think an understanding of our own country, but kind of the relationships often not officially, but private relationships and certainly when the moment comes we're going to have to, i know we're investing some money now, but we need to continue to do that because it's building from the bottom up, as it were, to try to regain some of the ground that's been lost during the last two years in particular. >> john, thank you, thank you. >> 1776, 1936? >> i think there are probably other points of history or years we could look to to make different points about this war

and i completely agree with you, 1936 is a very apt analogy. this is an existential war for ukraine. if russia keeps on, there will be, you know, it will be a very sad time for ukraine. but i think that what we all recognize is that this is not only an attack on ukraine, it is an attack on the west. it's an attack on the u.s., on n.a.t.o. and it is an attack on the international system and you know, as denise said at the outset, what kind of a world do we want to be living in? if we don't step up now, we are going to have to deal with the russian threat and russian actions later on and it will be, you know, perhaps not at a time of our choosing, not at a time that's advantageous to us and perhaps involve american boots on the ground and i think that that's a very dangerous prp proposition not only for

us, but for the world and i completely agree with you. >> a great closing statement and thank you for that. let me thank ambassadors tefft, and john in particular, co-sponsoring this. please help me thanking these folks and stick around. [applause] . [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> c-span shop.org is c-span's

online store. browse our latest collection of c-span products, apparel, books, home decor and accessories. there's something for every c-span fan and every purchase helps support our nonprofit operation. shop now for anytime at c-span shop.org. >> now we'll take you live now to the u.s. senate. a few judicial nominations on the agenda today, along with president biden's nomination for chief counsel of the internal revenue service. three vote series are planned and floor negotiations continue on government spending to avoid a partial government shutdown at midnight on friday. 20% of the federal government could close, if no deal is reached by friday, march 8th, the government would fully shut down. speaker mike johnson is proposing the house and senate approve a short-term spending bill that would shift both funding deadlines to about a week later. we'll continue to