period in european history. >> shockingly optimistic finish for this conversation. i didn't expect us to go there. and these two stick around, there's a lot of more terrific panels to come, join me in thinking timothy.

[background noises] >> good morning, everyone. welcome to the second panel foreign policy in the united states the brookings institution. we have a terrific panel which

will be a continuation of these issues. the past here, let me introduce them. in the deputy secretary in and out of government our very own, an expert on european security and foreign policy and indo pacific issues, good to see you here. next door from carnegie, a

fellow on the craft program. in his recent book, 2020 entitled tomorrow, the u.s. global supremacy a critical view on different policies and looking forward to discussing that. finally, mariana has recently joined us as a nonresident fellow but she herself is as it hovered and working as a senior worker, a very impressive project called managing that we will be talking about the issues. a couple of days ago we had secretary of lincoln around the

corner at the school of advanced international studies and he said a number of interesting things. he said in we are going through what is essentially a hint moment in history today that postwar period has ended and the new one has not started. talking about basically we know where we want to go but don't know how to get there will russia and europe and defense and the way forward and the

world were becomes unhinged. what does it mean for europe and transatlantic alliance? between russia, china and america. >> thank you -- can you hear me? thank you for the question, this is what kind of path europe needs to take in this idea of being in unhinged moment and an inflection and we have heard this over and over again which

seems to me having worked in this field, we are always at an inflection. seems like every five years nato is in process or we are out of crossroads or something. we are definitely in place of change but we have been before and what helps us deal with change and the unknown is a lot of structures we built are still in place that that they don't need to be tweaked and changed and brought up to date but this is something we can hold onto that we didn't have before when there were crises in before. we have these structures that give an idea of how we can navigate. that's one of the great tools since the end of world war ii, the structures it has and the

ability it has shown to work together to help their membership so we have these structures to help us in one thing we are going to have to focus on, we've got this work in ukraine that will have a tremendous impact on what this will look like. ... as it navigates what happens once he's finally comes ukraine. >> you've raised a number of very interesting issues. i go back to secretary blinken who said what we are expensing

now is more than a test of the post-cold war order span of it. want to skip to you because i want you to respond as a european. but stephen, europe passed between the great powers and whether or not we can hold on to cold war systems and institutions. what we mostly call as a rules-based order. if there's a victory for ukraine at the end of all this -- is there? >> first of all well done to everybody who's come out and a post-pandemic september friday morning. it's great to see people filled the room in this setting. so i think that it's good to get beyond the massive abstraction of rules-based order and liberal international order which nobody including the is able to define

come right? i think right now there's a a choice to be made with respect to the way the transatlantic alliance understands itself and where it's going for the next several decades, and essentially the choices is like this. the united states could continue to take the lead in a much more competitive global environment in counterbalancing china in the indo-pacific as well as russia, a more aggressive and unpredictable russia in europe. europe's side of that bargain will be to probably have to come over to washington's side more in terms of the threat perception of china derisking economically from china, and it would probably remain dependent on the united states for its own

security. and right now i think that is a prevailing approach from the biden administration in washington and transatlanticall transatlantically. i think that that is not going to put the alliance on a good footing to secure its goals in five, ten, 20 years because i think it is past time for europe not to be dependent on either the capabilities or the willpower of the united states to come to europe's rescue in a moment of crisis. the fact that we're sitting here and talking about contemplating donald trump returning to the white house in a little bit more than a year should be very telling in that regard, but i think it would also be a mistake to get fixated on the figure of trump himself. there are some deeper reasons why i think the united states is ill equipped to manage the

russia problem in addition to the china problem in addition to all the headwinds that it faces in its own society going forward. and one of the reasons why i think secretary blinken is right to call this a least a potential inflection point or the end of an era is that the united states recommitted to european security after the cold war really because of the lack of threat because things seem so good, , t seemed like the united states could remain the leading guarantor of european security and even expand its commitments under come with an expanding nato precisely because the costs seen below. read the entire congressional debate on expansion in 2004 to seven countries including the baltic countries. nobody was taking seriously the question, will the united states actually have to come to the defense of nato territory in these places that many of which

bordered russia? so we face a very different environment and to think it would be a mistake to look at decades of seemingly fairly consistent use commitment to european security and assume that that is the most low-risk way for the transatlantic community to achieve its goals because the underlying conditions that elicited the u.s. commitment have changed so profoundly. so i would favor more of a division of labor approach in which europe i think no better moment the now uses the opportunity now to take over the lions share of the defense burden gradually over time, but starting now, , and that would free the united states up to handle both security in asia and pressing domestic needs. >> so, tara, i want to come to

you now. -- [inaudible] is this on? as as a european listening to s -- may be the battery is out? i can borrow your mic for a quick question. so as a european listening to this debate between two u.s. thought leaders, what do you hear and what is the lesson for europe as it charts out a course between united states, china, and russia that clearly is i think the overlapping one, overlapping aspects of what both jim and stephen said. but how does it sound in europe? >> thanks so much, actually. it is great to be a very unruly struck by both the gym and

stevens interventions and as listening to stephen just thinking that think i agree with them, europe needs to do more but for the past 30 years it's not more, the idea for europe that was at the u.s. is going to guarantee it security was going to do so through nato in particular. so now if we are looking at a situation where a native commitment might not be so strong and the u.s. might refocus, we have europe that is not invested in defense of doping in his be an either/or. i don't think it is nato or europe. i think this debate honestly is 30 years old. the situation is about is totally different but we need to have the discussion if nato is not going to be the main character of european security, we find ourselves extremely vulnerable. i mean in military terms. in economic terms we've understood our vulnerability clearly, the post, how we faced covid and the realization that we were so dependent on chinese and indian markets in particular

for key pharmaceuticals i think was really a seachange moment for the eua, and i honestly don't think the eu could have acted the way it acted since the beginning of russia's invasion of ukraine if it hadn't gone through the covid pandemic. the fact that the covid pandemic led to debt neutralization to really overcome a number of taboos and european policymaking was a true moment. i mean, the commission president said she wants to lead the geopolitical commission. we've heard countries like france and germany talk about european sovereignty but these are more about division about europe is to act in the world and is to act as an economic powerhouse. talking about european defense european capabilities in terms of sins, it is still something that is not so easy to do, not so easy to do because i think washington is very contradictory there. we do hear voices more and more voices coming from both sides of the aisle saying europe needs to do more, but at the same time it should also state in nato.

so how is it supposed to do more if, if we can't think of european security be on nato and if the u.s. is likely to commit to stay longer, i think we really find yourself in a very contradictory situation. i'm talking of the european security order here. i'm not even talking about how russia features in all this and how russia's working ukraine features in the european security order, , and china features and european decision-making. china is still a major trading partner for the eu. it will remain so. the are a number of countries in the european union who do not want to see a change right now. were talking about derisking absolutely and we are preparing for it, but derisking is a tactic, not a strategy. de-risking is not a long-term plan plan. it's a preparation. what is the eu's long-term plan in dealing with russia, china and the u.s.? and i'm not putting the three on par. we have very different relationships with these three countries, but the way europe

and the u.n. in particular can position yourself as a geopolitical actor as having an impatient on the world stage is something that's going to take time. this is a new vision for the eu. it is almost apathetic to european project. the european political project was a peace project. it was the very idea that we did need geopolitics anymore, that we're going to overcome geopolitics. we are facing a moment right now where we are realizing that this is not possible and that we need to become a geopolitical actor and we will need to reconcile the tension of being a peace project and being a real political actor at the same time. >> tara, thank you. you've given us a sense of the internal european debate as well. let's put it out there. it isn't a consensus on some of these issues inside europe or among transatlantic partners, and when it comes to the topic of asia, pivot to asia, or meeting the challenge from

china, i think we've heard timothy garton ash represent one particular perspective early in the early panel, essentially if europeans think if you want to visit to asia, help us went in ukraine. and stephen here has put at e other way around. do more in ukraine so we can pivot to asia. obviously both of these views, opinions are out here in this town. but i want to bring this to europe, european security, data issues. margiotta, , there's a war ragig and ukraine. you are following the debate in ukraine as well as looking into european security. how do you formulate what this war means for us, for the future of european security? is ukrainian victory essential

for future european security architecture? if so, how would you define that architecture? >> thank you so much, >> thank you so much. let me take a moment before i attempt to -- i've got it all figured out. before i answer your question, some of you might know i am ukrainian. my family is still in the ukraine. the people close to me are still in ukraine. i can't speak on behalf of the entire country, but i want to take a moment to thank all of you who, through your efforts, your thoughts, your contributions, your taxpayer dollars, supporting ukraine in this hour of need. it's not an overstatement to say my country is here today in large part because of the

support and solidarity from this country as well as western civilized world as we like to call it. i think based on the discussion that we have been having today, i would like to rewind a little bit to the nature of the european project and the european business of integration. timothy nash is here and introduced us to this topic a little bit in the first panel but this was the answer to the devastation to war-torn continent that seemed not to be able to put its business in order for the first half of the 20th century, becoming the locus of two world wars. what we learned in the interwar period is having a lot of

small, sovereign nations that have either week, unprotected statehood, with all the possible disputes about borders, languages, and ethnicities, with rising powers in the mix on one continent, is a recipe for disaster and that is what ultimately resulted in the bloodiest most destructive military conflict we have ever known. much of the thinking in the first postwar years was how do we prevent that from happening in the future. many of the debates were about containing germany. a lot of these projects, including the us sort of underwriting the security of

the continent was to prevent the resurgence of germany. that might seem absurd to us today but that was very real thinking at the time and this was a new experiment. it was an experiment in integrating this different countries that have a lot of historical animosities between each other. for centuries before. the prosperity and success of the european project whatever we think about the hero crises in brussels involved that. we all have our horror stories. it was an incredibly successful project in europe after a devastating war and the us ruled in that, not just financial but through being this outside power who various actors could deeper, battling

it out was a stabilizing factor. there was much political purchase, much political weight to the nato alliance as much as the defense component of and that is why the lines did not disintegrate after the end of the cold war and hung together perhaps without much purpose or what else but still it persevered, kept on and defend it. in stark contrast to what had happened in the east in the warsaw pact. the moment the coercive power, the patron, was removed, there is an inherent value, something that keeps the european project together, and us security guarantee is crucial to it and to bring it to ukraine in just

a couple sentences, the post-soviet settlement left was basically a huge ukraine sized security vacuum in the middle of europe. ukraine over georgia or other soviet peripheries as it were, former periphery of a former empire, that basically re-creates that situation of small countries with sort of developing, we can sovereignty rights still going through some of these in the throes of post-soviet transition battling a lot of its own problems, institution building, trying to provide their security with resurgent former imperial power. it is no surprise at all the next big war in europe should break out in exactly that security vacuum.

with ukraine eyeing nato, it's not just a wish list the ukrainian leaders have. let's remember there was no appetite for nato in ukraine, ten years of ukrainian statehood and it was only a function of rambunctious russia coming back on stage that prompted ukrainian leaders to consider that as the only other alternative to its security. >> so ukraine and nato, let's stay on this question. is it the original sin or a solution to our problem ending the war, by way of original sin i am referring to 2008, bucharest, the much talked

about nato decision to keep and georgia in the waiting room signaling that they might be perhaps one day members but not right now, the two arguments out there, one, that that was a mistake, the second argument obviously is tempted russia but didn't ever of enough guarantees and therefore i have to measure backfired. one, if you could give me your sense. you worked on these issues inside come in and out of government but also looking forward, is nato part of the solution here when it comes to european security? >> thank you. that is a question we could save for a couple hours. i would love to talk about this. i was involved with nato from its first day. as a young man in the pentagon

working in the european office in the charge of partnership for peace and getting nato candidates ready to give into the alliance, i worked it ever since one way or another. so original sin, that is an interesting way to put it. when i look back on 2008 it was a mistake that was made and shaped by this politics and personalities who were there in bucharest in 2,008. doing it themselves at the negotiating table when nato was trying to have a summit meeting, it was a mistake that others said at the time that this was not the way to approach ukraine membership, having them turned away in bucharest without some things there in terms of something stronger, it was putting them

in a very awkward -- without the map and other things as well. it was not -- it was -- the understanding around the table on the us delegation there was not deep enough to understand the ramifications of what they were doing. there were other pressures and politics going on around the table that had them going in a direction that was a very halfstep as you said and we had to pay for that with the invasion of georgia and now ukraine and we see what has happened but i do believe in 2008 it was a failure of statecraft by the united states and some of the allies that left a bad draft communiqué and lead to where we are. in terms of today, looking to the future, what we don't want to my mind is another onus that happened a couple months ago in a communiqué, an approach that was almost in some ways worse than 2008. i think we now are looking at a future that has got to include

nato and eu membership. you laid this out very well in the panel before. i don't have to repeat them but it is part of the solution. it's a matter of how do we do it? i will say at the washington summit, the pressure on the administration not to have a villainous but to bring in ukraine at this crowning summit, anniversary summit, election summit, a lot of political pressure there, the idea of ukraine's future in nato will be a cute this summer. it will be what everyone is going to be looking for. as far as i'm concerned, we've got to do it then, we cannot afford to have another kicking it down the road or another misfire like 2,008. so that is part of the solution, eu membership has got to be part of that too. it cannot lag behind like the way we did in in the 90s and 2000s. >> regardless of what is happening on the battlefield? >> i say that absolutely and

there was a time not long ago i would have said we are going to have to see where we are the battlefield but we are past that point. also i'm a bit more optimistic on where things are going on the battlefield and we will be in a place where we can do that but don't think we can wait. we've got to do it, we've got to do it this summer. >> i'm going to get to you in a minute because i know you have views on this issue that are divergent but the french position on nato and ukraine has been interesting. it has evolved almost 180 ° difference from being very opposed to now being a champion of ukraine membership, we've seen that with emmanuel macron. is this a real shift? is a public relations exercise? does this reflect the divisions inside europe? tell us how you read it.

>> they say it is a real shift. i would say it to me, actually, the more important shift is the one on eu enlargement. to me that is more from the french side, the french have been known to block un and lodgment for a long time, there's a debating europe about deepening the union, whether you and large it, people say you can do both simultaneously. there was a division in europe because the strength of the eu is open in its capacity to absorb and the french are more, we need to go to a closer union. something the brixton like and was part of the debate. they didn't want this idea.

the idea france has endorsed ukraine coming in but also muldova, they are threats to security on the question buy russian forces. the fact the french have moved on this is interesting to me. emmanuel macron sees this as a moment he can champion his idea of european sovereignty even more. that we are going to do this, the western balkans right there. looking at the union of 35 member states, and complexities in terms of how you get these countries into the single market and make sure there's a level laying field, make sure the eu is competitive again and

the economic powerhouse. that's the more interesting shift. in a way, earlier this year, in terms of french attitudes in central and eastern european member states which i found quite interesting, to me on the french side, that's a greater shift than on the nato enlargement side where the french are in favor of ukraine coming in but they say as long as the us mechanism, the reality of nato negotiations and not endorsing it publicly then in a way it's very easy for paris to say wants ukraine in. >> i want you to sum up european sovereignty, a big buzzword in europe but rarely heard in this town. a big concept for geopolitical

europe, in one sense, what is it? >> it's about building critical infrastructure, protecting europe all the while remaining open, protecting rules-based international order and transatlantic alliance played a huge role in european sovereignty but also that europe needs to grow stronger in terms of protecting physical materials, its economic trend and also partners, this is not a end word, it's about the eu building partnerships, transatlantic alliance very much interested but also building partnerships with the middle east, with asia and thinking of this new quarter that was announced at the g 20 meeting which will play a central role in terms of the eu presenting itself as an infrastructure provider and partnering in a very different way with asian and middle eastern countries, not looking just at europe, providing

infrastructure and know-how but actually partnerships. >> when he was us ambassador to moscow, bill burns is said to have pulled nato membership, ukraine membership to nato. all redlines for russia. which is something that is, in your recent new york times article, appeared right before, you have a publicly diverse position from jim, you think enlargement was a mistake and will be a mistake for ukraine. but now we are in this war. everyone is part of this war. the term proxy war has been thrown about in the first session. it is almost unavoidable to

mention nato in this context. have your views changed? can nato afford to lose in this system? >> it is important that ukraine continue to exist as an independent country. we hope that the war will end. on what terms and when, a huge question. we face a really difficult question about what is the best way for ukraine to be secure, independent, prosperous, hopefully democratic and non-corrupt in the future, this is where a little bit of recent history is illuminating. drift a little bit back to the present question. it strikes me that a lot of supporters today of ukraine joining nato are being offered an invitation to join in the near-term, sound a lot like

critics of nato enlargement when the post-cold war process of enlargement began in the late 1990s. critics, including george cannon argued that although there wouldn't be any near-term catastrophe with russia, launching enlargement as an open-ended process, not a 1-time thing, not okay, we will do it, maybe that is the end, but as explicitly continuous process in which new countries moving closer to russia's borders would be constantly considered and the door left open, this was some things that would create a new dividing line in post-cold war europe where it is still possible that a dividing line might not exist or still seem possible. and the united states and other members of nato but the united

states in particular would therefore gain new security commitments that would be harder and harder to defend, more peripheral from the core us interest in ensuring a basically peaceful stable europe particularly western, northern and central europe, and be more prone to antagonize russia and turn russia hostile and i would add to that argument that who would be left especially vulnerable? it would be those states caught in the middle of an expanding nato military alliance and potentially more aggrieved russia and not given protection by nato. to date i don't think the process of nato enlargement has been something that has benefited ukraine even as i understand purposely well but make sense for ukraine to want to get into nato.

so you mentioned 2008, we are all dissatisfied with 2008 for good reason, but in what direction are we dissatisfied? was the problem that ukraine wasn't given membership or was the problem that the whole question was very publicly broached, an empty promise was made, this was provocative to russia without providing security to ukraine and we should not have gone down that road to begin with. i'm in the latter camp and there is an unfortunate dichotomy right now in the public debate between causes of a war, something internal to russia, russian imperialism, russian aggression, nato enlargement a factor, they were both factors. they are more mutual reinforcing factors than they are competing factors, in part precisely because russia sought a sphere of influence in

post-soviet territory arctic -- particularly with russian speakers, that nato enlargement to those areas was so galling to so many russians as bill burns wrote in 2,008. these are both in player, therefore i would be very concerned about extending nato membership to ukraine particularly because for nine years now the war between russia and ukraine has occurred, every nato member has chosen not to directly fight for ukraine, making a pledge to do so would potentially lack credibility, i think it would force us in response to station large numbers of troops, perhaps nuclear weapons, in ukraine. if you think about what was done in west germany, that was west germany in the cold war to make deterrence incredible in that case, we have a real problem in this case.

i think the eu pad for ukraine is very promising. we should not give flatware put in what he wants which is an opportunity to make what happens in ukraine a showdown between the united states and russia. >> diane, i'm going to get you in a second but a cancer. membership means that nato russia war essentially, having to defend ukraine, article 5 possible, nuclear weapons, possible. how do you prevent an escalation if ukraine was given membership at the next nato summit? i want your answer, a burning

nuclear question. >> you point out all the reasons, very good job of pointing the other side of the question. it's not something that is black and white in terms of how do you do this. nato hasn't had to do an enlargement move with this kind of complexity ever and getting consensus within the alliance, by itself will be tough but i think you have to approach it in a more savvy wave and we did in bucharest in 2008. i think we have to approach it in a way that is not going to put ukraine in an even worse place which is what happened in 2008. i think the approach needs to be one that provides deterrence for ukraine and it has to be shaped in a way that might be different than in the past in terms of extension of

membership, in washington, we need to take a first step which is to invite them to membership. you don't bring them in immediately in washington, you're going to wave a magic wand. you've got to start the process but it has got to be started in a real way, can't be an empty promise. we've had too much of that. this has got to be real, not another committee. it's got to be some things that means membership is coming. it has to be done in a way that shows strength in nato, unity in nato to we've agreed to do this. the problem in bucharest, there wasn't the consensus clear there was mass confusion, the bush administration came in and pushed an approach and it didn't work out. statecraft issues there.

washington, it can be done with more savvy and it has got to be done with the strength of nato unity. i don't think we have another choice but we can do it in a way that helps us deal with the problems you laid out number that have been laid out. >> mariana, two question simultaneously, the first is a short one, is there still a real threat of nuclear escalation, we know biden is being cautious about escalation on the ukraine front, president biden talked about world war iii in terms of providing what range et cetera. and last year this time there was a real threat of nuclear escalation. do you still see a threat for nuclear escalation on the side of russia? this one can be short. the real question i want to ask

you is how does this stand? that was short too. >> before i very quickly answer your two questions, i would like to weigh in on the previous debate just very briefly. there' s not that many options out there for ukraine a security. there's three things you can do. one is for ukraine to become a belarus, etc. be of russia, the sphere of influence, whatever and follow that route and that's the scenario russia has been pursuing edward very much like to do that and if ukrainian publics were on board with that, whatever. it is their choice. the stage 2 revolution, two maps of protests. and to thank you for, 2014, in

this scenario, no matter what people in washington want. ukraine has an agency in all of them. 2, to become part of integrated european security architecture, and in that, there's nato, with all due respect eu security structures basically nonexistent. for all intents and purposes. so how this happens is a big set of questions, i agree with those who said the 2008 and bucharest was a bane of house measures, the opposite of what advised us to speak softly and carry big sticks, that was the opposite. the third solution to ukraine security is to become the built up militarized garrison state, maybe follow an israeli model

where there's a strong alliance with the united states but become immobilized on the character of ukraine, we don't know, even with the best efforts, to stand up for russia, three times the size with all the resources, could ukraine have done better to provide security? absolutely. absolutely. but still the best effort, those capacities would have been limited. with all that, is there a threat of nuclear escalation, absolutely. but there is a dimensional conflict on the ground, stakes are raised. there's definitely a heightened risk. president putin has used nuclear threats abundantly for political effect, they seem to

have worked. because they seem to have worked he continues to use them. they worked in the sense of inducing caution on the part of the west. not detouring altogether western support, but very cautious approach. in terms of providing assistance coming in terms of limiting end use and so forth. all of it very justified but costing a lot of ukrainian lives in the meantime and hampering the prospects for successful ukrainian counteroffensive's. that leads me to the question of how this ends. the short answer is we don't know. nobody knows. a war is a war. right now it could seem like a slog on the southern front. tomorrow we could be reading the news that the second line of defense is broken, ukrainian

troops poured in, reserves the redeployed, we don't know, we don't know. it will end some day and when it ends the question of long-term security for ukraine and europe will have to be solved in such a way that none of this can happen again. >> less than one minute and i have a quick question. you talked about israeli model. we've had a lot of questions from the audience. how does it end, what steps need to be taken, do you envision peacekeepers, security guarantees? specific questions, in foreign affairs and called for negotiation. basically how does it end? >> give me one minute. i would favor a combination of

the israel model, very flawed, the israel model, well armed, well-trained ukraine with support from its international partners including the united states for arms and training, significant support and integration into europe but i don't favor nato membership. i don't think there is any savvy way to get the alliance on board because there are deep objections. we saw them come out in washington and berlin. to that course of action. i'm concerned by the idea that nato membership is alternative to the israel model, to a well armed, well supported ukraine as if the piece of paper, article 5 is going to provide security. we need to learn something from the league of nations about that.

that may have worked in the past 3 decades, quote, because we don't actually know but for nato security guarantees russia would have invaded other countries possibly but we don't know. in the case of ukraine, ukraine is going to have to be well armed, well supported, and physically able to deter russia through its capabilities. the nato option, i worry there's a fantasy being created that nato is a silver bullet, and because of those words, this will never happen again. >> i have 2 apologize publicly to tara varma because we are running out of time. a possible next trump administration, europeans, would like to talk about but a round of applause please for our panelists. and thank you all. [applause] [inaudible

conversations] >> coming up alive today on c-span the house is back at 9 am eastern for legislative business and will try to begin debate on defense spending bill for 2,024 after procedural vote failed earlier this week. on c-span2 the senate returns at 11 am to consider defense nominations including confirmation of general randy george to be chief of staff of the army and general eric smith to be commandant of the marine corps. and on c-span 3 at 9 am, a hearing on a rural broadband funding for house energy and commerce subcommittee. the