help us to do even more of that, continued regulation and some others will also help, but importantly, i think it's premature for this committee to be thinking about legislation. the fcc has the ability to examine the regulations and make-- >> thank you very much. mr. chairman, thank you again. i yield back. >> the gentleman's time expired and the chair now recognizes the gentle lady from florida's 3rd district for five minutes. >> wonderful. thank you, mr. chairman for holding this hearing today and thank you to our witnesses for appearing before the committee. i'm actually fascinated by this issue because it is so rapidly changing, this environment that it's hard to keep up and so, as a cord cutter myself, i just-- call me twitter-pated, i'm sure my staff loves that right now. and jumping in, you mentioned that fubo plans to introduce ai products designed to enhance

the customer or the consumer experience. can you tell what that might look like? >> well, as i said, we're focused on the consumer experience and one of the ways we gauge that is by engaging our product-- >> we'll leave this program here. watch the rest on c-span.org. now, to a discussion on u.s. foreign policy as the war in ukraine continues. this is live coverage on c-span2. >> ukraine the west and the world. breaking points transformational moments. we're delighted to have so many joining us here in the audience in washington on our faulk auditorium and around the world and looking forward to timely and important discussion. since russia launched the war 18 months ago, the war has had disastrous for ukrainian people and ripple effects in europe and around the world.

european security and n.a.t.o., and transatlantic relationship. the impact on domestic foreign policy and the trajectory of great power competition. we're fortunate today to have a remarkable group to discuss these issues. we'll start with lessons from the post berlin wall period, in history where civil society and leaders around the globe grasped the chance to reshape the world after the cold war. we're living through what appears to be another transformational moment in europe. where it will lead remains unclear. speaking for the issue will be timothy garton nash, homelands, history of europe and our own fiona hill for the united states here at brookings moderated by the new yorker's susan glasser. following this discussion right now, brookings visiting fellow will moderate a panel focusing on europe's past between

russia, china and the united states, the global ramifications of the russia-ukraine war and what the sharpening u.s.-china rivalry means to the atlantic security order. we'll conclude with a conversation on democratic governance and global disruptions and western hogemeny. and this discussion will trackle how governments can balance the foreign and domestic policies in the face of crises. we're streaming live and on the record and we'll be talking questions from viewers via e-mail events at brookings.edu or social media using the #us europe and a microphone for those of you in the faulk auditorium. i'll hand it over to susan glasser. looking forward.

>> thank you suzanne and all of for spending part of your day. i'm personally looking forward to it how often do you get to start your conversation with a conversation between timothy garton nash and fiona hill and we're lucky that they've joined us this morning and i want to thank suzanne for starting with this idea about 1989 because i do think there's a big frame for the discussion that we are having and what we need to have and there are consequences. what does it mean, the war in europe. and you'll often hear this is the largest land war in europe since world war ii. this is a profound challenge to the european security order and things along that vein and yet, i think the way we should start this conversation is to talk about, do we even have a way, a framework for thinking about the longer term consequences of this moment? and you know, i remember a few

years ago somebody said to me, well, 1989 just might have been the best year of any of our lives, we just didn't know it at the time. and in that spirit, timothy, i want to start with you because you've written this remarkable book and fiona hill and i both have copies here because we shouldn't leave it to the author to shamelessly promote his work when we can do it for him. i can tell you, it is actually a gripping read and it is the story in many ways of the spirit of 1989 and what we got right and what we also didn't get right. so, i think it's worth stepping back from the immediate crisis of the war in ukraine for a minute to kind of begin with a question to you, timothy, about, you know, how we can apply those lessons to this moment. >> yeah, listen, thank you very much. it's wonderful to be here with two people whose work i very much admire. and not having to boost one's

own book, you've done it for me. >> it's on sale, by the way, at the brookings bookstore. >> thank you very much. and there was a famous book, "post war", defining a post-war period. this book covers i cover post war which gives the title to the session. by the way, i'm struck that here in washington you have to explain it's the berlin wall. i mean, for us europeans, what other wall is there? that the one trump didn't build to mexico? which wall are we talking about? and i think the post-wall period goes from the 9th of november, 1989 the fall of the berlin wall to february of 2022. i think the full scale invasion of ukraine ends that period and that period, like a game of european football, is a game of two halves. so in the first half you have

this quite extraordinary spread of freedom and democracy and enlargement of the geopolitical west. think about it, the eu and n.a.t.o. eu, 12 members and n.a.t.o. in 1989, and 2007, 27 members of eu and members of n.a.t.o. and step forward, the second half starting with putin's annexation of georgia and the global financial crisis, it's pretty much downhill all the way. it's a downward turn and crisis ending with the largest war in europe since 1945. and let me pick out throw lessons, if i may, and then we'll go into the conversation. and first of all, this touches on what you said about 1989. the mistake we made was to think that was normal, that was the way history was going to go. actually, it was a one in a

million example of historical luck. of what machiavelli calls fortunea. the mistake we made, the fallacy of extrapolation, right? we took the way things had gone through to 2007, namely very well, and said that's the way it's going to continue. we took history with a small age, which is always the product of the interaction between deep structure and process on the one hand and con juncture, contingency, chance, and leadership on the other and turned it into history with a capital h, the inevitable progress towards freedom. freedom isn't a process, freedom is a struggle as the ukrainians are reminding us. that's lesson number one. lesson number two, looking back and it's very much here, i would say that the decline of the russian/soviet empire has

been one of the great drivers of european history for the last 40 years and is probably going to be pre occupying us for the next 40, right? and history teaches us something about declining empires, which is they don't like it. ask the british. ask the french. ask the portugese. west european colonial spent 40 years after 1945 trying to defend their colonel possessions in often brutal wars. when the largest remaining empire in europe, the russia soviet empire vanishes away in three years, 1989-1991 we shouldn't have thought that was the end of the story and therefore, when that empire started doing what declining empires do, which is trying to strike back, i mean, you could

already say chechnya, but big time, georgia, 2008 above all 2014. 2014 for me is the point where the west failed to turn. we should have learned that lesson of history and i'd argued if we had a much different and stronger response in 2014 we wouldn't be in the mess we're in today. third quick lesson, susan, we have to learn from our successes as well as from our failures. and the biggest single success of this period was the double eastward enlargement of the geopolitical west, eu and n.a.t.o. and the ukrainians have understood this perfectly. if you talk to the ukrainian commissioner on zoom, she has a

back drop which shows the symbols of the eu and n.a.t.o. interlinking through ua, ie, the symbol for ukraine. it's always both. it always-- and by the way that goes back. and it's both n.a.t.o. and eu, it's euro-atlantic integration and therefore we now have this -- it's that process stalled for 15 years after 2008 basically and suddenly, we have again. >> thanks to the wall, a really big, exciting strategic agenda which is about a new big double eastward enlargement of the geopolitical west, ukraine, maldova, georgia, the west in balkans, so i think, you know, it's important to learn from your successes as well as from your failures. >> yeah, it's interesting that you make that point.

i just came back from tablesi, one of the only places in the world you see on the street graffiti in addition to lots of graffiti about, you know, doing bad things to russia, literally eu symbols, you know, as graffiti on the walls, expressing aspirations that may or may not happen anytime soon. fiona, who also i should say has her own terrific book, i'm sure many of you here have read it. there's nothing for you here, but there's something for her here. all right. she and i, we've had this conversation a number of times, but i think, i haven't-- we haven't talked about this recently so i'm curious in light of what timothy is saying in terms of being humble about what we didn't get right about 1989. let's say we now recognize this is a moment, one of those inflection points as president biden often refers to it since

the full scale invasion of ukraine. i'm curious, given the huge response that you have actually seen from europe in terms of support for ukraine, certainly the united states, we're now at nearly $50 billion in u.s. military assistance, more than close to 80 billion overall in committed assistance. that's running ahead of in current dollars, even of the three year marshall plan. it's an extraordinary investment. we don't even really have a consensus terminology in what to call this. what is it that we are doing right now to support ukraine? as you know, there's a huge fight unfolding here in washington i think around this question. in the white house if you ask them, i did this recently, would you call this a proxy war? they reacted as if i had just like punched them in the stomach because that's not something that they want to call it. you and i have talked before,

is it actually, according to vladimir putin, the early stages of world war iii? what do you think it is that's happening right now? and what is-- is it important for us to sort of name and understand the moment in that way? >> well, thanks very much, susan. and i just want to commend timothy as well on the fabulous book that's now sitting next to me in a chair which deserves its own chair and it's a point at the very beginning of the book i think helps encapsulate what we're talking about here. you point out through your own personal experiences and interactions, everyone has a different year zero and everybody would have a different year nine in their minds and i think this is part of the issue that we're dealing with. we're"we" is when we unpack and talk about it because so many different people, depending on their perspectives, you bring out very well in the book, have different starting points. if i think about that 1989, that's when susan and i met. we were actually in a russian

history class with richard pipes and i think russia under the old regime and the empire. and i just started my masters program, susan was wrapping up her undergraduate and we both had an interest in where it was headed. i got a degree in soviet studies and it was defunct a few months later and i was sitting in the audience waiting for my agree and my masters in soviet studies and sitting on the podium was one getting an honorary degree, the former soviet-- i think he was technically the soviet foreign minister, we pleat with new thinking how to get out of the cold war. in months he would be president of an independent georgia as confused as well as everybody else about where things were heading. this is a time nobody knew the trajectory. he was sitting there, obviously bee mused, why is he getting

this award and everybody thinking that he ended the cold war, but he was just beginning on an odyssey of his own, it's that whole kind of 1989, for some countries was an opening to something that they hoped would be new, but if you think about the metaphor of georgia where you've just come from, it was one civil war after another, one conflict after another. one aspiration basically never achieved and georgia is still today is racked wracked by so many of the goses of the past and i remember one of his advisors say, the problem, nobody thinks of us as real countries, but just shadows, shadow cast by the old soviet union and by you because you don't know what to think about us. part of the reason we're here today unpacking all of this, we continue to look at everything through the lens of russia. you know, we talked about when the soviet union fell apart and the russians, 25 million russians, but there were just russian speakers.

most of us here speak english, but we're not all english. timothy is, i was born in england, but we've got fluid identities and english is a language ubiquitous everywhere, everybody who speaks english doesn't express themselves as english, english is in india, second. and we didn't think of english people living where zimbabwe in south africa. >> and part of this reason today, part of confusion where we are, we never really got a grip of that era of 1989 about where it might be heading. and now, you know, we keep trying to give ourselves satisfying explanations. but you know, if you think about countries like finland in this context and you know, the-- we talk about the united states

for ukraine, but proportionally, the baltic states, finland, country are giving more support proportional to gdp. why? in 1939 they got snatched by stalin having been independent. and timothy writes about this, europe going west again. it's not that the west went east. most of the west, particularly countries that got independence, poland, the baltic states. and finland got invaded by sovietion. 1989 seemed like an abberation and although the finns were embracing the european union and had in the back of their mind that history would come back again with another 9 like 1939. they were always raring to go.

so we ought to ourselves take a pause. you know, when we look through our own lens at 1989 where we've been and how we feel about the war in ukraine. a lot of the countries are all in because as timothy said, they have a different year zero, a different year 9 to think about a lot of these dates in different historical patterns. >> yeah, i think that's an important jumping off point then for where we are today here bus it does look different in washington than it looks in europe and so i do, i want to ask both of you this question about, there isn't the same level of consensus. there has been remarkable support on the one hand, if you look at polls, americans have been very supportive of ukraine although that's ebbed over time in terms of support for specific amounts of military assistance, but i don't think there's consensus in our society about what we're doing and of course, it looks very different if you have a thousand mile border with

russia than it does here in the u.s. and so, i do want to ask both of you this question, how you think about what it is that is our commitment to ukraine right now. >> well, i'm sure many of you might just pick up the new york times today. maybe not everybody watching on c-span might have done so, but i would actually commend a long piece by thomas freedman and also by the editorial board which i think lays it out very clearly. we may not think that ukraine matters to us, sitting over here and feckless the way that we debated. the way we present ourselves, the united states, timothy made reference back again to, you know, kind of world war ii, but susan and i actually exchanged a glass when he was talking about, for putin it's a 100 year war and he's going back to

world war i, he may have laid us off the scent by talking about world war ii and-- 1917, people in the audience who would know about it as well. when mr. prigozhin was marching on moscow, putin talked about 1917, the stab in the back for the revolution, the russian empire world war i, repeatedly ukraine is an abomination, a frankenstein country, a country that shouldn't exist and lenin and bolsheviks, creating the soviet union and say from the previous 100 year ward you never know until the get to the end it. we're at 100 years now. not that we're old enough to remember 1914 or 1917 even though we might have links to that. that's the kind of shadow that's cast all over this and that what makes it, you know, extremely difficult to deal with, because putin is making a

battle for history here, and we have to-- and this is why books like this are really so good about putting things into perspective. we have to stop him from weaponizing history. and if we look at our own history in the united states, it took a very long time for the united states to become independent. putin's always talking about crimea belongs to russia because they snatched it in 1783. naples, 1783. it wasn't until september of 1783, sorry for the history lesson here, i've been trying to perfect my elevator speech telling people why this matters and the elevator has been going up to different floors. and u.s. was in independent state and alaska wasn't, but the one person that we do have a russia border, see it from our bedroom. and 1776 to 1783 to get itself in order and didn't have all of

its borders in place. ukraine is like the young united states. like any other european country constantly refighting for its independence and borders. if we like ukraine down now we're letting ourselves down. many people came to the united states defense. if you think back to world war ii, the same debates about our homeland, our original homeland, the united kingdom. imagine if we hadn't stood up and helping churchill. that's why the u.k. is all in because they recognize zelenskyy as another winston churchill trying to use his networks to keep support. this is, unfortunately, whether we like it or not, as timothy said before, a replay of all of those fights that we've had in the past and people may call us hawks or reactionary, but there are so many times we have to stand up and be counted and we might not like it and might like our comfortable life back, but unfortunately that's not the situation we're in right now. this is one of the moments where you have to take a stand.

>> one comment on the past and one on the future. fiona, you pointed out that everybody in this room speaks english, but they're not all english. this is a point i made to vladimir putin in 1994 at a conference in st. petersburg, putin was then the deputy mayor of st. petersburg and famously, he piped up and said, there are territories that historical always belonged to russia and the russian federation has to look after them and he specifically mentioned crimea and he mentioned the 25 million, the 25 million russians and i actually came back and i said, if england claimed all the people who spoke english, we would be the largest country in the world. and he didn't quite like that answer, i think. but it is very revealing that he was already thinking of how to get the empire back three years after the end of the

soviet union. don't tell me n.a.t.o. enlargement which happens five years later is the cause of putin's attitude to ukraine. and in the way he thought about restoring russian greatness, there is a huge missed opportunity, which you can think about by taking the english comparison, right? so in 2013, the kyiv national institute of socialology, regular polling in ukraine, found that 80% of ukrainians had a positive general attitude to russia, 80%. after the full scale invasion, 2%. vladimir putin has destroyed the russian world and there was that-- a book in central kyiv earlier this year, with are they're collecting russian language books and pulping them in order to send the money to support

ukrainian armed forces. i saw piles of books in the center of a book shop. when i was there, a guy came in carrying bundles of book. and he said i've got 50 volumes of lenin, space for 50 volumes of lenin. >> yes, bring them in. >> there's a tragedy there for russian culture whereof course, england, we made huge mistakes, but because it was a softer landing to the post-colonial, it's enriched by post-colonial writers, you can go on and on. there's a russia tragedy there. i've spent half my time in ukraine, three times in the last nine months. a year ago my biggest worry was waivering, unfading european

support. i was worried about germany, worried about italy. today by far my biggest worry is fading u.s. support. basically, i mean, there are some uncertain customers in europe, hungary, obviously, slovakia after the election the end of the month and basically europe is going to stick with it. militarily it depends on the united states. if you look at polling and congress and budget, above all, if you think of the prospect of a second trump presidency, i mean, that would be a disaster in so many ways, but it would be an absolute catastrophe for ukraine and i don't know what fiona thinks of that, this seems to me clear that putin is waiting and working and hoping for a trump victory so that we really have a task, susan, all of us, to make the case to the

american public. now, fiona made part of the case, which is this is what we're about. it's sticking up for countries fighting for their freedom and independence. but there's also a geopolitical case, which is this, you want to pivot to asia, you think your biggest problem is china, then you've got to help ukraine to win. number one, that's the biggest deterrent to xi jinping not to have a go at taiwan. number two, you then have the largest, most combat hardened in europe and ukraine. the second largest in poland. germany is spending 2% of gdp, if sticks to it, the second largest budget in europe and to russia. actually you have a new burden sharing transatlantic between europe and the united states where europe is doing much more for its own defense and therefore, you can free up the resources to meet the challenge in asia and you will have asserted our commitment to

international order, but i think, you know, it's a case that we need to keep making. >> well, you know, it's interesting that you make this point. i was just last night speaking with the senior republican senator who is a supporter of ukraine and he said exactly this, he says he was pleading actually with the administration to reframe the current -- there's a 24 billion dollar supplemental appropriation that they've asked congress to pass, it's not clear-- we know what's happening with congress this week whether that's happening or not. to your point, it's a pivot to asia, it's as much about taiwan as much as about ukraine and how you should be talking about it with congress and to the american people. so i think it's a resonant point. but fiona, i think it's important to give us your take on just this week, vladimir putin basically endorsed donald trump once again, you know. it's not a surprise, perhaps, but you saw this firsthand.

are we right to assume that donald trump, you know, he says he will end the war in 24 hours. he didn't even believe-- he essentially adopted the russian view of ukraine, correct, that ukraine was not a real state and in marie's memoir, recounts a meeting in the oval office with poroshenko, the previous president of ukraine she was pleasant with donald trump in the spring of 2017, trump says ukraine is not a real country and crimea never belonged to ukraine and therefore, why should he care about that? he said at that to the president of ukraine, correct? >> so what do we take from that? >> well, look, i mean, we take from that, you know, what is pretty obvious and, you know, as i said before people like to use, well, russia, and putin likes to use ground zero 1783, a lot of country wouldn't be on

the map in 1783, germany included, italy, you know, the united states without florida, which actually might be a good thing, sometimes, from some people's perspective, i guess, kind of when you look at its dispositive role in elections. >> i can see we're going to get a headline out of this. >> i know, i just thought i would throw that out there, just to throw it into the water, a little bit of drama. look, if we think that through, you know, it obviously gets us to a point about where do you stop on things like this. being ignorant of history is not an excuse, and president trump was shockingly ignorant of american history and he didn't know where the united states was 1783, perhaps a resident of florida he would have been more hesitant to make that comment if he could have gone back in time and think about all of this. but the other point that we're making here is, you know, president trump also prided himself and actually in this case, rightly so, on his intervention on north korea because he did head off a

crisis on north korea by some, you know, i would just, some creative forms of diplomacy, which wasn't palatable for everyone, but we were on the point of a real disaster there. what else has been happening this week? vladimir putin's been meeting with kim jong-un and that should be sobering. we think that russia is not consequence in the asian pacific, we've got to think again. the conflict the two koreas have taken sides. the north most definitively now with putin and kim jong-un is kind of a model for putin, a rogue, and handling weapons and south korea also on support in ukraine. if we focus on china and taiwan, but there's a lot else going on here. for south korea, this is extraordinary threatening what's happening in the ukraine because before, you know, we

got into this war, of course, all of our discussions were hoping there would be some negotiated solution to the division of the korean peninsula, and some hoped would be a model for ukraine. and now the idea that north korea could invade south korea and reunify the peninsula. japan, another country completely fixed on assisting ukraine, mostly diplomatic, but as a financial and other means through sanctions because japan worries about not just its territorial dispute with russia, but the claims that china has on its territory. india, we'll probably hear about this in one of the other panels, but india has disputes with pakistan, with china in the himalayas, the way that russia threatens to set off a nuclear weapon because he's not winning in ukraine and that would set a model for others,

when nuclear powers are facing off against each other. putting history aside or ignorance of history aside in the case of president trump, it's not going to be solved within 24 hours. the knock-on effects of this war are very important. it's not just china and other countries that are watching this very closely. it's changing the whole patterns of global interaction. who would have thought that we'd be watching kim jong-un with putin, putin getting military support from north korea and not the other way around. this is in many respects putting history on its head. >> and knock-on, timothy. >> since fiona mentioned 1783. something else happened in 1783, katherine the great annexed crimea. i think it's really important to say, russia has zero, zero right to crimea. crimea was russian for a much

shorter period of time than sylesia was german, from the 1740's until 1945. crimea only belonged to russia strictly speaking 1783 until 1917. after the russian civil war it became a part of the soviet union, a lot of times as an autonomous soviet socialist republic and the original people are the crimeaen tartars and not russians. and khrunichev gave it back. and if we have a legitimacy claim that because it belonged to us once sometime in history, there's a legitimate claim to it now. international order is lost. germany would then have a stronger claim than russia has to crimea and we might like to take the american colonies back or calais from the french. i mean, so, that's -- that's

the importance of putting these historical claims back in the cupboard where they belong. the knock-on effect, so, the post-war period is arguably the greatest triumph of the west. but interestingly it enters into a transition into what is loosely called a post-western world. one of the revelations, a shock for us in the west has been here is russia waging a brutal war of recolonization and india, brazil, turkey, south africa, indonesia, you know, china think that's not so bad, we're perfectly happy to go on doing business with them. i mean, look at the picture of the brics summit with lavrov grinning all over his cynical face as he clutches hands with

president xi, presidents, and prime minister modi. so there's a real lesson and challenge to us there. we're in this sense a post-western world, that is to say, one in which-- not one in which the west ceases to exist or ceases to be rich and powerful, but one the west can no longer set the agenda for world politics the way we've done until now. and the last comment, u.s. and europe, burden share. we talk about burden sharing security. in my view there's another burden sharing, i think that europe should do the lion's share of reconstruction for ukraine. i don't think we should be asking for-- you mentioned marshall plan. 80 years nearly after the end of the second world war, why should the united states being the, you know, the heavy lifting economically and this requires the country which does writes about so brilliantly,

germany, actually to step up the plate. this is the thing. germany has shifted a lot on the military position, but germany, you cannot expect germany to lead on the military support for ukraine, but economic, to do its bid, but not to lead, but you can expect it to lead on the economic reconstruction effort, which is built in to bringing ukraine step by step into the eu. that's the other burden sharing. >> yeah, and this is an important point. by the way, i want to get-- we're not going to have very much time and probably a quick one or two questions. but a final question for both of you from me, very much on the question of the post-war and you talked about reconstruction just being one aspect of it. there's also the geopolitical aspect of having russia as a revisionist power, either a defeated revisionist power or in a different scenario, one that continues to fight on or

one that is victorious. fiona, this image this week really made me think a lot about that, actually. the image of putin meeting with kim jong-un because one scenario, but only one that we can envision, certainly, is a russia that is increasingly isolated in the world and sort of a russian-north korea scenario it's even more militarized than it is, perhaps its borders are more formally closed even than they are now, perhaps it pursues an even more explicit kind of techno totaltainerism that we've seen evolve in both north korea and china. what are the scenarios you are considering right now, both of you, kind for the russia in the post-war, we can't imagine a stable european order until we can understand what role russia in the future would play in it. >> well, i think getting back to where we started, 1989 and i was thinking about edward

sitting again on that podium getting his honorary degree is that we are going to have a lot of roads ahead of us and a lot of chaos and i think that, you know, coming up with some definitive decision right now is impossible because you know, we-- what i would imagine, you know, in kind of a russian case is, you know, not just more of sort of an attempt at power on putin and somebody after putin trying to emulate the same thing, but a lot of the fraying of russia like we saw in the 1990's. i'm not -- i wouldn't be one to actually predict the collapse of russia and i know a lot of people are looking at that. and some in ukraine hope that will be one of the outcomes. and we to fight the russian opposition and exiles just like in 1917. lenin came back after a couple of decades being in europe. there are so many russians in europe now, not just ukrainians, they're all sitting around not planning the dissolution of the russian

federation, but how they can play a role in russia's future with a different russia, more decentralized, more parliamentarian system. they're not, unfortunately, many of them really unpacking the problems of russian history and europeans haven't done it and the u.s. and east germany was in a different place and still legacy to unpack in germany. so, you know, i think when we look at russia, there's going to be a heck of a lot of work to do. it won't be like 1989 all over again. we won't be able to do and engage in, you know, many of the things that we did before. it's a moment to the country, deeper relationships with china certainly than it did before with the middle east. so many russians are now headed through dubai. they've shifted their trade and commerce to the middle east. you know, we are going to be seeing a lot of distortions there and the russian public that remains angry because although they--

mr. prigozhin summed it all up, the war was a mistake, but we don't want to lose it and that's going to be something that we are going to have to contend with. russia will be wanting to find its place somewhere as it always has through the largest history. it's going to take a lot of ingenuity and hard-headed thinking, but we shouldn't do that at the expense of ukraine. russia is a problem unto itself, it's manifesting itself in a pretty horrific way, but that should not stop us from thinking about ukraine and ukraine's future in a different way. >> post-war. >> first of all, we've got to get to post-war. so the most urgent thing we have to do is enable ukraine to win this war and that would have been easier if we'd given more military support sooner last year. we were in crisis management mode rather than in war winning mode. the french have a saying, when it's war, it's war, you've got to win it and now it's going to be a long, hard slog and i'm

worried that we're not going to have the level of sustaineded support, particularly in trump wins, but even if not, and that, a clear ukrainian victory, which means a russian defeat clearly, is in my view, the best thing for russia, too. there was a great speech in 1985, famous speech in thebundestag. defeat, root of law was built on defeat. and russia tragedy you don't have a defeat like that. and what i call the maximum feasible defeat and putin can't say, basically i got a sort of victory. so, to sum up a question, said the other day, we used to have

a russia policy, but no ukraine policy now we have a ukraine policy, but no russia policy. i think that is wrong because our ukraine policy is our russia policy. right? and if putin thinks that ukraine is part of russia. if we demonstrate it's not, it's an independent european country, that changes the future of russia. >> all right, i think if our organizers want, we can take two quick questions. >> one question, okay, all right. you get it. >> you're next to each other, both of you two can give us a quick question, okay? >> quick disclosure, carl, my father was born in odesa, russia, 1912, his father was a captain for the port for czar. and plans based, and said that ukraine would be like an israel. and there was a book, 200 years

together, the history of the jews in russia, have any of you read it in french, russian, only languages it's written or have putin release the official english translation because western publishers won't release it to us. >> hi, my question is, so in this, you know, trying to construct this new order with ukraine what role does u.s. security guarantees play. >> all right, quickly. quick response to that, fiona? >> well, i think all on the question of the security guarantees is you've probably already surmised from things that we are saying here, it's not sufficient for just the united states to have security guarantees. you have to be european countries and many others as well. so the united states plays an important role in terms of leadership and commitment and not going-- as we've been talking about, on

the diplomatic front as well, but it's not sufficient to just have this about the united states. in fact, that's what putin wants. he wants to make this look like a concept with the united states. he didn't just want the city, but yalta the world war ii conference in which just a group of guys, a small number of guys decides who gets to have what. so a larger framing for this is very important and i think we've already laid that out. interesting you point out-- i had no idea that had not been fully translated and confessed to not read the book, but knowing of the book and i think what we're seeing here, this is what zelenskyy is trying to get across and also with the appointment of the new defense minister, the ukraine is a complex place with a complex history. cities like maripol, greek, and the whole of ukraine is a

melting pot from previously civilization, the cradle of jewish life in the old russian empire, the settle extenned, and it's important for all of us to really understand that complexity and that's what zelenskyy is trying to get over. and it also runs in the first of, you know, putin's points if you speak russian and ethnically you are russia, everything that zelenskyy and ukraine are trying to stand for, you can be many things and have an overarching ukrainian identity. >> timothy a final word for you. >> i'll totally agree with fiona, and go further, a number of european states will have to give guarantees, you'll get them, britain, poland, astona and i hope germany and france. that in itself is not enough, that has to be a stepping stone to n.a.t.o. membership, the only lasting guarantee of-- and the pre-condition for effective reconstruction is n.a.t.o. membership.

i hope that at the warsaw summit-- washington, washington summit of n.a.t.o. next july, ukraine actually gets what it didn't get, an invitation to membership of n.a.t.o., not instant membership, but an invitation to membership of n.a.t.o. and then of course, some very tough questions about how you implement that. the more of the sovereign territory ukraine itself controls, the easier it becomes, but that is the way we have to go and last word, if we succeed in doing that and the reconstruction reform effort and the integration into the eu as well as n.a.t.o., then i can actually write a very optimistic sequel to this book because this would then be a really remarkable further step forward towards the great goal of a europe whole and free. really quite unexpected ending to this, you know, really dark

period in european history. >> and a shockingly optimistic finish for this conversation, i have to say. i didn't expect us to be going there. so, to sum up, next year in washington is the thing and fiona and timothy, i want to thank you and i hope brookings will reconvene us so that we can all celebrate this rosie scenario that at least the glimmers of suggest itself. please do stick around, there's a lot of more terrific panels to come, but in the meantime, please join me in thanking fiona and timothy and buy the book. [applause]. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> good morning, everyone. welcome to the second panel at this opener for brookings foreign policy cusc event. i am a fellow at the center on united states and europe at brookings institution and we

have a terrific panel, which is going to be-- which is going to be actually a continuation of some of the issues. we have heard fiona and timothy garton ash discuss on the first panel. i have an all-star cast here. let me quickly introduce them. jim townsend here. he has-- you know him as the co-host of a cooking show, brussel sprout, co-host of a foreign policy show, of course, and he served as a deputy undersecretary of defense working on n.a.t.o. issues in and out of government under obama administration and previous, subsequent administrations. tara, our own tara varma has joined brookings from europe. she is an expert on european security, french foreign policy and indo-pacific issues. tara, good to see you here.

steven from next door from carnegie. he is a fellow on the american state craft program at carnegie and his recent book, "2020, entitled takes a critical view on u.s. military and defense policy, particularly of the past few decades and looking forward to discussing that in the ukraine context. and finally, mary anna has recently joined us as a non-resident fellow, but she herself is at harvard center for science and international affairs at the kennedy school and working as a senior research associate with a very impressive project called managing the atom. so we'll be talking about some of the issues. now, a couple of days ago this

week, earlier this week, we had secretary blinken right around the corner, actually at the school of advanced and international studies across the hall and he said a number of very interesting things. he said that we are going through what is essentially a hint moment in history today, that post-war period has ended and the new one has not started. and has talked about basically, you know, has saying we don't know-- we know where we want to go, but we don't know how to get there without stumbling into something. so, really laying out some of the dilemmas that we heard on the first panel about russia,

about europe, about defense and the way forward. tim, i want to start with you. our panel is entitled europe's past, between russia, china and america. now, secretary blinken has called this a hint moment, a hint, the moment when warld world order has become unhinged. president biden has called it an inflection point. what does it mean for europe and transatlantic alliance, in particular, does europe need a path between russia, china, and america? >> well, thank you. is this on? can you hear me? there we go. thank you for the question and thank you for putting me first. this is an interesting question about what kind of path europe needs to take and also, this idea of being an unhinged moment and also, an inflection

point and we've heard these terms over and over again. it seems to me, having worked in this field for 30-some odd years, we're always at inflection point. it seems like every five years n.a.t.o. is in crisis or we're at a crossroads or something. yes, we're definitely in a place of change, but we've been in places of change before, too. and i think that what has helped us deal with change and unknown, a lot of the structures that we built after world war ii are still in place. not that they don't need to be tweaked and changed and we continually do that at n.a.t.o., it's always reforming itself, but this is something we can hold onto at world war ii during times of crisis, having dealt with in war. we have the structures that give us an idea how we can navigate. that's for europe, i think, one of the great tools that it has

since the end of world war ii is the european union and the structure that it has and the ability it's shown certainly since covid to work together as a union of nations to try to help their membership through tough times. we have these structures to help us out. and i think one of the things that we're going to have to really focus on is something timothy said and that is, we've got this war going on in ukraine that's going to have a tremendous impact on what this pathway is going to look like, and we've got to stay focused on that for the united states, i think, particularly, we've got to deal with wobbliness. ...

test of the post-cold war order. it's skip to try to because the one who to respond as a european. stephen, europe's pass which means great powers whether or not we go on to cold war systems and institutions come what we most the call as a rules-based order. if there's a victory for ukraine at the end of all this,. >> first of all, well done to everybody who has come out in the post-pandemic september friday morning. it's great to see people filled the room in this setting. i think that it's good to get beyond the massive abstraction of the rules-based order within

a liberal area in which nobody including me the seems quitee to define. i think right now there's a choice to be made with respect to the way the transatlantic alliance understands itself and where it's going for the next several decades. and essentially the choices is like this. the united states could continue to take the lead in a much more competitive global environment in counterbalancing china in the indo-pacific as well as russia, a more aggressive and unpredictable russia in europe. europe's side of the bargain will be to probably have to come over to washington's side more in terms of the threat perception of china, derisking economically from china.

and it would probably remain dependent on the united states for its own security. and right now i think that is the prevailing approach from the biden administration in washington and transatlantic lake. i think that that is not going to put the alliance on good footing to secure its goals. in five, ten, 20 years because i think it is past time for your not to be dependent on either the capabilities or the willpower of united states to come to europe's rescue in a moment crisis. the fact were sitting here and talking about contemplating donald trump returning to the white house in a little bit more than a year should be very telling in that regard, but i think it would also be a mistake to get fixated on the figure of trump himself. there are some deeper reasons

why i think the united states is ill-equipped to manage the russia problem in addition to the china problem, in addition to all the headwinds that it faces in its own society going forward. one of the reasons why i think secretary blinken is right to call this a lease of potential inflection point or the end of an era is that the united states recommitted to european security after the cold war, really because of the lack of threat, because things seem so good it seems like the united states could remain the leading territory of european security and even expand its commitments under come with an expanding nato precisely because the costs seen below. read the entire congressional debate on the expansion in 2004, the seven countries including the baltic countries. nobody was taking seriously the question will the united states

actually have to come to the defense of nato territory and displaces that many of which bordered russia? so we faced a very different environment at a think it would be a mistake to look at decades of fairly consistent use commitment to european security and assume that is the most you know low-risk way for the transatlantic community to achieve its goals because the underlying conditions that elicited the use commitment have changed so profoundly. so i would favor more of a division of labor approach in which europe i think nobody moment the now uses the opportunity now to take over the lion's share of the defense burden gradually over time, but starting now, in the patrica united states up to handle both security and asia and pressing

domestic needs. >> so tara, i want to talk to you know about as a european listening to this, as a european listening to this -- [inaudible] still not on. maybe the batteries are out? i i can bargain mic for a quick question. so as a european listening to this debate between two u.s. thought leaders, what do you hear and what is the lesson for europe as it charts out a course between united states, china and russia? that clearly is i think the overlapping, one overlapping aspect of what both jim and stephen said. what is the sound in europe?

>> thanks a much bit it's great to be. i'm really struck by both jim and stevens interventions and is listening to stephen just now thinking that it think i agree with him, europe needs to do more that for the past 30 years it's not more, the idea for europe was the fuse was going to get it secure and was going to do so through nato in particula. so now if you look at a situation where the nato commitment might not be so strong and the u.s. might refocus come we have a europe that is not invested enough in its defense. of the ganesan be an either/or. i don't think it a state or europe. i think this debate odyssey s 30 years old, the situation europe is announced totally different but we need to have the discussion. if nato is not going to be the main guarantor of european security we find her cells extremely vulnerable. i mean in military terms. in economic terms i think we understood our vulnerability clearly. the post, how we faced covid and the realization that we were so

depended on chinese and indian markets in particular for key pharmaceutical, i think was really a seachange moment and i honestly don't think the eu could've acted the way it acted since the beginning of russia's invasion of ukraine. it had not come to the covid pandemic. the fact the covid pandemic led to debt neutralization to really overcoming a a number of tabos and european policymaking was a true moment that says she wants to lead the geopolitical commission per we heard countries like france and germany talk about european sovereignty but these are more about the vision out how europe is to act and will and his act as an economic powerhouse. talking about european defense, european capabilities in terms of defense, is still something that is that so easy to do, it's not so easy to do because i think washington is very contradictory. we do here more and more voices coming from both sides of the outside europe needs to do more.

but at the same time issued also stay in data i saw how is it supposed to do more if it's come if we can't think of european security beyond nato and the u.s. is not going to commit to stay longer. i think we will define ourselves any very contradictory situation. i'm talking about european security orders here, not even talking about how russia features and all this i doubt russians were in ukraine features in the european security order and out china features and european decision-making. china is still a major trading partner for the eu. it will remain so. there are a number of countries and the european union could do no want to see a change right now. we are talking about deregulating and preparing for it. but de-risking is a tactic, not a strategy. d risking is that a long-term plan. it is a preparation. what is the use of long-term plan inking with russia, china a few squirts on the putting the three on par. i think with very different

relationships with these three countries. but the way europe and the u.n. in particular can position itself as a geopolitical actor as having an admission on the world stage is something that's going to take time. this is a new vision for the eu. as almost at the fed to european project. the european political project was a decent project for the very idea that we did need geopolitics anymore, that we were going to overcome geopolitics. we are facing a moment now what we're realizing this is a possible and we need to become a geopolitical actor and the ability to reconcile between a peace project and being actual political actor at the same time. >> thank you, thank you. have given us a sense of the european debate as well. let's put it out there. there isn't a consensus on some of these issues inside europe are alongside transatlantic partners and when it comes to the topic of asia, pivot to

asian or meeting the challenge from china. i think we have heard timothy garton ash represent one particular perspective early in the early panel. essentially european saint if you want to visit to asia, help us win in ukraine. stephen here has put at the other way around. do more in ukraine so we can pivot to asia. obviously both of these views, opinions are out here in this town. now but i want to bring this to europe, european security and nato issues. mari donna, there's a war raging in ukraine. you are following the debate in ukraine as well as looking into european security. aspect of it. how do you formulate what this war means for us for the future of european security?

is ukrainian victory essential for future european security architecture? if so, how would you define that architecture? >> thank you so much, asli. let me just take a moment before i attempt to, i mean i got, i get all figured out that i could tell you right off, but before answer the question, some of you might know i am ukrainian. my family is still in ukraine here many of the people that are close to me are still in ukraine, and i just want, i can't speak on behalf of the entire country out of want to take this moment to thank all of you who, through your efforts, through your thoughts, through your contributions, through your spare dollars, have been supporting ukraine in this hour of need. it is not an overstatement that my country stands today because in large part because of the support and solidarity it has

received from this country as well as kind of the western civilized world, as will like to call it. based on the discussion that we been having today, i would like to rewind back a little bit to understand the nature of the whole european project, and the whole european, you know, business of integration. timothy garton ash is here and he introduced us to this topic a little bit on the first panel, but really this was the answer to the devastation to a war-torn continent that seemed to not be able to kind of put its business in order for the first half of the 20th century, becoming the locus of two world wars, right?

and what we learned in the interwar period is that having a lot of small quote-unquote sovereign nations that have either week, unprotected statehood, you know, with all the possible disputes about borders and languages and matching borders with languages and with its ethnicities, with rising powers in the mix on one continent is a recipe for disaster. and that's what ultimately resulted in the bloodiest, most destructive military conflict the history has ever known. so much of the thinking in the first post war years was how do we prevent that from happening in the future? many of the debates what wt containing germany, right? a lot of these projects, including the u.s. sort of underwriting the security of the

continent was to prevent the resurgence of germany. that might seem absurd to us today but that was very real thinking at the time. basically this was a new experiment. it was experiment in integrating these very real different countries that have a lot of historical animosities between each other, for centuries before. and the prosperity and the success of the european project, the matter what we think about how they bureaucracies in brussels and all that, i'm sure we all have our or stories, ultimately it was an incredibly successful project in europe after a devastating war. and the u.s. rolled in that, not just financial to marshall's plan that through being canada's outside power, right, to whom various actors could defer instead of kind of battling it

out between themselves, was a very stabilizing factor. ultimately, there was much political purchase, much political weight to the need allies, as much as a defense couple of it. and that is why the alliance did not disintegrate after 1809, after the end of the cold war. it hung together perhaps without much purpose, what else, but it still persevered. they kept on and it expanded. in very stark contrast to what it happened in east in the warsaw pact. the moment the course the power of the patron was removed, the thing fizzled away, right? so there is an inherent value, right? there's something that keeps this european project together, and the use security guarantee is very crucial to it, and to bring it to ukraine in just a

couple of sentences, would post soviet settlement left was basically a huge ukraine sized security vacuum in the middle of europe. again, over ukraine, over moldova, over georgia, over the other sort of soviet periphery as it were, the former periphery over former empire. that basically re-created that into a worse situation of small countries with sort of developing week sovereignty, right, still going in the throes of posts on the transition a lot of its own problems, institution building, trying to provide for their security with a resurgent and rambunctious former imperial power. as no surprise that at alle next big war in europe should break out in exactly that

security vacuum. so, you know, with ukraine eyeing nato it's not just a wish list that ukrainian leaders have. let's remember that there was no appetite for nato in ukraine the first at least ten years of ukrainian statehood, , and it ws only a function of rambunctious russia coming back on stage the prompted ukrainian leaders to consider that as the only other alternative to its security. >> so ukraine and dado, let's go, let's stay on this question for a little bit, jim. is it the original sin, or solution to our problem, possibly ending the war? by way of original sin, i am referring to 2008, bucharest,

the much talks about nato decision to keep ukraine and georgia in the waiting room, signaling that they will be, they might be perhaps one day members, but not right now. there are two arguments out there. one, that that was a mistake that provoked russia, , and the second argument obviously is that, that tempted russia but didn't deliver enough guarantees and, therefore, was a half measure that backfired. wonder if you could give me your sense of the nato enlargement debate and if there were some of these issues inside and outside of government, but also looking forward, is nato part of the solution here when it comes to ukraine and european security? >> well, thank you. that question, we could see here for a couple of hours. i would love to talk about this. i was involved with nato enlargement from the first day.

the young man in the pentagon working in your office there in the charge of partnership for peace and all of getting nato candidates ready to get into the alliance. work and that in one way or another ever since. original sin, that's an interesting way to put it. i think when you look back on 2008, it was a mistake that was made and shake by the politics and the personalities who were there in bucharest in 2008, doing it themselves at the negotiating table while nato was in the process of trying to have a summit meeting. and it was a mistake that others said at the time that this was going, this is not the way to approach ukraine membership but by having them turned away and bucharest without something

there, a term something stronger than what come is putting them in a very -- [inaudible] >> absolute, without the map, with the other thinks as well i think was not, the understanding around the table, certain the u.s. delegation there was not deep enough to understand the ramifications of what they were doing. there were other pressures and politics going on around the table that had them going in a direction that was a very half stead as you said at a think we've had to pay for that with the invasion of georgia and now ukraine. we see what's happened but i do believe in 2008 it was a failure of statecraft by the united states and some of the allies that let a bad draft, communiqée and led to where we are. in terms of today and looking to the future will be don't want to my mind is another -- that happened a couple months ago indie communicate and approach it was almost in some ways worse in 2008. i think we now are looking at a

future that's got to include nato and timothy laid this,, fiona played this out very well in the panel before. i don't have to repeat them but it is part of the solution. it's a matter of now how do we do it? and i will say at the washington summit the pressure on the administration not to have -- but to bring in ukraine at his crowning summit, anniversary summit, election summer, summit, a lot of political pressure there. the idea of ukraine's future in nato will be acute this summer. it will be what everyone will be looking for and as far as i'm concerned we've got to do it then. we cannot afford to have another kicking down the road or another misfire like 2008. so that is part of the solution. eu membership has got to be part of that. it cannot lag behind just the way we did in the '90s and the 2000. >> you were saying regardless of

what's happening on the battlefield? >> i say that absolutely. and it was a time not so far a go when i would say well, you know, we will have disabled or on the battlefield. but i think we passed that point maker also a bit more optimistic on where things are going on the battlefield and a big we will be in place where we can do that. but i don't think we can wait. we've got to do it, do it this summer. >> steve, going to get you in a minute because i know you have used on this issues that are divergent from jim's, but tara, the french position on nato and ukraine has been interesting. it's really involved almost 180 degrees different from being very opposed to now being a champion of ukraine membership issue. we seen that at vilnius with president macron. is this a real shift? is his public relations exercise? is this reflect the divisions

inside europe? tell us. >> it's a real shift. i would say to me actually the more important issue is the one on eu enlargements, which -- to me that is more of a strategic shift from the french side. the french have been known to block you in enlargement for lard longtime practice debates in europe about whether you deepened the union, whether you enlarge it. a number of people were saying you can do it both simultaneously. there was a inside europe of people thinking we need to enlarge because the strength of the you is its openness, it's expected to absorb and french were very much more of the idea that we needed to go to an ever closer union, something to bridge -- and was very much part of the brexit debate when the brits decided to leave. so the french were pushing for that.

the idea that france has endorsed of course ukraine come into the you but also moldova, we don't speak of so much here but it was actually an integral part of the strategy debate because russian troops are in moldova right now. i think that's important to say. the fact that the french have moved on this is really interesting to me. i think, for opportunistic. he sees as mohican champion his ideas for european sovereignty even more. the fact that we're going to go with this greater european union with ukraine and moldova but also the western balkans would be integrated. szilagyi of the union of currently five member states with complicated neighbors, but also complexities in terms of how you get all this country into the single market, how you make sure there is a level plain feel, how do you make sure the

eu is competitive because again the eu is an economic powerhouse and this is its strength today. i think to me that is a more interesting shift. in a way macron -- early this year when he atone for french mistakes in terms of french attitudes come eastern, central and eastern european member states which i found actually quite interesting. to me honestly that is on the french side the much greater shift that on the nato enlargement side where the french are very much in favor of ukraine come in but the keeping also a fungus the use of blogging, nothing is going to happen, that's the reality of nato negotiations and as long as the u.s. is not endorsing it publicly, then noa is very easy for paris to say it once it ukraine and because it knows they will not move. >> sa position. i i want you to sum up european sovereignty, which is a big buzzword in europe, are rard in this town. it's a big concept for geo-

political europe. in one sense, what is it? >> it's about building critical infrastructure, protecting europe all the while remaining open, protecting the rules-based international order at the transatlantic alliance plays a a huge role in european sovereignty. there's also the sense you need to grow stronger to the protecting critical matures, protecting its economic trends but it also wants partners. this is not an inward looking you. spotted eu building partnership come transatlantic very much aligns very much sensitive but also building partnerships with the middle east, asia and thinking of this new corridor which was announced at the g20 beaty, which is going to play also a central role in terms of the eu presenting itself as an infrastructure provider, and partnering in a very different way with asia and middle eastern countries, not looking just at

europe providing infrastructure and know-how but actually building to partnerships. >> stephen, when he was the u.s. ambassador to moscow, bill burns, is said to have called nato membership, ukraine's membership to nato the reddest of all bread lines for russia. which is something -- red lights desperate which is something in your recent "new york times" article, you have a publicly different issue from jim. you think enlargement was a mistake, and will be a mistake for ukraine. now, but now we are in this war. everyone is part of this war. the term proxy war has been thrown about in the first session. it's almost unavoidable to

mention nato in this context. have your views changed? and can nato afford to lose in this instance? >> it's very important that ukraine continue to exist as an independent country, that of course we hope that the war will end, on what terms and when we may a huge question. but we face a really difficult question about what is the best way for ukraine to be secure,, independent, prosperous, hopefully democratic and non-corrupt in the future? this is where where a litf recent history i think is illuminating, some going to drift a little bit back and i will come to the present question. it strikes me that a lot of the supporters today of ukraine joining nato are being offered an invitation to join in the near term, sound a lot like the

critics of nato enlargement when the post cold war process of enlargement began in the late 1990s. the critics among whom included george cannon, argued that although there wouldn't be in the near term catastrophe with russia, that launching enlargement as an open-ended process, not a one-time thing, but okay we will do it, maybe that's the end, but as especially continuous process in which new countries moving closer to russia's borders would be constantly considered and the door left open. this is something that would create a new dividing line in post-cold war europe, still possible that a dividing line might not exist, or still seem possible.

and the united states and other members of nato but the united states in particular would therefore again new security commitments that would be harder and harder to defend, more and more peripheral from the core u.s. interest and entering a basically peaceful and stable europe, particularly western, northern and central europe. and be more prone to antagonize russia and turned russia hostile. and i would add to that argument that who would be left especially vulnerable? well, it would be those states caught in the middle of an expanding nato military alliance and a potentially more aggrieved russia, not actually given protection by nato. so to date i don't think that the process of nato enlargement has been something that is benefited ukraine, even as i understand perfectly well that makes its sense for ukrainet to get into nato.

so he mentioned 2008. you know, i think we're all dissatisfied with 2008 for good reason. but in what direction i we dissatisfied? was the problem that ukraine wasn't given membership, or was the problem that the whole question was very publicly broached, and empty promises made, this was provocative to russia without providing security to ukraine? and we should've not gone down that road to begin with. so i'm in that latter camp and, unfortunately, look, there's an unfortunate dichotomy right now in the public debate between the causes of the war something interval to russia, russian everyone is in aggression? or was nato enlargement a factor? they were both factors. they are more mutually reinforcing factors than they are competing factors. it's in part precisely because russia sought a sphere of

influence and post-soviet territory, particularly areas with russian speakers, that nato enlargement to those areas was so galling to so many russians, as bill burns wrote in 2008 pics of these are both in play,, therefore, i would be very concerned about extending nato membership to ukraine, particularly because for nine years now that the war between russia and ukraine has occurred, every nato member has chosen not to directly fight for ukraine, making a pledge to do so would potentially lack credibility. i think it would force us in response to station large numbers of troops, perhaps nuclear weapons, and ukraine. everything about what was done in west germany, and that was west german in the cold war to

make deterrent try to seem credible in that case. so we have a real problem in this case. i think it eu pact for ukraine though is a very promising, and as fiona hill said earlier, we should not give vladimir putin what he wants, which is an opportunity to make what happens in ukraine a showdown between the united states and russia. >> mariana, go to get you for a second but quickly to jim, quick answer. steve was saying membership needs i'm nato ukraine, and nato-russia war essentially, having to defend ukraine, possible nuclear weapons, possible date of troops. how do you prevent an escalation if ukraine was to give, was given membership pass, even membership at the next nato summit? i want your answer to be --

there's a new clear, nuclear question that will go to mariana afterwards. >> well, you point out all the recent and i think a very good job of pointing the other side of this question. and it's not something that is black and white in terms of how do you do this. nato has now to do and enlargement move with this kind of complexity ever. and getting consensus within the alliance by itself will be tough. but i think, i think you have to approach it anymore savvy way that we did in bucharest in 2008. i think we have to have, approach it in a way that's not going to put ukraine in an even worse place, which is what happened in 2008. i think the approach needs to be one that provides deterrence for ukraine, and it's got to be shaped in a way that might be different than has been shaped in the past in terms of an extension of membership to the

past newer allies. in washington, i think we need to take a first step, and it's really a first step, which is to invite them in, to invite them to membership. in other words, you don't bring them and immediately. washington your now a member, wave a magic wand and there you go. >> start a process. >> you've got to start the process but it's got to be started in the real way. they can't be an empty promise. with it too much of that. this is got to be real. i can't be another committee. it can't be another ukraine committee at nato. it's got to be something that means that membership is coming. and it's got to be done in a way that shows strength in nato and unity in data that we've agreed to do this. the problem of bucharest was the wasn't the consensus there. there was confusion there and the administration came in and pushed an approach and it didn't work out as we know.

there were statecraft issues there. washington particularly done with more savvy and think it's got to be done with strength of nato unity. i do think we have another choice. but we can do it in a way that helps us deal with the problems that you laid out, that up and play better as well by my colleagues. >> margiotta, two questions, i want to throw them simultaneously. the first is a short one. is a still a real threat of nuclear escalation? we know that biden administration has been cautious about escalation on the ukraine front. president biden talked about world war iii, what weapons to provide, what range, et cetera. and last year this time there's also a real threat of nuclear escalation, people talked about, phone calls and diplomacy. do you still see a threat for nuclear escalation on the side of russia?

this one can be sure. the real question i want to ask you is, how does this end? >> both easy question. >> and that when a short, too. >> before i very quickly answer your two questions, i would like to weigh in on the previous debate just very briefly. look, there is not the many options out there for ukraine security. there's three things you could do. one is ukraine to become of belarus, part of russia come part of its sphere of influence come whatever and follow that route and that's the scenario russia has been pursuing and would very much like to do that. and to be honest if ukraine publics were on board with that i think the west would be just like yeah, whatever, you know. it's their choice. the problem is ukrainian, the public stage of two revolutions in order not to do it, two public massive protests.

2004 and 2014, they are just not acquiescing to this scenario, no matter what people in washington want. ukraine has an agency in all of this. two is to become part of integrated european security architecture, and in that there's nato. there's really nothing else. with all due respect, eu security structures are basically nonexistent. with all intents and purposes. so how this happens is a big set of questions. certainly i agree with those who said that 2008 and bucharest was a bane of half measures. was opposite of what was it teddy roosevelt advises to speak softly and carry a big stick? well, that was the opposite of that. and the third solution for ukraine's security is to become the built-up militarized

garrison state, maybe follow an israeli model where there is a strong allies, bilateral alliance say with the united states, you know, but ridges become this kind of very mobilized, on the territory of ukraine. does europe want that? you know, we don't know. and even with the best efforts on ukrainian part can you still stand up to russia that is like three times the size with all the resources? could ukraine have done better to provide for it security over the 30 years? absolutely. absolutely. but still with the best efforts, you know, those capacities within been limited. with all that, is there a threat of nuclear escalation? absolutely. when there is a hot conventional conflict on the ground, you know, there's definitely a heightened risk. president putin has used nuclear threats abundantly for political

effect. they seem to have worked because it seemed to have worked he continues to use them. they work in the sense of inducing caution on the part of the west, non-deterrent at all, altogether western support. but very cautious approach in terms of providing assistance, in terms of limiting in juice and so forth. all of it very justified but, unfortunately, costing a lot of ukrainian lies in the meantime, and, and actually hampering the prospect for successful ukrainian counteroffensive. and that leads me to the question about all of this in spirit the short answer is, we don't know. nobody knows, right? a war is a war. right now it would seem like a slog on the southern front. tomorrow we could be reading the

news that the second line of defense has broken ukrainian troops have poured in, reserve troops, you know, we don't know that. it will end some day, and when it ends the question of long-term security for ukraine and for europe at large will have to be solved in such a way that none of this can happen again. >> so steve, less than one minute and then either quick question for tara. you talk about israeli model. we thought a lot of questions from the audience. how does it end? what steps need to be taken? you know, you envision peacekeepers? security guarantees? their specific questions to the peace and foreign affairs school for negotiations. basically how does it end? >> all right. give me one minute. >> one minute, steve.

>> so i would favor a combination of the israel model, quote-unquote very flawed analogy, but the israel model, well armed, well-trained ukraine with support from its international partners including united states for arms and training, significant support and integration into europe. but i don't favor nato membership. i don't think there's any kind of savvy way to get the alliance on board because there are deep objections. we saw that come out in vilnius, in washington and in berlin to that course of action. but i'm really concerned by the idea that nato membership is an alternative to the israel model, to a well armed, well supported ukraine. as if this piece of paper article v is going to provide security. we need to learn something back to the league of nations, right?

that may have worked in the past three decades quote-unquote because we don't actually know that but for nato security guarantees, russia would've invaded other countries, possibly, but we don't know. but in the case of ukraine, ukraine is going to have to be well armed, well supported, and physically able to deter russia to its capabilities. this nato option of where there's a kind of fantasy being created that nato is a silver bullet, and then because of those words this will never happen again. >> well, i have to apologize publicly to tara because we're running out of time. does china and possible next trump administration there were europeans we would like to talk about, but alas a round of applause pleas for our

panelists. [applause] >> and thank you all. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> hello, everyone. we are actually not, feel free to get yourself coffee but we're not doing a break. sorry about that. we are on a tight schedule, and if everybody sort of munching on over there in front of the door could pass, move their conversations elsewhere, that would be really great. i and discussed about. my name is constanze stelzenmuller. i run the center of the u.s. and europe, and we, i have assumed or a terrific panel, but before introduce them i want to give two two shadows. one is to stephen were tire, stephen jones on the previous

panel which is terrific in middle of his paternity leave full-time very grateful so thank you together what is to a colleague jim was also and have joined us and to instead had to have some very benign medical procedure. jim, if you're watching, get well and sorry you couldn't be with us. with that, we have until 11:30 to discuss a not exactly minor issue in this entire scenario that we're facing until the end of what you're looking at berkeley think wet our? >> fascination, not poor with our topics for i know, i know, i know. going to have to be shelby say that with uterine and especially you, knowing you, this panel sort of run itself but it will attempt to post a minimum of discipline and you can all watch me feel as i do that. anyway, what i will do is come let me first introduced our

panelists, doctor alina polyakova a former colleague of ours at brookings who unfortunately left us to write another institution, and who knows why? she's a president and ceo of the center for european policy analysis for european policy analysis, sorry. which under her leadership shall we just say has been doing absolutely terrific work. so congratulations to you on that. matthew continetti is a journalist and senior fellow who i haven't read this ofcom social, cultural constitutional studies out of the american enterprise institute. we really grateful to have you. we were just joking that we hear on the road with brookings here, then carnegie and then aei and then across the road, moving to another part of town, who knows why? over sort of our numbers in each others houses enough, right? and to think we need to do more of that so this is an attempt to keep that, to keep that going.

i also just read in your by you been sanctioned by russia. >> i am. >> curious, just carries, alina, you must be sanctioned as well? have managed to get -- no? >> i was on the list of i think 500 names it was announced earlier this year. very proud to be on that list. also like the fact that my name appeared ahead of barack obama's. [laughing] >> well, i thought he might have a triple whammy. i don't understand why do not sanctioned but i'm sure -- >> after today's panel it's inevitable. they will issue an update. [laughing] all right. finally i have next immediately irrepressible norman eisen, attorney, since within talking books i just ripped this out of hand of his assistant, his book which a tremendous reviews and effect i been meaning to get an apple a4, i promise, i told her.

>> you may have it. >> thank you. thank you anyway. i hate just ripping books. anyway, norm is not just a former u.s. ambassador to prague, he is also highly active in the world of combating corruption and disinformation as the course also alina with her work. we have completely terrific panel. one less thing. norms also the inspiration for a character in a movie. he's inspiration for a character -- that doesn't happen to a lot of people and again my name is constanze stelzenmuller. i run the center. the topic what to talk about today is a nexus between optics and policy. because as we all know we are running into a series of now upkeep elections in europe and in america which we already are seeing constraining the foreign policy, foreign and security policy space.

and these are elections in poland coming up on the 15th of october, then the european elections next spring, , finally the u.s. elections in november of next year. and not completely irrelevantly a couple of german state elections in october as well, and then in three eastern states with the alternative for germany is trending extremely high, distressingly high, next fall just before the u.s. election. but we want to focus i think first on these elections but we also want to get some thought to the problems of governance, of governance at a time of common disruptions, of seemingly intractable unsolvable problems, problems that are not amenable to treaties. and see what we, what the situation which puts a huge threat on policymakers, on institutions, and on markets.

whether we can find any positive recommendations to make. as to how to make governance more -- in the time of political upheaval. and as we of course the situation i just described and powers the extremist and populous. let me start first with the election because that is the proximate source of stress and shock right now as we're seeing and want to start with you, alina. i think we're probably all in agreement on this panel, even if we think that the hard left in our political spaces does silly stuff. they are not about to change the constitutional order, , right? i think the challenge i'm going to suggest that the challenge of the day is that the hard right in our political spaces across the transatlantic world is hell-bent on rewriting our constitutional order, right?

that is what it will do. it's not just about cultural war, right? it not just about economic inequality. it is about rewriting the rulebooks of our orders. alina come since you've just been in europe and you're just been in poland to want to brats perhaps give us a little bit of an impression of what come what is your take on what's going on in europe and perhaps with an emphasis on poland where you're just come back from? thank you for joining us for thank you so much, constanze. i feel so honored to be back at brookings and with my call expedia you can get out but you can never leave. as the eagle said. [laughing] >> hotel brookings. >> unhappy, and happy to be an example of that lack of escape. constanze, very happy to go into this question but please don't hate me from for wanting te short comment in relation to the debate on the last panel, okay? spur i knew you were going to do that.

>> i can't help myself, because there was a discussion on the last panel about membership for ukraine and i think it was maybe stephen who said that nato membership is not a good idea, but eu membership would be. and i just want to point out that the whole idea that somehow nato enlargement has anything to do with russia's aggression against ukraine, i mean, just actually it's wrong frankly. and it was, in fact, eu membership and ukraine's desire to join the eu, not nato, and that even to join but to have a free trade agreement with the european union in 2013 that actually started the revolution of dignity in ukraine and then led to russia's first military invasion of ukraine in 2014 and the annexation of crimea and the invasion of the donbas. this has nothing to do with nato. and the facts support from nato

was so low that the likelihood of ukraine joining was basically zero and tell russia annexed crimea. i just want to put that out there because i think when we're having this there is heated debate now because we are talking acumen lies that are lost on a daily basis now, we have to be careful about how we revise history to make convenient arguments. >> can i do a two finger agreement with that? we are, but it's okay. i just published an analysis, i just published an analysis of brookings gmf analysis of the role that supports your insight, of the role of corruption in the latest aggression, and the response to the crackdown of the oligarchs, which if you look at the regional sources, was a clear economic motivation that

has nothing whatsoever to do with nato. so it's another -- i think it's overstated to say nate is membership is completely unrelated. however, -- nato's -- about the connection -- >> it does have to be short. >> that's it. it was one long run it's an. >> i know, still it was long. alina. >> thank you for allowing us that interjection, constanze. these are important things because there's not just theoretical geopolitical debates were having. there's people involved, people's agency involved. this isn't a chessboard. i think we often like to have geopolitical discussions that this is a global chessboard, that those of us are the decision-makers not me have responsibility whatsoever for making the big decisions but those sitting in our capitals are just moving chess pieces around. that's not what this is. this is about people and about their lives and about their lives and another livelihoods. and is about our final u.s. national security interest at

the end of the day. okay, all that being said, very good friend of this panel. i think you are 100% right. there is i would say and you aspect to the politics of the extreme right. i have been studying this topic for many years, for better or for worse, and we have had a pattern in europe for decades now where we seen the emergence of far right nationalist, populous, what if you want to call them, political parties pretty since the 1970s. i think it it feels to us that this is all fresh and new happening at the same time, but this is been a slow burning process that is now really coming to light and starting to affect i think the governance of our democracies in profound ways. but you're right that this anti-institutionalism, a profound desire to dismantle democratic institutions from within is a new hue, that we

haven't seen before in such a concrete manner, certainly there was authoritarianism as part of far right political parties agendas, but it looked quite different here i think now the danger is that we are seeing in places like hungry for many years now speediest original model. >> right. poland is different. want to make that clear, poland is not hungry but many of these countries were seeing democratic rules being revised for the purpose of, and doing that i'm doing democracy. this is a great irony. and i think that is something for us to all be concerned about, the pattern we've seen in the u.s. that plays out differently because we have a two-party system here. but it's one and the same. it's similar arguments, the tools, norman i wrote a report about the summer years ago about how authoritarian illiberal states, two reports, learn from

each other. and the last report we did together, it's a brookings report call for democracy playbook actually lays out strategy front to push back against these kinds of tools that far right and authoritarian leaders use. so to your point, constanze, right, we are in a new era i think in many ways but it's been something we just haven't paid attention to for a long time. >> okay. that is a point at a much take but it do want to sort of push back on one question. i have been sort of trawling through sort of the analyses of the hard right and it seems to me that there are sort of two versions of this story that i think are worth actually trying to pass. and what is yes, there is a terrifying prize of the hard right across the transatlantic space for u.s. and europe, and traditional center-right parties are caving when faced with this onslaught. and there's certainly evidence for that including in my

country, including last night some of you perhaps you read this kind of stuff as obsessive as i do will know that the cd, the liberals and the afd all in the opposition voted together on a property tribe, transfer tax law against the governing red red green coalition government. that is an astonishing thing at a time when we have, when we had elections coming up in two states which ought to be a shoo-in for the conservatives. arguably, the cdu is now in a very defensive position. but there is another version of this story, which is that all these, a lot of these populists at least in europe have turned into post populous at the name that comes up most often is george malone in italy and their children to be relatively transit lettuces, that they are pro-european and they are sort of trying to play within the system and within the rules.

which of these is true? .. i think what we have seen across europe is parties take over but they do is basically push spectrum to the right and it accounts for the collapse in

one factor is faith try to pander to the far right and as a result they voters. as a result they legitimized the far right agenda rather than being able to succeed and do better than the far right and it is so profound. incredibly important election coming up in some call it opposition and it's the most significant but one of the doing? they are collapsing into a immigration rhetoric the idea for payments for children and

support, these are the agenda of the right and they are losing support and i think this is the profound effect we've had in greek shift to the right and profound inability to cover. >> will also come to the real issue and that is right. forgive me but while many have been pretending at the very least, they are finding the need to be pragmatic and it has radicalized but it is trending

in eastern germany and the state elections aren't until next year. they are trending into this terrifying. any democratic government created against the door but have to be at least a three way is not a four-way complicating government creating logistic problems for the enormous opposition. the american right which i recommend everybody read, describe to us and especially

given intention the real problem is the desire to change, the nature of the ordinance. >> thank you for having me, a pleasure to be here. i now know the longest journey in the world is a i. [laughter] want to take a step back so because your opening conversation is interesting, it seems when we go back and look at immersions around the world, is the nationalist international so various populist parties seem

to share a certain agenda, all responding to migration test international institutions going whether it's you or nato they all seem to have this view of vladimir putin but it seems they have to disaggregate so it's not pas, none of them are trump, its own unique set and it is different, maybe she will be slightly different depending on that so it's important to see how the movements are diverging

from each other in subtle ways. on rulemaking it is striking to me that american national populist movement sees themselves as defending the constitution of the united states. even when they attempt to overturn the 2020 election trump enlisted john eastman maybe there is a loophole in the constitution that allows this boat. even their they saw themselves upholding this vision of what the constitution is and it seems many of the structural changes are coming from the american left whether it is abolishing the electoral college but an

important distinction to keep in mind. what is the state of play? easy to understand that today national populist candidates for national populist really hold about 84% of the republican electorate. donald trump is up about 60% and number two is ron desantis and maloney like figure perhaps is the best we hope at 13% and vivek ramaswamy at 9%. this is the republican party is a fundamentally different creature than when i arrived in washington d.c. two decades ago, a generation ago and it's not unusual for parties in america

to go through these changes and all republican party holes all through a sequence of developments beginning in the 1920s and robert taft was different, coldwater's was different than ronald reagan and certainly no donald trump things change in the republican party whether we like it or not, and i mostly dislike it will cannot be denied. >> let me come back to two things. one, while i agree with you the are different, they have caused the parties attacking them.

a niece of mine is think on a harder position and so on. it would hurt her edge so the last chapter emphasizes the constitution so much as an ordering framework that it's all we need to refer to to bring america on course. i have immense respect for this

document but i would say where i want to push back we are seeing of this juncture people who are intentionally trying to rewrite the frame of the intent and ways that are unitarian and populist will against foundational principles such as the separation of powers protection of imperialism. i'm thinking this school of thought this book of nationalism which in ... i'll but it was said to be an inspiration the eu

needed to be defended because they violated the rules of sane and healthy nationalist. there are rumors organizing and creating not just its own media, the things we all know, it's one of the other signs of think tanks here in washington but aren't there fears of the more organized hard edged and competent hard great coming, are they known or justified? >> to comment on the most energetic part of the national

populism in the united states, organized with advocates of conservatism in the united states the political era is responsible for organizing the group. they put out a statement last summer which i thought was remarkable, clearly either ignored or violated american constitutionalism and the declaration of independence. i think what is important is we look at the american right today, make a distinction between theoretical intellectual arguments and populist movement as it's expressed. some of the comments concerning religion and society enforcing religion, i do not think it

would be accepted by most republican voters. other things about federalism, it's good until it results in something. many owners would say we like having the freedom so a perfect example was rich man north of richmond, all of the anthony. i love this episode because the working class does the song, the rules of the united states political astonishment ruining this country and the working man and it's taken up by the published right in america and

oliver anthony is the new mascot and they got to talking and he said of the integration, diversity is our strength. the government is not the solution to the problem for people on the hard right-thinking investor policy production so he is more representative of actual americans and the thing about america is we have this libertarianism in great but i think will prevent us from the heart of the endorsing them. >> it is also true the general society something i want to rely on the door to come to you was

staring at me intensely. >> that's my tactic. >> we can play that game, both of us. [laughter] we are going to talk about what you suggested, the link and their connections to the various other actors outside the political space. >> thank you to the center of the united states of europe for inviting me to be here. i was excited to join the panel. my co-author and friend, alina. we traveled together with the rest of our group.

we analyze these inks in the report. the liberal toolkit analyze the solution michael solution democracy, addition i have a new display on both anatomy of the week but also an example of a conscious nature of the effort to build which is pepper carlson's recent interview with victor. with cursory eviction from fastest a result of the

operation of u.s. rule of law which has been is through the populism crisis you wrote about analyze and spoke about his will. he's been ousted from fox news but he does interviews now on x, formerly twitter and it should be x-rated for democracy content because it is a startling of the theoretical structure of the linkage and efforts to build bridges and he got 128 million views. every time somebody clicks on the video, i click on it ten

times myself to write this essay because i couldn't believe what i was hearing, it is a view so it's not saying he has an audience of 128 million but is getting millions of people in this 30% support trump in german fascism, never a poll in which they got lower than the low 30s. that 30% number is much more perilous in the government if you look at support for netanyahu we can't ignore the revolutions of 1848, the new

face of netanyahu, you come to this magic so majority over and over again. the united states because of that structure is perilous but not existential. i think it's an existential threat for german democracy in the this diplomacy of the far right is no coincidence steve bannon and intellectual godfather the far right movement opened the first outpost because nationalism and i proclaim to be

liberal but this has found a very fertile ground because in israel you don't have separation of church and state, you have a marriage of church and state, synagogue and state which is what work on his reaching for and that is very important. so what else does this contain?

i owe alina for my intervention, we have analyzed the entities in this essay angkor wat is one of the most frequent visitors to the united states and its mandatory visit. they attacked the core pillars of the liberal state. there is an assault in the first instance because it can be the softest of the pillars. it's easy using intimidation,

you get the leverage of the criminal system when you take power. you don't even need to prosecute. >> we remember, you don't need to prosecute coaches to investigate so first an attack on the free press criminalizing of the. then you move to attack free and fair election. again, we saw that in the united states. there's ways you can use your power to constrain the electoral space and as you consolidate more power, attacked the judicial system because like the free press, it's another break on autocracy. i will take exception of the idea that there is ambiguity of

rewriting constitutional and some of the things the left will you i will say what john eastman did, it was not rewriting or even changing the constitution, he's accumulated through attacking independence on autocracy, what john eastman did was throw out constitutional order. that's what was shocking.

october 23, it's nowhere in the u.s. constitutional order to say the role can substitute the loser for the winner or send it back to turn over the choice of the people in state legislature. >> this is one an important book, one of the most startling and terrifying aspects of the outright challenge of people like trump and others, they have the power to set but the truth is so many follow them and that

because the fact that a number of others say that is not the truth and they are empowering them. that is something i see in this debate, the free voters, i'm not going down that rabbit hole. i am a terrible moderator. >> will moderate the moderator. [laughter] critical question in every democracy. >> the question between, he's been trying to take his conference, he took it to london

and the brakes were somewhat bemused by what's going on here. are we overreacting saying there's something like the hard right is there? i would like brief interaction between you. >> thanks for that and i want to emphasize your comments about transformation of other parties, one of the biggest things i hear is maybe wishful thinking that trump as a person is the problem and off the political scene,

will go back to the republican party of reagan but is not what he said. look who is coming up on the bench. the republican base has been transformed. i don't think there is a return. i think getting into the minds of other allies so it's a living international entity or are we overestimating the relationships and alignment between these groups? i remember in 2014 the year after i finished work on the

emergence of the far right and what it meant for politics, i'm looking at the links between russia and local parties and nobody wanted to publish because they would say who cares about the topic? little parties and irrelevance in these meetings in the stove matters so they could get published the that was the view it has been the view. you may not know the full breadth but trust you me, this has been in for a very long time and now we see doctor carlson,

this is the tip of the iceberg, we don't know what's below, the deep and profound. >> there to brought linkages, one is politics migration, no question to me the last 15 years migration has been driving the right and the hard right embraced control but also empowers hoplites and right politicians throughout the western world and beyond because electorates are responding migrant includes in the second is what i call politics cultural despair. politics of cultural despair shows every part, every piece in

society is working against you so for republicans and conservatives in the 30s, they get it against us. we do have small businesses, that is the one institutional support. the problem over the next ten years and especially last three years is the final support of business being captured by the left only amplifying cultural despair and when you think the institutions of governor society have the purpose of destroying this way of life to not care about democratic accountability

and refit the system. >> we are clearly where we can go on for three hours. but sadly we are at the end. i'm going to ask all three of you for a final word. i apologize to the audience not taking questions, i'm an idiot. let me say what then is the response of democratic forces, who should be the response of democratic forces? the pool in german developed by a german who led to america, defense of democracy and that would consist of things for bidding are great and another pool, as you were stressing, the

on representativeness establishment democratic forces and they need to change their way, need to become more representative of the rise it is confusion. what is your take on this question? >> i think you have to defend the mode of democracy, one is about the process of democracy in the united states because of constitutional order, is not going to involve manning speech unlike germany like a holocaust denial but what you can to his fight fiercely and there is a big debate on democratic

policymaking here and research was to the contrary, don't impeach trump because it will not work and make it worse but that's not what it teaches us. i would argue the first impeachment that the template, this was tweeted about me last week, a list of resentments that starts with that impeachment, it sets democratic accountability through the criminal justice system. i read a whole book about that and you can agree to disagree but on the other side, we must have substance of democracy, democracy must deliver for the people because it doesn't, you will get into policy problems of

migration, cultural disaffection and the rest unless there is a vibrant, you can't just be against, we have to be for affirmative prosperity of democracy. >> i can only speak in the american context but my view is we must work to strengthen structures of american constitutional. i think they were able to prevent 2020 and i think they support and it will prevent 2024. i will say longer-term america, it is very hard for the republican party reduced to national populist to win a national election so the long-term solution somehow is able to reconnect republican grassroots with the type of

institutional elite used to divide a policy agenda and positive attitude for populist thought atherton negative anti- institutional attitude which we can see so often today. >> i'm going to end on an optimistic note which is not usually my style but we are in a moment of darkness, we have a tremendous opportunity because of russia's brutal war because of the end of the day russia's war was about preventing a country from becoming a democracy in the true sense of the word which is exactly where ukrainians want to go. president biden has said as much and for years we have seen this decline in the belief in democracy among young people certainly here and across europe and some of the best democracies

and institutions but i think now people are not taking the freedom democrat societies allow, certainly not in europe and this is a moment for us capture the imagination particularly of the next generation because we are aging out. in practice a we have a ton of incredible people, i leasee motivation and that is being replicated across europe so i think it is time for us to switch how we learn and say we will impart democracy, the new democracy of europe or whatever and learn how they have been

fighting the fight on the ground and they are not taking it for granted. >> i want to agree with you, this is a dark moment in many ways dangerous but also one returning to principles and understand what matters and i think that's good having skated through much of the miraculous. when we thought progress would be linear and we have been given the gift we all deserve, we now know many of governmental choices will be tragic but we have things worth fighting for. with that, i want to thank the people who made this happen and on any given day made me look like i know what i'm doing which is not just my colleagues but assistant director who helped

organize this event and made it happened, i want to thank the people who help us put this together and put of until the stage and make the audio technology work and i want to thank both of you for sticking with us, it's been great to have here and we will continue these conversations. i would ask you to remain seated but i think there might also still be coffee out there. q. [applause]

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♪♪ five to six minute video one to two questions in the next 20 years and the most important change in america. in the most important change in america. and celebrate every teacher in this competition and the opportunity to share and submit documentaries. january 19, 2024.